

identifying data deleted to
prevent clearly unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy

U.S. Department of Homeland Security
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., Rm. 3000
Washington, DC 20529



U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services

PUBLIC COPY



41

FILE: [REDACTED]
MSC 05-181-10167

Office: NEW YORK

Date: **MAY 23 2008**

IN RE: Applicant: [REDACTED]

APPLICATION: Application for Status as a Temporary Resident pursuant to Section 245A of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

SELF-REPRESENTED

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. The file has been returned to the office that originally decided your case. If your appeal was sustained, or if your case was remanded for further action, you will be contacted. If your appeal was dismissed, you no longer have a case pending before this office, and you are not entitled to file a motion to reopen or reconsider your case.

Robert P. Wiemann, Chief
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The application for Temporary Resident Status pursuant to the terms of the settlement agreements reached in *Catholic Social Services, Inc., et al., v. Ridge, et al.*, CIV. NO. S-86-1343-LKK (E.D. Cal) January 23, 2004, and *Felicity Mary Newman, et al., v. United States Immigration and Citizenship Services, et al.*, CIV. NO. 87-4757-WDK (C.D. Cal) February 17, 2004, (CSS/Newman Settlement Agreements) was denied by the District Director, New York, and that decision is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant submitted a Form I-687, Application for Status as a Temporary Resident Under Section 245A of the Immigration and Nationality Act (Act), and a Form I-687 Supplement, CSS/Newman Class Membership Worksheet. The director determined that the applicant had not established by a preponderance of the evidence that he had continuously resided in the United States in an unlawful status for the duration of the requisite period. The director acknowledged that the applicant submitted affidavits from individuals who claimed to have knowledge of the beneficiary's residence in the United States during the requisite period, but noted that the affidavits were insufficient to establish the beneficiary's continuous residence in the United States. The director denied the application, finding that the applicant had not met his burden of proof and was, therefore, not eligible to adjust to temporary resident status pursuant to the terms of the CSS/Newman Settlement Agreements.

On appeal, the applicant submits new evidence, along with copies of previously submitted evidence. Counsel for the applicant asserts that the applicant has provided sufficient credible, probative evidence to meet his burden of proof.

An applicant for temporary resident status must establish entry into the United States before January 1, 1982, and continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since such date and through the date the application is filed. Section 245A(a)(2) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(2). The applicant must also establish that he or she has been continuously physically present in the United States since November 6, 1986. Section 245A(a)(3) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(3). The regulations clarify that the applicant must be physically present in the United States from November 6, 1986 until the date of filing the application. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(b).

For purposes of establishing residence and physical presence under the CSS/Newman Settlement Agreements, the term "until the date of filing" in 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(b) means until the date the applicant attempted to file a completed Form I-687 application and fee or was caused not to timely file during the original legalization application period of May 5, 1987 to May 4, 1988. CSS Settlement Agreement, paragraph 11 at page 6; Newman Settlement Agreement, paragraph 11 at page 10.

The applicant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she has resided in the United States for the requisite periods, is admissible to the United States under the provisions of section 245A of the Act, and is otherwise eligible for adjustment of status. The inference to be drawn from the documentation provided shall depend on the extent of the documentation, its credibility and amenability to verification. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5).

The "preponderance of the evidence" standard requires that the evidence demonstrate that the applicant's claim is "probably true," where the determination of "truth" is made based on the factual circumstances of each individual case. *Matter of E-M-*, 20 I&N Dec. 77, 79-80 (Comm. 1989). In evaluating the evidence, *Matter of E-M-* also stated that "[t]ruth is to be determined not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality." *Id* at 80. Thus, in adjudicating the application pursuant to the preponderance of the evidence standard, the director must examine each piece of evidence for relevance, probative value, and credibility, both individually and within the context of the totality of the evidence, to determine whether the fact to be proven is probably true.

Even if the director has some doubt as to the truth, if the petitioner submits relevant, probative, and credible evidence that leads the director to believe that the claim is "probably true" or "more likely than not," the applicant or petitioner has satisfied the standard of proof. *See U.S. v. Cardozo-Fonseca*, 480 U.S. 421, 431 (1987) (defining "more likely than not" as a greater than 50 percent probability of something occurring). If the director can articulate a material doubt, it is appropriate for the director to either request additional evidence or, if that doubt leads the director to believe that the claim is probably not true, deny the application or petition.

At issue in this proceeding is whether the applicant has submitted sufficient credible evidence to meet his burden of establishing continuous unlawful residence in the United States during the requisite period. Here, the applicant has failed to meet this burden.

The record shows that the applicant submitted a Form I-687 application and a Form I-687 Supplement, CSS/Newman Class Membership Worksheet, to CIS on March 30, 2005. The applicant signed this form under penalty of perjury, certifying that the information he provided is true and correct. **At part #30** of the Form I-687 application where applicants were asked to list all residences in the United States since first entry, the applicant indicated that he resided [REDACTED] New York, New York from October 1981 until June 1986 and at [REDACTED], New York, New York from June 1986 until March 1993.

The applicant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he has resided in the United States for the requisite period. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5). To meet his burden of proof, an applicant must provide evidence of eligibility apart from his own testimony. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(6). The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3) provides an illustrative list of documentation that an applicant may submit to establish proof of continuous residence in the United States during the requisite period. This list includes: past employment records; utility bills; school records; hospital or medical records; attestations by churches, unions or other organizations; money order receipts; passport entries; birth certificates of children; bank books; letters or correspondence involving the applicant; social security card; selective service card; automobile receipts and registration; deeds, mortgages or contracts; tax receipts; and insurance policies, receipts or letters. The applicant did not submit any contemporaneous evidence of this nature pertaining to the requisite period.

An applicant may also submit any other relevant document pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(vi)(L). In an attempt to establish continuous unlawful residence in this country for the duration of the requisite period, the applicant submitted the following evidence with his initial application:

A notarized letter dated March 21, 2005 from [REDACTED], who stated that he is the applicant's brother-in-law residing at [REDACTED] A, New York, New York. Mr. [REDACTED] did affirm that the applicant lived at [REDACTED] New York, New York from October 1981 until June 1986 and at [REDACTED] York from June 1986 until March 1993. Mr. [REDACTED] did not indicate the date that he met the applicant or that he has any direct, personal knowledge of his continuous residence in this country for the duration of the requisite period. He offered no specific information regarding how frequently and under what circumstances he saw the applicant during the relevant period, nor did he provide any relevant details regarding the applicant's residence in the United States beyond listing the residential addresses of the applicant. Given his claim that he is the applicant's brother-in-law, the lack of detail in his statement is significant, and its probative value is limited.

On February 6, 2006, the director issued a Notice of Intent to Deny (NOID) to the applicant. The director acknowledged the applicant's claim that he entered the United States in October 1981, but noted that he furnished no evidence of such an entry. The director noted that the applicant testified that he gave his passport to immigration, but found that the applicant's testimony was not credible.

The director acknowledged the affidavit submitted by the applicant, but noted that it was not accompanied by proof that the affiants were in the United States during the statutory period. The director advised that credible affidavits are those which include some document identifying the affiant, some proof the affiant was in the United States during the statutory period, and some proof of a relationship between the affiant and the applicant.

The director advised the applicant that he had failed to submit documents that would establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he continuously resided in the United States for the duration of the requisite period, and afforded him 30 days in which to submit additional evidence in support of his application.

In response to the director's NOID, the applicant submitted one additional form affidavit signed by [REDACTED]. Ms. [REDACTED] indicated that she and the applicant have been neighbors since 1986. Like the affidavit submitted from [REDACTED] with the initial application, [REDACTED] does not indicate the date that she met the applicant or that she has any direct, personal knowledge of his continuous residence in this country for the duration of the requisite period. She offered no specific information regarding how frequently and under what circumstances she saw the applicant during the relevant period, nor did she provide any relevant details regarding the applicant's residence in the United States beyond listing the residential addresses of the applicant. Thus, her statements can be given only minimal weight.

The director denied the application on September 24, 2006. The director acknowledged the additional affidavits submitted, but found that given the paucity of evidence in the record, the applicant had failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he had continuously resided in the United States for the duration of the requisite period.

On appeal, the applicant submits the following new evidence:

1. A form affidavit, signed by [REDACTED] and dated October 20, 2006. Mr. [REDACTED] stated that he is a police officer residing at [REDACTED] Bronx, New York. Mr. [REDACTED] indicated that he has known the applicant since 1981. He did not indicate where or how he met the applicant, or how frequently or under what circumstances he saw the applicant during the requisite period, nor did he provide any other details regarding the events and circumstances of the applicant's residence in the United States that would tend to lend probative value to his statement. Moreover, he did not specifically state that he has direct, personal knowledge that the applicant continuously resided in the United States during the requisite period. For these reasons, this affidavit can be given only minimal weight as corroborating evidence.
2. A form affidavit, signed by [REDACTED] and dated October 20, 2006. Mr. [REDACTED] stated that he resides at [REDACTED] Bronx, New York. Like the other affiants, he indicated that he has known the applicant since 1981, but he did not indicate where or how he met the applicant, or how frequently or under what circumstances he saw the applicant during the requisite period, nor did he provide any other details regarding the events and circumstances of the applicant's residence in the United States that would tend to lend probative value to his statement. Further, he indicated that he has gone for period of six months without seeing the applicant. Thus, his statements do not confirm that the applicant has resided continuously in the United States during the requisite period. For these reasons, this affidavit can be given only minimal weight as corroborating evidence.
3. A letter signed by [REDACTED] who indicates that he is the public information officer for Masjid Malcolm Shabazz. In this letter, Mr. [REDACTED] states, "[REDACTED] is a member of the Muslim community and has been here since 1981 . . . he attends Friday Jumah prayer service and other prayer services here at the Masjid Malcolm shabazz." This letter does not conform to the statutory requirements for attestations by churches, unions, or other organizations, which is found at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2 ((d)(3)(v)). That regulation requires such attestations to "show the inclusive dates of membership and state the address where the applicant resided during the membership period." Mr. [REDACTED] does not provide dates of the applicant's membership or any other information that is probative of the issue of his initial entrance to the United States prior to January 1981 or his continuous residence for the duration of the statutory period. Thus, it can be given no probative weight.

While an applicant's failure to provide evidence other than affidavits shall not be the sole basis for finding that he or she failed to meet the continuous residency requirements, an application which is lacking in

contemporaneous documentation cannot be deemed approvable if considerable periods of claimed continuous residence rely entirely on affidavits which are considerably lacking in certain basic and necessary information. As discussed above, the affiants' statements are significantly lacking in detail and do not establish that the affiants actually had personal knowledge of the events and circumstances of the applicant's residence in the United States. Overall, the affidavits provided are so deficient in detail that they can be given no significant probative value. Further, this applicant has provided no contemporaneous evidence of residence in the United States relating to requisite period.

As is stated above, the "preponderance of the evidence" standard requires that the evidence demonstrate that the applicant's claim is "probably true," where the determination of "truth" is made based on the factual circumstances of each individual case. *Matter of E-M-*, 20 I&N Dec. 77, 79-80 (Comm. 1989). The applicant has been given the opportunity to satisfy his burden of proof with a broad range of evidence pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3).

The absence of sufficiently detailed documentation to corroborate the applicant's claim of continuous residence for the entire requisite period seriously detracts from the credibility of this claim. Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5), the inference to be drawn from the documentation provided shall depend on the extent of the documentation, its credibility and amenability to verification. Given the applicant's reliance upon affidavits with minimal probative value, and the paucity of evidence submitted, it is concluded that he has failed to establish continuous residence in an unlawful status in the United States from prior to January 1, 1982 through the date he attempted to file a Form I-687 application as required under both 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5) and *Matter of E- M-*, *supra*. The applicant is, therefore, ineligible for Temporary Resident Status under section 245A of the Act on this basis.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. This decision constitutes a final notice of ineligibility.