U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Office of Administrative Appeals MS 2090
Washington, DC 20529-2090

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services

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FILE: [redacted] Office: FAIRFAX Date: JUN 01 2009

MSC 01 364 60257

[redacted]

IN RE: Applicant: [redacted]

APPLICATION: Application for Status as a Permanent Resident pursuant to Section 1104 of the Legal Immigration Family Equity (LIFE) Act of 2000, Pub. L. 106-553, 114 Stat. 2762 (2000), *amended by* LIFE Act Amendments, Pub. L. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

[redacted]

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. If your appeal was dismissed or rejected, all documents have been returned to the National Benefits Center. You no longer have a case pending before this office, and you are not entitled to file a motion to reopen or reconsider your case. If your appeal was sustained or remanded for further action, you will be contacted.

John F. Grissom
Acting Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The application for permanent resident status under the Legal Immigration Family Equity (LIFE) Act was denied by the Director, Fairfax, Virginia. An appeal from that decision was remanded to the director by the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) and the director again denied the application. The matter is now again before the AAO on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The director determined that the applicant failed to establish that she entered the United States before January 1, 1982, and resided in a continuous unlawful status from then through May 4, 1988, as required under section 1104(c)(2)(B) of the LIFE Act.

On appeal, counsel for the applicant submits a brief.

Section 1104(c)(2)(B) of the LIFE Act states:

> (i) In General – The alien must establish that the alien entered the United States before January 1, 1982, and that he or she has resided continuously in the United States in an unlawful status since such date and through May 4, 1988. In determining whether an alien maintained continuous unlawful residence in the United States for purposes of this subparagraph, the regulations prescribed by the Attorney General under section 245A(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) that were most recently in effect before the date of the enactment of this Act shall apply.

An applicant for permanent resident status under section 1104 of the LIFE Act has the burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she has resided in the United States for the requisite periods, is admissible to the United States and is otherwise eligible for adjustment of status under this section. The inference to be drawn from the documentation provided shall depend on the extent of the documentation, its credibility and amenability to verification. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.12(e).

The "preponderance of the evidence" standard requires that the evidence demonstrate that the applicant's claim is "probably true," where the determination of "truth" is made based on the factual circumstances of each individual case. *Matter of E-M-*, 20 I&N Dec. 77, 79-80 (Comm. 1989). In evaluating the evidence, *Matter of E-M-* also stated that "[t]ruth is to be determined not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality." *Id.* Thus, in adjudicating the application pursuant to the preponderance of the evidence standard, the director must examine each piece of evidence for relevance, probative value, and credibility, both individually and within the context of the totality of the evidence, to determine whether the fact to be proven is probably true.

Even if the director has some doubt as to the truth, if the applicant submits relevant, probative, and credible evidence that leads the director to believe that the claim is "probably true" or "more likely than not," the applicant has satisfied the standard of proof. *See U.S. v. Cardozo-Fonseca*, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (defining "more likely than not" as a greater than 50 percent probability of something occurring). If the director can articulate a material doubt, it is appropriate for the director to either

request additional evidence or, if that doubt leads the director to believe that the claim is probably not true, deny the application.

Although the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3) provides an illustrative list of contemporaneous documents that an applicant may submit in support of his or her claim of continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since prior to January 1, 1982, the submission of any other relevant document is permitted pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(vi)(L). *See* 8 C.F.R. 245a.15(b). To meet his or her burden of proof, an applicant must provide evidence of eligibility apart from the applicant's own testimony. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.12(f). Affidavits indicating specific, personal knowledge of the applicant's whereabouts during the relevant time period are given greater weight than fill-in-the-blank affidavits providing generic information.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(i) states that letters from employers attesting to an applicant's employment must: provide the applicant's address at the time of employment; identify the exact period of employment; show periods of layoff; state the applicant's duties; declare whether the information was taken from company records; and identify the location of such company records and state whether such records are accessible or in the alternative state the reason why such records are unavailable.

The applicant filed a Form I-485, Application to Register Permanent Resident Status or Adjust Status, under the LIFE Act on September 29, 2001. The director initially denied the application on June 26, 2006. An appeal from that decision was filed by the applicant on July 24, 2006. On February 6, 2008, the AAO remanded the matter to the director. The director issued a Notice of Intent to Deny (NOID) the application on July 10, 2008, and a Notice of Decision (NOD) denying the application on August 8, 2008. The applicant, through counsel, filed the current appeal from the director's most recent denial decision on September 3, 2008.

The AAO maintains plenary power to review this matter on a *de novo* basis. 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) ("On appeal from or review of the initial decision, the agency has all the powers which it would have in making the initial decision except as it may limit the issues on notice or by rule."); *see also, Janka v. U.S. Dept. of Transp.*, NTSB, 925 F.2d 1147, 1149 (9th Cir. 1991). The federal courts have long recognized the AAO's *de novo* review authority. *See,* e.g. *Dor v. INS*, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989).

A review of the record reveals that, in an attempt to establish her continuous unlawful residence since before January 1, 1982, through May 4, 1988, the applicant provided the following documentation throughout the application process:[1]

Employment letters:

[1] Documentation that does not cover the required period is not relevant to a determination of the alien's presence during the required period and will not be considered or accorded any evidentiary weight in these proceedings.

1. A letter dated November 7, 1990, from Metromedia Paging Services stating the applicant had been employed part-time as a clerk/receptionist since June 1987.

2. A letter from [redacted], dated October 30, 1990, stating the applicant had been in her service as a housekeeper and nanny for six years.

As "employment letters," these documents do not comply with the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(i) in that they fail to provide the applicant's address at the time of employment; identify the exact period of employment; show periods of layoff; declare whether the information was taken from company records; and identify the location of such company records and state whether such records are accessible or in the alternative state the reason why such records are unavailable.

Affidavits from acquaintances:

3. Fill-in-the-blank affidavits dated in October and November 1990 from [redacted] stating that the applicant had resided with her at [redacted], Alexandria, Virginia, since April 1980 (a lease agreement contained in the record signed by [redacted] for that address covers the time period from May 1, 1986 through April 30, 1991); [redacted] stating the applicant had resided in Alexandria, Virginia, since April 1980 – that he met her several times at social gatherings; [redacted] (the applicant's brother) stating the applicant had resided in Alexandria since April 1980.

4. A letter dated August 24, 2001 from [redacted] stating that she had known the applicant since 1980 and that the applicant was her daughter's nanny from June 1983 to September 1986. In a revised letter dated October 12, 2004 from [redacted] she states that she had known the applicant since April 1980 and that the applicant was her housekeeper as well as her daughter's nanny from December 1980 to March 1987.

5. A letter from [redacted] dated September 14, 2001, stating he had known the applicant since September 1981 – that she had been an active member of the Ghanaian Community Association.

6. A letter dated September 12, 2001, stating he had known the applicant since 1980.

Other documentation:

7. An aerogramme/air letter mailed to the applicant in the United States with a stamp from Ghana and a 1982 postal mark. The letter does not have any writing on it and there is no sender's name and address.

In summary, the applicant has provided no employment letters that comply with the guidelines set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(i)(A) through (F), no utility bills according to the guidelines set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(ii), no school records according to the guidelines set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(iii), no hospital or medical records according to the guidelines set forth in 8 C.F.R. §245a.2(d)(3)(iv), and no attestations from churches, unions or other organizations according to the guidelines set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(v). The applicant also has not provided documentation according to the guidelines set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(vi), (including, for example, money order receipts, passport entries, children's birth certificates, bank book transactions, letters of correspondence (other than that provided in No. 7, above), a Social Security card, tax receipts or automobile, contract, and insurance documentation) according to the guidelines set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(vi)(A) through (K). The documentation provided by the applicant consists of third-party affidavits ("other relevant documentation"). These third-party affidavits lack specific details as to how the affiants knew of the applicant's entry into the United States, and details regarding how often and under what circumstances they had contact with the applicant throughout the requisite time period.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.12(e) provides that "[a]n alien applying for adjustment of status under [section 1104 of the LIFE Act] has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she has resided in the United States for the requisite periods." Preponderance of the evidence is defined as "evidence which as a whole shows that the fact sought to be proved is more probable than not." Black's Law Dictionary 1064 (5th ed. 1979). *See Matter of Lemhammad*, 20 I&N Dec. 316, 320, Note 5 (BIA 1991).

Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5), the inference to be drawn from the documentation provided shall depend on the extent of the documentation, its credibility and amenability to verification. Given the paucity of documentation submitted, the AAO determines the applicant has not met her burden of proof. The applicant has not established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that she entered the United States before January 1, 1982, resided in this country in an unlawful status continuously since that time through May 4, 1988, as required under 1104(c)(2)(B)(i) of the LIFE Act and 8 C.F.R. § 245a.11(b). Thus, she is ineligible for permanent resident status under section 1104 of the LIFE Act.

As always in these proceedings, the burden of proof rests solely with the applicant. Section 245a.2(d)(5) of the Act.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. This decision constitutes a final notice of ineligibility.