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U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Office of Administrative Appeals MS 2090
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U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services

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FILE: [REDACTED]
MSC 06 041 12554

Office: LOS ANGELES

Date: NOV 27 2009

IN RE: Applicant:



APPLICATION: Application for Status as a Temporary Resident pursuant to Section 245A of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

SELF-REPRESENTED

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. If your appeal was dismissed or rejected, all documents have been returned to the National Benefits Center. You no longer have a case pending before this office, and you are not entitled to file a motion to reopen or reconsider your case. If your appeal was sustained or remanded for further action, you will be contacted.

Perry Rhew
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The application for temporary resident status pursuant to the terms of the settlement agreements reached in *Catholic Social Services, Inc., et al., v. Ridge, et al.*, CIV. NO. S-86-1343-LKK (E.D. Cal) January 23, 2004, and *Felicity Mary Newman, et al., v. United States Immigration and Citizenship Services, et al.*, CIV. NO. 87-4757-WDK (C.D. Cal) February 17, 2004 (CSS/Newman Settlement Agreements), was denied by the Director, Los Angeles . The decision is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant submitted a Form I-687, Application for Status as a Temporary Resident under Section 245A of the Immigration and Nationality Act (Act), and a Form I-687 Supplement, CSS/Newman Class Membership Worksheet. The director determined that the applicant had not established by a preponderance of the evidence that he had continuously resided in the United States in an unlawful status for the duration of the requisite period, and that the evidence submitted by him did not establish his eligibility for the immigration benefit sought. The director denied the application, finding that the applicant had not met his burden of proof and was, therefore, not eligible to adjust to temporary resident status pursuant to the terms of the CSS/Newman Settlement Agreements. Specifically, the director noted that the evidence submitted by the applicant in support of his application lacked sufficient detail to establish the applicant's residence in the United States throughout the requisite period.

On appeal, the applicant submits a brief and additional evidence stating that he has established his eligibility for the immigration benefit sought.

An applicant for temporary resident status must establish entry into the United States before January 1, 1982, and continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since such date and through the date the application is filed. Section 245A(a)(2) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(2). The applicant must also establish that he or she has been continuously physically present in the United States since November 6, 1986. Section 245(a)(3) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(3). The regulations clarify that the applicant must have been physically present in the United States from November 6, 1986 until the date of filing the application. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(b)(1).

For purposes of establishing residence and physical presence under the CSS/Newman Settlement Agreements, the term "until the date of filing" in 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(b)(1) means until the date the applicant attempted to file a completed Form I-687 application and fee or was caused not to timely file during the original legalization application period of May 5, 1987 to May 4, 1988. CSS Settlement Agreement paragraph 11 at page 6; Newman Settlement Agreement paragraph 11 at page 10.

The applicant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she has resided in the United States for the requisite period, is admissible to the United States under the provisions of section 245A of the Act, and is otherwise eligible for adjustment of status. The inference to be drawn from the documentation provided shall depend on the extent of the documentation, its credibility and amenability to verification. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5). To meet his or her burden of proof, an applicant must provide evidence of eligibility apart from his or her own testimony, and the sufficiency of all

evidence produced by the applicant will be judged according to its probative value and credibility. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(6).

Although the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3) provides an illustrative list of contemporaneous documents that an applicant may submit in support of his or her claim of continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since prior to January 1, 1982, the submission of any other relevant document is permitted pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(vi)(L).

The “preponderance of the evidence” standard requires that the evidence demonstrate that the applicant's claim is “probably true,” where the determination of “truth” is made based on the factual circumstances of each individual case. *Matter of E-M-*, 20 I&N Dec. 77, 79-80 (Comm. 1989). In evaluating the evidence, *Matter of E-M-* also stated that “[t]ruth is to be determined not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality.” *Id.* at 80. Thus, in adjudicating the application pursuant to the preponderance of the evidence standard, the director must examine each piece of evidence for relevance, probative value, and credibility, both individually and within the context of the totality of the evidence, to determine whether the fact to be proven is probably true.

Even if the director has some doubt as to the truth, if the petitioner submits relevant, probative, and credible evidence that leads the director to believe that the claim is “probably true” or “more likely than not,” the applicant or petitioner has satisfied the standard of proof. *See U.S. v. Cardozo-Fonseca*, 480 U.S. 421, 431 (1987) (defining “more likely than not” as a greater than 50 percent probability of something occurring). If the director can articulate a material doubt, it is appropriate for the director to either request additional evidence or, if that doubt leads the director to believe that the claim is probably not true, deny the application or petition.

The issue in this proceeding is whether the applicant (1) entered the United States before January 1, 1982 and (2) has continuously resided in the United States in an unlawful status for the requisite period of time. The record contains the following evidence which is material to the applicant’s claim:

- The applicant submitted witness statements from the following individuals in support of his application: [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] The witness statements are general in nature with the witnesses stating that they have knowledge of the applicant’s residence in the United States during all, or a portion of, the requisite period.

As stated previously, the evidence must be evaluated not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality. The witness statements provided do not provide detailed evidence establishing how the witnesses knew the applicant, the details of their association or relationship, or detailed accounts of an ongoing association establishing a relationship under which the witnesses could be reasonably expected to have personal knowledge of the applicant’s residence, activities and whereabouts during the requisite period covered by the applicant’s Form I-687. To be considered probative, witness statements must do more than simply state that a witness knows an applicant and that the applicant has lived in the United States for a specific time period. The statements must contain sufficient

detail, generated by the asserted contact with the applicant, to establish that a relationship does in fact exist, how the relationship was established and sustained, and that the witness does, by virtue of that relationship, have knowledge of the facts asserted. The witness statements submitted by the applicant, therefore, are not deemed probative and are of little evidentiary value.

- [REDACTED] submitted a statement dated April 29, 1992, wherein he stated that [REDACTED] social security number: [REDACTED] has been employed by his company since September 13, 1986. On April 15, 1988, [REDACTED] submitted a statement on behalf of Plasticorp providing the same information as that provided by [REDACTED]

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(i) states that letters from employers attesting to an applicant's employment must: provide the applicant's address at the time of employment; identify the exact period of employment; show periods of layoff; state the applicant's duties; declare whether the information was taken from company records; and identify the location of such company records and state whether such records are accessible or in the alternative state the reason why such records are unavailable. The employment statements submitted by the applicant fail to provide the information required by the above-cited regulation. The statements do not declare whether the information provided was taken from company records, or identify the location of such company records and state whether they are accessible or in the alternative why they are unavailable. As such, the employment statements are not deemed probative and are of little evidentiary value.

It is further noted that the applicant asserts that he worked for Plasticorp under the assumed name of [REDACTED]. In support of that assertion, the applicant submitted an affidavit from [REDACTED] who states that he knows the applicant worked at Plasticorp under the name of [REDACTED] with social security number [REDACTED] beginning September 13, 1986. The affiant attached to his affidavit a photograph of the applicant.

In cases where an applicant claims to have met any of the eligibility criteria under an assumed name, the applicant has the burden of proving that he is the person who used that name. An applicant's true identity is established pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(1). The assumed name must appear in the documentation provided by the applicant to establish eligibility. To meet the requirements of this regulation, documentation must be submitted to prove the common identity, i.e., that the assumed name was in fact used by the applicant. As noted in 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(2), the most persuasive evidence is a document issued in the assumed name which identifies the applicant by photograph, fingerprint or a detailed physical description. Other evidence which could be considered are detailed sworn affidavits which identify the affiant by name and address, state the affiant's relationship to the applicant and a detailed description of the basis of the affiant's knowledge of the use of the assumed name by the applicant. Affidavits accompanied by a photograph which has been identified by the affiant as the individual known to the affiant under the assumed name will carry greater weight. The affiant does not claim to have knowledge of the applicant's whereabouts or activities prior to September 13, 1986, or of the applicant's place of residence during the stated period of employment.

The only other evidence submitted by the applicant in support of his application is his personal statement. The applicant's statement, however, in the absence of other relevant and credible evidence establishing his residence in the United States throughout the requisite period, will not sustain his claim. As previously noted, in order to meet his or her burden of proof, an applicant must provide evidence of eligibility apart from his or her own testimony, and the sufficiency of all evidence produced by the applicant will be judged according to its probative value and credibility. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(6).

The absence of sufficiently detailed documentation to corroborate the applicant's claim of continuous residence for the entire requisite period seriously detracts from the credibility of his claim. Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5), the inference to be drawn from the documentation provided shall depend on the extent of the documentation, its credibility and amenability to verification. Given the applicant's reliance upon documents with minimal probative value, it is concluded that the evidence submitted fails to establish continuous residence in an unlawful status in the United States during the requisite period.

Therefore, based upon the foregoing, the applicant has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he has continuously resided in an unlawful status in the United States for the requisite period as required under both 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5) and *Matter of E- M--*, supra. The applicant is, therefore, ineligible for temporary resident status under section 245A of the Act on this basis.

According to evidence in the record, the applicant was arrested on April 21, 1990 and charged with the following offenses:

1. Count 01: 23152(A) VC MISD - UND INFLNCE ALCHL/DRUG IN VEH.
2. Count 02: 23152(B) VC MISD - .08% MORE WGHT ALCHL DRIVE VEH.
3. Count 03: 14601.2(A) VC MISD - DRIVING WITH SUSPENDED LICENSE.

The case was dismissed on September 6, 1997

On October 15, 1989, the applicant was charged with the following offenses:

1. Count 01: 23152(A) VC MISD - UND INFLNCE ALCHL/DRUG IN VEH.
2. Count 02: 23152(B) VC MISD - .08% MORE WGHT ALCHL DRIVE VEH.
3. Count 03: 16028(A) VC INF - NO PROOF OF CAR INSURANCE.
4. Count 04: 14601.1(A) VC MISD - DRIVING WITH SUSPENDED LICENSE.

The applicant was convicted of Count 02 on November 29, 1989. The remaining three charges were dismissed [REDACTED].

The single misdemeanor conviction does not render the applicant ineligible for temporary resident status.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. This decision constitutes a final notice of ineligibility.