



U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services

**identifying data deleted to
prevent clearly unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy**

PUBLIC COPY

LI




FILE:  Office: LOS ANGELES Date: JAN 14 2010
MSC 05 231 14738

IN RE: Applicant: 

APPLICATION: Application for Status as a Temporary Resident pursuant to Section 245A of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:



INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. If your appeal was dismissed or rejected, all documents have been returned to the National Benefits Center. You no longer have a case pending before this office, and you are not entitled to file a motion to reopen or reconsider your case. If your appeal was sustained or remanded for further action, you will be contacted.

Perry Rhew
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The application for temporary resident status pursuant to the terms of the settlement agreements reached in *Catholic Social Services, Inc., et al., v. Ridge, et al.*, CIV. NO. S-86-1343-LKK (E.D. Cal) January 23, 2004, and *Felicity Mary Newman, et al., v. United States Immigration and Citizenship Services, et al.*, CIV. NO. 87-4757-WDK (C.D. Cal) February 17, 2004 (CSS/Newman Settlement Agreements), was denied by the Director, Los Angeles. In a subsequent motion to reopen, the director vacated the previous decision dated June 21, 2006 denying the application for status as a temporary resident under section 245A of the Act. In her current decision dated April 17, 2007, the director again denied the application. The decision is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant submitted a Form I-687, Application for Status as a Temporary Resident under Section 245A of the Immigration and Nationality Act (Act), and a Form I-687 Supplement, CSS/Newman Class Membership Worksheet. The director denied the application, finding that the applicant had disrupted his period of required continuous residence and physical presence in the United States during the statutory period of November 6, 1986 to May 4, 1988.

On appeal, counsel states that the applicant misstated that in August, 1987, he took a trip to Sri Lanka for three months. Counsel claims that the applicant was nervous at the interview and did not know exactly what to say. Counsel asserts that the correct information is that he left the United States in August, 1987, and returned to the United States on September 15, 1987.

An applicant shall be regarded as having resided continuously in the United States if, at the time of filing the application for temporary resident status, no single absence from the United States has exceeded 45 days, and the aggregate of all absences has not exceeded 180 days between January 1, 1982, through the date the application is filed, unless the alien can establish that due to emergent reasons the return to the United States could not be accomplished within the time period allowed, the alien was maintaining residence in the United States, and the departure was not based on an order of deportation. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.1(c)(1)(i).

The applicant claimed on his Form I-687 application, during his Form I-687 interview and in his statement dated December 8, 2005, that he went to Sri Lanka to visit his mother and family from August 13, 1987 – October 11, 1987. Absent an explanation or other evidence, the applicant has not established that he did not remain outside the United States for more than 45 days. No explanation and evidence was provided with the Form I-687 application and during the interview to show that the applicant's absence from the United States was due to emergent reasons. Therefore, the applicant has disrupted any period of continuous residence in the United States during the statutory period of January 1, 1982 to May 4, 1988 and has not shown emergent reasons for the length of the absence.

The applicant also disrupted any period of required physical presence when he was absent from the United States from August 13, 1987 – October 11, 1987. On appeal, counsel states that the applicant gave the wrong information to the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) officer because he was nervous and could not remember the precise date of return. Counsel states that the applicant has now checked all his documents and information and knows that the correct date he left the United States was in August, 1987 and the correct return date is September, 15, 1987. Counsel has not provided any documentary evidence such as the applicant's passport, airline ticket,

or other evidence of the applicant's attempt to return to the United States on September 15, 1987, to substantiate his statement. Absent such evidence, the AAO finds that the applicant disrupted his period of required continuous physical presence in the United States during the statutory period of November 6, 1986 to May 4, 1988.

A legalization applicant must show continuous physical presence in the United States from November 6, 1986 through May 4, 1988. See Section 245A(a)(3)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(3)(A). An absence during this period which is found to be brief, casual and innocent shall not break a legalization applicant's continuous physical presence. Section 245A(a)(3)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(3)(B). See e.g. *Espinoza-Gutierrez v. Smith, INS, et al.*, 94 F.3d 1270 (9th Cir. 1996). The *Espinoza-Gutierrez* court held that a legalization applicant's absence would not represent a break in continuous physical presence if it was found that the absence was brief, casual and innocent as defined by the court in *Rosenburg v. Fleuti*, 374 U.S. 449 (1963). See also *Assa'ad v. U.S. Attorney General, INS*, 332 F.3d 1321 (11th Cir. 2003) (which affirmed the portion of the holding in *Espinoza-Gutierrez* relied upon here, but disagreed with a different aspect of that holding.) The AAO finds that the applicant's absence from the United States in this case was not brief, casual and innocent in that the record indicates: that he was absent from the United States for at least 60 or more days.¹ See *Rosenberg, supra* (where the court looked to (1) the duration of the alien's absence; (2) the purpose of the absence; and (3) the need for special documentation to make the trip abroad to determine whether the absence was a brief, innocent and casual or meaningfully disruptive of the alien's residence in the United States.)

The AAO also finds that the applicant did not provide credible evidence to establish that he entered the United States prior to January 1, 1982, and thereafter continuously resided in the United States in an unlawful status for the duration of the requisite period.

An applicant for temporary resident status must establish entry into the United States before January 1, 1982, and continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since such date and through the date the application is filed. Section 245A(a)(2) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(2). The applicant must also establish that he or she has been continuously physically present in the United States since November 6, 1986. Section 245(a)(3) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(3). The regulations clarify that the applicant must have been physically present in the United States from November 6, 1986 until the date of filing the application. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(b)(1).

For purposes of establishing residence and physical presence under the CSS/Newman Settlement Agreements, the term "until the date of filing" in 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(b)(1) means until the date the applicant attempted to file a completed Form I-687 application and fee or was caused not to timely file during the original legalization application period of May 5, 1987 to May 4, 1988. CSS

¹ The regulation implementing the statutory requirement of "continuous unlawful residence" in the United States defines that term as no single absence from the United States exceeding 45 days and absences in the aggregate not exceeding 180 days. See, section 245A(a)(2)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a)(2)(A) and 8 C.F.R. § 245a.1(c)(1)(i). The term "continuous physical presence" suggests that a shorter time frame should be applied to determine the permissible length of single and aggregate absences from the United States during the period from November 6, 1986 to May 4, 1988.

Settlement Agreement paragraph 11 at page 6; Newman Settlement Agreement paragraph 11 at page 10. The applicant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she has resided in the United States for the requisite period, is admissible to the United States under the provisions of section 245A of the Act, and is otherwise eligible for adjustment of status. The inference to be drawn from the documentation provided shall depend on the extent of the documentation, its credibility and amenability to verification. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5). To meet his or her burden of proof, an applicant must provide evidence of eligibility apart from his or her own testimony, and the sufficiency of all evidence produced by the applicant will be judged according to its probative value and credibility. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(6).

Although the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3) provides an illustrative list of contemporaneous documents that an applicant may submit in support of his or her claim of continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since prior to January 1, 1982, the submission of any other relevant document is permitted pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(vi)(L).

The “preponderance of the evidence” standard requires that the evidence demonstrate that the applicant's claim is “probably true,” where the determination of “truth” is made based on the factual circumstances of each individual case. *Matter of E-M-*, 20 I&N Dec. 77, 79-80 (Comm. 1989). In evaluating the evidence, *Matter of E-M-* also stated that “[t]ruth is to be determined not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality.” *Id.* at 80. Thus, in adjudicating the application pursuant to the preponderance of the evidence standard, the director must examine each piece of evidence for relevance, probative value, and credibility, both individually and within the context of the totality of the evidence, to determine whether the fact to be proven is probably true.

Even if the director has some doubt as to the truth, if the petitioner submits relevant, probative, and credible evidence that leads the director to believe that the claim is “probably true” or “more likely than not,” the applicant or petitioner has satisfied the standard of proof. *See U.S. v. Cardozo-Fonseca*, 480 U.S. 421, 431 (1987) (defining “more likely than not” as a greater than 50 percent probability of something occurring). If the director can articulate a material doubt, it is appropriate for the director to either request additional evidence or, if that doubt leads the director to believe that the claim is probably not true, deny the application or petition.

At issue in this proceeding is whether the applicant submitted sufficient credible evidence to meet his burden of establishing that he (1) entered the United States before January 1, 1982, and (2) has continuously resided in the United States in an unlawful status for the requisite period of time. The documentation that the applicant submits in support of his claim to have arrived in the United States before January 1, 1982 and lived in an unlawful status during the requisite period consists of his school records and other evidence. The AAO will consider all of the evidence relevant to the requisite period to determine the applicant’s eligibility.

The USCIS adjudicating officer’s notes reveal that the applicant claimed the first time he entered the United States was without inspection in January, 1981, with his uncle [REDACTED]. The applicant also claimed during the interview that he never went to school in the United States but attended school in Sri Lanka from 1972 – 1986 and then changed his mind and stated “72 to 80

around there.” In his statement dated December 8, 2005, the applicant claimed he entered the United States on March 27, 1981.

The inconsistencies regarding the applicant’s initial entry into the United States are material to the applicant’s claim in that they have a direct bearing on the applicant’s continuous residence in the United States during the requisite period. No evidence of record resolves these inconsistencies. It is incumbent upon the applicant to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence. Any attempt to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies will not suffice unless the petitioner submits competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. Doubt cast on any aspect of the applicant’s proof may lead to a reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining evidence offered in support of the application. *See Matter of Ho*, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591-92 (BIA 1988).

The applicant submitted statements from [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] to establish his initial entry and residence in the United States during the requisite period. The affidavits contain statements that the affiants have personally known that the applicant resided in the United States since March, 1981. The affiants generally attest to being friends with the applicant but provide no other information about the applicant.

The statements submitted do not contain sufficiently detailed descriptions to establish the reliability of their assertions. As stated previously, the evidence must be evaluated not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality. The absence of sufficiently detailed statements to corroborate the applicant’s claim of continuous residence for the entire requisite period seriously detracts from the credibility of his claim. For instance, none of the witnesses supplies any details about the applicant’s life, such as, knowledge about his family members, education, employment, hobbies, shared activities and the manner he entered the United States.

The witnesses do not provide concrete information, specific to the applicant and generated by the asserted associations with him, which would reflect and corroborate the extent of those associations and demonstrate that they were a sufficient basis for reliable knowledge about the applicant’s residence during the time addressed in the affidavits. To be considered probative and credible, witness affidavits must do more than simply state that an affiant knows an applicant and that the applicant has lived in the United States for a specific time period. Their content must include sufficient detail from a claimed relationship to indicate that the relationship probably did exist and that the witness does, by virtue of that relationship, have knowledge of the facts alleged. Therefore, the statements have little probative value.

The remaining evidence consists of a letter from the applicant’s previous employer, [REDACTED] store manager of [REDACTED] stated that the applicant was employed as a dishwasher from August, 1984 to present. [REDACTED] does not attest to the applicant’s entry and continuous residence in the United States and provides no other information about the applicant or any evidence to verify the applicant’s employment. Further, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(i) states that letters from employers attesting to an applicant’s employment must: provide the applicant’s address at the time of employment; identify the exact period of employment; show periods of layoff; state the applicant’s duties; declare whether the information was taken from

company records; and, identify the location of such company records and state whether such records are accessible or in the alternative state the reason why such records are unavailable. As the letter does not meet the requirements stipulated in the aforementioned regulation, it will be given nominal weight.

An applicant applying for adjustment of status under this part has the burden of proving by a preponderance of evidence that he or she is eligible for adjustment of status under section 245a of the Act. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5). In the instant case, the applicant has failed to submit sufficient evidence to overcome the director's denial. The insufficiency of the evidence calls into question the credibility of the applicant's claim of continuous unlawful residence in the United States throughout the requisite period. The evidence submitted is insufficient to establish the applicant's entry into the United States before January 1, 1982, and continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since such date and through the requisite period.

Therefore, based upon the foregoing, the applicant has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he entered the United States before January 1, 1982 and continuously resided in an unlawful status in the United States for the requisite period as required under both 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5) and *Matter of E- M--*, *supra*. The applicant is, therefore, ineligible for temporary resident status under section 245A of the Act.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. This decision constitutes a final notice of ineligibility.