\ int \ TABLE OF CONTENTS - INTERIM DECISIONS REFERENCED IN OTHER PUBLICATIONS ON ILINK \ Interim Decision # 1540
Volume 11 (Page 446)
MATTER OF SAFADI
In Deportation Proceedings
Decided by Board December 15, 1965
(1) The Service has the power to terminate the period of respondent's stay as a nonimmigrant visitor when it became aware of the fact he had no desire to depart from the United States, coupled with the fact he had separated from his citizen wife.
(2) As the right to petition for nonquota classification lies solely in the citizen spouse, and since the evidence establishes respondent's inability to acquire such status through his citizen wife who is in the process of obtaining a divorce and has refused to petition on his behalf, and a visa is not otherwise immediately available to him, he is statutorily ineligible for adjustment of status under section 245, Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended.
Act of 1952--Section 241(a)(2) [ 8 U.S.C. 1251(a)(2) ]--Remained longer.
BEFORE THE BOARD
The respondent, a native and citizen of Jordan, appeals from an order entered by the special inquiry officer on August 27, 1965 granting him voluntary departure in lieu of deportation as an alien who after entry as a nonimmigrant visitor has remained longer than permitted. Exceptions have been taken to the finding of deportability and to the denial of discretionary relief under section 245 of the Immigration and Nationality Act.
The respondent, a male alien, 25 years of age, last entered the United States through the port of New York on February 26, 1965. He was admitted as a temporary visitor until April 26, 1965. The order to show cause charges that the respondent is deportable under section 241(a)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act in that after admission as a nonimmigrant under section 101(a)(15) of the said Act he has remained in the United States for a longer time than permitted.
The respondent defends on the ground that he had been authorized by the Immigration Service to remain in the United States subsequent to April 26, 1965. He relies on the fact that his application to extend the time of his temporary stay was endorsed by an immigration officer to show that his stay had been extended to October 26, 1965 (Ex. 3). He submitted a Form I-94 so endorsed to support his contention.
The application for extension of temporary stay filed by the respondent was received by the San Antonio Office on April 6, 1965 (Ex. 3). It contains a notation dated May 27, 1965 showing that respondent's temporary stay was extended until October 26, 1965. The respondent's Form I-94 contains a similar notation but is undated. The notations in both documents have been scratched out in ink and there is evidence that this was done on June 17, 1965. There is evidence that an extension of respondent's stay was
denied on June 17, 1965 based upon information that he had no desire to depart from the United States and that he had separated from his citizen spouse.
It has been held that whatever license an alien has either to enter or to remain in the United States such license is revokable at the will of the government (
Chun Yim v. United States
, 78 F.2d 43, cert. den. 296 U.S. 627;
Mahler v. Eby
, 264 U.S. 32). Counsel maintains that respondent's case is distinguishable from our decision in
Matter of L--
, 9 I. & N. Dec. 239, because in the case of respondent there was no change in his immigration status. We do not find this factor controlling in the respondent's case. The Immigration Service had the power to terminate the period for which the respondent was admitted for a temporary visit when it became aware of the fact that he had no desire to depart from the United States coupled with the fact that his wife was in the process of filing for a divorce which would make him ineligible for nonquota classific
ation. We affirm the finding of the special inquiry officer that the respondent is deportable as charged in the order to show cause.
The respondent applied for an adjustment of his immigration status to that of a permanent resident alien under the provisions of section 245 of the Immigration and Nationality Act. He testified that he married a United States citizen on March 28, 1965 (Ex. 5). It appears that the respondent's citizen spouse has refused to petition for his nonquota classification and that she is in the process of terminating their marriage.
Section 245 requires among other things that an immigrant visa be immediately available to the applicant at the time his application is approved. Since the evidence affirmatively establishes that the respondent is in no position to acquire nonquota classification as the right of petition lies solely in his citizen spouse we will affirm the finding of the special inquiry officer that the respondent is statutorily ineligible for relief under section 245 of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Cf.
Sealzo v. Hurney
, 225 F.Supp. 560, E.D.Pa., 1963, aff'd. 338 F.2d 339 (C.A. 3, 1964) .
The respondent has been granted the maximum relief available. We will dismiss the appeal.
It is directed that the appeal be and the same is hereby dismissed.
Volume 11 (Page 493)
United States Department of Justice
Board of Immigration Appeals
MATTER OF BRANTIGAN
In Visa Petition Proceedings
Decided by Board February 8, 1966
In visa petition proceedings the burden of proof to establish eligibility for the benefit sought rests with the petitioner, and in the absence of proof of the legal termination of a U.S. citizen petitioner's prior marriage, reliance on the presumption of validity accorded by California law to his subsequent ceremonial marriage in that State to beneficiary is not satisfactory evidence of the termination of his prior marriage and is insufficient by itself to sustain petitioner's burden of proof of a valid mar
riage on which to accord beneficiary nonquota status.
The case comes forward on motion of counsel that the Board reopen the proceedings and reconsider its decision rendered on October 28, 1965.
The record relates to a native of the Philippines, a naturalized citizen of the United States, who seeks nonquota status on behalf of the beneficiary, a native and citizen of the Philippines. The parties were married on February 23, 1965 at San Francisco, California.
In our decision of October 28, 1965 we relied upon the
Petition of Sam Hoo
, 63 F.Supp. 439 (N.D.Cal.S.D., 1945), where the petitioner rested on a presumption of validity accorded by California law to his marriage to an American citizen, and the court held that the burden of proof required of an applicant for United States citizenship never shifts, found there was no satisfactory evidence of the dissolution of the prior marriage, and that the presumption of validity was not a sufficient basis upon which to sustain the burden of proving a valid marriage as the basis of a claim to e
ligibility for citizenship. We held the reliance upon presumption as to the dissolution of a prior marriage was unsatisfactory evidence of the termination of the prior marriage. We noted that in the event the petitioner instituted an action (of which the Service would be notified) and secured a declaratory judgment affirming the validity of his marriage, a motion to reopen would be entertained.
In the present motion counsel indicates that a declaratory judgment in the California courts as to the validity of the marriage cannot be obtained and seeks to differentiate Petition of Sam Hoo on the ground that the petitioner in that case knew his second wife to be alive within the five-year period antedating his California marriage, that he had no reason to believe her dead when he married his American wife and that she did not die until the year after such marriage took place.
While the facts of the cited case are as recited by counsel, the holding of the court appears to go further. The court stated that it may well be the validity of petitioner's California marriage, if attacked by an interested party, would be sustained under California law because of the presumptions indulged in and recognized by the California courts. These presumptions clearly find their rationale in the laudable desire to sustain, in the public interest and well being, the stability of the marriage status
in matters relating to legitimacy, inheritance, and other relationships growing out of and dependent upon the marital status. But the burden upon petitioner, when he seeks American citizenship, is different. The presumptions of California law must give way to the burden of proof required of an applicant for United States citizenship. The court held that the evidence as to the validity of petitioner's California marriage was not satisfactory; that citizenship is not to be bestowed upon an applicant by showin
g that he has indulged in a ceremony of marriage with an American citizen spouse which would leave the door open to fraud if an applicant could rest his case upon a ceremony of marriage in a so- called presumption of validity under California law. The burden of proof never shifts from a petitioner for citizenship to the Government and the petitioner must by satisfactory evidence establish the validity of his marriage before he may acquire the valued gift of citizenship. The court overruled a recommendation
by the Naturalization Service that the petition be granted and instead denied the petition.
Petition of Lujan
, 144 F.Supp. 150 (D.C. Guam, 1956), the petitioner, a citizen and resident of the Philippines, obtained a Mexican mail- order divorce from her first husband in 1941 and married her United States citizen husband in 1951. The court held the mail order Mexican divorce was invalid but the petitioner contended that the court should follow the California law to the effect that the legality of a regularly solemnized marriage is presumed and that the burden of proof is upon him who seeks to attack such marriage, e
ven though such burden might involve the proof of a negative, citing sections 61 of the California Civil Code and the Guam Civil Code. The court relied upon the holding of Petition of Sam Hoo, supra, and stated that the court was making no attempt to pass upon the validity of the petitioner's marriage if the question were raised in a different type of proceeding; however, the court held simply that the petitioner had failed to sustain her burden of proof that she was the wife of a United States citizen
In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proof to establish eligibility sought for the benefit conferred by the immigration laws rests upon the petitioner. Both the prior and present regulations
require that if a petition is submitted on behalf of a spouse, it must be accompanied by a certificate of the marriage to the beneficiary and proof of the legal termination of all previous marriages of both spouses.
However, we note that the motion encloses an affidavit by petitioner's daughter, now in the United States, regarding the absence of her mother. In order to give the petitioner every opportunity to establish the validity of his present marriage, we will reopen the proceedings to permit the daughter to be questioned under oath by a Service officer regarding the absence of her mother; and to ascertain what efforts were made by the petitioner to communicate with his first wife. A written memorandum should accom
pany the decision.
It is ordered that the proceedings be reopened in accordance with the preceding paragraph and to afford the petitioner every opportunity to establish the validity of his present marriage.
Volume 11 (Page 565)
United States Department of Justice
Board of Immigration Appeals
MATTER OF DE LUCIA
In Deportation Proceedings
Decided by Board April 21, 1966
(1) Claim of prejudgment is rejected absent evidence the outstanding order of the Attorney General has not been followed which directs all Service and Board officers exercising hearing powers to use their "independent judgment" and "give each alien a fair and impartial trial without prejudgment."
(2) Alleged undue publicity in the press does not preclude a fair deportation hearing; neither does Government refusal to permit counsel for respondent to review a character investigation report, not introduced into evidence; nor does denial of respondent's request to subpoena certain Government officials where it is clear from the record their testimony would not have been relevant to the issues of relief under sections 249, 212(h) and 243(h).
(3) In finding a lack of good moral character for the purposes of section 249 of the Act, the special inquiry officer did not err in considering respondent's illegal gambling activities in 1962, his imprisonment from July 1959 to October 1961, and his failure to testify truthfully during the reopened hearing.
(4) Notwithstanding respondent's long residence and close family ties in the United States, since the creation of a record of admission for permanent residence pursuant to section 249 of the Act, as amended, is a matter of administrative grace, his application therefor is denied where he has submitted no affirmative evidence of his genuine reformation or rehabilitation and by his equivocal answers and his refusal to answer relevant questions during the hearing he has failed to come forward with full informa
tion within his knowledge regarding his activities which has a direct bearing on his application.
(5) Reopening of proceedings for the introduction of additional evidence on the issue of political persecution is denied as no purpose would be served thereby since ample evidence of record affirmatively establishes that respondent, if deported to Italy, would not be subject to persecution within the meaning of section 243(h) of the Act, as amended by Public Law 89-236, because of his criminal record in the United States.
Order: Act of 1952--Section 241(a)(1) [8 U.S.C. 1251(a)(1)]--Excludable by the law existing at the time of entry, to wit: a person who has not presented an unexpired passport or official document in the nature of a passport issued by the government to which he owes allegiance, or other travel document showing his origin and identity, as required by the Passport Act of May 22, 1918, and the Executive Order in effect at the time of entry.
Act of 1952--Section 241(a)(1) [8 U.S.C. 1251(a)(1)]--Excludable by the law existing at the time of such entry, to wit: a person who has been convicted of a felony or other crime or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude prior to entry into the United States, under section 3 of the Act of February 5, 1917, to wit: voluntary homicide.
The respondent is a native of Italy. He has been found deportable under the provisions of section 241(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act as an alien who was excludable at the time of entry, in that, he did not present the required immigration documents and had been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude prior to entry, to wit, voluntary homicide (8 U.S.C. 1251(a)(1)).
The case was last before us in September of 1964. An order entered on that occasion granted the respondent's motion to reopen the proceedings for the "limited purposes"
mentioned in a stipulation between opposing counsel which was approved by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit on August 27, 1964. Pursuant to the Board's order, reopened hearings were accorded the respondent in November 1964, February, March and June 1965.
The respondent has applied for the creation of a record of his lawful entry pursuant to section 249 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1259); a waiver of the criminal ground of inadmissibility under section 212(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended (8 U.S.C. 1182(h)) which if granted would remove an existing bar to relief under section 249 (supra) and the withholding of his deportation to Italy under the provisions of section 243(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S
.C. 1253(h)). The special inquiry officer in an order entered on October 25, 1965 denied the respondent's applications for discretionary relief and ordered his deportation to England. An alternative order of deportation to Italy was also entered if England is unwilling to accept him. The respondent's appeal from this order is now before us.
The respondent is a male alien, 67 years of age. He last entered the United States through the port of New York on August 12, 1920. He was found deportable in 1959 as an alien who had entered the United States without proper documents and as an alien who had been convicted of voluntary homicide in 1917, a crime involving moral turpitude committed prior to entry. The order of deportation was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in 1961.
De Lucia v. Flagg
, 297 F.2d 58, cert. den. 369 U.S. 837. The respondent is married to a lawfully resident alien and is the father of two male American citizen children, veterans of World War II and a female American child, the mother of his five grandchildren.
The record created during the reopened hearings consists of some 370 pages of testimony and more than 130 exhibits. Extensive briefs and supplemental briefs submitted by counsel for the alien and the Deputy General Counsel of the Immigration Service are before us for consideration. The record, the briefs and oral argument have been thoroughly reviewed. Our decision, however, will be limited solely to a determination of whether the respondent has been accorded a fair hearing and to a determination of whether
an exercise of the Attorney General's discretion is warranted with respect to relief under sections 249, 212(h) and 243(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (supra).
THE ISSUE OF WHETHER THE RESPONDENT HAS BEEN ACCORDED A FAIR HEARING
Counsel for the respondent maintains that his client has not been accorded a fair hearing during the reopened proceeding. He alleges that the special inquiry officer prejudged the respondent's applications for discretionary relief; that respondent's case has been prejudiced by undue publicity in the press; that there was prejudicial error in that respondent was not permitted to examine a character investigation report and that favoritism was shown the Government in the issuance of subpoenas and during the c
ross- examination of the respondent whereas respondent's request to subpoena certain local and Government officials and to cross-examine Government witnesses was wholly denied or extremely limited.
We find no substance to counsel's claim that the respondent has been denied a fair hearing on his applications for discretionary relief.
The respondent supports his claim of prejudgment by a series of exhibits (A 106 through 124) which he alleges establish that all Attorneys General since May of 1952 and some of the Commissioners of Immigration and Naturalization have stressed the desirability of giving top priority to the deportation of aliens alleged to be in a class referred to as "racketeers." Counsel argues that published statements of the various Attorneys General including the incumbent Attorney General and certain Commissioners of Im
migration and Naturalization have committed officers within the Immigration Service to an adverse course of action and bias against any alien purported to be within the so-called "racketeer" class.
Similar claims have been made in previous cases decided by this Board.
Such claims have been supported with some of the documentary evidence now before us. There was a claim of prejudgment in the Accardi and Marcello cases when they were before the Supreme Court of the United States. The claim of prejudgment was rejected in both instances.
We reject the claim of prejudgment in the instant case for the reason that respondent has failed to introduce any substantial evidence that the incumbent Attorney General or the incumbent Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization has issued an expressed or implied directive
to rule adversely on the respondent's applications for discretionary relief. In fact, there is an outstanding order of the Attorney General, issued April 23, 1954, which directs all officers exercising hearing powers in the Immigration Service and the Board of Immigration Appeals to exercise their power "fully and faithfully" and use their "independent judgment and ... discretion as the regulations confer upon them ... Those charged with the duty of hearing and deciding (cases) must give each alien a fair
and impartial trial without prejudgment ..."
We find no evidence that the order of the Attorney General has not been followed in this proceeding.
Counsel argues that the respondent is entitled to an evidentiary administrative hearing solely on the issue of prejudgment of his applications for discretionary relief. He relies on a decision by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in the case of
Buffalino v. Kennedy
, 322 F.2d 1016 (June 1963) and a recent order of Judge Oliver Gasch of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia signed on February 23, 1966 (Civil Action No. 486-61).
We find counsel's plea for a separate evidentiary hearing on the issue of prejudgment without substance. Counsel has made no claim that this Board has prejudged the respondent's applications for discretionary relief. This Board has full power of decision with regard to the special inquiry officer's interpretation of the law, the facts and the exercise of the discretionary relief the respondent seeks.
Furthermore, the instant case is distinguishable from
(supra). Buffalino's applications for relief under sections 249 and 243(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act were denied by the District Director at Philadelphia, Pennsylvania and his order was thereafter affirmed by the Regional Commissioner. Both of these officials are charged with enforcement duties. The action here under consideration has been taken and is being reviewed by officials of the Department of Justice who are concerned solely with adjudicative functions and the record contains a specifi
c directive of the Attorney General which commands these officials to exercise their own independent judgment and give each alien a fair and impartial hearing without prejudgment (supra5). There has been no judicial finding in the case before us that a prima facie case of prejudgment has been presented by the present record. We find no substance to counsel's plea for a separate evidentiary hearing on the issue of prejudgment in light of our review of the record before us.
Counsel also maintains that the respondent's hearing has been rendered unfair and that his applications for relief have been prejudiced by the fact that the case has received undue publicity in the press. 8 CFR 242.16(a) provides in part that "Deportation hearings shall be open to the public, except that the special inquiry officer may, in his discretion and for the purpose of protecting witnesses, respondents, or the public interest, direct that the general public or particular individuals shall be exclude
d from the hearing in any specific case." We find nothing in the record which indicates that counsel for the respondent requested a closed hearing for the purpose of protecting the respondent or any of his witnesses from any undue publicity which a case such as this would normally produce.
Counsel alleges that the publicity in this case created such an atmosphere that the "fountain of justice was poisoned at its source ... before the hearing began" (record of oral argument, p. 3) and that under these circumstances it was impossible for the special inquiry officer to give the respondent a fair hearing. Again, counsel has submitted no substantial evidence to support his allegations. At page 220 of the transcript of the record, the special inquiry officer stated, "I intend to make my decision in
this matter on the evidence in the record and not on the basis of any newspaper stories ... this matter is not being tried before a jury, and I'm the person that (is) going to consider the evidence." At page 376 C of the record, the special inquiry officer made a similar statement when denying counsel's motion for a change of venue. At page 29 of his opinion the special inquiry officer stated he would disregard "press releases and newspaper reports relating to the respondent (and) submitted by respondent's
Counsel asserts that the respondent has been prejudiced and his hearing rendered unfair by reason of the fact that the Government refused to permit examination of a character investigation which the trial attorney concedes was intensive but which was not offered in evidence by the Government. Counsel maintains that an intensive examination of the respondent could not fail to develop some favorable factors in support of his (respondent's) application for discretionary relief. Counsel takes the position that
"fair play" requires the Government to present all the evidence at its disposal and that the Government should not be a party to the suppression of evidence.
An alien who applies for discretionary relief has the burden of establishing his eligibility therefor.
Matter of T–S–Y–
, 7 I. & N. Dec. 582, BIA (September 1957);
Matter of Y–
, 7 I. & N. Dec. 697, BIA (March 1958). The trial attorney stated for the record that there was "no favorable evidence that I know of" (presumably in the character investigation report) and that counsel for the respondent was "at liberty to introduce any favorable evidence (that he felt would) help (his) case." (R-pp. 253-254) The respondent did not produce a single character witness to support his claim of good character. Since the Government did not introduce the character report in evidence, counsel for
the respondent was not entitled to review it.
Respondent, through counsel, asserts that he was not accorded equal treatment with the Government in that his requests for the subpoenas of witnesses were wholly denied whereas the Government's written application for subpoenas submitted in advance of the hearing was granted. As we view the record there has been full compliance with 8 CFR 287.4, the regulation governing the issue of subpoenas. We note that the Government did not call any of the witnesses who had been subpoenaed prior to the start of the hea
ring. We find no error in the special inquiry officer's denial of respondent's request to subpoena certain Government officials since it is clear from the record that their testimony would not have been relevant to the issues of relief under sections 249, 212(h) and 243(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act and would have only cluttered the record with negative evidence.
Counsel asserts that the Government was permitted unlimited cross-examination of the respondent whereas had the respondent sought to recall an adverse witness he would have been severely limited (R-255, et seq.). He maintains that the respondent had been thoroughly cross-examined on three days by the original trial attorney and that the substitute trial attorney sought to reexamine him on matters already in the record. Section 242(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1252(b)) provides the spe
cial inquiry officer with ample authority to permit such cross-examination of an alien as he deems appropriate for a proper disposition of the case. Where the exercise of discretion is the issue before the special inquiry officer, he is permitted wide latitude in seeking the truth and exposing falsehood. We find no substance to counsel's allegations that the special inquiry officer's rulings in this area denied the respondent a fair hearing. Cf.
Matter of S–
, 5 I. & N. Dec. 60, BIA, January 1953;
Matter of T–
, 9 I. & N. Dec. 646, BIA, May 1962.
CREATION OF A RECORD OF LAWFUL ADMISSION UNDER SECTION 249 OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT, AS AMENDED, AND WAIVER OF THE CRIMINAL GROUND OF EXCLUSION PURSUANT TO SECTION 212(h) OF THE SAME ACT (AS AMENDED) (8 U.S.C. 1259 AND 1182(h))
The respondent seeks to set aside the outstanding order of deportation by the exercise of the discretion granted the Attorney General pursuant to section 249 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended (8 U.S.C. 1259). This provision of the statute authorizes the Attorney General, " in his discretion," to create a record of lawful admission in the case of any alien who has "no such record ... otherwise available and who--
(a) entered the United States prior to June 30, 1948;
(b) has had his residence in the United States continuously since such entry;
(c) is a person of good moral character; and
(d) is not ineligible to citizenship; ... provided the alien 'is not inadmissible under section 212(a) in so far as it relates to criminals, procurers and other immoral persons ...'."
In conjunction with an application for the creation of a record of lawful admission an otherwise eligible alien who is inadmissible as a criminal under paragraph (9) of section 212(a) of the Act "may request a waiver of such ground of inadmissibility pursuant to the provisions of section 212(h) of the Act, as amended" (8 CFR 249.1).
The respondent meets the statutory requirements of section 249 of the Immigration and Nationality Act in so far as they relate to the nonexistence of a record of his lawful admission for permanent residence; his entry prior to June 30, 1948; his continuous residence in the United States subsequent to such entry and his eligibility for citizenship. The only issues before us in connection with the eligibility of the respondent is whether he is a person of good moral character and warrants an adjustment of his
immigration status as a matter of discretion.
The respondent has the burden of establishing that he is eligible for the relief he seeks and that he should be granted such relief in the exercise of the Attorney General's discretion (8 CFR 242.17(d)). The special inquiry officer finds that the respondent has not met this burden.
When an alien seeks the favorable exercise of the Attorney General's discretion, it is incumbent upon him to supply such information that is within his knowledge and is relevant and material to a determination of whether he is a person of good moral character (cf.
Matter of Amando Mariani
, Int. Dec. No. 1478, BIA, June 8, 1965;
Kim v. Rosenberg
, 363 U.S. 405, 42 L. ed. 2d 1299 (1960);
United States v. Anastasio
, 120 F.Supp. 435 (D.C.N.Y., April 1954), reversed on other grounds 226 F.2d 912, cert. den. 351 U.S. 931).
The special inquiry officer concludes that the respondent has not established that he is a person of good moral character and accordingly is not statutorily eligible for relief under section 249 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended. The evidence supporting this conclusion is fully set forth in the special inquiry officer's opinion of October 25, 1965. It is incorporated herein by reference and will not be repeated.
The special inquiry officer refers to three basic reasons for denying respondent's application for relief under section 249 (supra). He is convinced that the respondent did not testify truthfully during the reopened hearings. He gives considerable weight to the fact that the respondent was in prison for over 20 months during the five-year period immediately preceding the filing of his application under section 249 and he gives weight to the respondent's admitted large-scale, illegal gambling activity in 196
2 (p. 40, special inquiry officer opinion).
During the course of the hearing, the respondent on numerous occasions, on advice of counsel, refused to comply with the special inquiry officer's directive that he respond to questions concerning his assets, income and activities (R-pp. 254-339). For example, the respondent refused to answer relevant questions concerning his criminal convictions in Italy (pp. 269-272); his entry into the United States under an assumed name (pp. 272-274); his fraudulent naturalization (pp. 276-282); his conviction in 1944 f
or conspiracy to commit extortion (pp. 282-284); his conviction for income tax evasion in 1957 (pp. 286-288); and the source and nature of his income over a period of 36 years (pp. 289-293-297-298).
\ int \ TABLE OF CONTENTS - INTERIM DECISIONS REFERENCED IN OTHER PUBLICATIONS ON ILINK \ Interim Decision # 1540