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U.S. Department of Homeland Security  
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services  
Office of Administrative Appeals  
Washington, DC 20529-2090



U.S. Citizenship  
and Immigration  
Services

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[Redacted]

FILE: [Redacted] MSC 02 236 63978

Office: NEW YORK

Date:

**APR 06 2009**

IN RE: Applicant: [Redacted]

APPLICATION: Application for Status as a Permanent Resident pursuant to Section 1104 of the Legal Immigration Family Equity (LIFE) Act of 2000, Pub. L. 106-553, 114 Stat. 2762 (2000), *amended by* LIFE Act Amendments, Pub. L. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000).

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

[Redacted]

**INSTRUCTIONS:**

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. If your appeal was dismissed or rejected, all documents have been returned to the National Benefits Center. You no longer have a case pending before this office, and you are not entitled to file a motion to reopen or reconsider your case. If your appeal was sustained or remanded for further action, you will be contacted.

  
John F. Grissom  
Acting Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The application for permanent resident status under the Legal Immigration Family Equity (LIFE) Act was denied by the Director, New York, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The director denied the application because the applicant failed to demonstrate that he resided in the United States in a continuous, unlawful status from before January 1, 1982, through May 4, 1988, as required by section 1104(c)(2)(B) of the LIFE Act. Specifically, the director determined that the applicant's absence in October 1987 disrupted his claim of continuous residence in the United States during the requisite period. The director further found that the applicant had failed to establish his entry into the United States prior to January 1, 1982.

On appeal, counsel, on behalf of the applicant, asserts that "the denial of the applicant's application was against the law and facts of the case and was an abuse of discretion." Counsel contends that the applicant submitted ample evidence of his presence in the United States during the statutory period. Counsel asserts that the applicant's prolonged absence from the United States resulted from his mother's health problems, which necessitated the applicant's continued stay in Pakistan. Counsel submits a declaration regarding the hospitalization of the applicant's mother in October 1987. The AAO has reviewed all of the evidence and has made a *de novo* decision based on the record and the AAO's assessment of the credibility, relevance and probative value of the evidence.<sup>1</sup>

Section 1104(c)(2)(B) of the LIFE Act states:

(i) In General – The alien must establish that the alien entered the United States before January 1, 1982, and that he or she has resided continuously in the United States in an unlawful status since such date and through May 4, 1988. In determining whether an alien maintained continuous unlawful residence in the United States for purposes of this subparagraph, the regulations prescribed by the Attorney General under section 245A(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) that were most recently in effect before the date of the enactment of this Act shall apply.

"Continuous unlawful residence" is defined at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.15(c)(1), as follows: An alien shall be regarded as having resided continuously in the United States if no single absence from the United States has exceeded forty-five (45) days, and the aggregate of all absences has not exceeded one hundred and eighty (180) days between January 1, 1982, and May 4, 1988, unless

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<sup>1</sup> The AAO maintains plenary power to review each appeal on a *de novo* basis. 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) ("On appeal from or review of the initial decision, the agency has all the powers which it would have in making the initial decision except as it may limit the issues on notice or by rule."); *see also*, *Janka v. U.S. Dept. of Transp., NTSB*, 925 F.2d 1147, 1149 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1991). The AAO's *de novo* authority has been long recognized by the federal courts. *See, e.g. Dor v. INS*, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n.9 (2d Cir. 1989).

the alien can establish that due to emergent reasons, his or her return to the United States could not be accomplished within the time period allowed.

Although this term is not defined in the regulations, *Matter of C-*, 19 I. & N. Dec. 808 (Comm. 1988) holds that *emergent* means “coming unexpectedly into being.” The applicant has not submitted any evidence to establish that an emergent reason delayed her return to the United States.

An applicant for permanent resident status under section 1104 of the LIFE Act must establish entry into the United States before January 1, 1982, and continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since such date through May 4, 1988. *See* § 1104(c)(2)(B) of the LIFE Act and 8 C.F.R. § 245a.11(b). The applicant has the burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she has resided in the United States for the requisite periods, is admissible to the United States and is otherwise eligible for adjustment of status under section 1104 of the LIFE Act. The inference to be drawn from the documentation provided shall depend on the extent of the documentation, its credibility and amenability to verification. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.12(e). To meet his or her burden of proof, an applicant must provide evidence of eligibility apart from the applicant’s own testimony, and the sufficiency of all evidence produced by the applicant will be judged according to its probative value and credibility. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.12(f). 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(6).

The “preponderance of the evidence” standard requires that the evidence demonstrate that the applicant’s claim is “probably true,” where the determination of “truth” is made based on the factual circumstances of each individual case. *Matter of E-M-*, 20 I&N Dec. 77, 79-80 (Comm. 1989). In evaluating the evidence, *Matter of E-M-* also stated that “[t]ruth is to be determined not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality.” *Id.* at 80. Thus, in adjudicating the application pursuant to the preponderance of the evidence standard, the director must examine each piece of evidence for relevance, probative value, and credibility, both individually and within the context of the totality of the evidence, to determine whether the fact to be proven is probably true.

Even if the director has some doubt as to the truth, if the applicant submits relevant, probative, and credible evidence that leads the director to believe that the claim is “probably true” or “more likely than not,” the applicant or petitioner has satisfied the standard of proof. *See U.S. v. Cardozo-Fonseca*, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (defining “more likely than not” as a greater than 50 percent probability of something occurring). If the director can articulate a material doubt, it is appropriate for the director to either request additional evidence or, if that doubt leads the director to believe that the claim is probably not true, deny the application.

Although the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3) provides an illustrative list of contemporaneous documents that an applicant may submit in support of his or her claim of continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since prior to January 1, 1982, the submission of any other relevant document is permitted pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(vi)(L).

The issue in this proceeding is whether the applicant has continuously resided in the United States in an unlawful status for the duration of the statutory period. The record indicates that the applicant was interviewed on March 10, 2004. During his interview, the applicant stated that he was left the United States on October 10, 1987, and returned on November 25, 1987, 46 days later. The director determined that the applicant's absence exceeded the forty-five days permitted under the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.15(c)(1).

On appeal, counsel asserts that the applicant's prolonged absence from the United States was due to emergent reasons. Counsel asserts that the applicant's mother was suffering from enteric fever and toxemia and he submits a declaration in support of his assertion. The declaration from [REDACTED] indicates that the applicant's mother has been a regular patient of his clinic since 1986 and that she was admitted into his hospital from October 4, 1987 to October 19, 1987 with complaint of enteric fever and toxemia.

Although this term is not defined in the regulations, *Matter of C-*, 19 I. & N. Dec. 808 (Comm. 1988) holds that *emergent* means "coming unexpectedly into being." Here, the applicant has not established that an emergent reason delayed his return to the United States. As the applicant's mother was admitted into the hospital on October 4, 1987, the applicant had knowledge of his mother's health condition prior to his departure on October 10, 1987, and purposely departed the United States for that specific reason. There is no evidence in the record that the health condition of the applicant's mother unexpectedly delayed the applicant's return to the United States within the time permitted.

It is also noted that, upon review, the AAO finds that the evidence in the record is insufficient to establish the applicant entered the United States prior to January 1, 1982.

Based upon the foregoing, the applicant's absence in 1987 exceeded the forty-five days permitted in a single absence. Therefore, the applicant has failed to establish that he resided in continuous unlawful status in the United States from before January 1, 1982 through May 4, 1988, as required under Section 1104(c)(2)(B) of the LIFE Act. Given this, he is ineligible for permanent resident status under Section 1104 of the LIFE Act.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed. This decision constitutes a final notice of ineligibility.