


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U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Administrative Appeals Office (AAO)
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., MS 2090
Washington, DC 20529-2090



U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services

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
DATE: JUL 05 2012

Office: NEWARK

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Consolidated




IN RE: Applicant:



APPLICATION: Application for Status as a Permanent Resident pursuant to Section 1104 of the Legal Immigration Family Equity (LIFE) Act of 2000, Pub. L. 106-553, 114 Stat. 2762 (2000), amended by LIFE Act Amendments, Pub. L. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000).

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:



INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. If your appeal was dismissed or rejected, all documents have been returned to the National Benefits Center. You no longer have a case pending before this office, and you are not entitled to file a motion to reopen or reconsider your case. If your appeal was sustained or remanded for further action, you will be contacted.

Perry Rhew
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The application for permanent resident status under the Legal Immigration Family Equity (LIFE) Act was denied by the Director, Newark, New Jersey and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

On October 16, 2007 the director denied the application based on the determination that the applicant was ineligible to adjust to permanent resident status under the provisions of the LIFE Act. The director found that the applicant had not established by a preponderance of the evidence that he had continuously resided in the United States in an unlawful status for the duration of the requisite period. However, the director failed to articulate specific grounds for denial of the application.

When denying a petition, a director has an affirmative duty to explain the specific reasons for the denial; this duty includes informing a petitioner why the evidence failed to satisfy its burden of proof pursuant to section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 103.3(a)(1)(i). In this case, the AAO finds that the director failed to evaluate the evidence of record and provide the applicant specific reasons for denial. Furthermore, the applicant asserts on appeal that he did not receive a copy of the NOD and that his employment authorization was extended from 2003 through 2011 based on his pending LIFE Act application. The AAO is unable to determine from the record of proceedings if the applicant was properly mailed the NOD and will now adjudicate the application following a *de novo* review of the entire record of proceedings.

On appeal, through counsel, the applicant indicates that, "... the appellant has resided in the U.S. since July 21, 1981, for over 29 years, and the previously submitted documentation proving his residency should have been sufficient for your office to approve his I-485 Application for Permanent Residency."

The AAO conducts appellate review on a *de novo* basis. *See Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004). Following *de novo* review, the AAO finds that the applicant has failed to establish his continuous residence in the United States from January 1, 1982 through the end of the relevant period.

An applicant for permanent resident status must establish entry into the United States before January 1, 1982 and continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since such date and through May 4, 1988. Section 1104(c)(2)(B) of the LIFE Act and 8 C.F.R. § 245a.11(b).

An applicant for permanent resident status under section 1104 of the LIFE Act has the burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she has resided in the United States for the requisite periods, is admissible to the United States under the provisions of section 212(a) of the Act, and is otherwise eligible for adjustment of status under this section. The inference to be drawn from the documentation provided shall depend on the extent of the documentation, its credibility and amenability to verification. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.12(e).

Although the regulations provide an illustrative list of contemporaneous documents that an applicant may submit, the list also permits the submission of affidavits and any other relevant document. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(vi)(L).

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(i) states that letters from employers attesting to an applicant's employment must: provide the applicant's address at the time of employment; identify the exact period of employment; show periods of layoff; state the applicant's duties; declare whether the information was taken from company records; and, identify the location of such company records and state whether such records are accessible or in the alternative state the reason why such records are unavailable.

The "preponderance of the evidence" standard requires that the evidence demonstrate that the applicant's claim is "probably true," where the determination of "truth" is made based on the factual circumstances of each individual case. *Matter of E-M-*, 20 I&N Dec. 77, 79-80 (Comm. 1989). In evaluating the evidence, *Matter of E-M-* also stated that "[t]ruth is to be determined not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality." *Id.* Thus, in adjudicating the application pursuant to the preponderance of the evidence standard, the director must examine each piece of evidence for relevance, probative value, and credibility, both individually and within the context of the totality of the evidence, to determine whether the fact to be proven is probably true.

Even if the director has some doubt as to the truth, if the petitioner submits relevant, probative, and credible evidence that leads the director to believe that the claim is "probably true" or "more likely than not," the applicant or petitioner has satisfied the standard of proof. *See U.S. v. Cardozo-Fonseca*, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (defining "more likely than not" as a greater than 50 percent probability of something occurring). If the director can articulate a material doubt, it is appropriate for the director to either request additional evidence or, if that doubt leads the director to believe that the claim is probably not true, deny the application or petition.

The issue in this proceeding is whether the applicant has established that he (1) entered the United States before January 1, 1982 and (2) has continuously resided in the United States in an unlawful status for the requisite period of time and (3) is admissible to the United States. Section 245A(a)(4)(A) of the Immigration & Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(4)(A), requires an alien to establish that he or she is admissible to the United States as an immigrant in order to be eligible for adjustment to permanent resident status under the LIFE Act.

The documentation that the applicant submits in support of his claim to have arrived in the United States before January 1982 and lived in an unlawful status during the requisite period consists of several affidavits. The AAO has reviewed each document to determine the applicant's eligibility; however, the AAO will not quote each witness statement in this decision.

The documentation contained in the record which pertains to the relevant period consists of the following:

- Affidavits from [REDACTED]. The affidavits lack sufficient detail to be considered probative. For example, [REDACTED] indicates that she has known the applicant for the past four years. Her affidavit is dated March 2001. She does not indicate how she met the applicant or how she dates her initial acquaintance. [REDACTED] indicates that he has known the applicant since 1981 and that they were acquainted in India. He does not provide any information regarding the applicant's residence in the United States or the dates of their acquaintance in the United States. None of the affiants indicate regular, direct contact with the applicant which would support his assertion that he resided continuously in the United States.

- A letter dated March 24, 2001 from [REDACTED] indicating that the applicant is a regular attender. The dates of the applicant's attendance are not referenced, nor does the declarant provide the applicant's address during the relevant period. This letter does not conform to the statutory requirements for attestations by churches, unions, or other organizations, which is found at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2 ((d)(3)(v)). That regulation requires such attestations to "show the inclusive dates of membership and state the address where the applicant resided during the membership period." This letter fails to meet those requirements.

To be considered probative and credible, witness affidavits must do more than simply state that an affiant knows an applicant and that the applicant has lived in the United States for a specific time period. Their content must include sufficient detail from a claimed relationship to indicate that the relationship probably did exist and that the witness does, by virtue of that relationship, have knowledge of the facts alleged. Upon review, the AAO finds that, individually and together, the witness statements do not indicate that their assertions are probably true. Therefore, they have little probative value.

While an applicant's failure to provide evidence other than affidavits shall not be the sole basis for finding that he or she failed to meet the continuous residency requirements, an application which is lacking in contemporaneous documentation cannot be deemed approvable if considerable periods of claimed continuous residence rely entirely on affidavits which are considerably lacking in certain basic and necessary information. As discussed above, the affiants' statements are significantly lacking in detail and do not establish that the affiants actually had continuous personal knowledge of the events and circumstances of the applicant's residence in the United States. Few of the affiants provided much relevant information beyond acknowledging that they visited the applicant several times during the relevant period. Overall, the affidavits provided are so deficient in detail that they can be given no significant probative value.

Furthermore, the record of proceeds contains multiple material inconsistencies. Doubt cast on any aspect of the applicant's proof may lead to a reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining evidence offered in support of the application. It is incumbent upon the applicant to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence, and attempts to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies, absent competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth, in fact, lies, will not suffice. *Matter of Ho*, 19 I&N Dec. 582 (BIA 1988).

Such inconsistencies in the record may only be overcome through independent, objective evidence of the applicant's claim that he resided continuously in the United States during the statutory period.

First, the applicant submitted a Form I-687 Application for Temporary Resident Status in 1990. On that application, the applicant indicates that he lived in Ridgewood, New Jersey from August 1981 until October 1989. However, the applicant submitted a Record of Sworn Statement on February 3, 1997 in which he indicates that he has lived in the United States for 15 years and he lived in California for four years before returning to India in 1985. The applicant further testifies that he remained out of the United States for 4 years. In an appeal before the Executive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR) the applicant indicates, through counsel, that he has lived continuously in the United States since 1981, "except a two year return to

India in the 1980s." The applicant also indicates in the same statement, that he left the United States for France in 1985 returning in 1989. The applicant's Form I-687 mentions only one absence during the relevant period, in November 1987.

The applicant shall be regarded as having resided continuously in the United States if no single absence from the United States has exceeded 45 days, and the aggregate of all absences has not exceeded 180 days during the requisite period unless the applicant can establish that due to emergent reasons the return to the United States could not be accomplished within the time period allowed, the applicant was maintaining a residence in the United States, and the departure was not based on an order of deportation. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(h).

If the applicant's absence exceeded the 45-day period allowed for a single absence, it must be determined if the untimely return of the applicant to the United States was due to an "emergent reason." Although this term is not defined in the regulations, *Matter of C-*, 19 I&N Dec. 808 (Comm. 1988), holds that "emergent" means "coming unexpectedly into being." Thus, the applicant's absence from 1985 until approximately 1989 renders him ineligible for benefits under the LIFE Act.

Beyond the director's decision, the applicant is also ineligible for temporary resident status because he is inadmissible to the United States. Section 245A(a)(4)(A) of the Act requires an alien to establish that he or she is admissible to the United States as an immigrant in order to be eligible for LIFE Act legalization. Section 212(a)(9)(A)(ii)(II) of the Act renders inadmissible aliens who departed the United States while an order of removal was outstanding and who seek admission within 10 years of the date of the alien's departure. Section 212(a)(9)(A)(ii)(II) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii)(II).

The record indicates that the applicant was ordered deported by an Immigration Judge on May 16, 2001. The applicant filed an appeal of that decision on May 16, 2001 however, the applicant withdrew the appeal on April 8, 2002 thus the order became final on that date. The record also indicates that the applicant entered the United States on April 10, 2008, thus, he departed under an order of deportation and is now subject to the ten (10) year bar. Section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii)(II).

Although this ground of inadmissibility may be waived pursuant to section 245A(d)(2)(B) of the Act, the record does not indicate that the applicant ever requested or was granted such a waiver. Accordingly, the applicant is ineligible benefits under the LIFE Act due to his inadmissibility as an alien previously removed. Even if the applicant did file the appropriate waiver of this ground of inadmissibility, the issue is moot as the applicant is ineligible for benefits under the LIFE Act for the reasons stated above.

Given the applicant's reliance upon documents with minimal probative value, it is concluded that he has failed to establish continuous residence in an unlawful status in the United States from prior to January 1, 1982 through the relevant period as required under section 1104(c)(2)(B) of the LIFE Act. The applicant is also ineligible for legalization as an alien previously removed. The applicant is, therefore, ineligible for permanent resident status under section 1104 of the LIFE Act on this basis.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. This decision constitutes a final notice of ineligibility.