


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FILE:

MSC 04 321 10544

Office: LOS ANGELES

Date: **APR 06 2010**

IN RE:

Applicant:



APPLICATION: Application for Status as a Temporary Resident pursuant to Section 245A of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:



INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. If your appeal was dismissed or rejected, all documents have been returned to the National Benefits Center. You no longer have a case pending before this office, and you are not entitled to file a motion to reopen or reconsider your case. If your appeal was sustained or remanded for further action, you will be contacted.

Perry Rhew
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The application for temporary resident status pursuant to the terms of the settlement agreements reached in *Catholic Social Services, Inc., et al., v. Ridge, et al.*, CIV. NO. S-86-1343-LKK (E.D. Cal) January 23, 2004, and *Felicity Mary Newman, et al., v. United States Immigration and Citizenship Services, et al.*, CIV. NO. 87-4757-WDK (C.D. Cal) February 17, 2004 (CSS/Newman Settlement Agreements), was denied by the Director, Los Angeles. The decision is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant submitted a Form I-687, Application for Status as a Temporary Resident under Section 245A of the Immigration and Nationality Act (Act), and a Form I-687 Supplement, CSS/Newman (LULAC) Class Membership Worksheet. The director denied the application, finding that the applicant had not established by a preponderance of the evidence that he had continuously resided in the United States in an unlawful status for the duration of the requisite period. Specifically, the director determined that the applicant's trip to Mexico in 1987 exceeded the 45-day allowance on single absences during the requisite period.

On appeal, counsel, on behalf of the applicant, asserts that the applicant was not able to return to the United States due to emergent reasons. Counsel contends that the applicant's mother became unexpectedly ill while the applicant was in Mexico and delayed his return. The AAO has reviewed all of the evidence and has made a *de novo* decision based on the record and the AAO's assessment of the credibility, relevance and probative value of the evidence.¹

An applicant for temporary resident status must establish entry into the United States before January 1, 1982, and continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since such date and through the date the application is filed. Section 245A(a)(2) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(2). The applicant must also establish that he or she has been continuously physically present in the United States since November 6, 1986. Section 245(a)(3) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(3). The regulations clarify that the applicant must have been physically present in the United States from November 6, 1986 until the date of filing the application. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(b)(1).

Continuous unlawful residence is broken if an absence from the United States is more than 45 days on any one trip unless return could not be accomplished due to emergent reasons. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(h)(1)(i). "Emergent reasons" has been defined as "coming unexpectedly into being." Matter of C, 19 I&N Dec. 808 (Comm. 1988).

For purposes of establishing residence and physical presence under the CSS/Newman Settlement Agreements, the term "until the date of filing" in 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(b)(1) means until the date the

¹ The AAO maintains plenary power to review each appeal on a *de novo* basis. 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) ("On appeal from or review of the initial decision, the agency has all the powers which it would have in making the initial decision except as it may limit the issues on notice or by rule."); *see also, Janka v. U.S. Dept. of Transp., NTSB*, 925 F.2d 1147, 1149 (9th Cir. 1991). The AAO's *de novo* authority has been long recognized by the federal courts. *See, e.g. Dor v. INS*, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n.9 (2d Cir. 1989).

applicant attempted to file a completed Form I-687 application and fee or was caused not to timely file during the original legalization application period of May 5, 1987 to May 4, 1988. CSS Settlement Agreement paragraph 11 at page 6; Newman Settlement Agreement paragraph 11 at page 10. The applicant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she has resided in the United States for the requisite period, is admissible to the United States under the provisions of section 245A of the Act, and is otherwise eligible for adjustment of status. The inference to be drawn from the documentation provided shall depend on the extent of the documentation, its credibility and amenability to verification. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5). To meet his or her burden of proof, an applicant must provide evidence of eligibility apart from his or her own testimony, and the sufficiency of all evidence produced by the applicant will be judged according to its probative value and credibility. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(6).

Although the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3) provides an illustrative list of contemporaneous documents that an applicant may submit in support of his or her claim of continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since prior to January 1, 1982, the submission of any other relevant document is permitted pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(vi)(L).

The “preponderance of the evidence” standard requires that the evidence demonstrate that the applicant's claim is “probably true,” where the determination of “truth” is made based on the factual circumstances of each individual case. *Matter of E-M-*, 20 I&N Dec. 77, 79-80 (Comm. 1989). In evaluating the evidence, *Matter of E-M-* also stated that “[t]ruth is to be determined not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality.” *Id.* at 80. Thus, in adjudicating the application pursuant to the preponderance of the evidence standard, the director must examine each piece of evidence for relevance, probative value, and credibility, both individually and within the context of the totality of the evidence, to determine whether the fact to be proven is probably true.

Even if the director has some doubt as to the truth, if the petitioner submits relevant, probative, and credible evidence that leads the director to believe that the claim is “probably true” or “more likely than not,” the applicant or petitioner has satisfied the standard of proof. *See U.S. v. Cardozo-Fonseca*, 480 U.S. 421, 431 (1987) (defining “more likely than not” as a greater than 50 percent probability of something occurring). If the director can articulate a material doubt, it is appropriate for the director to either request additional evidence or, if that doubt leads the director to believe that the claim is probably not true, deny the application or petition.

The issue in this proceeding is whether the applicant (1) entered the United States before January 1, 1982 and (2) has continuously resided in the United States in an unlawful status for the requisite period of time.

In the Notice of Decision, the director determined that the applicant’s trip to Mexico in December 1987 exceeded the 45-day allowance on single absences during the requisite period. On appeal, counsel asserts that the applicant’s mother became unexpectedly ill while the

applicant was in Mexico and delayed his return. On appeal, counsel submitted a medical affidavit corroborating the applicant's claim that his mother needed treatment from January through March 1988. Based on this evidence, pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(h)(1)(i), the applicant's return to the United States could not be accomplished due to emergent reasons. Therefore, the director's decision is withdrawn. The applicant's prolonged absence did not interrupt his claim of continuous residence during the requisite period.

The documentation that the applicant submits in support of his claim to have arrived in the United States before January 1982 and resided in an unlawful status during the requisite period consists of seven attestations from individuals claiming to know the applicant and copies of two of his children's immunization records. The AAO has reviewed each document in its entirety to determine the applicant's eligibility.

The witness statements are general in nature and state that the witnesses have knowledge of the applicant's residence in the United States for all, or a portion of, the requisite period. The attestations from [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] all state that they first met the applicant in December 1981. The affidavits from [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] both state that they have known the applicant since 1982 and that the applicant resided in the United States during the requisite period. The affidavit from [REDACTED] states that the applicant resided and worked at [REDACTED] from 1984 to 1992. The declaration from [REDACTED] states that he met the applicant in the United States in 1984.

These statements fail, however, to establish the applicant's continuous unlawful residence in the United States for the duration of the requisite period. As stated previously, the evidence must be evaluated not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality; an applicant must provide evidence of eligibility apart from his or her own testimony; and the sufficiency of all evidence produced by the applicant will be judged according to its probative value and credibility.

The witness statements fail to provide concrete information, specific to the applicant and generated by the asserted associations with him, which would reflect and corroborate the extent of those associations and demonstrate that they have a sufficient basis for reliable knowledge about the applicant's residence during the time addressed in the affidavits. None of the statements indicate direct knowledge of the applicant's method of entry into the United States. To be considered probative and credible, witness affidavits must do more than simply state that an affiant knows an applicant and that the applicant has lived in the United States for a specific time period. Their content must include sufficient detail from a claimed relationship to indicate that the relationship probably did exist and that the witness does, by virtue of that relationship, have knowledge of the facts alleged. Upon review, the AAO finds that, individually and together, the witness statements have little probative value and do not indicate that their assertions are probably true.

In addition, the record contains copies of the immunization records of two of the applicant's children. The record reflects that one child, born in Mexico in February 1982, received immunization shots in the United States. This immunization record states, with regard to the shots in 1982, that the "Dates [of immunization] Verified by Public Health" and does not establish that those shots were received by the child in the United States. Similarly, the record reflects that a second child, born in Mexico in March 1987, received immunization shots in the United States. The only shots given by the U.S. clinic, the Perris Health Clinic, were in 1992. The earlier immunizations were stamped "Dates Verified by Public Health." Therefore, these documents fail to establish applicant's continuous residence in the United States during the requisite period. It is noted that the record contains immunization records for a third child; however, there are no relevant dates during the requisite period in the immunization record.

The AAO issued a Notice of Intent to Deny, dated February 27, 2010, to provide the applicant with an opportunity to submit evidence to rebut the issues described above. The applicant failed to respond. Therefore, based upon the foregoing, the documents submitted in support of the applicant's claim have been found to have minimal probative value as evidence of the applicant's residence in the United States for the requisite period. The applicant has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he entered the United States before January 1, 1982 and continuously resided in an unlawful status in the United States for the requisite period as required under both 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5) and *Matter of E- M-*, *supra*. The applicant is, therefore, ineligible for temporary resident status under section 245A of the Act on this basis.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. This decision constitutes a final notice of ineligibility.