

identifying data deleted to
prevent clearly unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy


U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Office of Administrative Appeals MS 2090
Washington, DC 20529-2090



U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services

PUBLIC COPY

L1



FILE:

MSC-06-081-11612

Office: NORFOLK

Date:

MAY 04 2010

IN RE:

Applicant:



APPLICATION:

Application for Status as a Temporary Resident pursuant to Section 245A of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:



INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. If your appeal was dismissed or rejected, all documents have been returned to the National Benefits Center. You no longer have a case pending before this office, and you are not entitled to file a motion to reopen or reconsider your case. If your appeal was sustained or remanded for further action, you will be contacted.

Perry Rhew
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The application for temporary resident status pursuant to the terms of the settlement agreements reached in *Catholic Social Services, Inc., et al., v. Ridge, et al.*, CIV. NO. S-86-1343-LKK (E.D. Cal) January 23, 2004, and *Felicity Mary Newman, et al., v. United States Immigration and Citizenship Services, et al.*, CIV. NO. 87-4757-WDK (C.D. Cal) February 17, 2004 (CSS/Newman Settlement Agreements), was denied by the Director, Norfolk. The decision is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant submitted a Form I-687, Application for Status as a Temporary Resident under Section 245A of the Immigration and Nationality Act (Act), and a Form I-687 Supplement, CSS/Newman Class Membership Worksheet. The director determined that the applicant had not established by a preponderance of the evidence that he had continuously resided in the United States in an unlawful status for the duration of the requisite period. Specifically, the director noted that the applicant was admitted to the United States in B-1 visitor status on March 7, 1981 as evidenced by a copy of the applicant's passport and entry stamp in the record of proceedings. However, the director noted that the evidence contained in the record which pertains to the applicant's continuous unlawful residence in the United States following his entry is insufficient to establish eligibility. The director denied the application on December 4, 2007.

On appeal, the applicant asserts that United States Citizenship & Immigration Services (USCIS) erred in finding that the applicant failed to prove that he was in unlawful status in the United States prior to January 1, 1982 in a manner known to the government. He asserts that he violated his lawful status by overstaying his period of lawful stay following his March 1981 entry.

Preliminarily, the AAO notes that the director adjudicated the application on the merits and presumptively found the applicant eligible for class membership under the terms of the CSS/Newman Settlement Agreements. On September 9, 2008 the court approved a Stipulation of Settlement in the class action *Northwest Immigrant Rights Project, et al vs. USCIS, et al*, 88-CV-00379 JLR (W.D. Was.) (NWIRP). Class members are defined, in relevant part, as:

1. Class Members [include] all persons who entered the United States in a nonimmigrant status prior to January 1, 1982, who are otherwise *prima facie* eligible for legalization under § 245A of the INA [Immigration & Nationality Act], 8 U.S.C. § 1255a, who are within one or more of the Enumerated Categories described below in paragraph 2, and who –

(A) between May 5, 1987 and May 4, 1988, attempted to file a complete application for legalization under § 245A of the INA and fees to an INS officer or agent acting on behalf of the INS, including a Qualified Designated Agency (“QDE”), and whose applications were rejected for filing (hereinafter referred to as ‘Subclass A members’); or

(B) between May 5, 1987 and May 4, 1988, attempted to apply for legalization with an INS officer, or agent acting on behalf of the INS, including a QDE, under § 245A of the INA, but were advised that they were ineligible for legalization, or were refused legalization application forms, and for whom such information, or inability to obtain the required application forms, was a substantial cause of their failure to file or complete a timely written application (hereinafter referred to as 'Sub-class B' members); or

(C) filed a legalization application under INA § 245A and fees with an INS officer or agent acting on behalf of the INS, including a QDE, and whose application

- i. has not been finally adjudicated or whose temporary resident status has been proposed for termination (hereinafter referred to as 'Sub-class C.i. members'),
- ii. was denied or whose temporary resident status was terminated, where the INS or CIS action or inaction was because INS or CIS believed the applicant had failed to meet the 'known to the government' requirement, or the requirement that s/he demonstrate that his/her unlawful residence was continuous (hereinafter referred to as 'Sub-class C.ii members').

2. Enumerated Categories

- (1) Persons who violated the terms of their nonimmigrant status prior to January 1, 1982 in a manner known to the government because documentation or the absence thereof (including, but not limited to, the absence of quarterly or annual address reports required on or before December 31, 1981) existed in the records of one or more government agencies which, taken as a whole, warrants a finding that the applicant was in an unlawful status prior to January 1, 1982, in a manner known to the government.
- (2) Persons who violated the terms of their nonimmigrant visas before January 1, 1982, for whom INS/DHS records for the relevant period (including required school and employer reports of status violations) are not contained in the alien's A-file, and who are unable to meet the requirements of 8 C.F.R. §§ 245a.1(d) and 245a.2(d) without such records.
- (3) Persons whose facially valid 'lawful status' on or after January 1, 1982 was obtained by fraud or mistake, whether such 'lawful status' was the result of
 - (a) reinstatement to nonimmigrant status;
 - (b) change of nonimmigrant status pursuant to INA § 248;
 - (c) adjustment of status pursuant to INA § 245; or

- (d) grant of some other immigration benefit deemed to interrupt the continuous unlawful residence or continuous physical presence requirements of INA § 245A.

The AAO finds that the applicant is a member of the NWIRP class as enumerated above and will adjudicate the application in accordance with the standards set forth in the settlement agreement.

NWIRP provides that I-687 applications pending as of the date of the agreement shall be adjudicated in accordance with the adjudication standards described in paragraph 8B of the settlement agreement. Under those standards, the applicant must make a *prima facie* showing that prior to January 1, 1982, the applicant violated the terms of his or her nonimmigrant status in a manner known to the government because documentation or the absence thereof (including, but not limited to, the absence of quarterly or annual address reports required on or before December 31, 1981) existed in the records of one or more government agencies which, taken as a whole, warrants a finding that the applicant was in an unlawful status prior to January 1, 1982, in a manner known to the government. It is presumed that the school or employer complied with the law and reported violations of status to the INS; the absence of such report in government records is not alone sufficient to rebut this presumption. Once the applicant makes such a showing, USCIS then has the burden of coming forward with proof to rebut the evidence that the applicant violated his or her status. If USCIS fails to carry this burden, the settlement agreement stipulates at paragraph 8B that it will be found that the alien's unlawful status was known to the government as of January 1, 1982. With respect to individuals who obtained their status by fraud or mistake, the applicant bears the burden of establishing that he or she obtained lawful status by fraud or mistake. The settlement agreement further stipulates that the general adjudicatory standards set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 245a.18(d) or 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(k)(4), whichever is more favorable to the applicant, shall be followed to adjudicate the merits of the application once class membership is favorably determined.

An applicant for temporary resident status must establish entry into the United States before January 1, 1982, and continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since such date and through the date the application is filed. Section 245A(a)(2) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(2). The applicant must also establish that he or she has been continuously physically present in the United States since November 6, 1986. Section 245A(a)(3) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(3). The regulations clarify that the applicant must have been physically present in the United States from November 6, 1986 until the date of filing the application. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(b)(1).

For purposes of establishing residence and physical presence under the NWIRP Settlement Agreement, the term "until the date of filing" in 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(b)(1) means until the date the applicant attempted to file a completed Form I-687 application and fee or was caused not to timely file during the original legalization application period of May 5, 1987 to May 4, 1988. NWIRP Settlement Agreement paragraph 8 at pp. 14-15.

The applicant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she has resided in the United States for the requisite period, is admissible to the United States under the provisions of section 245A of the Act, and is otherwise eligible for adjustment of status. The inference to be drawn from the documentation provided shall depend on the extent of the documentation, its credibility and amenability to verification. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5).

Although the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3) provides an illustrative list of contemporaneous documents that an applicant may submit in support of his or her claim of continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since prior to January 1, 1982, the submission of any other relevant document is permitted pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(vi)(L).

The “preponderance of the evidence” standard requires that the evidence demonstrate that the applicant's claim is “probably true,” where the determination of “truth” is made based on the factual circumstances of each individual case. *Matter of E-M-*, 20 I&N Dec. 77, 79-80 (Comm. 1989). In evaluating the evidence, *Matter of E-M-* also stated that “[t]ruth is to be determined not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality.” *Id.* at 80. Thus, in adjudicating the application pursuant to the preponderance of the evidence standard, the director must examine each piece of evidence for relevance, probative value, and credibility, both individually and within the context of the totality of the evidence, to determine whether the fact to be proven is probably true.

Even if the director has some doubt as to the truth, if the petitioner submits relevant, probative, and credible evidence that leads the director to believe that the claim is “probably true” or “more likely than not,” the applicant or petitioner has satisfied the standard of proof. *See U.S. v. Cardozo-Fonseca*, 480 U.S. 421, 431 (1987) (defining “more likely than not” as a greater than 50 percent probability of something occurring). If the director can articulate a material doubt, it is appropriate for the director to either request additional evidence or, if that doubt leads the director to believe that the claim is probably not true, deny the application or petition.

In support of his claim of continuous unlawful residence in the United States, the applicant asserts that he entered the United States in March 7, 1981 using a B1/B2 nonimmigrant visitor visa. He asserts that he overstayed the period of lawful admission following his entry.

The AAO maintains plenary power to review each appeal on a *de novo* basis. 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (“On appeal from or review of the initial decision, the agency has all the powers which it would have in making the initial decision except as it may limit the issues on notice or by rule.”); *see also, Janka v. U.S. Dept. of Transp., NTSB*, 925 F.2d 1147, 1149 (9th Cir. 1991). The AAO’s *de novo* authority has been long recognized by the federal courts. *See, e.g. Dor v. INS*, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989). In this case, the AAO finds that the applicant violated his status by failing to submit quarterly address reports pursuant to Section 265 of the INA.

Until Dec. 29, 1981, section 265 of the Act stated that any alien in the United States in "lawful temporary residence status shall" notify the Attorney General "in writing of his address at the expiration of each three-month period during which he remains in the United States, regardless of whether there has been any change in address." See section 265 of the Act (1980) and PL 97-116, 1981 HR 4327(1981) which confirms that section 265 was modified, effective December 29, 1981, such that lawful non-immigrants were no longer required to file quarterly address reports regardless of whether there had been any change in address.

The applicant entered the United States in B-2 visitor status on March 7, 1981. The applicant asserts that he remained in the United States until 1984 when he departed and reentered the United States in J-1 status. He would have been required to provide written updates of his address at the expiration of each three-month period during which he remained in the United States, regardless of whether there was any change in address, for the period March 7, 1981 until December 29, 1981. The record of proceedings is void of any address updates.

Following *de novo* review by the AAO, USCIS records do not reflect that the applicant filed quarterly or annual address notifications as required prior to December 29, 1981. In accordance with the terms of NWIRP, the AAO finds that the evidence establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that the applicant was unlawfully present in a manner known to the government prior to January 1, 1982. Consequently, the applicant has overcome the grounds for denial cited by the director and has established that his unlawful status was known to the government prior to January 1, 1982.

However, the application cannot be approved because the applicant has failed to establish that he resided continuously in the United States from the time of his entry until his August 16, 1984 entry in J-1 status.

The applicant asserts that he remained in the United States from March 7, 1981 until August 16, 1984 when he departed the United States and reentered in J-1 Exchange visitor status. The director noted that the applicant has submitted ample evidence of his residence in the United States following his 1984 entry in J-1 status. The AAO concurs. However, it is noted that the evidence submitted in support of the applicant's residence in the United States between March 1981 and August 1984 is insufficient to establish the applicant's unlawful residence in the United States during this period. Specifically, the applicant submits the following evidence pertaining to this period:

- Copies of two certificates from [REDACTED] dated March 27, 1981 and March 18, 1981 issued to the applicant.
- Affidavits from [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. All contain statements that the affiants have known the applicant for some time and that they attest to the applicant being physically present in the United

States during the required period. These affidavits fail, however, to establish the applicant's continuous unlawful residence in the United States for the duration of the requisite period. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] both indicate that they knew the applicant in Nigeria and Canada prior to the relevant period. [REDACTED] indicates that she rode with the applicant from Canada to the United States and stayed for one week in 1981 and then only visited the applicant in February 1984 and July 1987 in the United States. She asserts that she resided continuously in Canada throughout the relevant period. Therefore, she does not have direct personal knowledge of the applicant's continuous residence. [REDACTED] indicates that the applicant stayed with him in Springfield, Massachusetts from 1981 until July 1984. He does not indicate that he has direct personal knowledge of the applicant's residence in the United States beyond July 1984. [REDACTED] indicates that she was told by a friend that the applicant was living in Massachusetts, however, she does not indicate that she has direct, personal knowledge. [REDACTED] indicates that he has personal knowledge of the applicant's residence however, he does not indicate the basis of this knowledge.

As stated previously, the evidence must be evaluated not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality; an applicant must provide evidence of eligibility apart from his or her own testimony; and the sufficiency of all evidence produced by the applicant will be judged according to its probative value and credibility. None of the witness statements provide concrete information, specific to the applicant and generated by the asserted associations with him, which would reflect and corroborate the extent of those associations and demonstrate that they were a sufficient basis for reliable knowledge about the applicant's residence during the time addressed in the affidavits. To be considered probative and credible, witness affidavits must do more than simply state that an affiant knows an applicant and that the applicant has lived in the United States for a specific time period. Their content must include sufficient detail from a claimed relationship to indicate that the relationship probably did exist and that the witness does, by virtue of that relationship, have knowledge of the facts alleged. Upon review, the AAO finds that, individually and together, the witness statements do not indicate that their assertions are probably true. Therefore, they have little probative value.

Thus, the AAO agrees with the director that the applicant has not established his continuous residence in the United States prior to August 16, 1984.

It is further noted by the AAO that the director indicated that the applicant was subject to the two-year home residency requirement following the expiration of his J-1 status, as required by Section 212(e) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). The director noted that the Secretary of State designated on April 25, 1972 and revised on March 17, 1997 a list of fields of specialized knowledge or skills and those countries which clearly required the services of persons engaged in those skills. The director noted that pursuant to that list, the applicant was subject to a two-year foreign residency requirement as a Nigerian national participating in a computer science field. The director noted that the applicant was subject to this requirement and therefore, inadmissible to the United States pursuant to 22 C.F.R. § 41.65(b). However, the

AAO notes that the file contains a copy of a no-objection letter from the Embassy of the Federal Republic of Nigeria indicating that the government of Nigeria has no objection to the applicant remaining in the United States and recommends a waiver of the residency requirement under Section 212(e) of the Act. It is unclear from the record if the applicant was granted such a waiver.

Finally, the application may not be approved since the evidence establishes that the applicant is inadmissible to the United States. Section 245A(a)(4)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(4)(A), requires an alien to establish that he or she is admissible to the United States as an immigrant in order to be eligible for temporary resident status.

The record reflects that the applicant sought through misrepresentation to procure an immigration benefit under the Act. As noted above, on August 16, 1984 the applicant was granted J-1 status as an Exchange visitor. He applied for and was granted this status without disclosing his previous status violation, that is, that he failed to properly file the required address updates or to depart the United States in a timely manner following his March 1981 entry.

An alien is inadmissible if he seeks through fraud or misrepresentation to procure an immigration benefit under the Act. Section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i). Thus, the applicant is inadmissible and ineligible for legalization benefits.

Pursuant to section 245A(d)(2)(B)(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(d)(2)(B)(i), the cited grounds of inadmissibility may be waived in the case of individual aliens for humanitarian purposes, to assure family unity, or when it is otherwise in the public interest. The AAO notes that the applicant has not filed a Form I-690 Application for Waiver of Grounds of Excludability relating to the misrepresentation. If this were the sole reason for dismissing the appeal the AAO would give the applicant an opportunity to file a Form I-690. Since the applicant failed to establish his eligibility for temporary resident status, no purpose would be served in granting such a waiver.

Therefore, based upon the foregoing, the applicant has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he entered the United States before January 1, 1982 and continuously resided in an unlawful status in the United States for the entire requisite period as required under both 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5) and *Matter of E- M--*, *supra*. The applicant is, therefore, ineligible for temporary resident status under section 245A of the Act on this basis.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. This decision constitutes a final notice of ineligibility.