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**U.S. Department of Homeland Security**  
20 Mass. Ave., N.W., Rm. 3000  
Washington, DC 20529-2090



**U.S. Citizenship  
and Immigration  
Services**

L2

FILE:

[REDACTED]  
MSC 02 022 64336

Office: NEW YORK

Date: FEB 04 2009

IN RE:      Applicant: [REDACTED]

APPLICATION: Application for Status as a Permanent Resident pursuant to Section 1104 of the Legal Immigration Family Equity (LIFE) Act of 2000, Pub. L. 106-553, 114 Stat. 2762 (2000), *amended by* LIFE Act Amendments, Pub. L. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000).

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

SELF-REPRESENTED

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. The file has been returned to the office that originally decided your case. If your appeal was sustained, or if your case was remanded for further action, you will be contacted. If your appeal was dismissed, you no longer have a case pending before this office, and you are not entitled to file a motion to reopen or reconsider your case.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "John F. Grissom".

John F. Grissom, Acting Chief  
Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** On August 30, 2007, the Director, New York, denied the application for permanent resident status under the Legal Immigration Family Equity (LIFE) Act. The matter is now on appeal before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO). The appeal will be dismissed.

The director denied the application, finding that the applicant had not established by a preponderance of the evidence that he had continuously resided in the United States in an unlawful status for the duration of the requisite period. The director asserted that the only documentation submitted to support the applicant's claim of residency was letters and affidavits that did not appear credible or amenable to verification. The director noted that none of the affiants appeared to have direct personal knowledge of the circumstances of the applicant's residence. The director further noted that several of the letters appeared altered or "deceitfully created." Finally, the director noted that the birth of the applicant's three children in Senegal during the statutory period contradicted the applicant's oral testimony regarding his travel outside the United States.

On appeal, the applicant asserts that the information contained in the affidavits and letters he submitted was verifiable when he originally submitted them in 1990 and that it is out of his control if the establishments are no longer in business or an affiant no longer works at one of the establishments. The applicant asserts that his wife used to travel from Senegal to the United States to buy goods.

An applicant for permanent resident status under section 1104 of the LIFE Act has the burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence entry into the United States before January 1, 1982, and continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since such date and through May 4, 1988. See 1104(c)(2)(B) of the LIFE Act and 8 C.F.R. 245a.11(b). The applicant has the burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she has resided in the United States for the requisite periods, is admissible to the United States and is otherwise eligible for adjustment of status under this section. The inference to be drawn from the documentation provided shall depend on the extent of the documentation, its credibility and amenability to verification. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.12(e).

The "preponderance of the evidence" standard requires that the evidence demonstrate that the applicant's claim is "probably true," where the determination of "truth" is made based on the factual circumstances of each individual case. *Matter of E-M-*, 20 I&N Dec. 77, 79-80 (Comm. 1989). In evaluating the evidence, *Matter of E-M-* also stated that "[t]ruth is to be determined not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality." *Id.* Thus, in adjudicating the application pursuant to the preponderance of the evidence standard, the director must examine each piece of evidence for relevance, probative value, and credibility, both individually and within the context of the totality of the evidence, to determine whether the fact to be proven is probably true.

Even if the director has some doubt as to the truth, if the applicant submits relevant, probative, and credible evidence that leads the director to believe that the claim is "probably true" or "more likely than not," the applicant or applicant has satisfied the standard of proof. *See U.S. v. Cardozo-Fonseca*, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (defining "more likely than not" as a greater than 50

percent probability of something occurring). If the director can articulate a material doubt, it is appropriate for the director to either request additional evidence or, if that doubt leads the director to believe that the claim is probably not true, deny the application.

Although the regulations provide an illustrative list of contemporaneous documents that an applicant may submit, the list also permits the submission of affidavits and any other relevant document. *See 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(vi)(L)*. To meet his or her burden of proof, an applicant must provide evidence of eligibility apart from his or her own testimony. 8 C.F.R. 245a.12(f). Affidavits that indicate specific, personal knowledge of the applicant's whereabouts during the relevant time period are given greater weight than fill-in-the-blank affidavits that provide generic information.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(i) states that letters from employers attesting to an applicant's employment must: provide the applicant's address at the time of employment; identify the exact period of employment; show periods of layoff; state the applicant's duties; declare whether the information was taken from company records; and identify the location of such company records and state whether such records are accessible or in the alternative state the reason why such records are unavailable.

A LIFE Legalization applicant must also provide evidence establishing that, before October 1, 2000, he or she was a class member applicant in a legalization class-action lawsuit. See 8 C.F.R. 245a.14. In this case, the record reflects that the applicant applied for such class membership by submitting a "Form for Determination of Class Membership in CSS v. Meese [CSS lawsuit]," accompanied by a Form I-687 "Application for Status as a Temporary Resident (Under Section 245A of the Immigration and Nationality Act)," dated October 20, 1990.

On October 22, 2001, the applicant submitted the current Form I-485, Application to Register Permanent Residence or Adjust Status. On June 21, 2004, the applicant appeared for an interview based on the application.

The issue in this proceeding is whether the applicant has furnished sufficient credible evidence to meet his burden and establish by a preponderance of the evidence, that his claim of entry into the United States before January 1, 1982, and continuous residence in the United States during the requisite period is probably true.

The documentation that the applicant submits in support of his claim consists of five letters and affidavits.

The applicant submitted a fill-in-the-blank "Affidavit of Witness" form signed by [REDACTED]. The form indicates that the affiant has personal knowledge that the applicant has resided in the United States in New York, New York. The form allows the affiant to fill in a statement that he or she "is able to determine the date of the beginning of his or her acquaintance with the applicant in the United States from the following fact(s): \_\_\_\_\_. [REDACTED] simply added: "I have known him since 1981. We met on the occasion of my birthday party." This

affidavit, prepared on a fill-in-the-blank form, contains minimal details regarding any relationship with the applicant during the requisite period. The affiant fails to indicate any personal knowledge of the applicant's claimed entry to the United States or of the circumstances of his residence other than the city where he resided. Lacking such relevant detail, the affidavit can be afforded only minimal weight as evidence of the applicant's residence and continuous residence in the United States for the requisite period.

The applicant submitted fill-in-the-blank letters from three hotels he claims to have resided at during the statutory period. These hotels no longer appear to be in business. As such, the information contained in the letters is not amenable to verification. Given this, they can be afforded only minimal weight as evidence of the applicant's residence and continuous residence in the United States for the requisite period.

The applicant also submitted a letter from the mosque he claims to have attended during the statutory period. This letter can be given minimal evidentiary weight and has little probative value as it does not provide basic information that is expressly required by 8 C.F.R. 245a.2(d)(3)(i). Specifically, the letter does not explain the origin of the information given and does not provide the address where the applicant resided during the period of his involvement with the church. Given this lack of detail, the letter can be given minimal weight as evidence of the applicant's continuous residence or physical presence in the United States during the requisite period;

Although the applicant has submitted numerous affidavits in support of his application, he has not provided any contemporaneous evidence of residence in the United States during the duration of the requisite period. As stated previously, the evidence must be evaluated not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality.

The remaining evidence in the record is comprised of the applicant's statements and application forms, in which he claims to have first entered the United States in January 1981, without inspection and to have resided for the duration of the requisite period in New York. As noted above, to meet his burden of proof, the applicant must provide evidence of eligibility apart from his own testimony. The applicant has failed to do so.

Having examined each piece of evidence, both individually and within the context of the totality of the evidence, the AAO finds that the applicant has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence he entered into the United States before January 1, 1982, and that he resided continuously in an unlawful status for the requisite period.

Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5), the inference to be drawn from the documentation provided shall depend on the extent of the documentation, its credibility and amenability to verification. Given the applicant's reliance upon documents with minimal probative value, the applicant has failed to establish continuous residence in an unlawful status in the United States for the requisite period, as required under both 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5) and *Matter of E-M-*, *supra*.

Therefore, based on the above, the applicant has failed to establish entry into the United States prior to January 1, 1982, and continuous unlawful residence through May 4, 1988, as required under Section 1104(c)(2)(B) of the LIFE Act. Given this, he is ineligible for permanent resident status under Section 1104 of the LIFE Act.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed. This decision constitutes a final notice of ineligibility.