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U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Administrative Appeals Office (AAO)
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., MS 2090
Washington, DC 20529-2090



**U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services**

B2



DATE: **MAR 22 2012**

Office: TEXAS SERVICE CENTER



IN RE:



PETITION: Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as an Alien of Extraordinary Ability Pursuant to Section 203(b)(1)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(1)(A)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:



INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied by us in reaching our decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. The specific requirements for filing such a request can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$630. Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires that any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,

Perry Rhew
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The employment-based immigrant visa petition was denied by the Director, Texas Service Center, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner seeks classification as an employment-based immigrant pursuant to section 203(b)(1)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(1)(A), as an alien of extraordinary ability in the arts. The director determined that the petitioner had not established the requisite extraordinary ability and failed to submit extensive documentation of his sustained national or international acclaim.

Congress set a very high benchmark for aliens of extraordinary ability by requiring through the statute that the petitioner demonstrate the alien's "sustained national or international acclaim" and present "extensive documentation" of the alien's achievements. *See* section 203(b)(1)(A)(i) of the Act and 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h)(3). The implementing regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h)(3) states that an alien can establish sustained national or international acclaim through evidence of a one-time achievement of a major, internationally recognized award. Absent the receipt of such an award, the regulation outlines ten categories of specific objective evidence. 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h)(3)(i) through (x). The petitioner must submit qualifying evidence under at least three of the ten regulatory categories of evidence to establish the basic eligibility requirements.

On appeal, counsel asserts that the petitioner meets at least three of the ten regulatory categories of evidence at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h)(3). For the reasons discussed below, the AAO will uphold the director's decision.

I. LAW

Section 203(b) of the Act states, in pertinent part, that:

(1) Priority workers. -- Visas shall first be made available . . . to qualified immigrants who are aliens described in any of the following subparagraphs (A) through (C):

(A) Aliens with extraordinary ability. -- An alien is described in this subparagraph if --

(i) the alien has extraordinary ability in the sciences, arts, education, business, or athletics which has been demonstrated by sustained national or international acclaim and whose achievements have been recognized in the field through extensive documentation,

(ii) the alien seeks to enter the United States to continue work in the area of extraordinary ability, and

(iii) the alien's entry into the United States will substantially benefit prospectively the United States.

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) and legacy Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) have consistently recognized that Congress intended to set a very high standard for individuals seeking immigrant visas as aliens of extraordinary ability. *See* H.R. 723 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 59 (1990); 56 Fed. Reg. 60897, 60898-99 (Nov. 29, 1991). The term “extraordinary ability” refers only to those individuals in that small percentage who have risen to the very top of the field of endeavor. *Id.*; 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h)(2).

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h)(3) requires that the petitioner demonstrate the alien’s sustained acclaim and the recognition of his or her achievements in the field. Such acclaim must be established either through evidence of a one-time achievement (that is, a major, international recognized award) or through the submission of qualifying evidence under at least three of the ten categories of evidence listed at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h)(3)(i)-(x).

In 2010, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (Ninth Circuit) reviewed the denial of a petition filed under this classification. *Kazarian v. USCIS*, 596 F.3d 1115 (9th Cir. 2010). Although the court upheld the AAO’s decision to deny the petition, the court took issue with the AAO’s evaluation of evidence submitted to meet a given evidentiary criterion.¹ With respect to the criteria at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h)(3)(iv) and (vi), the court concluded that while USCIS may have raised legitimate concerns about the significance of the evidence submitted to meet those two criteria, those concerns should have been raised in a subsequent “final merits determination.” *Id.* at 1121-22.

The court stated that the AAO’s evaluation rested on an improper understanding of the regulations. Instead of parsing the significance of evidence as part of the initial inquiry, the court stated that “the proper procedure is to count the types of evidence provided (which the AAO did),” and if the petitioner failed to submit sufficient evidence, “the proper conclusion is that the applicant has failed to satisfy the regulatory requirement of three types of evidence (as the AAO concluded).” *Id.* at 1122 (citing to 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h)(3)).

Thus, *Kazarian* sets forth a two-part approach where the evidence is first counted and then considered in the context of a final merits determination. In this matter, the AAO will review the evidence under the plain language requirements of each criterion claimed. As the petitioner did not submit qualifying evidence under at least three criteria, the proper conclusion is that the petitioner has failed to satisfy the regulatory requirement of three types of evidence. *Id.*

II. ANALYSIS

A. Evidentiary Criteria

This petition, filed on November 19, 2009, seeks to classify the petitioner as an alien with extraordinary ability as the [REDACTED].

¹ Specifically, the court stated that the AAO had unilaterally imposed novel substantive or evidentiary requirements beyond those set forth in the regulations at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h)(3)(iv) and 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h)(3)(vi).

The petitioner has submitted documentation pertaining to the following categories of evidence under 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h)(3).²

Published material about the alien in professional or major trade publications or other major media, relating to the alien's work in the field for which classification is sought. Such evidence shall include the title, date, and author of the material, and any necessary translation.

The petitioner submitted published material about himself and his work in newspapers such as the *New York Times* and the *Los Angeles Times*, and in trade publications such as *Indiewire*. Accordingly, the petitioner has established that he meets the plain language requirements of this regulatory criterion.

Evidence of the alien's original scientific, scholarly, artistic, athletic, or business-related contributions of major significance in the field.

The petitioner submitted letters of support from the Commissioner of the State of New Hampshire Department of Cultural Resources, the Director of Operations for See Factor Industry Inc., the Senior Vice President of Technicolor New York, the Executive Director of the Spain – U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the Executive Director of the New York State Film Commission, and the Senior Vice President of Panavision New York indicating that the petitioner is the creator and founder of the [REDACTED] discussing the international scope of the festival, and explaining the significance of the festival in the short film industry. The petitioner also submitted documentation of extensive media coverage of the [REDACTED] in newspapers throughout the United States. Therefore, the AAO affirms the director's finding that the petitioner's creation of the MSFF constitutes an original contribution of major significance in the field.

The AAO notes, however, that the plain language of the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h)(3)(v) requires “contributions of major significance” (emphasis added) in the plural. The use of the plural is consistent with the statutory requirement for extensive evidence. Section 203(b)(1)(A)(i) of the Act. Significantly, not all of the criteria at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h)(3) are worded in the plural. Specifically, the regulations at 8 C.F.R. §§ 204.5(h)(3)(iv) and (ix) only require service on a single judging panel or a single high salary. When a regulatory criterion wishes to include the singular within the plural, it expressly does so as when it states at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k)(3)(ii)(B) that evidence of experience must be in the form of “letter(s).” Thus, the AAO can infer that the plural in the remaining regulatory criteria has meaning. In a different context, federal courts have upheld USCIS' ability to interpret significance from whether the singular or plural is used in a regulation. See *Maramjaya v. USCIS*, Civ. Act. No. 06-2158 (RCL) at 12 (D.C. Cir. March 26, 2008); *Snapshot.com Inc. v. Chertoff*, 2006 WL 3491005 at *10 (D. Or. Nov. 30, 2006) (upholding an interpretation that the regulatory requirement for “a” bachelor's degree or “a” foreign equivalent degree at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(l)(2) requires a single degree rather than a combination of academic credentials). Thus, the plain language of this

² On appeal, the petitioner does not claim to meet any of the regulatory categories of evidence not discussed in this decision.

regulatory criterion requires evidence of more than one original contribution of major significance in the field. Without documentary evidence of more than one qualifying original contribution, the petitioner has not established that he meets the plain language requirements of the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h)(3)(v).

Evidence that the alien has performed in a leading or critical role for organizations or establishments that have a distinguished reputation.

The aforementioned letters of support indicate that the petitioner has performed in a leading role as the [REDACTED]. Further, the published material submitted by the petitioner about the MSFF is sufficient to demonstrate that the organization has a distinguished reputation. The AAO notes, however, that the plain language of the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h)(3)(viii) requires evidence that the petitioner has performed in a leading or critical role for distinguished “organizations or establishments” in the plural. As previously discussed, the use of the plural is consistent with the statutory requirement for extensive evidence. Section 203(b)(1)(A)(i) of the Act. Accordingly, demonstrating a leading or critical role for only a single distinguished organization, the [REDACTED] does not meet the plain language requirements of the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h)(3)(viii).

Evidence that the alien has commanded a high salary or other significantly high remuneration for services, in relation to others in the field.

The petitioner submitted a September 1, 2008 “Employment Agreement” indicating that his company, the MSFF, would pay him a salary of \$100,000 per year. The record, however, does not include documentary evidence (such as payroll records or U.S. income tax forms) showing the petitioner’s actual earnings for any specific time period. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm’r 1998) (citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg’l Comm’r 1972)). In response to the director’s notice of intent to deny, the petitioner submitted a February 26, 2006 article entitled “What nonprofits pay their CEOs” indicating that [REDACTED] receives a yearly salary of \$85,000. The petitioner also submitted an April 27, 2009 article entitled [REDACTED] indicating that the [REDACTED] earns a salary of \$50,000 per year. The preceding examples offered by the petitioner are limited to the salaries of only two film festival [REDACTED] and they are not an appropriate basis for comparison in demonstrating that his compensation constitutes a “high salary or other significantly high remuneration for services, in relation to others in the field.” [Emphasis added.] The petitioner’s sample size is too low and thus lacks the precision to provide a reliable basis for comparison. For instance, the petitioner’s limited comparison excludes the salaries of Executive Directors from more popular film festivals in the U.S. such as [REDACTED]

and the Chicago International Film Festival. The record does not include an adequate sampling of reliable earnings information showing that the petitioner has received a “high salary” or

“significantly high remuneration” relative to other film festival Executive Directors working in the United States. *See Matter of Price*, 20 I&N Dec. 953, 954 (Assoc. Comm’r 1994) (considering professional golfer’s earnings versus other PGA Tour golfers); *see also Grimson v. INS*, 934 F. Supp. 965, 968 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (considering NHL enforcer’s salary versus other NHL enforcers); *Muni v. INS*, 891 F. Supp. 440, 444-45 (N. D. Ill. 1995) (comparing salary of NHL defensive player to salary of other NHL defensemen). In the present matter, the documentary evidence submitted by the petitioner does not establish that he has received a high salary or other significantly high remuneration for services in relation to others in the field. Accordingly, the petitioner has not established that he meets the plain language requirements of this regulatory criterion.

B. Summary

The petitioner has failed to satisfy the antecedent regulatory requirement of three categories of evidence.

C. Prior O-1 Nonimmigrant Visa Status

The record reflects that the petitioner was the beneficiary of an approved O-1 nonimmigrant visa petition for an alien of extraordinary ability in the arts. Although the words “extraordinary ability” are used in the Act for classification of artists under both the nonimmigrant O-1 and the first preference employment-based immigrant categories, the statute and regulations define the term differently for each classification. Section 101(a)(46) of the Act states, “The term ‘extraordinary ability’ means, for purposes of section 101(a)(15)(O)(i), in the case of the arts, distinction.” The O-1 regulation reiterates that “[e]xtraordinary ability in the field of arts means distinction.” 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(o)(3)(ii). “Distinction” is a lower standard than that required for the immigrant classification, which defines extraordinary ability as “a level of expertise indicating that the individual is one of that small percentage who have risen to the very top of the field of endeavor.” 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h)(2). The evidentiary criteria for these two classifications also differ in several respects, for example, nominations for awards or prizes are acceptable evidence of O-1 eligibility, 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(o)(3)(iv)(A), but the immigrant classification requires actual receipt of nationally or internationally recognized awards or prizes. 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h)(3)(i). Given the clear statutory and regulatory distinction between these two classifications, the petitioner’s receipt of O-1 nonimmigrant classification is not evidence of his eligibility for immigrant classification as an alien with extraordinary ability. Further, the AAO does not find that an approval of a nonimmigrant visa mandates the approval of a similar immigrant visa. Each petition must be decided on a case-by-case basis upon review of the evidence of record.

It must be noted that many I-140 immigrant petitions are denied after USCIS approves prior nonimmigrant petitions. *See, e.g., Q Data Consulting, Inc. v. INS*, 293 F. Supp. 2d 25 (D.D.C. 2003); *IKEA US v. US Dept. of Justice*, 48 F. Supp. 2d 22 (D.D.C. 1999); *Fedin Brothers Co. Ltd. v. Sava*, 724 F. Supp. 1103 (E.D.N.Y. 1989). Because USCIS spends less time reviewing I-129 nonimmigrant petitions than I-140 immigrant petitions, some nonimmigrant petitions are simply approved in error. *Q Data Consulting, Inc. v. INS*, 293 F. Supp. 2d at 29-30; *see also Texas A&M Univ. v. Upchurch*, 99 Fed. Appx. 556 (5th Cir. 2004) (finding that prior approvals do

not preclude USCIS from denying an extension of the original visa based on a reassessment of the alien's qualifications).

The AAO is not required to approve applications or petitions where eligibility has not been demonstrated, merely because of prior approvals that may have been erroneous. *See, e.g., Matter of Church Scientology International*, 19 I&N Dec. 593, 597 (Comm'r 1988). It would be absurd to suggest that USCIS or any agency must treat acknowledged errors as binding precedent. *Sussex Engg. Ltd. v. Montgomery*, 825 F.2d 1084, 1090 (6th Cir. 1987), *cert. denied*, 485 U.S. 1008 (1988).

Furthermore, the AAO's authority over the service centers is comparable to the relationship between a court of appeals and a district court. Even if a service center director has approved a nonimmigrant petition on behalf of the alien, the AAO would not be bound to follow the contradictory decision of a service center. *Louisiana Philharmonic Orchestra v. INS*, No. 98-2855, 2000 WL 282785, *1, *3 (E.D. La.), *aff'd*, 248 F.3d 1139 (5th Cir. 2001), *cert. denied*, 122 S.Ct. 51 (2001).

III. CONCLUSION

The documentation submitted in support of a claim of extraordinary ability must clearly demonstrate that the alien has achieved sustained national or international acclaim and is one of the small percentage who has risen to the very top of the field of endeavor.

Even if the petitioner had submitted the requisite evidence under at least three evidentiary categories, in accordance with the *Kazarian* opinion, the next step would be a final merits determination that considers all of the evidence in the context of whether or not the petitioner has demonstrated: (1) a "level of expertise indicating that the individual is one of that small percentage who have risen to the very top of the[ir] field of endeavor" and (2) "that the alien has sustained national or international acclaim and that his or her achievements have been recognized in the field of expertise." 8 C.F.R. §§ 204.5(h)(2) and (3); *see also Kazarian*, 596 F.3d at 1119-20. While the AAO concludes that the evidence is not indicative of a level of expertise consistent with the small percentage at the very top of the field or sustained national or international acclaim, the AAO need not explain that conclusion in a final merits determination.³ Rather, the proper conclusion is that the petitioner has failed to satisfy the antecedent regulatory requirement of three categories of evidence. *Id.* at 1122.

The petitioner has not established eligibility pursuant to section 203(b)(1)(A) of the Act and the petition may not be approved.

³ The AAO maintains de novo review of all questions of fact and law. *See Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d at 145. In any future proceeding, the AAO maintains the jurisdiction to conduct a final merits determination as the office that made the last decision in this matter. 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(ii). *See also* section 103(a)(1) of the Act; section 204(b) of the Act; DHS Delegation Number 0150.1 (effective March 1, 2003); 8 C.F.R. § 2.1 (2003); 8 C.F.R. § 103.1(f)(3)(iii) (2003); *Matter of Aurelio*, 19 I&N Dec. 458, 460 (BIA 1987) (holding that legacy INS, now USCIS, is the sole authority with the jurisdiction to decide visa petitions).

The burden of proof in visa petition proceedings remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the petitioner has not sustained that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.