


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U.S. Department of Homeland Security
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U.S. Citizenship
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
B4

FILE: [Redacted] Office: CALIFORNIA SERVICE CENTER Date: DEC 01 2005
WAC 03 240 52593

IN RE: Petitioner: [Redacted]
Beneficiary: [Redacted]

PETITION: Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as a Multinational Executive or Manager Pursuant to Section 203(b)(1)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(1)(C)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:



INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

Robert P. Wiemann, Director
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The preference visa petition was denied by the Director, California Service Center. The matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be summarily dismissed.

The petitioner was established in 2000 in the state of California. The petitioner is engaged in the wholesale of hosiery and seeks to employ the beneficiary as its president. Accordingly, the petitioner endeavors to classify the beneficiary as an employment-based immigrant pursuant to section 203(b)(1)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(1)(C), as a multinational executive or manager. The director denied the petition based on the determination that the petitioner failed to establish that the beneficiary would be employed in a managerial or executive capacity. Specifically, the director recited the statements provided to describe the beneficiary's proposed position and discussed the petitioner's organizational structure and wage report for the third quarter of 2003. Based on the documentation submitted, the director concluded that the petitioner's organization consisted of only one full-time employee, besides the beneficiary, which he did not deem sufficient to relieve the beneficiary from having to perform primarily non-qualifying tasks.

On appeal, counsel disputes the director's findings and provides a supplemental description of the beneficiary's proposed job position. However, the additional description is generally non-responsive to the director's concerns and consists of essentially the same job description that had been provided earlier in response to the director's request for additional evidence. The remaining part of the job description consists of conclusory assertions regarding the beneficiary's employment capacity. However, merely repeating the language of the statute or regulations does not satisfy the petitioner's burden of proof. *Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Sava*, 724 F. Supp. 1103, 1108 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), *aff'd*, 905 F. 2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990); *Avyr Associates, Inc. v. Meissner*, 1997 WL 188942 at *5 (S.D.N.Y.).

The petitioner also submitted an additional organizational chart and job descriptions for the three managers named in the chart. However, of the three department managers named in the chart only one appears in the petitioner's 2003 third quarterly wage report. Thus, the petitioner claims to have employees in managerial positions, yet fails to provide documentation to substantiate their employment with the petitioning organization as of the date the petition was filed. *See Matter of Katigbak*, 14 I&N Dec. 45, 49 (Comm. 1971). Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)).

Furthermore, the organizational chart submitted on appeal is entirely inconsistent with the chart provided in response to the director's request for evidence. Namely, only two of the nine employees named in the initial organizational chart are also named in the chart most recently submitted on appeal. Of those two employees, one is the beneficiary himself. It is incumbent upon the petitioner to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence. Any attempt to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies will not suffice unless the petitioner submits competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. *Matter of Ho*, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591-92 (BIA 1988). In the instant case, rather than address the deficiencies discussed by the director in the denial, the petitioner complicates the matter by introducing seemingly inconsistent information regarding its personnel structure. Neither counsel nor the petitioner acknowledges the significant differences between the two organizational charts; nor do they provide an explanation to resolve this apparent inconsistency.

Counsel also indicated on the Form I-290B that a separate brief or evidence would be submitted within 30 days of the appeal, which was received on December 14, 2004. To date, more than nine months since the appeal was filed, no additional evidence or information has been received. Accordingly, the record will be considered complete as currently constituted.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 103.3(a)(1)(v), states, in pertinent part:

An officer to whom an appeal is taken shall summarily dismiss any appeal when the party concerned fails to identify specifically any erroneous conclusion of law or statement of fact for the appeal.

Inasmuch as the petitioner has failed to identify specifically an erroneous conclusion of law or statement of fact in this proceeding, the appeal must be summarily dismissed.

As a final note, counsel makes a brief reference to the petitioner's current approved L-1 employment of the beneficiary. With regard to the beneficiary's L-1 nonimmigrant classification, it should be noted that, in general, given the permanent nature of the benefit sought, immigrant petitions are given far greater scrutiny by CIS than nonimmigrant petitions. The AAO acknowledges that both the immigrant and nonimmigrant visa classifications rely on the same definitions of managerial and executive capacity. *See* §§ 101(a)(44)(A) and (B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(44). Although the statutory definitions for managerial and executive capacity are the same, the question of overall eligibility requires a comprehensive review of all of the provisions, not just the definitions of managerial and executive capacity. There are significant differences between the nonimmigrant visa classification, which allows an alien to enter the United States temporarily for no more than seven years, and an immigrant visa petition, which permits an alien to apply for permanent residence in the United States and, if granted, ultimately apply for naturalization as a United States citizen. *Cf.* §§ 204 and 214 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1154 and 1184; *see also* § 316 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1427.

In addition, unless a petition seeks extension of a "new office" petition, the regulations allow for the approval of an L-1 extension without any supporting evidence and CIS normally accords the petitions a less substantial review. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(l)(14)(i) (requiring no supporting documentation to file a petition to extend an L-1A petition's validity). Because CIS spends less time reviewing Form I-129 nonimmigrant petitions than Form I-140 immigrant petitions, some nonimmigrant L-1 petitions are simply approved in error. *Q Data Consulting, Inc. v. INS*, 293 F. Supp. 2d at 29-30 (recognizing that CIS approves some petitions in error).

Moreover, since each nonimmigrant and immigrant petition is a separate record of proceeding with a separate burden of proof; each petition must stand on its own individual merits. The prior nonimmigrant approvals do not preclude CIS from denying an extension petition. *See e.g. Texas A&M Univ. v. Upchurch*, 99 Fed. Appx. 556, 2004 WL 1240482 (5th Cir. 2004). The approval of a nonimmigrant petition in no way guarantees that CIS will approve an immigrant petition filed on behalf of the same beneficiary. CIS denies many I-140 immigrant petitions after approving prior nonimmigrant I-129 L-1 petitions. *See, e.g., Q Data Consulting, Inc. v. INS*, 293 F. Supp. 2d at 25; *IKEA US v. US Dept. of Justice*, 48 F. Supp. 2d at 22; *Fedin Brothers Co. Ltd. v. Sava*, 724 F. Supp. at 1103.

Furthermore, if the previous nonimmigrant petitions were approved based on the same unsupported and contradictory assertions that are contained in the current record, the approval would constitute material and gross error on the part of the director. Thus, even if the AAO were to accept the appeal as properly filed, the

AAO is not required to approve an application or petition where eligibility has not been demonstrated, merely because of prior approvals that may have been erroneous. *See, e.g. Matter of Church Scientology International*, 19 I&N Dec. 593, 597 (Comm. 1988). It would be absurd to suggest that CIS or any agency must treat acknowledged errors as binding precedent. *Sussex Engg. Ltd. v. Montgomery*, 825 F.2d 1084, 1090 (6th Cir. 1987), *cert. denied*, 485 U.S. 1008 (1988).

Finally, the AAO's authority over the service centers is comparable to the relationship between a court of appeals and a district court. Even if a service center director had approved the nonimmigrant petitions on behalf of the beneficiary, the AAO would not be bound to follow the contradictory decision of a service center. *Louisiana Philharmonic Orchestra v. INS*, 2000 WL 282785 (E.D. La.), *aff'd*, 248 F.3d 1139 (5th Cir. 2001), *cert. denied*, 122 S.Ct. 51 (2001).

In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Inasmuch as counsel has failed to identify specifically an erroneous conclusion of law or a statement of fact in this proceeding, the petitioner has not sustained that burden. Therefore, the appeal will be summarily dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is summarily dismissed.