


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U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U. S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Administrative Appeals Office (AAO)
20 Massachusetts Ave. N.W., MS 2090
Washington, DC 20529-2090



**U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services**



B4

DATE: **AUG 10 2012**

OFFICE: TEXAS SERVICE CENTER




IN RE: Petitioner:
 Beneficiary:



PETITION: Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as a Multinational Executive or Manager Pursuant to
 Section 203(b)(1)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(1)(C)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:



INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the AAO inappropriately applied the law in reaching its decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen in accordance with the instructions on Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$630. The specific requirements for filing such a motion can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. **Do not file any motion directly with the AAO.** Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires any motion to be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,

Perry Rhew
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The preference visa petition was denied by the Director, Texas Service Center. The matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner is a Florida corporation that is a “sales office and export services” company which seeks to employ the beneficiary as its Regional Manager. Accordingly, the petitioner endeavors to classify the beneficiary as an employment-based immigrant pursuant to section 203(b)(1)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(1)(C), as a multinational executive or manager.

The director denied the petition concluding that the petitioner failed to establish that the beneficiary’s proposed employment with the U.S. entity would be within a qualifying managerial or executive capacity.

On appeal, counsel disputes the director’s findings and provides an appellate brief laying out the grounds for challenging the denial. Counsel for the petitioner contends that the beneficiary is a function manager as he is responsible for managing a “key function of the business – to organize, direct and control the organization.” This decision will address the beneficiary’s proposed employment to determine whether the petitioner meets the applicable eligibility criteria.

Section 203(b) of the Act states in pertinent part:

(1) Priority Workers. -- Visas shall first be made available . . . to qualified immigrants who are aliens described in any of the following subparagraphs (A) through (C):

* * *

(C) Certain Multinational Executives and Managers. -- An alien is described in this subparagraph if the alien, in the 3 years preceding the time of the alien's application for classification and admission into the United States under this subparagraph, has been employed for at least 1 year by a firm or corporation or other legal entity or an affiliate or subsidiary thereof and who seeks to enter the United States in order to continue to render services to the same employer or to a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a capacity that is managerial or executive.

The language of the statute is specific in limiting this provision to only those executives and managers who have previously worked for a firm, corporation or other legal entity, or an affiliate or subsidiary of that entity, and who are coming to the United States to work for the same entity, or its affiliate or subsidiary.

A United States employer may file a petition on Form I-140 for classification of an alien under section 203(b)(1)(C) of the Act as a multinational executive or manager. No labor certification is required for this classification. The prospective employer in the United States must furnish a job offer in the form of a statement which indicates that the alien is to be employed in the United States in a managerial or executive capacity. Such a statement must clearly describe the duties to be performed by the alien.

Section 101(a)(44)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(44)(A), provides:

The term "managerial capacity" means an assignment within an organization in which the employee primarily--

- (i) manages the organization, or a department, subdivision, function, or component of the organization;
- (ii) supervises and controls the work of other supervisory, professional, or managerial employees, or manages an essential function within the organization, or a department or subdivision of the organization;
- (iii) if another employee or other employees are directly supervised, has the authority to hire and fire or recommend those as well as other personnel actions (such as promotion and leave authorization), or if no other employee is directly supervised, functions at a senior level within the organizational hierarchy or with respect to the function managed; and
- (iv) exercises discretion over the day-to-day operations of the activity or function for which the employee has authority. A first-line supervisor is not considered to be acting in a managerial capacity merely by virtue of the supervisor's supervisory duties unless the employees supervised are professional.

Section 101(a)(44)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(44)(B), provides:

The term "executive capacity" means an assignment within an organization in which the employee primarily--

- (i) directs the management of the organization or a major component or function of the organization;
- (ii) establishes the goals and policies of the organization, component, or function;
- (iii) exercises wide latitude in discretionary decision-making; and
- (iv) receives only general supervision or direction from higher level executives, the board of directors, or stockholders of the organization.

In examining the executive or managerial capacity of the beneficiary, USCIS will look first to the petitioner's description of the job duties. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(j)(5). Published case law clearly supports the pivotal role of a clearly defined job description, as the actual duties themselves reveal the true nature of the employment. *Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Sava*, 724 F. Supp. 1103, 1108 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), *aff'd*, 905 F.2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990); *see also* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(j)(5). That being said, however, USCIS reviews the totality of the record, which includes not only the beneficiary's job description, but also takes into account the nature of the petitioner's business, the employment and remuneration of employees, as well as the job descriptions of the beneficiary's subordinates, if any, and any other facts contributing to a complete understanding of a beneficiary's actual role within a given entity.

The definitions of executive and managerial capacity have two parts. First, the petitioner must show that the beneficiary performs the high-level responsibilities that are specified in the definitions. Second, the petitioner must prove that the beneficiary *primarily* performs these specified responsibilities and does not spend a majority of his or her time on day-to-day functions. *Champion World, Inc. v. INS*, 940 F.2d 1533 (Table), 1991 WL 144470 (9th Cir. July 30, 1991).

Upon review of the petition and evidence, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary would be employed in a managerial or executive capacity. When examining the executive or managerial capacity of the beneficiary, the AAO will look first to the petitioner's description of the job duties. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(l)(3)(ii). The petitioner's description of the job duties must clearly describe the duties to be performed by the beneficiary and indicate whether such duties are either in an executive or managerial capacity. *Id.*

In a letter dated December 3, 2009, counsel for the petitioner provided a list of duties to be performed by the beneficiary in the position of regional manager and a breakdown of hours per week spent on each duty. Counsel for the petitioner also stated that the beneficiary will "control the work of other professionals including the Accountant and Office Manager/HR Manager."

In response to the director's request for evidence, the petitioner described the beneficiary's duties in the United States in a letter dated March 20, 2010. The petitioner provided a second list of duties to be performed by the beneficiary and a percentage breakdown of time spent on each duty. The petitioner explained that the beneficiary used to supervise an office manager and warehouseman, "however, these positions are currently outsourced as a cost saving measure." The petitioner also stated that the petitioner "outsources its accounting services to a third party, [REDACTED]. The petitioner explained that the duties of the office manager include "answering phones, taking orders, general bookkeeping and filing," and the duties of the warehouseman include "accept deliveries, coordinate shipments and maintain inventory control."

The petitioner submitted an organizational chart that states: "Proposed staffing for the period of December 2009 through March 2010." The chart indicated the beneficiary as general manager who supervises an outsourced accountant and an office manager/secretary (temporary position), and two warehousemen that are also indicated as temporary positions. The chart also indicated a sales manager and two sales representatives that are unfilled positions but are projected for 2011. The petitioner submitted Form 1120, U.S. Corporation Income Tax Return, for 2009 that indicated compensation to the beneficiary of \$126,908.00 and a total of salaries and wages for employees other than the beneficiary as \$8,166.00 for 2009.

On appeal, counsel for the petitioner claims that the beneficiary is a function manager as he manages the essential function of managing the entire operations of the petitioner. Due to the overly general and vague list of job duties, the petitioner has failed to clarify how much time the beneficiary will spend performing qualifying tasks versus those that would be deemed non-qualifying.

In describing the beneficiary's position in the United States, the petitioner stated that the beneficiary will "manage the entire U.S. organization," "oversee all financial aspects of the company and set strategic policies and procedures," and "ensure that the managerial procedures and policies of the company abide by all current laws and regulations." The petitioner has not shown what specific tasks actually fall within these broad categories. Merely using the term "manage" to describe the beneficiary's function does not establish that the supervisory tasks the beneficiary will perform are of a qualifying nature. Without further information, it appears that the beneficiary will be providing the services of the business rather than directing such activities

through subordinate employees. An employee who "primarily" performs the tasks necessary to produce a product or provide a service is not considered to be "primarily" employed in a managerial or executive capacity. See sections 101(a)(44)(A) and (B) of the Act (requiring that one "primarily" perform the enumerated managerial or executive duties); see also *Matter of Church Scientology International*, 19 I & N Dec. 593, 604 (Comm. 1988).

The job description also includes several non-qualifying duties such as the beneficiary will "oversee all financial aspects of the company and set strategic policies and objectives," "prepare annual budgets and ensure that company revenues and expenditures fall within budgeted amounts," "control the expenditures of company funds," and "establish procedures for implementing the payroll process and company benefits in compliance with all laws and regulations." It appears that the beneficiary will be developing and marketing the services of the business, handling all of the sales operations, negotiating contracts, and handling the inventory ordering and shipping processes, rather than directing such activities through subordinate employees. The petitioner did not identify any employees who actually assisted the beneficiary in budgeting, marketing and sales, indicating that the beneficiary is the one to carry out these operational functions, which are outside the parameters of what would be deemed as being within a managerial or executive capacity. An employee who "primarily" performs the tasks necessary to produce a product or to provide services is not considered to be "primarily" employed in a managerial or executive capacity. See sections 101(a)(44)(A) and (B) of the Act (requiring that one "primarily" perform the enumerated managerial or executive duties); see also *Matter of Church Scientology Intn'l.*, 19 I&N Dec. at 604.

An analysis of the nature of the petitioner's business undermines the petitioner's assertion that the beneficiary is employed in a managerial or executive capacity. On appeal, the petitioner states that in 2009 it employed two additional employees, an office manager and a warehouseman, but these positions were "outsourced to a staffing agency in an effort to maintain profitability." However, the petitioner did not submit evidence to establish that the petitioner employs contractors such as a contract with the staffing agency, paystubs or tax forms such as Form 1099. Thus, it appears from the record that the beneficiary, as the only full-time employee, may be primarily engaged in performing the finance operations, marketing, sales, and business development activities, and all of the various operational tasks inherent in operating a business on a daily basis, such as paying bills, handling customer transactions, ordering products and running the shipping services, and negotiating contracts. Based on the record of proceeding, the beneficiary's job duties are principally composed of non-qualifying duties that preclude him from functioning in a primarily managerial or executive role.

Counsel contends that the beneficiary manages an essential function within the petitioner's organization. The term "function manager" applies generally when a beneficiary does not supervise or control the work of a subordinate staff but instead is primarily responsible for managing an "essential function" within the organization. See section 101(a)(44)(A)(ii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(44)(A)(ii). The term "essential function" is not defined by statute or regulation. If a petitioner claims that the beneficiary is managing an essential function, the petitioner must furnish a written job offer that clearly describes the duties to be performed in managing the essential function, i.e. identify the function with specificity, articulate the essential nature of the function, and establish the proportion of the beneficiary's daily duties attributed to managing the essential function. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(l)(3)(ii). In addition, the petitioner's description of the beneficiary's daily duties must demonstrate that the beneficiary manages the function rather than performs the duties related to the function. An employee who primarily performs the tasks necessary to produce a product or to provide services is not considered to be employed in a managerial or executive capacity. *Boyang, Ltd. v. I.N.S.*, 67 F.3d 305 (Table), 1995 WL 576839 (9th Cir, 1995)(citing *Matter of Church Scientology International*, 19 I&N

Dec. at 604. The petitioner has not provided evidence that the beneficiary manages an essential function. The petitioner provided a brief and vague job description that did not discuss how the beneficiary is managing an essential function. Only on appeal did counsel for the petitioner claim that the beneficiary is managing an essential function. A visa petition may not be approved based on speculation of future eligibility or after the petitioner or beneficiary becomes eligible under a new set of facts. *See Matter of Michelin Tire Corp.*, 17 I&N Dec. 248 (Reg. Comm'r 1978); *Matter of Katigbak*, 14 I&N Dec. 45, 49 (Comm'r 1971). A petitioner may not make material changes to a petition in an effort to make a deficient petition conform to USCIS requirements. *See Matter of Izummi*, 22 I&N Dec. 169, 176 (Assoc. Comm'r 1998). The beneficiary's job description does not establish that the beneficiary is primarily performing in a managerial capacity.

Beyond the required description of the job duties, USCIS reviews the totality of the record when examining the claimed managerial or executive capacity of a beneficiary, including the petitioner's organizational structure, the duties of the beneficiary's subordinate employees, the presence of other employees to relieve the beneficiary from performing operations duties, the nature of the petitioner's business, and any other factors that will contribute to a complete understanding of a beneficiary's actual duties and role in a business. In the case of a function manager, where no subordinates are directly supervised, these other factors may include the beneficiary's position within the organizational hierarchy, the depth of the petitioner's operations, the indirect supervision of employees within the scope of the function managed, and the value of the budgets, products, or services that the beneficiary manages.

The petitioner has not identified employees within the petitioner's organization, subordinate to the beneficiary, who would relieve the beneficiary from performing routine duties inherent to operating the business. The fact that the beneficiary has been given a managerial job title and general oversight authority over the business is insufficient to elevate his position to that of a "function manager" as contemplated by the governing statute and regulations. As discussed above, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary's duties are primarily managerial in nature, and thus he cannot be considered a "function manager."

Other than stating that the beneficiary will be responsible for managing the essential function of overseeing "the Petitioner's entire U.S. operations," counsel provides no explanation or evidence in support of his claim that the beneficiary would qualify as a function manager pursuant to section 101(a)(44)(A)(ii) of the Act. The unsupported statements of counsel on appeal or in a motion are not evidence and thus are not entitled to any evidentiary weight. *See INS v. Phinpathya*, 464 U.S. 183, 188-89 n.6 (1984); *Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez*, 17 I&N Dec. 503 (BIA 1980).

In summary, the petitioner has failed to provide sufficient evidence to establish that the beneficiary would be employed in the United States in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity. Therefore, the petition cannot be approved.

Furthermore, the record does not support a finding of eligibility based on additional grounds that were not previously addressed in the director's decision. The record lacks substantive job descriptions establishing what job duties the beneficiary performed during his employment abroad. Conclusory assertions regarding the beneficiary's employment capacity are not sufficient. Merely repeating the language of the statute or regulations does not satisfy the petitioner's burden of proof. *Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Sava*, 724 F. Supp. 1103, 1108 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), *aff'd*, 905 F. 2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990); *Avyr Associates, Inc. v. Meissner*, 1997 WL 188942 at *5 (S.D.N.Y.). The actual duties themselves will reveal the true nature of the employment. *Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Sava*, 724 F. Supp. at 1108. The petitioner has not established that the beneficiary was employed

abroad in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity. For this additional reason, the petition cannot be approved.

An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. *See Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States*, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), *aff'd*, 345 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2003); *see also Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004)(noting that the AAO reviews appeals on a *de novo* basis).

The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and alternative basis for denial. In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The petitioner has not sustained that burden.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.