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FILE: [REDACTED] Office: BALTIMORE Date:
MSC-05-007-10306

OCT 13 2009

IN RE: Applicant: [REDACTED]

APPLICATION: Application for Temporary Resident Status under Section 245A of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:



INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. If your appeal was dismissed or rejected, all documents have been returned to the National Benefits Center. You no longer have a case pending before this office, and you are not entitled to file a motion to reopen or reconsider your case. If your appeal was sustained or remanded for further action, you will be contacted.

Perry Rhew
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The application for temporary resident status pursuant to the terms of the settlement agreements reached in *Catholic Social Services, Inc., et al., v. Ridge, et al.*, CIV. NO. S-86-1343-LKK (E.D. Cal) January 23, 2004, or *Felicity Mary Newman, et al., v. United States Immigration and Citizenship Services, et al.*, CIV. NO. 87-4757-WDK (C.D. Cal) February 17, 2004, (CSS/Newman Settlement Agreements) was denied by the director of the Baltimore office and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant submitted a Form I-687, Application for Status as a Temporary Resident under Section 245A of the Immigration and Nationality Act (Act) and a Form I-687 Supplement, CSS/Newman (LULAC) Class Membership Worksheet. The director denied the application finding that the applicant had been absent from the United States for a period in excess of 45 days. In addition, the director found that the evidence submitted by the applicant did not establish that he had resided continuously in the United States for the duration of the requisite period. Therefore, the director concluded that the applicant was not eligible to adjust to temporary resident status pursuant to the terms of the CSS/Newman Settlement Agreements.

On appeal, counsel for the applicant asserts that the evidence which the applicant previously submitted establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that he continuously resided in the United States in an unlawful status for the duration of the requisite time period. The applicant has not submitted any additional evidence on appeal. The AAO has considered the applicant's assertions, reviewed all of the evidence, and has made a *de novo* decision based on the record and the AAO's assessment of the credibility, relevance and probative value of the evidence.¹

An applicant for temporary resident status must establish entry into the United States before January 1, 1982, and continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since such date and through the date the application is filed. Section 245A(a)(2) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(2). The applicant must also establish that he or she has been continuously physically present in the United States since November 6, 1986. Section 245A(a)(3) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(3). The regulations clarify that the applicant must have been physically present in the United States from November 6, 1986 until the date of filing the application. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(b)(1).

For purposes of establishing residence and physical presence under the CSS/Newman Settlement Agreements, the term "until the date of filing" in 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(b) means until the date the applicant attempted to file a completed Form I-687 application and fee or was caused not to timely file during the original legalization application period of May 5, 1987 to May 4, 1988.

¹ The AAO maintains plenary power to review each appeal on a *de novo* basis. 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) ("On appeal from or review of the initial decision, the agency has all the powers which it would have in making the initial decision except as it may limit the issues on notice or by rule."); *see also, Janka v. U.S. Dept. of Transp., NTSB*, 925 F.2d 1147, 1149 (9th Cir. 1991). The AAO's *de novo* authority has long been recognized by the federal courts. *See, e.g. Dor v. INS*, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n.9 (2d Cir. 1989).

CSS Settlement Agreement paragraph 11 at page 6; Newman Settlement Agreement paragraph 11 at page 10.

The applicant shall be regarded as having resided continuously in the United States if at the time the application for temporary resident status is filed no single absence from the United States has exceeded 45 days, and the aggregate of all absences has not exceeded 180 days during the requisite period unless the applicant can establish that due to emergent reasons the return to the United States could not be accomplished within the time period allowed, the applicant was maintaining a residence in the United States, and the departure was not based on an order of deportation. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.1(c)(1).

Continuous unlawful residence is broken if an absence from the United States is more than 45 days on any one trip unless return could not be accomplished due to an "emergent reason". 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(h)(1)(i). "Emergent reasons" has been defined as "coming unexpectedly into being." *Matter of C*, 19 I&N Dec. 808 (Comm. 1988).

The applicant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she has resided in the United States for the requisite periods, is admissible to the United States under the provisions of section 245A of the Act, and is otherwise eligible for adjustment of status. The inference to be drawn from the documentation provided shall depend on the extent of the documentation, its credibility and amenability to verification. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5).

Although the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3) provides an illustrative list of contemporaneous documents that an applicant may submit in support of his or her claim of continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since prior to January 1, 1982, the submission of any other relevant document is permitted pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(vi)(L). To meet his or her burden of proof, an applicant must provide evidence of eligibility apart from the applicant's own testimony, and the sufficiency of all evidence produced by the applicant will be judged according to its probative value and credibility. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(6).

The "preponderance of the evidence" standard requires that the evidence demonstrate that the applicant's claim is "probably true," where the determination of "truth" is made based on the factual circumstances of each individual case. *Matter of E-M-*, 20 I&N Dec. 77, 79-80 (Comm. 1989). In evaluating the evidence, *Matter of E-M-* also stated that "[t]ruth is to be determined not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality." *Id.* Thus, in adjudicating the application pursuant to the preponderance of the evidence standard, the director must examine each piece of evidence for relevance, probative value, and credibility, both individually and within the context of the totality of the evidence, to determine whether the fact to be proven is probably true. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(6). The weight to be given any affidavit depends on the totality of the circumstances, and a number of factors must be considered. More weight will be given to an affidavit in which the affiant indicates personal knowledge of the applicant's whereabouts during the time period in question rather than a fill-in-the-blank affidavit that provides generic information. The regulations provide specific guidance on the sufficiency of documentation

when proving residence through evidence of past employment or attestations by churches or other organizations. 8 C.F.R. §§ 245a.2(d)(3)(i) and (v).`

Even if the director has some doubt as to the truth, if the applicant submits relevant, probative, and credible evidence that leads the director to believe that the claim is "probably true" or "more likely than not," the applicant or petitioner has satisfied the standard of proof. See *U.S. v. Cardozo-Fonseca*, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (defining "more likely than not" as a greater than 50 percent probability of something occurring). If the director can articulate a material doubt, it is appropriate for the director to either request additional evidence or, if that doubt leads the director to believe that the claim is probably not true, deny the application or petition. Doubt cast on any aspect of the applicant's proof may lead to a reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining evidence offered in support of the application. *Matter of Ho*, 19 I & N Dec. 582, 591-592 (BIA).

In this case, at the time of completing the instant I-687 application, at part 32 of the application, the applicant was asked to list his absences from the United States, and he listed absences from the United States, during the requisite period, in 1984 through 1988. The applicant did not list the exact dates of these absences in the instant I-687 application. On September 12, 2005 the applicant completed a sworn statement, wherein he listed two of his absences from the United States during the requisite statutory period as being from October 15 to December 15, 1984 and December 15, 1985 to March 1, 1986, absences of 61 days and 76 days, respectively. Although the applicant has not produced copies of any passport with which he traveled during the requisite period, his testimony indicates that he had two absences from the United States, each in excess of 45 days, during the requisite period.

The applicant's admitted absences from the United States from October 15 to December 15, 1984 and December 15, 1985 to March 1, 1986 are clearly a break in any period of continuous residence he may have established. On appeal, the applicant does not contend that there was an emergent reason why he could not return sooner. Since the applicant has not provided any evidence that was the "emergent reason" for his failure to return to the United States in a timely manner, he has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he has continuously resided in an unlawful status in the United States for the requisite period, as required under both 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5) and *Matter of E-M-*, *supra*. The applicant is, therefore, ineligible for temporary resident status under section 245A of the Act on this basis.

Beyond the decision of the director, additional documentation that the applicant submits in support of his claim to have arrived in the United States before January 1982 and lived in an unlawful status during the requisite period consists of several witness statements. The AAO has reviewed each document in its entirety to determine the applicant's eligibility; however, the AAO will not quote each witness statement in this decision. Some of the evidence submitted indicates that the applicant resided in the United States after May 4, 1988; however, because evidence of residence after May 4, 1988 is not probative of residence during the requisite time period, it shall not be discussed.

The applicant has submitted the affidavits of [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. Their affidavits are general in nature and state that the affiants have knowledge of the applicant's residence in the United States for all, or a portion of, the requisite period.

The applicant has submitted employment verification letters from [REDACTED] and [REDACTED].

[REDACTED] states that he worked with the applicant sometime in the summer and spring months of 1984 and 1985 at Gail Construction Company in New York. However, the testimony of the affiant is inconsistent with the testimony of the applicant in the instant I-687 application, in which the applicant does not list any employment with Gail Construction Company during the requisite statutory period.

[REDACTED] states that, some time after meeting the applicant in 1983, he got the applicant a job with him at a gas station at [REDACTED]. However, the testimony of the affiant is inconsistent with the testimony of the applicant in the instant I-687 application, in which the applicant does not list any employment with a gas station, or any employment at the stated address, during the requisite statutory period.

[REDACTED] states that the applicant worked for him from December 1981 to February 1982 as a building supervisor at [REDACTED] in Brooklyn. The witness also states that the applicant was provided a free apartment as a result of his employment. However, the testimony of the affiant is inconsistent with the testimony of the applicant in the instant I-687 application, in which the applicant does not list any employment as a building supervisor, or any employment at the stated address, during the requisite statutory period. In addition, in the instant I-687 application the applicant does not list any residences in the United States during the requisite statutory period.

The employment verification letters from [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] do not meet the requirements set forth in the regulations, which provide specific guidance on the sufficiency of documentation when proving residence through evidence of past employment. The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(i) provides that letters from employers must include: (A) Alien's address at the time of employment; (B) Exact period of employment; (C) Periods of layoff; (D) Duties with the company; (E) Whether or not the information was taken from official company records; and (F) Where records are located and whether the Service may have access to the records. If the records are unavailable, an affidavit-form letter stating that the alien's employment records are unavailable and why such records are unavailable may be accepted in lieu of subsections (E) and (F). The employment verification letters fail to comply with the above cited regulation because they lack considerable detail regarding the applicant's employment. The witnesses do not state how they were able to date the applicant's employment. It is unclear whether they referred to their own recollection or any records they may have maintained. For these reasons, the statements of the witnesses regarding the applicant's employment are of little probative value.

Furthermore, although the witnesses claim to have personal knowledge of the applicant's residence in the United States during the requisite period, the witness statements do not provide concrete information, specific to the applicant and generated by the asserted associations with him, which would reflect and corroborate the extent of those associations, and demonstrate that they were a sufficient basis for reliable knowledge about the applicant's residence in the United States during the requisite period. To be considered probative and credible, witness affidavits must do more than simply state that an affiant knows an applicant and that the applicant has lived in the United States for a specific time period. Their content must include sufficient detail from a claimed relationship to indicate that it probably did exist and that the witness, by virtue of that relationship, does have knowledge of the facts alleged. For instance the witnesses do not state how they date their initial meeting with the applicant or specify social gatherings, other special occasions or social events when they saw and communicated with the applicant during the requisite period. The affiants also do not state how frequently they had contact with the applicant during the requisite period. The affiants do not provide sufficient details that would lend credence to their claimed knowledge of the applicant's residence in the United States during the requisite period. For these reasons the AAO finds that the witness statements do not indicate that their assertions are probably true.

The remaining evidence in the record is comprised of copies of the applicant's statements, the instant I-687 application, the applicant's initial I-687 application filed in 1990 to establish the applicant's CSS class membership, an I-485 application to adjust to permanent resident status under the Legal Immigration Family Equity (LIFE) Act, an I-485 application to adjust to permanent resident status and the underlying Form I-130 petition for alien relative, an I-485 application to adjust to permanent resident status and the underlying Form I-140 immigrant petition for alien worker.

The AAO finds in its *de novo* review that the record of proceedings contains materially inconsistent statements from the applicant regarding his entry into and absences from the United States during the requisite statutory period.

After filing the instant I-687 application, the applicant submitted a sworn statement dated September 12, 2005, in which the applicant testified that he entered the United States on December 20, 1980, and that he had five absences from the United States during the requisite statutory period. At the time of his interview the applicant stated that his first entry into the United States was in 1980.

The applicant's testimony regarding the instant I-687 application is inconsistent with the applicant's testimony regarding the initial I-687 application. In a class member worksheet dated September 19, 1990, the applicant stated that he first entered the United States on December 20, 1981. In addition, the initial I-687 application lists only one absence from the United States, from February to March 1988.

The applicant has failed to provide probative and credible evidence of his continuous residence in the United States for the duration of the requisite period. The inconsistencies regarding the dates

the applicant first entered into or was absent from the United States are material to the applicant's claim in that they have a direct bearing on the applicant's residence in the United States during the requisite period. No evidence of record resolves these inconsistencies. It is incumbent upon the applicant to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. Doubt cast on any aspect of the applicant's proof may lead to a reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining evidence offered in support of the application. *Matter of Ho*, 19 I & N Dec. 582, 591-592 (BIA). These contradictions undermine the credibility of the applicant's claim of entry into the United States prior to January 1, 1982 and continuous residence in the United States during the requisite period.

As stated previously, to meet his or her burden of proof, an applicant must provide evidence of eligibility apart from the applicant's own testimony, and the sufficiency of all the evidence produced by the applicant will be judged according to its probative value and credibility. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(6). The applicant has failed to provide probative and credible evidence of his continuous residence in the United States for the duration of the requisite period. The applicant's evidence lacks sufficient detail, and there are material inconsistencies in the record.

Upon a *de novo* review of all of the evidence in the record, the AAO agrees with the director that the evidence submitted by the applicant has not established that he is eligible for the benefit sought. The various statements currently in the record which attempt to substantiate the applicant's residence and employment in the United States during the statutory period are not objective, independent evidence such that they might overcome the inconsistencies in the record regarding the applicant's claim that he maintained continuous residence in the United States throughout the statutory period, and thus are not probative.

The record also reveals that on April 13, 1992, the applicant was placed into exclusion proceedings by an immigration judge based upon the applicant being inadmissible to the United States and excludable as an immigrant without an immigrant visa. See Section 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the Act. On July 6, 1993, an immigration judge ordered that the exclusions proceedings be terminated.

Based upon the foregoing, the applicant has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he entered the United States before January 1, 1982 and continuously resided in an unlawful status in the United States for the requisite period as required under both 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5) and *Matter of E- M--*, *supra*. The applicant is, therefore, ineligible for temporary resident status under section 245A of the Act on this basis.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. This decision constitutes a final notice of ineligibility.