



U.S. Citizenship
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FILE: [REDACTED]
MSC-06 098 15285

Office: HOUSTON

Date: **OCT 16 2009**

IN RE: Applicant [REDACTED]

APPLICATION: Application for Status as a Temporary Resident pursuant to Section 245A of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT: SELF-REPRESENTED

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. If your appeal was dismissed or rejected, all documents have been returned to the National Benefits Center. You no longer have a case pending before this office, and you are not entitled to file a motion to reopen or reconsider your case. If your appeal was sustained or remanded for further action, you will be contacted.

Perry J. Rhew
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The application for temporary resident status pursuant to the terms of the settlement agreements reached in *Catholic Social Services, Inc., et al., v. Ridge, et al.*, CIV. NO. S-86-1343-LKK (E.D. Cal) January 23, 2004, and *Felicity Mary Newman, et al., v. United States Immigration and Citizenship Services, et al.*, CIV. NO. 87-4757-WDK (C.D. Cal) February 17, 2004 (CSS/Newman Settlement Agreements) was denied by the director in Houston, Texas. The decision is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant, a native of Mexico who claims to have lived in the United States since May 1981, submitted a Form I-687, Application for Status as a Temporary Resident under Section 245A of the Immigration and Nationality Act (Act), and a Form I-687 Supplement, CSS/Newman Class Membership Worksheet on January 6, 2006. The director denied the application, finding that the applicant had not established by a preponderance of the evidence that he had continuously resided in the United States in an unlawful status for the duration of the requisite period.

On appeal the applicant asserts that he has submitted sufficient credible evidence to establish that he meets the continuous residence requirement for duration of the requisite period. The applicant submits additional affidavits with the appeal.

An applicant for temporary resident status must establish entry into the United States before January 1, 1982, and continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since such date and through the date the application is filed. Section 245A(a)(2) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(2). The applicant must also establish that he or she has been continuously physically present in the United States since November 6, 1986. Section 245A(a)(3) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(3). The regulations clarify that the applicant must have been physically present in the United States from November 6, 1986 until the date of filing the application. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(b).

For purposes of establishing residence and physical presence under the CSS/Newman Settlement Agreements, the term “until the date of filing” in 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(b) means until the date the applicant attempted to file a completed Form I-687 application and fee or was caused not to timely file during the original legalization application period of May 5, 1987 to May 4, 1988. CSS Settlement Agreement paragraph 11 at page 6; Newman Settlement Agreement paragraph 11 at page 10.

The applicant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she has resided in the United States for the requisite periods, is admissible to the United States under the provisions of section 245A of the Act, and is otherwise eligible for adjustment of status. The inference to be drawn from the documentation provided shall depend on the extent of the documentation, its credibility and amenability to verification. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5).

Although the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3) provides an illustrative list of contemporaneous documents that an applicant may submit in support of his or her claim of continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since prior to January 1, 1982, the

submission of any other relevant document is permitted pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(vi)(L). To meet his or her burden of proof, an applicant must provide evidence of eligibility apart from the applicant's own testimony, and the sufficiency of all evidence produced by the applicant will be judged according to its probative value and credibility. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(6).

The "preponderance of the evidence" standard requires that the evidence demonstrate that the applicant's claim is "probably true," where the determination of "truth" is made based on the factual circumstances of each individual case. *Matter of E-M-*, 20 I&N Dec. 77, 79-80 (Comm. 1989). In evaluating the evidence, *Matter of E-M-* also stated that "[t]ruth is to be determined not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality." *Id.* Thus, in adjudicating the application pursuant to the preponderance of the evidence standard, the director must examine each piece of evidence for relevance, probative value, and credibility, both individually and within the context of the totality of the evidence, to determine whether the fact to be proven is probably true. See 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(6). The weight to be given any affidavit depends on the totality of the circumstances, and a number of factors must be considered. More weight will be given to an affidavit in which the affiant indicates personal knowledge of the applicant's whereabouts during the time period in question rather than a fill-in-the-blank affidavit that provides generic information. The regulations provide specific guidance on the sufficiency of documentation when proving residence through evidence of past employment or attestations by churches or other organizations. 8 C.F.R. §§ 245a.2(d)(3)(i) and (v).

Even if the director has some doubt as to the truth, if the applicant submits relevant, probative, and credible evidence that leads the director to believe that the claim is "probably true" or "more likely than not," the applicant or petitioner has satisfied the standard of proof. See *U.S. v. Cardozo-Fonseca*, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (defining "more likely than not" as a greater than 50 percent probability of something occurring). If the director can articulate a material doubt, it is appropriate for the director to either request additional evidence or, if that doubt leads the director to believe that the claim is probably not true, deny the application or petition.

The issue in this proceeding is whether the applicant (1) entered the United States before January 1, 1982 and (2) has continuously resided in the United States in an unlawful status for the requisite period of time. Here, the applicant has failed to meet his burden.

The AAO notes that the applicant, who claims to have traveled to and entered the United States in May 1981 with his uncle, was about 14 years old when he allegedly entered the United States. The applicant did not submit any credible evidence to establish such entry. For someone claiming to have lived in the United States since 1981, it is noteworthy that the applicant is unable to produce a solitary piece of primary evidence during the following seven years through May 4, 1988, such as school or medical records to establish his continuous residence in the United States during the 1980s. It is reasonable to expect that a child of 14 years old residing in the United States in 1981 would possess these records. The applicant did not provide any reasonable explanation why he is unable to produce such documents. The applicant was 14 years

old in 1981 and would have been cared for by an adult. Furthermore, the applicant did not provide evidence of how he cared for himself including paying for rent from 1985 until his first claimed employment in 1990.

The applicant submitted an affidavit from [REDACTED] sworn to on December 25, 2005. [REDACTED] claims that he is the applicant's uncle, that he traveled to the United States with the applicant in May 1981, and that the applicant lived with him from 1981 to 1984. Considering the length of time [REDACTED] claims to have known the applicant and the family relationship between them, [REDACTED] provided remarkably very few details about the applicant's life in the United States such as the applicant's residential address after 1984, especially since [REDACTED] claims that the applicant lived close to him after the applicant moved out of his house in 1984. [REDACTED] did not provide any documentation such as photographs, letters or the like, demonstrating his relationship with the applicant during the 1980s. Nor did [REDACTED] provide any evidence to establish his own identity, his relationship with the applicant and his own residence in the United States during the requisite period. In view of these substantive deficiencies and the lack of information about the applicant's residence after 1984, the affidavit from [REDACTED] has very little probative value as credible evidence that the applicant entered the United States before January 1, 1982 and resided continuously in the country in an unlawful status through the requisite period.

As for the remaining evidence in the record – consisting of affidavits from acquaintances who claim to have known the applicant during various periods in the 1980s – they have minimalist formats with very little input from the affiants. Only one affiant - [REDACTED] claims to have known the applicant before January 1, 1982. The affiants provided very few details about the applicant's life in the United States and the nature and extent of their interactions with him over the years. The affidavits are not accompanied by any documentary evidence – such as photographs, letters, and the like – of the affiants' personal relationships with the applicant in the United States during the 1980s. Although some of the affiants provided documents to establish their own identities, none of the affiants provided any documentation to establish that they resided in the United States during the 1980s. In view of these substantive shortcomings, the AAO finds that the affidavits have little probative value. They are not persuasive evidence of the applicant's continuous unlawful residence in the United States from before January 1, 1982 through the requisite period.

Upon a *de novo* review of all of the evidence in the record, the AAO agrees with the director that the evidence submitted by the applicant has not established that he is eligible for the benefit sought.

Given the paucity of evidence in the record, the AAO finds that the applicant has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he entered the United States before January 1, 1982 and continuously resided in an unlawful status in the United States for the requisite period as required under both 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5) and *Matter of E- M--*, *supra*. The applicant is, therefore, ineligible for temporary resident status under section 245A of the Act on this basis.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. This decision constitutes a final notice of ineligibility.