


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U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services

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FILE: [REDACTED]
MSC 01 284 60121

Office: NEW YORK

Date: JAN 02 2009

IN RE: Applicant: [REDACTED]

APPLICATION: Application for Status as a Permanent Resident pursuant to Section 1104 of the Legal Immigration Family Equity (LIFE) Act of 2000, Pub. L. 106-553, 114 Stat. 2762 (2000), amended by LIFE Act Amendments, Pub. L. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000).

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:



INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. The file has been returned to the office that originally decided your case. If your appeal was sustained, or if the matter was remanded for further action, you will be contacted. If your appeal was dismissed, you no longer have a case pending before this office, and you are not entitled to file a motion to reopen or reconsider your case.

John F. Grissom, Acting Chief
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The application for permanent resident status under the Legal Immigration Family Equity (LIFE) Act was denied by the Director, New York, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The district director denied the application because he concluded the applicant's was not credible, noting that the applicant had been implicated in obtaining fraudulent employment documentation and that the applicant's own testimony from previous filings contradicted his assertions of eligibility in this proceeding.

On appeal, counsel for the applicant resubmits previous evidence, but fails to address the applicant's prior fraud or the applicant's own contradictory admissions in the record.

An applicant for permanent resident status must establish entry into the United States before January 1, 1982 and continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since such date and through May 4, 1988. *See* § 1104(c)(2)(B) of the LIFE Act and 8 C.F.R. § 245a.11(b).

An applicant for permanent resident status under section 1104 of the LIFE Act has the burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she has resided in the United States for the requisite periods, is admissible to the United States and is otherwise eligible for adjustment of status under this section. The inference to be drawn from the documentation provided shall depend on the extent of the documentation, its credibility and amenability to verification. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.12(e).

An applicant must establish eligibility by a preponderance of the evidence. The "preponderance of the evidence" standard requires that the evidence demonstrate that the applicant's claim is "probably true," where the determination of "truth" is made based on the factual circumstances of each individual case. *Matter of E-M-*, 20 I&N Dec. 77, 79-80 (Comm. 1989). In evaluating the evidence, *Matter of E-M-* also stated that "[t]ruth is to be determined not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality." *Id.* Thus, in adjudicating the application pursuant to the preponderance of the evidence standard, the director must examine each piece of evidence for relevance, probative value, and credibility, both individually and within the context of the totality of the evidence, to determine whether the fact to be proven is probably true.

Even if the director has some doubt as to the truth, if the petitioner submits relevant, probative, and credible evidence that leads the director to believe that the claim is "probably true" or "more likely than not," the applicant or petitioner has satisfied the standard of proof. *See U.S. v. Cardozo-Fonseca*, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (defining "more likely than not" as a greater than 50 percent probability of something occurring). If the director can articulate a material doubt, it is appropriate for the director to either request additional evidence or, if that doubt leads the director to believe that the claim is probably not true, deny the application or petition.

United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) regulations provide an illustrative list of contemporaneous documents that an applicant may submit to establish presence during the required period. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.15(b)(1); *see also* 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(vi)(L). Such evidence may include employment records, tax records, utility bills, school records, hospital or medical records, or attestations by churches, unions, or other organizations so long as certain information is included. The regulations also permit the submission of affidavits and any other relevant document,

but applications submitted with unverifiable documentation may be denied. Documentation that does not cover the required period is not relevant to a determination of the alien's presence during the required period and will not be considered or accorded any evidentiary weight in these proceedings.

On September 13, 2007, the director sent the applicant a Notice of Intent to Deny (NOID), which stated that the applicant lacked credibility due to having obtained fraudulent employment authorization documentation, and due to the fact that his assertions in a previous filing before USCIS contradicted his testimony in these proceedings. The evidence submitted by the applicant was insufficiently probative of continuous unlawful residence in the U.S. from prior to January 1, 1982 through May 4, 1988, and continuous physical presence in the U.S. from November 6, 1986 through May 4, 1988, to overcome the strong implication of fraud.

The applicant responded through counsel changing his testimony with regards to the presence of his wife such that the applicant's children were born in India throughout the required period.

On October 11, 2007, the director denied the application because the applicant had failed to overcome his lack of credibility to establish his burden of eligibility.

On appeal, counsel for the applicant submits a brief statement, resubmits previous evidence, but fails to address the applicant's prior fraud or the applicant's own contradictory admissions in the record.

The applicant has submitted photocopies of handwritten documents, including documents which have not been translated, and several statements by third parties.

As stated above, the inference to be drawn from the documentation provided shall depend on the *extent* of the documentation. The minimal evidence furnished cannot be considered extensive, and in such cases a negative inference regarding the claim may be made as stated in 8 C.F.R. § 245a.12(e).

Documents which generically assert an affiant has known an applicant since a particular year are not sufficiently probative to support assertions of eligibility. Such casual knowledge of an applicant lacks the context to be sufficiently probative such that USCIS can make an informed determination that the applicant has been residing continuously in an unlawful status for the duration of the required period. In this case the documents provided list inconsistent areas of residence for the applicant, are generic in nature and fail to fully explain how the affiants came to know the applicant and what the nature of the relationships were. The documents and affidavits submitted are internally inconsistent, generic in nature, and lack credibility.

In this case the applicant was implicated in a fraud scheme Operation Catchhold as having obtained fraudulent documentation by bribery and previous filings with USCIS specifically contradicted his assertions in this proceeding, indicating the evidence of the applicant's eligibility is not credible. Neither counsel nor the applicant address the fact that the applicant has been implicated in a scheme to obtain documents by bribery, and in response the contradictory statements by the applicant in a previous filing simply changes his testimony to assert that his wife did come to the United States. The AAO would note that a Biographical Questionnaire, Form G-325, submitted by the applicant lists his address in Pakistan from "birth - '89." The applicant had several children born in India

throughout the required period, previously the applicant had asserted that his wife never came to the United States, now on appeal he has changed his testimony, but asserts she entered and exited without inspection and cannot provide any evidence of her travels to get to the United States, or her actual presence after entering the United States. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)). Further, without documentary evidence to support the claim, the assertions of counsel will not satisfy the petitioner's burden of proof. The unsupported assertions of counsel do not constitute evidence. *Matter of Obaigbena*, 19 I&N Dec. 533, 534 (BIA 1988); *Matter of Laureano*, 19 I&N Dec. 1 (BIA 1983); *Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez*, 17 I&N Dec. 503, 506 (BIA 1980).

In this case the applicant clearly made contradictory representations before USCIS in order to obtain various immigration benefits. None of the evidence submitted rises to the level of rehabilitating the applicant's credibility. Doubt cast on any aspect of the petitioner's proof may undermine the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining evidence offered in support of the visa petition. *Matter of Ho*, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591 (BIA 1988). It is incumbent upon the petitioner to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence. Any attempt to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies will not suffice unless the petitioner submits competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. *Id.* In this case the applicant has not submitted any such independent or objective evidence, and relies entirely on the jumbled ramblings of counsel.

The discrepancies and errors catalogued above lead the AAO to conclude that the evidence of the applicant's eligibility is not credible. It is concluded that the applicant has not overcome the specter of fraud and therefore failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he entered the United States before January 1, 1982 and maintained continuous, unlawful residence from such date through May 4, 1988, as required for eligibility for adjustment to permanent resident status under section 1104(c)(2)(B)(i) of the LIFE Act. The applicant is, therefore, ineligible for permanent resident status under section 1104 of the LIFE Act.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. This decision constitutes a final notice of ineligibility.