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U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U. S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Office of Administrative Appeals MS 2090
Washington, DC 20529-2090



**U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services**

A 1

[REDACTED]

FILE:

[REDACTED]

Office: LOS ANGELES, CA

Date:

APR 07 2010

IN RE:

[REDACTED]

APPLICATION: Application to Register Permanent Residence or Adjust Status (Form I-485) Pursuant to Section 245 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

[REDACTED]

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. Please refer to 8 C.F.R. § 103.5 for the specific requirements. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$585. Any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen, as required by 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i).

Perry Rhew
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The Field Office Director, Los Angeles, California, denied the Application for Permission to Reapply for Admission into the United States after Deportation or Removal (Form I-212) and it is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of Mexico who, on March 10, 2000, appeared at the San Ysidro, California port of entry. The applicant presented a U.S. birth certificate bearing the name ' [REDACTED]' [REDACTED]. The applicant was placed into secondary inspection. The applicant admitted that she was not the true owner of the document and she did not have valid documentation to enter the United States. The applicant admitted that she knew that it was illegal to enter the United States using this document. The applicant admitted that she had previously resided in the United States for two years. The applicant was found to be inadmissible pursuant to sections 212(a)(6)(C)(ii) and 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii) and 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I), for making a false claim to U.S. citizenship and for being an immigrant without valid documentation. On March 11, 2000, the applicant was expeditiously removed from the United States pursuant to section 235(b)(1) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1).

On March 28, 2001, the applicant filed an Application to Register Permanent Residence or Adjust Status (Form I-485) based on a Petition for Alien Relative (Form I-130) filed on her behalf by her U.S. citizen spouse. The Form I-485 indicates that the applicant entered the United States without inspection on June 15, 1998. On February 19, 2002, the Form I-485 and Form I-130 were denied. On November 21, 2002, the applicant's spouse filed a second Form I-130, which was approved on September 15, 2003. On September 27, 2004, the applicant filed a second Form I-485 based on the approved Form I-130. The Form I-485 indicates that the applicant entered the United States without inspection in April 2000. On the same day, the applicant filed the Form I-212, indicating that she continued to reside in the United States. On June 10, 2009, the Form I-485 was denied. The applicant is inadmissible under section 212(a)(9)(A)(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(i). She seeks permission to reapply for admission into the United States under section 212(a)(9)(A)(iii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(iii) in order to remain in the United States and reside with her U.S. citizen spouse and U.S. citizen child.

The field office director determined that the applicant is inadmissible pursuant to section 212(a)(9)(C)(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(C)(i), for illegally reentering the United States after having been removed. The field office director determined that the applicant was not eligible to apply for permission to reapply for admission because she had not remained outside the United States for the required ten years. The field office director denied the Form I-212 accordingly. See *Field Office Director's Decision Attachment I-291*, dated June 10, 2009.¹

On appeal, counsel contends that the decision in *Gonzales v. DHS (Gonzales II)*, 508 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 2007), is on appeal and a decision on the applicant's Form I-212 should be held in abeyance.²

¹ The AAO notes that the field office director failed to issue a separate attachment I-291 for the denial of the Form I-212, but that the attachment I-291 for the denial of the Form I-485 sets forth the appropriate reasons for denial of the Form I-212.

² The restraining order preventing USCIS from denying an applicant's Form I-212 because he or she has not remained outside the United States for a period of ten years, expired on February 6, 2009. While counsel contends that USCIS'

On appeal, counsel contends that it would be impermissibly retroactive, fundamentally unfair and manifestly unjust to apply *Gonzales v. DHS (Gonzales II)*, 508 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 2007) when the applicant, in filing the Form I-212, relied upon the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (Ninth Circuit) decision in *Perez-Gonzalez v. Ashcroft*, 379 F.3d 783 (9th Cir. 2004). See *Form I-290B*, dated June 24, 2009. In support of her contentions, counsel submits only the referenced Form I-290B. The entire record was reviewed in rendering a decision in this case.

Section 212(a)(9) of the Act states in pertinent part:

(A) Certain aliens previously removed.-

- (i) Arriving aliens.- Any alien who has been ordered removed under section 235(b)(1) or at the end of proceedings under section 240 initiated upon the alien's arrival in the United States and who again seeks admission within five years of the date of such removal (or within 20 years in the case of a second or subsequent removal or at any time in the case of an alien convicted of an aggravated felony) is inadmissible.
- (ii) Other aliens.- Any alien not described in clause (i) who-
 - (I) has been ordered removed under section 240 or any other provision of law, or
 - (II) departed the United States while an order of removal was outstanding, and who seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal (or within 20 years of such date in the case of a second or subsequent removal or at any time in the case of an alien convicted of an aggravated felony) is inadmissible.
- (iii) Exception.- Clauses (i) and (ii) shall not apply to an alien seeking admission within a period if, prior to the date of the alien's reembarkation at a place outside the United States or attempt to be admitted from foreign contiguous territory, the [Secretary of Homeland Security] has consented to the alien's reapplying for admission.

....

(C) Aliens unlawfully present after previous immigration violations.-

denial of the applicant's Form I-212 is premature because a further appeal has been filed in *Gonzalez*, the Ninth Circuit denied the plaintiffs' application for an injunction on February 6, 2009, finding that the plaintiffs were unlikely to be successful on appeal.

(i) In general.-Any alien who-

(I) has been unlawfully present in the United States for an aggregate period of more than 1 year, or

(II) has been ordered removed under section 235(b)(1), section 240, or any other provision of law, and who enters or attempts to reenter the United States without being admitted is inadmissible.

(ii) Exception.

Clause (i) shall not apply to an alien seeking admission more than 10 years after the date of the alien's last departure from the United States if, prior to the alien's reembarkation at a place outside the United States or attempt to be readmitted from a foreign contiguous territory, the Secretary of Homeland Security has consented to the alien's reapplying for admission.

(iii) Waiver

The Secretary of Homeland Security may waive the application of clause (i) in the case of an alien who is a VAWA self-petitioner if there is a connection between—

(I) the alien's battering or subjection to extreme cruelty; and

(II) the alien's removal, departure from the United States, reentry or reentries into the United States; or attempted reentry into the United States.

The AAO notes that a waiver to the section 212(a)(9)(C)(i) ground of inadmissibility is available to individuals classified as battered spouses under the cited sections of section 204 of the Act. *See also* 8 U.S.C. § 1154. There are no indications in the record that the applicant is or should be classified as such.

An alien who is inadmissible under section 212(a)(9)(C)(i) of the Act may not apply for consent to reapply unless he or she has *remained outside* the United States for more than 10 years since the date of the alien's last departure from the United States. *See Matter of Torres-Garcia*, 23 I&N Dec. 866 (BIA 2006); *Matter of Briones*, 24 I&N Dec. 355 (BIA 2007); and *Matter of Diaz and Lopez*, 25 I&N Dec. 188 (BIA 2010). Thus, to avoid inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(C) of the Act, it must be the case that the applicant's last departure was at least ten years ago, the applicant has remained outside the United States since that departure, *and* that U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) has consented to the applicant's reapplying for admission. While the applicant's last departure from the United States occurred on March 11, 2000, more than ten years ago, she has

not remained outside the United States since that departure and she is currently in the United States.³ The applicant is currently statutorily ineligible to apply for permission to reapply for admission.

On appeal, counsel contends that it would be impermissibly retroactive, fundamentally unfair and manifestly unjust to deny the applicant's Form I-212 because of her reliance on *Perez-Gonzalez*.

The applicant's Form I-212 was pending while an injunction restraining USCIS from applying agency policy as set forth in *Matter of Torres-Garcia* had been issued. The AAO finds, therefore, that in filing the Form I-212 under such circumstances, counsel's contention that the applicant reasonably relied upon the Ninth Circuit's *Perez-Gonzalez v. Ashcroft* decision is illogical.

The Ninth Circuit, in deferring to the BIA's decision in *Matter of Torres-Garcia*, found that the BIA's findings were reasonable and that the statute is unambiguous and unchanged since its promulgation. The Ninth Circuit found that the issue might have been resolved under the first step of *Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council*, 467 U.S. 87, 104 S. Ct. 2778, 81 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1984), by examining the text of the relevant statutes and their legislative histories. The court found that it must defer to *Torres-Garcia* and that the statute itself is unambiguous. In *Matter of Torres-Garcia*, the BIA found that 8 C.F.R. § 212.2 was not promulgated to implement the current section 212(a)(9) of the Act and that the very concept of retroactive permission to reapply for admission, i.e., permission requested after unlawful reentry, contradicts the clear language of section 212(a)(9)(C) of the Act, which in its own right makes unlawful reentry after removal a ground of inadmissibility that can only be waived by the passage of at least ten years. The BIA found that the *Perez-Gonzalez v. Ashcroft* decision contradicts the clear language of the statute and the legislative policy underlying the statute in general. Since the statute is unambiguous and has been in effect since April 1, 1997, counsel's contention that the correct application of the statute is impermissibly retroactive, fundamentally unfair and manifestly unjust is unfounded since the applicant's removal, unlawful reentry and filing of the Form I-212 occurred after the statute's enactment.

Finally, the statute and case law clearly states that an alien who has been ordered removed and enters or attempts to reenter the United States without being admitted may seek an exception to permanent grounds of inadmissibility when seeking admission more than ten years after the date of the alien's last departure from the United States, if, the applicant receives permission to reapply for admission prior to reentering the United States.⁴ *Matter of Torres-Garcia, Supra.*; *Matter of Briones, Supra.*; and *Matter of Diaz and Lopez, Supra.*

Beyond the decision of the field office director, the AAO finds that the applicant is inadmissible under the provisions of section 212(a)(6)(C)(ii) of the Act and no waiver is available. Therefore, the applicant is mandatorily inadmissible to the United States and no purpose would be served in the

³ The applicant will be required to submit evidence establishing that she is currently outside the United States and has remained outside the United States for period of ten years when she becomes eligible to apply for permission to reapply for admission.

⁴ The AAO notes that the reentry after obtaining permission to reapply for admission must be a lawful admission to the United States; otherwise, the applicant has again illegally reentered the United States after having been removed and renewed his or her inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(C) of the Act.

favorable exercise of discretion in adjudicating an application to reapply for admission into the United States.⁵

Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361, provides that the burden of proof is upon the applicant to establish that she is eligible for the benefit sought. The applicant in the instant case does not qualify for a waiver or the exception under section 212(a)(9)(C)(ii) and (iii) of the Act. Thus, as a matter of law, the applicant is not eligible for approval of a Form I-212. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed as a matter of discretion.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.

⁵ The AAO maintains plenary power to review each appeal on a de novo basis. 5 U.S.C. 557(b) ("On appeal from or review of the initial decision, the agency has all the powers which it would have in making the initial decision except as it may limit the issues on notice or by rule."); *see also*, *Janka v. U.S. Dept. of Transp., NTSB*, 925 F.2d 1147, 1149 (9th Cir. 1991). The AAO's de novo authority has been long recognized by the federal courts. *See, e.g. Dor v. INS*, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989).