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U.S. Citizenship  
and Immigration  
Services

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FILE:



Office: LOS ANGELES

Date: DEC 01 2008

- consolidated herein]

MSC 02 247 62658

IN RE:

Applicant:



PETITION: Application for Status as a Permanent Resident pursuant to Section 1104 of the Legal Immigration Family Equity (LIFE) Act of 2000, Pub. L. 106-553, 114 Stat. 2762 (2000), amended by LIFE Act Amendments, Pub. L. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000).

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

SELF-REPRESENTED

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. If your appeal was dismissed or rejected, all documents have been returned to the National Benefits [or Records] Center. You no longer have a case pending before this office, and you are not entitled to file a motion to reopen or reconsider your case. If your appeal was sustained or remanded for further action, you will be contacted.

John F. Grissom, Acting Chief  
Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The application for permanent resident status under the Legal Immigration Family Equity (LIFE) Act was denied by the Director, Los Angeles, California, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The director determined that the applicant had not established that he resided in the United States in a continuous unlawful status from before January 1, 1982, through May 4, 1988, as required under section 1104(c)(2)(B) of the LIFE Act.

On appeal, the applicant submits a brief statement.

Section 1104(c)(2)(B) of the LIFE Act states:

(i) In General – The alien must establish that the alien entered the United States before January 1, 1982, and that he or she has resided continuously in the United States in an unlawful status since such date and through May 4, 1988. In determining whether an alien maintained continuous unlawful residence in the United States for purposes of this subparagraph, the regulations prescribed by the Attorney General under section 245A(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) that were most recently in effect before the date of the enactment of this Act shall apply.

An applicant for permanent resident status under section 1104 of the LIFE Act has the burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she has resided in the United States for the requisite periods, is admissible to the United States and is otherwise eligible for adjustment of status under this section. The inference to be drawn from the documentation provided shall depend on the extent of the documentation, its credibility, and its amenability to verification. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 245a.12(e).

The “preponderance of the evidence” standard requires that the evidence demonstrate that the applicant's claim is “probably true,” where the determination of “truth” is made based on the factual circumstances of each individual case. *Matter of E-M-*, 20 I&N Dec. 77, 79-80 (Comm. 1989). In evaluating the evidence, *Matter of E-M-* also stated that “[t]ruth is to be determined not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality.” *Id.* Thus, in adjudicating the application pursuant to the preponderance of the evidence standard, the director must examine each piece of evidence for relevance, probative value, and credibility, both individually and within the context of the totality of the evidence, to determine whether the fact to be proven is probably true.

Even if the director has some doubt as to the truth, if the applicant submits relevant, probative, and credible evidence that leads the director to believe that the claim is “probably true” or “more likely than not,” the applicant has satisfied the standard of proof. *See U.S. v. Cardozo-Fonseca*, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (defining “more likely than not” as a greater than 50 percent probability of something occurring). If the director can articulate a material doubt, it is appropriate for the director to either

request additional evidence or, if that doubt leads the director to believe that the claim is probably not true, deny the application.

Although the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3) provides an illustrative list of contemporaneous documents that an applicant may submit in support of his or her claim of continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since prior to January 1, 1982, the submission of any other relevant document is permitted pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(vi)(L). *See* 8 C.F.R. 245a.15(b). To meet his or her burden of proof, an applicant must provide evidence of eligibility apart from the applicant's own testimony. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.12(f). Affidavits indicating specific, personal knowledge of the applicant's whereabouts during the relevant time period are given greater weight than fill-in-the-blank affidavits providing generic information.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(i) states that letters from employers attesting to an applicant's employment must: provide the applicant's address at the time of employment; identify the exact period of employment; show periods of layoff; state the applicant's duties; declare whether the information was taken from company records; and identify the location of such company records and state whether such records are accessible or in the alternative state the reason why such records are unavailable.

The applicant filed the current Form I-485, Application to Register Permanent Resident Status or Adjust Status, under the LIFE Act on June 4, 2002. On March 8, 2007, the director denied the application. The applicant filed a timely appeal from that decision on April 3, 2007.

The issue in this proceeding is whether the applicant has furnished sufficient credible evidence to demonstrate that he continuously resided in the United States in an unlawful status from before January 1, 1982 through May 4, 1988.

In an attempt to establish his continuous unlawful status from before January 1, 1982, through May 4, 1988, the applicant submitted a fill-in-the-blank affidavit from [REDACTED], stating that the applicant lived on his property in Ingleside, California, from January 12, 1980, to November 23, 1984; a fill-in-the-blank affidavit from [REDACTED] stating that the applicant had been employed as a gardener from January 17, 1980, to December 15, 1984; generic receipts issued to the applicant in 1982, some of which appear to have been altered; photocopies of Travelers Express receipts issued to [REDACTED] dated in 1983, other photocopies of such receipts are illegible; photocopies of registered mail receipts, dated in 1983, some of which show the applicant as the receiver, and some of which show the applicant as the sender; and, a fill-in-the-blank affidavit from [REDACTED] stating that the applicant had lived in the United States since 1985.

The applicant claims that he used the alias [REDACTED]. In support of his application he also submitted a letter from Textile Dying & Finishing in Los Angeles, California, stating that [REDACTED] had been employed since 1985; a photocopy of a Social Security Card issued to [REDACTED] (No. [REDACTED]); a photocopy of an identification card from [REDACTED]

Finishing, containing his photograph, the name of "[REDACTED]," and a signature of [REDACTED] and, various documentation dated in or after 1985 relating to "[REDACTED]"

In cases where an applicant claims to have met any of the eligibility criteria under an assumed name, the applicant has the burden of proving that he or she was in fact the person who used that name. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(2)(i).

The most persuasive evidence of common identity is a document issued in the assumed name which identifies the applicant by photograph, fingerprint or detailed physical description. Other evidence which will be considered are affidavit(s) by a person or persons other than the applicant, made under oath, which identify the affiant by name and address and state the affiant's relationship to the applicant and the basis of the affiant's knowledge of the applicant's use of the assumed name. Affidavits accompanied by a photograph which has been identified by the affiant as the individual known to the affiant under the assumed name in question will carry greater weight. Other documents showing the assumed name may serve to establish the common identity when substantiated by corroborating detail. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(2)(ii).

In this case, the applicant provided a photocopy of an identification card, as noted above, from [REDACTED], Textile & Finishing, containing his photograph, the name of [REDACTED]" and a signature of [REDACTED]" However, it is noted that the signature on the identification card differs significantly from the signature on the photocopy of his Social Security card, also signed as [REDACTED]

Doubt cast on any aspect of the evidence as submitted may lead to a reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining evidence offered in support of the application. Further, it is incumbent on the applicant to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence; any attempts to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies, absent competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies, will not suffice. *Matter of Ho*, 19 I&N Dec. 582. (Comm. 1988).

The only documentation provided by the applicant to establish his presence in the United States prior to January 1, 1982, consists of the affidavits provided by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. The affidavit from [REDACTED] is vague as to how he dates his acquaintance with the applicant, how often and under what circumstances they had contact during the requisite period, and lacks details that would lend credibility to his statement. The employment letter from [REDACTED] does not comply with the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(i), in that the affiant does not provide the applicant's address at the time of employment; show periods of layoff; declare whether the information was taken from company records; and identify the location of such company records and state whether such records are accessible or in the alternative state the reason why such records are unavailable.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.12(e) provides that "[a]n alien applying for adjustment of status under [section 1104 of the LIFE Act] has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she has resided in the United States for the requisite periods." Preponderance of the

evidence is defined as “evidence which as a whole shows that the fact sought to be proved is more probable than not.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1064 (5<sup>th</sup> ed. 1979). *See Matter of Lemhammad*, 20 I&N Dec. 316, 320, Note 5 (BIA 1991).

The AAO finds that the applicant has failed to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he resided in the United States in a continuous unlawful status from before January 1, 1982 through May 4, 1988, as required by section 1104(c)(2)(B) of the LIFE Act. Given this, he is ineligible for permanent resident status under section 1104 of the LIFE Act.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed. This decision constitutes a final notice of ineligibility.