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
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
U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services

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FILE:



Office: LOS ANGELES

Date: **MAR 21 2008**

MSC 02 183 65619

IN RE:

Applicant:



APPLICATION:

Application for Status as a Permanent Resident pursuant to Section 1104 of the Legal Immigration Family Equity (LIFE) Act of 2000, Pub. L. 106-553, 114 Stat. 2762 (2000), amended by Life Act Amendments, Pub. L. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000).

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

Self-represented

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

Robert P. Wieman, Chief
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The application for permanent resident status under the Legal Immigration Family Equity (LIFE) Act was denied by the District Director, Los Angeles, California, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The district director denied the application because the applicant had not demonstrated that he had continuously resided in the United States in an unlawful status from before January 1, 1982, through May 4, 1988.

On appeal, the applicant asserts that he has been residing in the United States since 1981 and submits additional documentation in an attempt to establish his continuous residence in the United States during the requisite period.

An applicant for permanent resident status must establish entry into the United States before January 1, 1982, and continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since such date and through May 4, 1988. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.11(b).

An applicant for permanent resident status under section 1104 of the LIFE Act has the burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she has resided in the United States for the requisite periods, is admissible to the United States and is otherwise eligible for adjustment of status under this section. The inference to be drawn from the documentation provided shall depend on the extent of the documentation, its credibility and amenability to verification. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.12(e).

The “preponderance of the evidence” standard requires that the evidence demonstrate that the applicant's claim is “probably true,” where the determination of “truth” is made based on the factual circumstances of each individual case. *Matter of E-M-*, 20 I&N Dec. 77, 79-80 (Comm. 1989). In evaluating the evidence, *Matter of E-M-* also stated that “[t]ruth is to be determined not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality.” *Id.* Thus, in adjudicating the application pursuant to the preponderance of the evidence standard, the director must examine each piece of evidence for relevance, probative value, and credibility, both individually and within the context of the totality of the evidence, to determine whether the fact to be proven is probably true.

Even if the director has some doubt as to the truth, if the applicant submits relevant, probative, and credible evidence that leads the director to believe that the claim is “probably true” or “more likely than not,” the applicant has satisfied the standard of proof. *See U.S. v. Cardozo-Fonseca*, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (defining “more likely than not” as a greater than 50 percent probability of something occurring). If the director can articulate a material doubt, it is appropriate for the director to either request additional evidence or, if that doubt leads the director to believe that the claim is probably not true, deny the application.

Although the regulations provide an illustrative list of contemporaneous documents that an applicant may submit, the list also permits the submission of affidavits and any other relevant document. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(vi)(L).

An applicant who has been convicted of a felony or three or more misdemeanors in the United States is ineligible for adjustment to permanent resident status. Section 245A(b)(1)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act); 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(b)(1)(C); 8 C.F.R. §§ 245a.11(d)(1) and 18(a)(1).

“Misdemeanor” means a crime committed in the United States, either (1) punishable by imprisonment for a term of one year or less, regardless of the term actually served, if any; or (2) a crime treated as a misdemeanor under 8 C.F.R. § 245a.1(p). For purposes of this definition, any crime punishable by imprisonment for a maximum term of five days or less shall not be considered a misdemeanor. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.1(o).

The record reflects that on May 9, 2006, the applicant was convicted under the alias of driving with .08 percent or more alcohol in the blood, a violation of section 23152(b) VC in Case no. While this single conviction does not render the applicant ineligible pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 245a.11(d)(1) and 8 C.F.R. § 245a.18(a), the AAO notes that the applicant does have a misdemeanor conviction.

In an attempt to establish continuous unlawful residence since before January 1, 1982, through May 4, 1988, the applicant provided the following evidence throughout the application process:

- An affidavit notarized June 16, 2005, from of Pomona, California, who indicated that he was a supervisor at in Pomona and attested to the applicant’s employment from 1979 to late 1981.
- An affidavit notarized February 15, 2005, from of Pomona, California, who asserted he has been friends with the applicant since 1980 at the time the applicant resided in Pomona.
- An affidavit notarized February 12, 2005, from of Pomona, California, who indicated she was a co-worker of the applicant at in Pomona in 1980. The affiant asserted she has remained friends with the applicant since that time.
- A letter dated July 5, 1991, from (last name indecipherable), owner of in Santa Ana, California, who indicated the applicant has been employed as a laborer since August 1987.

The applicant also submitted numerous documents from entities addressed to and during the requisite period. These documents, however, have no probative value as the applicant failed to provide evidence from the entities establishing that he and are one and the same person. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)).

The record reflects that the applicant filed a Form I-687 application for class membership pursuant to one of the legalization class action lawsuits: *Catholic Social Services, Inc. v. Meese, vacated sub nom. Reno v. Catholic Social Services, Inc.*, 509 U.S. 43 (1993) (CSS), *League of United Latin American Citizens v. INS, vacated sub nom. Reno v. Catholic Social Services, Inc.*, 509 U.S. 43 (1993) (LULAC), or *Zambrano v. INS, vacated sub nom. Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Zambrano*, 509 U.S. 918 (1993) (Zambrano). The applicant was issued alien registration number It is noted that the applicant did not claim on his Form I-687 application to have been known by or used the aliases or

Doubt cast on any aspect of an applicant's proof may lead to a reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining evidence. It is incumbent upon an applicant to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence, and attempts to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies, absent competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth, in fact, lies, will not suffice. *Matter of Ho*, 19 I. & N. Dec. 582 (BIA 1988).

Given the credibility issues arising from the documentation provided by the applicant, it is determined that the applicant has not met his burden of proof. The applicant has not established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he entered the United States before January 1, 1982 and resided in this country in an unlawful status continuously from before January 1, 1982 through May 4, 1988, as required under 1104(c)(2)(B)(i) of the LIFE Act and 8 C.F.R. § 245a.11(b). Given this, the applicant is ineligible for permanent resident status under section 1104 of the LIFE Act.

Finally, the director, in her Notice of Intent to Deny dated October 3, 2005, noted that the Form I-693, Medical Examination, submitted by the applicant was not acceptable as his vaccinations were not current. The director determined that the applicant was inadmissible under section 212(a)(1)(A)(ii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. However, such grounds of inadmissibility may be waived pursuant to section 245A(d)(2) of the Act; 8.C.F.R. § 245a.18(c).

Given his failure to credibly establish continuous residence in the United States during the requisite period, the applicant is ineligible for permanent residence under section 1104 of the LIFE Act, and therefore the issuance of an application for waiver of inadmissibility is moot.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. This decision constitutes a final notice of ineligibility.