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
U.S. Department of Homeland Security  
U. S. Citizenship and Immigration Services  
Office of Administrative Appeals MS 2090  
Washington, DC 20529-2090



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
IN RE: Applicant:



APPLICATION:

Application for Status as a Temporary Resident pursuant to Section 245A of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, 8 U.S.C § 1255a.

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:



INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. The file has been returned to the National Benefits Center. If your appeal was sustained, or if the matter was remanded for further action, you will be contacted. If your appeal was dismissed, you no longer have a case pending before this office, and you are not entitled to file a motion to reopen or reconsider your case.

Perry Rhew  
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The application for temporary resident status pursuant to the terms of the settlement agreements reached in *Catholic Social Services, Inc., et al., v. Ridge, et al.*, CIV. NO. S-86-1343-LKK (E.D. Cal) January 23, 2004, or *Felicity Mary Newman, et al., v. United States Immigration and Citizenship Services, et al.*, CIV. NO. 87-4757-WDK (C.D. Cal) February 17, 2004, (CSS/Newman Settlement Agreements) was denied by the Director, Houston, Texas, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The director determined that the applicant had not established that she resided in the United States in a continuous unlawful status from before January 1, 1982 through the date of attempted filing during the original one-year application period that ended on May 4, 1988.

On appeal, counsel for the applicant asserts that the applicant has submitted sufficient evidence to establish her eligibility for temporary residence. Counsel does not submit additional evidence on appeal.

An applicant for temporary resident status – under section 245A of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act) – must establish entry into the United States before January 1, 1982, and continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since such date and through the date the application is filed. *See* section 245A(a)(2) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(2). The applicant must also establish that he or she has been continuously physically present in the United States since November 6, 1986. *See* section 245A(a)(3) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(3). The regulations clarify that the applicant must have been physically present in the United States from November 6, 1986 until the date of filing the application. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(b)(1).

For purposes of establishing residence and physical presence under the CSS/Newman Settlement Agreements, the term “until the date of filing” in 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(b)(1) means until the date the applicant attempted to file a completed Form I-687 application and fee or was caused not to timely file during the original legalization application period of May 5, 1987 to May 4, 1988. *See* CSS Settlement Agreement, paragraph 11 at page 6; Newman Settlement Agreement, paragraph 11 at page 10.

The applicant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she has resided in the United States for the requisite period, is admissible to the United States under the provisions of section 245A of the Act, and is otherwise eligible for adjustment of status. The inference to be drawn from the documentation provided shall depend on the extent of the documentation, its credibility and amenability to verification. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5).

Although the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3) provides an illustrative list of contemporaneous documents that an applicant may submit in support of his or her claim of continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since prior to January 1, 1982, the submission of any other relevant document is permitted pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(vi)(L).

The “preponderance of the evidence” standard requires that the evidence demonstrate that the applicant's claim is “probably true,” where the determination of “truth” is made based on the factual circumstances of each individual case. *Matter of E-M-*, 20 I&N Dec. 77, 79-80 (Comm. 1989). In evaluating the evidence, *Matter of E-M-* also stated that “[t]ruth is to be determined not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality.” *Id.* at 80. Thus, in adjudicating the application pursuant to the preponderance of the evidence standard, the director must examine each piece of evidence for relevance, probative value, and credibility, both individually and within the context of the totality of the evidence, to determine whether the fact to be proven is probably true.

Even if the director has some doubt as to the truth, if the applicant submits relevant, probative, and credible evidence that leads the director to believe that the claim is “probably true” or “more likely than not,” the applicant has satisfied the standard of proof. *See U.S. v. Cardozo-Fonseca*, 480 U.S. 421, 431 (1987) (defining “more likely than not” as a greater than 50 percent probability of something occurring). If the director can articulate a material doubt, it is appropriate for the director to either request additional evidence or, if that doubt leads the director to believe that the claim is probably not true, deny the application or petition.

Although the regulations provide an illustrative list of contemporaneous documents that an applicant may submit, the list also permits the submission of affidavits and any other relevant document. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(vi)(L).

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(i) states that letters from employers attesting to an applicant’s employment must: provide the applicant’s address at the time of employment; identify the exact period of employment; show periods of layoff; state the applicant’s duties; declare whether the information was taken from company records; and identify the location of such company records and state whether such records are accessible or in the alternative state the reason why such records are unavailable.

The applicant, a native of the Mexico who claims to have resided in the United States since July 1980, filed her application for temporary resident status under section 245A of the Act (Form I-687), together with a Form I-687 Supplement, CSS/Newman (LULAC) Class Membership Worksheet, on January 5, 2006.

In the Notice of Intent to Deny (NOID), the director stated that the applicant failed to submit sufficient evidence demonstrating her continuous unlawful residence, and continuous physical presence, in the United States during the requisite period. The director granted the applicant thirty (30) days to submit additional evidence.

In the Notice of Decision, dated December 5, 2007, the director denied the instant application based on the reasons stated in the NOID. The director noted that the applicant responded to the NOID, but failed to overcome the reasons for denial stated in the NOID.

The issue in this proceeding is whether the applicant has furnished sufficient credible evidence to demonstrate that she continuously resided in the United States in an unlawful status from before

January 1, 1982 through the date she attempted to file a Form I-687 during the original one-year application period that ended on May 4, 1988. After reviewing the entire record, the AAO determines that she has not.

#### Employment Letter

The applicant submitted a letter of employment from [REDACTED], stating that the applicant had been employed from 1985 to 1989. It is noted that [REDACTED] does not indicate the date the employment commenced, the capacity in which the applicant had been employed, and failed to provide the applicant's address at the time of employment. Also, the letter failed to show periods of layoff, declare whether the information was taken from her records, and identify the location of such records and state whether such records are accessible or in the alternative state the reason why such records are unavailable as required under 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(i). The letter, therefore, is not probative as it does not conform to the regulatory requirements.

In addition, the applicant provided the following:

- 1) A Verification of Former Student Enrollment, from Houston Independent School District, (HISD) for the period 1980-81, and 1981-82.
- 2) Medical records from "HCHD" dated October 23, 2007, indicating that the applicant received medical services in 1983, in 1984, and in September 1985.
- 3) A Texas Department of Health Immunization Record, indicating that the applicant received an immunization on August 19, 1980.
- 4) Birth certificates from the City of Houston, for [REDACTED], born on June 16, 1983; and, [REDACTED], born on September 4, 1984, showing the mother's name as [REDACTED]
- 5) An Identification Card from the Texas Department of Public Safety, indicating expiration in 1988, issued to [REDACTED]

Contrary to counsel's assertion, the applicant has failed to submit sufficient evidence to establish the requisite continuous residence and continuous physical presence. As noted above, the letter of employment the applicant provided lacks essential details. The remaining evidence (listed above) pertains to some years during the period from 1980 to September 1985. However, the verification form from the Houston Independent School District, indicates that during the period 1980-1981, the applicant attended Gregory-Lincoln Education Center, but withdrew; during the period 1981-1982, the applicant attended T.S. Jackson Middle School, but withdrew, and was a "No Show to HISD" for the period 1982-1983, therefore, it is of limited probative value. In addition, the applicant does not provide sufficient evidence to establish her residence for the period after September 1985. The applicant has not submitted additional evidence in support of her claim that she entered the United

States prior to January 1, 1982, and she had resided continuously in the United States during the entire requisite period.

As stated previously, the evidence must be evaluated not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality. Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5), the inference to be drawn from the documentation provided shall depend on the extent of the documentation, its credibility and amenability to verification. Given the applicant's reliance upon documents with minimal probative value, it is concluded that she has failed to establish continuous residence in an unlawful status in the United States from prior to January 1, 1982, through May 4, 1988.

Based on the foregoing analysis of the evidence, the AAO concludes that the applicant has failed to establish her continuous unlawful residence in the United States throughout the requisite period. Thus, the record does not establish that the applicant entered the United States before January 1, 1982 and resided continuously in the United States in an unlawful status from that date through the date she attempted to file a Form I-687 during the original one-year application period that ended on May 4, 1988. Accordingly, the applicant is ineligible for temporary resident status under section 245A(a)(2) the Act.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed. This decision constitutes a final notice of ineligibility.