\ int \ TABLE OF CONTENTS - INTERIM DECISIONS REFERENCED IN OTHER PUBLICATIONS ON ILINK \ Interim Decision # 1772
Volume 12 (Page 389)
MATTER OF INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORTATION CORPORATION
In Visa Petition Proceedings
Decided by Regional Commissioner August 7, 1967
Visa petition is granted to accord alien beneficiary industrial trainee classification under section 101(a)(15)(H)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act as an international freight traffic clerk where it is established that a planned training program exists; that such training is not available outside the United States; that any production by the alien will be more than offset by the time spent by employees in the training of the alien; that such production will be incidental to the training received;
and, further, that he will not be replacing a United States worker.
IN BEHALF OF PETITIONER:
John L. Murff, Esquire
680 Fifth Avenue
New York, New York 10019
BEFORE THE REGIONAL COMMISSIONER
This matter is before the Regional Commissioner on appeal from the decision of the District Director who denied the petition on the basis that the offer to the beneficiary is essentially one of productive employment which ordinarily could be performed by a United States worker and that it is not an offer of training as contemplated by section 101(a)(15)(H)(iii) of the Act.
The petitioning organization is engaged in the international freight forwarding business. It desires to accord training on its New York operations in connection with the directing and forwarding of goods from factories in the United States to Western Europe via New York. Modes of shipment vary from rail and truck to vessel and air carriers.
The beneficiary is a 22-year-old Swiss citizen presently residing in Zurich, Switzerland and employed as a traffic clerk with a Swiss firm closely associated with the petitioning firm which acts as the receiver for freight forwarded to Switzerland by the petitioner. The principal amount of goods shipped by the petitioner is to Switzerland and is handled by the firm with whom the beneficiary is employed. Upon the completion of the contemplated training he plans to return to his present employer in Zurich,
Switzerland to occupy the position of Junior Executive where he will engage in the handling and forwarding of international freight.
The petitioner has stated that the training will be mostly on-the-job training and that there is only one other trainee plus the beneficiary participating in the training program which encompasses all phases of their business. The estimated two years of training were broken down as follows:
FIRST YEAR: Direction in handling shipments of goods from factories in the USA to New York City including inland transportation and tariffs for truck, rail and air, and documentation in connection therewith.
FIRST PART OF SECOND YEAR: Problems in directing American cargo on board ships within the framework of foreign freight forwarders functions, including visits to New York piers in connection with moving shipments stationed in the harbor; meeting steamship line rates, bills of lading, ocean freight rate tariffs; proper stowage of cargo on board vessels; knowledge of label cargo, dock receipts, export declarations, knowledge of how to supervise export manager's office; and correspondence to inland carriers, st
eamship lines and truckers.
LAST PART OF SECOND YEAR: Same technical problems as above in connection with air freight shipping.
On appeal, and in oral argument in connection therewith, the petitioner stated that 25 percent of the total time would involve formal training and 75 percent thereof would be on-the-job training; that this program has been instituted because of considerable difficulty with the shipments going to Switzerland and after sending key employees to Switzerland for a period of six to twelve months to try to teach these methods in Switzerland without success, it was decided to bring those key employees of their af
filiates to the United States for such training; that the beneficiary will not replace a domestic worker; that any productive gain from the beneficiary will be incidental and will be more than offset by the time spent by employees in the training of the beneficiary; that the overall purpose of such training is to improve the affiliate's operation in Switzerland so that the United States firm can offer better service for their shipments originating here to their points of destination in Switzerland and Weste
rn Europe and that an understanding of the United States operation is essential thereto.
On the basis of the information submitted by the petitioner, including the resume of the training to be accorded to the beneficiary, we find that the training program is sufficient to minimally demonstrate that it is, in fact, a planned general training program and that the same is reasonably realistic for the position for which the beneficiary is being trained. It is also understandable that a more effective job can be done by the affiliate firm in Switzerland when their key personnel have a knowledge of
the petitioner's operation within the United States and the movement of the cargo to Switzerland at which point they assume responsibility. As a consequence, it is clear that such training is not available outside the United States and more credence is lent thereto by the petitioner's prior unsuccessful attempts to accord such training abroad. The petitioner has stated that any production by the beneficiary will be more than offset by time spent by employees in the training of the beneficiary and that such
production will be incidental to the training of the beneficiary and, therefore, that he will not be replacing a United States worker.
On the basis of the additional information submitted by the petitioner we conclude that a bona fide training situation exists. Therefore, the appeal will be sustained.
It is ordered that the appeal be sustained and the petition granted.
Volume 12 (Page 396)
United States Department of Justice
Board of Immigration Appeals
MATTER OF SANABRIA
In Adjustment of Status Proceedings
Decided by Regional Commissioner March 13, 1967
Admission as a crewman does not preclude a native and citizen of Cuba from establishing eligibility for adjustment of status under section 1 of the Act of November 2, 1966.
This matter is before the Regional Commissioner on certification by the District Director at Hartford, Connecticut who has ordered that the application for permanent residence be approved.
The applicant is an unmarried Cuban citizen, born December 15, 1941 at Havana, Cuba. He was first admitted to the United States at Miami, Florida on November 26, 1960 as a nonimmigrant crewman under section 101(a)(15)(D) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended. He made four subsequent entries in the same capacity, the last on April 15, 1961. On August 7, 1961, he was granted indefinite voluntary departure as a Cuban refugee.
The record further discloses that the alien was arrested in New York City on June 6, 1965 while operating an automobile which he had borrowed from a friend. In the vehicle were found a watch, automatic pistol and movie camera, all of which had been stolen from a home in Fairfield, Connecticut. The applicant was charged with violation of section 1897 of the New York State Penal Law (carrying a dangerous weapon), but the charge was dismissed. As a result of the same incident, he was rearrested at Fairfield, C
onnecticut on June 21, 1965 and charged with breaking and entering with criminal intent and receiving stolen goods in violation of Connecticut General Statutes 53-76 and 53-65. The first count was "nolled" in the Circuit Court at Fairfield on July 17, 1965. He was convicted on the second count of receiving stolen goods valued under $250 and was fined $50. This crime is classifiable as a petty offense under section 1(3) of Title 18, United States Code, thereby overcoming the element of excludability under se
ction 212(a)(9) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended. This is the applicant's only conviction for violation of law and there are no other derogatory factors in his case.
The instant Form I-485A, Application by Cuban Refugee for Permanent Residence, was filed by the alien on December 7, 1966 under the provisions of section 1 of the Act of November 2, 1966 (Public Law 89-732) which states as follows:
*** That, notwithstanding the provisions of section 245(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, the status of any alien who is a native or citizen of Cuba and who has been inspected and admitted or paroled into the United States subsequent to January 1, 1959 and has been physically present in the United States for at least two years, may be adjusted by the Attorney General, in his discretion and under such regulations as he may prescribe, to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence if t
he alien makes an application for such adjustment, and the alien is eligible to receive an immigrant visa and is admissible to the United States for permanent residence. Upon approval of such an application for adjustment of status, the Attorney General shall create a record of the alien's admission for permanent residence as of a date thirty months prior to the filing of such an application or the date of his last arrival into the United States, whichever date is later. The provisions of this Act shall be
applicable to the spouse and child of any alien described in this subsection, regardless of their citizenship and place of birth, who are residing with such alien in the United States.
In the matter at hand, the issue has been raised as to whether the applicant, who entered the United States as a crewman, is eligible to adjust his status to that of a permanent resident in view of section 245 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, which provides in pertinent part as follows:
(a) The status of an alien, other than an alien crewman, who was inspected and admitted or paroled into the United States may be adjusted by the Attorney General, in his discretion and under such regulations as he may prescribe to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence if (1) the alien makes an application for such adjustment, (2) the alien is eligible to receive an immigrant visa and is admissible to the United States for permanent residence, and (3) an immigrant visa is immediately ava
ilable to him at the time his application is approved.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
(c) The provisions of this section shall not be applicable to any alien who is a native of any country of the Western Hemisphere or of any adjacent island named in section 101(b)(5). (Emphasis supplied)
The introductory clause of the Act of November 2, 1966 exempts any alien who is a native or citizen of Cuba from the restrictive provisions of section 245(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, insofar as removing the bar to adjustment for natives of the Western Hemisphere and adjacent islands. However, the Act of November 2, 1966 is not amendatory legislation to section 245 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, but rather provides a means for granting Cuban refugees permanent residence wh
ich is separate and distinct from section 245(a). Therefore, we find that the restriction on crewmen contained in section 245(a) is not applicable to aliens who are eligible in every other respect for adjustment of status as Cuban refugees. This position is further buttressed by the language of section 1 of the Act of November 2, 1966 which states that "... the status of any alien who is a native or citizen of Cuba *** may be adjusted...." (Emphasis supplied). Under the circumstances, the following order wi
ll be entered.
It is ordered
that the application for permanent residence be approved and that the alien's admission be recorded as of June 7, 1964.
Volume 12 (Page 409)
United States Department of Justice
Board of Immigration Appeals
MATTER OF MAHAL
In Visa Petition Proceedings
Decided by Board January 9, 1967
The beneficiaries, issue of a polygamous (second) marriage of their father in Pakistan in 1928 according to Hindu rites, are entitled to fifth preference classification upon the filing of a visa petition by their United States citizen half-brother, a child of the same father by his original marriage in 1917 in India, since the polygamous marriage of the father was legal in India and Pakistan under Hindu law prevailing at that time and the children of such polygamous marriage were legitimate under the law th
ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:
Jack C. Dozier, Esquire
Atherton & Dozier
520 Wells Fargo Bank Bldg.
Stockton, California 95202
The case come forward pursuant to certification by the District Director of his orders dated October 28, 1966 denying the visa petitions for the reason that the beneficiaries are the offspring of a second polygamous marriage, which while valid where performed in Pakistan, cannot be considered as valid for immigration purposes; and that the issue of such a marriage do not enjoy a brother-sister relationship with the issue of the original and recognized marriage and are not entitled to status as the brother a
nd/or sister of a citizen of the United States.
The petitioner, a native of Pakistan, a citizen of the United States by naturalization on December 12, 1960, seeks preference status under section 203(a)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act on behalf of the beneficiaries as his half brother and half sister, respectively. The beneficiaries are both married. The male beneficiary was born December 3, 1929 in Pakistan and the female beneficiary was born October 17, 1936 in India.
The information submitted in support of the visa petitions established that the petitioner is the legitimate son of Udham Singh Mahal and Aupar Pirtam Kaur Mahal who were married June 1917 in India according to the Hindu Rites. The beneficiaries, the half brother and half sister of the petitioner, are the offspring of a second marriage of the same father to Aupar Kaur Mahal in October 1928 also under the Hindu Rites. According to information from the Consulate General of India at San Francisco dated Septemb
er 7, 1966, before the enactment of the Hindu Code Bill in 1955/1956, a man could legally marry more than one wife in India. It is established then that the petitioner and the beneficiaries are the children of polygamous marriage. It has been ascertained from the Indian Embassy at Washington, D.C. that the children of these polygamous marriages, which, it must be remembered were legal in both India and Pakistan until 1955/1956, under the Hindu law are legitimate in every sense of the word.
The case therefore falls squarely within the decision in
Matter of K– W - S–
, 9 I. & N. Dec. 396 (A.G., 1961). In that case the parties were a sister and her half brother who were the offspring of a wife and a concubine, respectively, in China. Under Chinese law the child of a concubine who is acknowledged by the father, was equally as legitimate as the child of his lawful wife. In affirming the Board's order that these children, who were legitimated under the law of China, should be regarded as brother and sister, the Attorney General pointed out that neither the decision nor the
1952 Act implies any approval of the institution of concubinage or polygamy, which constitutes a class excluded from entry into the United States under section 212(a)(11) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. However, in the 1952 Act, Congress deemed it more in accordance with humanitarian principles to try to keep together those offspring of a common parent who have lived together as a family unit in accordance with the established laws and institutions of their place of residence, regardless of whether
or not those laws are in conformity with the long social and family institutions
In the instant case the polygamous marriage of the father to two wives in India or Pakistan was legal under Hindu law prevailing at that time and the children of such polygamous marriages were under the law then prevailing considered legitimate.
Matter of K– W– S–
, (supra), is considered dispositive of the case to accord recognition of a brother and sister relationship such as will support a petition for preference status.
It is ordered that the visa petitions be approved for fifth preference quota status on behalf of the beneficiaries.
Volume 12 (Page 432)
United States Department of Justice
Board of Immigration Appeals
MATTER OF MESA
In Adjustment of Status Proceedings
Decided by Deputy Associate Commissioner September 6, 1967
While a Cuban refugee applicant for adjustment of status who falls within the provisions of sections 212(a)(15) and 241(a)(8), Immigration and Nationality Act, pertaining to aliens likely to be, or who are, public charges, is not thereby precluded from establishing statutory eligibility under section 1 of the Act of November 2, 1966 as an alien eligible to receive an immigrant visa and admissible to the United States for permanent residence, such factors may be considered in determining eligibility for such
relief as a matter of administrative discretion.
These cases are before us by certification, pursuant to 8 CFR 103.4, of the Southwest Regional Commissioner's decision denying the aliens' applications for adjustment of status under section 1 of the Act of November 2, 1966. The denial was based on a finding that the applicants were inadmissible for permanent residence under section 212(a)(15) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as persons likely to become public charges, hence, statutorily ineligible for the status sought. The decision will be reversed
The applicants, husband and wife, 55 and 61 years of age, respectively, are natives and citizens of Cuba. They were paroled into the United States as refugees from Cuba on April 9, 1962. They have not since departed from this country and are still in parole status. They now seek a change of status to that of permanent resident aliens.
In pertinent part, section 1 of the Act of November 2, 1966 reads as follows:
"... the status of any alien who is a native or citizen of Cuba and who has been inspected and admitted or paroled into the United States subsequent to January 1, 1959 and has been physically present in the United States for at least two years, may be adjusted by the Attorney General, in his discretion and under such regulations as he may prescribe, to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence if the alien makes an application for such adjustment, and the alien is eligible to receive an imm
igrant visa and is admissible to the United States for permanent residence." (Emphasis supplied).
As the Regional Commissioner has acknowledged, the applicants have satisfied the arrival and physical presence requirements of the Act and have made application for such adjustment. However, the Regional Commissioner has found that they have not met the terms of the statute with respect to eligibility to receive an immigrant visa and admissibility to the United States in that they are presently public charges and, as such, come within the proscriptive provisions of section 212(a)(15) of the Immigration and
The facts are as follows. The applicants arrived in the United States at Miami, Florida in April 1962 and thereafter relocated in San Francisco, California in July of that year. The applicants have acknowledged, and the record shows, that since their arrival in San Francisco they have been jointly supported by funds in the amount of $165.00 a month received from the San Francisco Department of Public Welfare. The record shows that these funds are furnished under that Department's "Cuban program".
At the time of their departure from Cuba the husband was the owner of a coffee roasting firm. Since their arrival in the United States neither applicant has been employed. At an interview, in connection with their applications, the husband stated that he was physically able to work but had not been employed "on account of my age and also due to my poorness in speaking the English language". Parenthetically, it is noted that the interview was conducted in the Spanish language. The husband stated, however, th
at they plan to return to Miami, at which time they would give up their welfare assistance, where he had offers of employment from two friends, one of whom was a painting contractor and the other the owner of a bakery. He added, "My children are already permanent residents and we wish ours too. In that way we can get better jobs and be better citizens. I am grateful to this country and by having my residence, I feel part of it."
The applicants, who reside with their married son and his wife and child, stated that by joining funds received from the welfare department with the wages earned by their son, who has a modest job, they are able to live comfortably. They have never sought financial assistance from any private organization. They stated that their daughter-in-law is also employed and during the absence of the son and daughter-in-law the applicants care for their granddaughter. The applicants also have a married daughter who i
s employed, as is her husband. This couple also have a child and do not contribute to the support of the applicants. As previously indicated, both of the applicants married children have acquired lawful resident alien status. The applicant husband stated that in the event the funds received from the welfare department were discontinued he is confident that their children would take care of them.
Section 212(a)(15) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, a ground for the exclusion of aliens, the provisions of which the Regional Commissioner has found to be a statutory bar to the granting of these applications reads as follows:
Aliens who, in the opinion of the consular officer at the time of application for a visa, or in the opinion of the Attorney General at the time of application for admission, are likely at any time to become public charges;
A similar ground for the expulsion of aliens, is contained in section 241(a)(8) of that Act and reads:
in the opinion of the Attorney General, has within five years after entry become a public charge from causes not affirmatively shown to have arisen after entry;
It is well settled that aliens who are likely to be, or who are, supported at the expense of the public because of poverty or some physical handicap come within the above statutory proscription. See
Matter of M–
Matter of T–
Accordingly, if the provisions of section 212(a)(15), supra, apply to applicants for adjustment under section 1 of the Act of November 2, 1966, on the facts here these applicants are, at present, statutorily ineligible for the status sought, as found by the Regional Commissioner.
In that regard we also find it necessary to consider the above ground for expulsion under section 241(a)(8), supra, for the obvious reason that it would be purposeless to find such applicants to be eligible for visas and admissible and grant the applications for adjustment if the factual situation showed that they would immediately thereafter become deportable under that expulsion provision. In fact, it has been held that such a situation would support a finding of inadmissibility even though not a specific
statutory ground for excludability.
Assuming arguendo, however, that such would not apply to this particular expulsion ground, the sound exercise of discretion, provided for in the Act of November 2, 1966, would generally warrant denial of an application if in fact the alien would be deportable thereunder.
The purpose of the Act upon which these applications are based is to provide a ready means to permit certain Cuban refugees in the United States to adjust to permanent resident status, in the discretion of the Attorney General, if they are eligible to receive an immigrant visa and are admissible for permanent residence. Many of these refugees are presently impoverished by force of circumstances beyond their control and are dependent upon Federal assistance. A major objective of this opportunity for adjustme
nt of status was, therefore, to aid in these refugees' resettlement by enhancing their opportunity to qualify for employment here and in turn reduce the Government's expenditures in their behalf.
It is axiomatic that laws remedial in nature, such as the Act under discussion, should be construed liberally. This then becomes a question of statutory interpretation of its qualifying terms relating to eligibility to receive a visa and admissibility to the United States with respect to section 212(a)(15) and section 241(a)(8), supra. As was pointed out in
Matter of S.S. Annik
the primary rule in that regard is that the intent of the legislation is to be carried out. The meaning of the statute is to be found in its words, without resort to any materials dehors the words of the statute itself, since it is presumed that the legislature chose apt words to express its intention. But these rules of statutory construction must yield in situations in which it can be demonstrated that adherence to them would defeat the intention of the legislature. It has been said that canons of constr
uction were evolved as aids in determining the intent of the legislature in enacting statutes, not as limitations in determining such intention.
, supra, goes on to state that a well recognized basis for departing from the rule that a statute must be given its strict literal interpretation exists where application of the rule would lead to an absurd, unjust, or unreasonable result. One of the classic illustrations of departure from the strict letter of a statute is the case reported in Plowden, which held that the statute of King Edward II, which provided that a prisoner who breaks prison is guilty of a felony, did not extend to a prisoner who break
s out because the prison was on fire--"for he is not to be hanged because he would not stay to be burnt."
We shall therefore briefly review the history of the legislation under reference
to determine whether strict literal application of the provisions mentioned would be consistent with the intent of the Congress. Commencing early in 1959 the Cuban Government, under Fidel Castro, turned that country into a Communist dominated area and enacted laws confiscating private property and other legislation oppressing the rights of its people. As a result, Cubans began to seek asylum in the United States in ever increasing numbers. These refugees, in the main, because of the circumstances of their
departure arrived with little in the way of money or valuables and most of those that were fortunate enough to have either, soon found their assets exhausted. As Miami, Florida was the most accessible port from that country, the impact of this large number of Cuban refugees was first centered in that State.
In early 1961, the late President John F. Kennedy directed the establishment of a Cuban Refugee Program under the Department of Health, Education and Welfare to alleviate the plight of these refugees. In June 1962 Congress enacted the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1962
authorizing the President to, among other things, render further assistance to qualified refugees who "are in urgent need of assistance for the essentials of life." In addition to the latter, the Act provides for assistance to State or local public agencies providing services for qualified refugees; health and educational services; special training for employment and for the expense of transportation to, and resettlement in, other areas of the United States, as well as other benefits.
By Executive Order 11077, effective July 1, 1962,
implementation of these aspects of that Act was assigned to the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare. This program has been continued under the Cuban Refugee Program of that Department.
In general, financial assistance is furnished under this program by the various State and municipal welfare departments who in turn are reimbursed therefor from Federal funds provided for the program in accordance with provisions of the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act, supra. That Act does not foreclose the use of these funds for these alien refugees after they have had their status adjusted to that of lawful permanent residents and such financial or other assistance necessary to the well being of thes
e people is continued to be extended where needed.
The Committee reports clearly reflect that the Congress in considering the enactment of the Act of November 2, 1966 was deeply conscious of the financial plight of these people and a major reason for the bill's enactment, as previously indicated, was to stabilize these refugees' immigration status as an essential element toward assisting them to become self-sufficient by removing or alleviating some barriers to employment stemming from the lack of firm roots, and thereby aid in reducing the Government's ex
penditures in their behalf.
It is clear from all of the foregoing that the Congress was keenly aware of the need for and receipt of assistance, financial and otherwise, by the beneficiaries of the then proposed legislation. Also, with regard to possible deportability of Cuban recipients of financial assistance, one of the cooperating voluntary social agencies expressed concern to the Senate Subcommittee that because "a Cuban refugee has been receiving public assistance and support *** through our Cuban Refugee Program *** they might b
e subject to deportation on the basis of indigency. We would like to see that this situation should not develop ***". To which a committee member responded in pertinent part, "*** the hard fact, *** is that economic issues do not permit the absorption of all these people, and the problem that you suggest might cause trouble unless we anticipate it. It is a deportable thing, I am told, for an alien. But I would be amazed if that rule of law was ever applied in the circumstances we find existing there".
We conclude that Congress, in setting out the requirement in the Act of November 2, 1966 that an alien applicant be eligible for a visa and admissible to this country, did not intend requiring application of the provisions of section 212(a)(15) or section 241(a)(8) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, supra, in light of the Congressional history showing the recognized impoverished circumstances of many of the refugees it proposed to benefit and the special legislation enacted to render them Federal assis
tance. Otherwise, to apply those provisions would have the effect of materially defeating the humanitarian purpose for enactment of the Act. Indeed, President Lyndon B. Johnson, in directing the waiver of permanent resident application fees stated that he did so "on humanitarian grounds" in that "Cuba requires that refugees coming to this country turn over to the Cuban Government any worldly assets they own before leaving the country. Most Cuban refugees are able to accumulate very few resources in a two-ye
It is found, therefore, that the statutory ground of ineligibility asserted by the Regional Commissioner is not sustained and that the applicants are eligible for the status sought.
There remains a question as to whether the applications should be granted as a matter of administrative discretion. The fact that the above-cited exclusion and expulsion grounds are found not to be a statutory bar does not necessarily preclude denial of an application as a matter of discretion
if it is found, for example, that circumstances with respect to the acceptance of public assistance were such that the applicants were not deserving or that their presence here on a permanent basis would not otherwise be in the best interests of the United States.
In the foregoing regard, the character of the subjects is unquestioned. It is noted that the monthly monetary amount they receive is moderate and is supplemented by earnings of their son and daughter-in-law, with whom they live; that the applicant husband is willing to work but has been handicapped by the language barrier and that he has actually taken action, apparently prior to the notice of denial of their applications, to separate his wife and self from their children in order to seek prospective employ
ment in another area. Bearing in mind the recognized fact that Cubans have a strongly family-centered culture
the latter evidences the sincere desire of the male applicant and his spouse to be self-sustaining. In that regard we note his comments previously quoted. "My children are already permanent residents and we wish ours too. In that way we can get better jobs and be better citizens. I am very grateful to this country and by having my residence, I feel part of it".
It is concluded that favorable exercise of discretion is warranted. An appropriate order will be entered.
It is ordered that
the order of the Regional Commissioner be, and hereby is, reversed and the applications granted.
\ int \ TABLE OF CONTENTS - INTERIM DECISIONS REFERENCED IN OTHER PUBLICATIONS ON ILINK \ Interim Decision # 1772