





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


DATE: **APR 09 2013**

OFFICE: TEXAS SERVICE CENTER


FILE: 


IN RE: Petitioner:
Beneficiary:



PETITION: Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as a Multinational Executive or Manager Pursuant to Section 203(b)(1)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(1)(C)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:



INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the AAO inappropriately applied the law in reaching its decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen in accordance with the instructions on Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$630. The specific requirements for filing such a motion can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. **Do not file any motion directly with the AAO.** Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires any motion to be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,

Ron Rosenberg
Acting Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The preference visa petition was denied by the Director, Texas Service Center. The matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner is a Florida corporation that is engaged in the "commerce [of] fruits and durable goods," and it seeks to employ the beneficiary as its general manager. Accordingly, the petitioner endeavors to classify the beneficiary as an employment-based immigrant pursuant to section 203(b)(1)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(1)(C), as a multinational executive or manager.

On March 26, 2012, the director denied the petition concluding that the petitioner failed to establish that the beneficiary's proposed employment with the U.S. entity would be within a qualifying managerial or executive capacity or that the petitioner has the ability to pay the beneficiary's proffered wage.

On appeal, counsel disputes the director's findings and provides an appellate brief laying out the grounds for challenging the denial.

Section 203(b) of the Act states in pertinent part:

(1) Priority Workers. -- Visas shall first be made available . . . to qualified immigrants who are aliens described in any of the following subparagraphs (A) through (C):

* * *

(C) Certain Multinational Executives and Managers. -- An alien is described in this subparagraph if the alien, in the 3 years preceding the time of the alien's application for classification and admission into the United States under this subparagraph, has been employed for at least 1 year by a firm or corporation or other legal entity or an affiliate or subsidiary thereof and who seeks to enter the United States in order to continue to render services to the same employer or to a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a capacity that is managerial or executive.

The language of the statute is specific in limiting this provision to only those executives and managers who have previously worked for a firm, corporation or other legal entity, or an affiliate or subsidiary of that entity, and who are coming to the United States to work for the same entity, or its affiliate or subsidiary.

A United States employer may file a petition on Form I-140 for classification of an alien under section 203(b)(1)(C) of the Act as a multinational executive or manager. No labor certification is required for this classification. The prospective employer in the United States must furnish a job offer in the form of a statement which indicates that the alien is to be employed in the United States in a managerial or executive capacity. Such a statement must clearly describe the duties to be performed by the alien.

The first issue that will be addressed in this proceeding calls for an analysis of the beneficiary's job duties. Specifically, the AAO will examine the record to determine whether the petitioner submitted sufficient evidence to establish that the beneficiary would be employed in the United States in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity.

Section 101(a)(44)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(44)(A), provides:

The term "managerial capacity" means an assignment within an organization in which the employee primarily--

- (i) manages the organization, or a department, subdivision, function, or component of the organization;
- (ii) supervises and controls the work of other supervisory, professional, or managerial employees, or manages an essential function within the organization, or a department or subdivision of the organization;
- (iii) if another employee or other employees are directly supervised, has the authority to hire and fire or recommend those as well as other personnel actions (such as promotion and leave authorization), or if no other employee is directly supervised, functions at a senior level within the organizational hierarchy or with respect to the function managed; and
- (iv) exercises discretion over the day-to-day operations of the activity or function for which the employee has authority. A first-line supervisor is not considered to be acting in a managerial capacity merely by virtue of the supervisor's supervisory duties unless the employees supervised are professional.

Section 101(a)(44)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(44)(B), provides:

The term "executive capacity" means an assignment within an organization in which the employee primarily--

- (i) directs the management of the organization or a major component or function of the organization;
- (ii) establishes the goals and policies of the organization, component, or function;
- (iii) exercises wide latitude in discretionary decision-making; and
- (iv) receives only general supervision or direction from higher level executives, the board of directors, or stockholders of the organization.

In examining the executive or managerial capacity of the beneficiary, USCIS will look first to the petitioner's description of the job duties. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(j)(5). Published case law clearly supports the pivotal role of a clearly defined job description, as the actual duties themselves reveal the true nature of the employment. *Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Sava*, 724 F. Supp. 1103, 1108 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), *aff'd*, 905 F.2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990); see also 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(j)(5). That being said, however, USCIS reviews the totality of the record, which includes not only the beneficiary's job description, but also takes into account the nature of the petitioner's business, the employment and remuneration of employees, as well as the job descriptions of the beneficiary's subordinates, if any, and any other facts contributing to a complete understanding of a beneficiary's actual role within a given entity.

The definitions of executive and managerial capacity have two parts. First, the petitioner must show that the beneficiary performs the high-level responsibilities that are specified in the definitions. Second, the petitioner must prove that the beneficiary *primarily* performs these specified responsibilities and does not spend a majority of his or her time on day-to-day functions. *Champion World, Inc. v. INS*, 940 F.2d 1533 (Table), 1991 WL 144470 (9th Cir. July 30, 1991).

Upon review of the petition and evidence, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary would be employed in a managerial or executive capacity. When examining the executive or managerial capacity of the beneficiary, the AAO will look first to the petitioner's description of the job duties. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(l)(3)(ii). The petitioner's description of the job duties must clearly describe the duties to be performed by the beneficiary and indicate whether such duties are either in an executive or managerial capacity. *Id.*

Due to the overly general and vague list of job duties, the AAO is unable to gain a meaningful understanding of how much time the beneficiary spent performing qualifying tasks versus those that would be deemed non-qualifying.

In describing the beneficiary's position in the United States, the petitioner stated that the beneficiary will be responsible for "planning, developing and implementing company strategy," "planning the future expansion of the business and the possibility of franchising the said business," "developing policies and procedures for procurement of services," and "plan and implementing new operating procedures to improve efficiency and reduce costs." It is unclear which specific tasks actually fall within these broad categories. Merely using the term "managing" to describe the beneficiary's function does not establish that the supervisory tasks the beneficiary will perform are of a qualifying nature. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm'r 1998) (citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm'r 1972)).

In addition, the job description includes several non-qualifying duties. In describing the beneficiary's employment with the petitioner, the petitioner indicated that the beneficiary will be responsible for "developing and implementing policies and new procedures for sales company"; "determining mark-up percentages necessary to insure profit, based on estimated budget, profit goals and average rate of client acquisition"; "oversee the negotiation of contracts with clients"; "formulating pricing policies for sales"; "evaluate market for new profitable opportunities in order to attain established policies and objectives of the company"; and "evaluate market for new profitable opportunities in order to attain established policies and objectives of the company." The petitioner has not clarified who actually

assists the beneficiary in performing the duties of sales, market research, budgeting, and negotiations; thus indicating that the beneficiary may be the one to carry out these operational functions, which are outside the parameters of what would be deemed as being within a managerial or executive capacity. An employee who "primarily" performs the tasks necessary to produce a product or to provide services is not considered to be "primarily" employed in a managerial or executive capacity. See sections 101(a)(44)(A) and (B) of the Act (requiring that one "primarily" perform the enumerated managerial or executive duties); see also *Matter of Church Scientology Intn'l.*, 19 I&N Dec. 593, 604 (Comm'r 1988).

The petitioner also provided an organizational chart with all employees supervised by the beneficiary and a brief job description for each employee. According to the organizational chart, the beneficiary supervises seven employees at the U.S. office and seven employees located in other countries and other counties. The beneficiary supervises a financial consultant, an administrative manager, and a sales manager; and the financial consultant in turn supervises the assistant manager and the secretary. The administrative manager supervises four purchase coordinators located outside of the United States. The sales manager supervises a sales and collector supervisor, an assistant sales person, and three sales associates that are located in different counties. The petitioner indicated that the three sales associates "receive their income through sales commissions."

The director's denial decision noted a discrepancy in the information regarding the employees of the petitioner. The director noted that the Form 941 indicated that the petitioner employed six individuals rather than seven. In addition, the documentation submitted by the petitioner did not indicate the employment of the purchase coordinators or the sales associates. In addition, the director noted that some employees do not appear to be working on a full-time basis and some employees listed on the organizational chart are not listed on the Forms 941. On the Form 941 for the third quarter of 2010, the form does not indicate the employment of the sales manager, the administrative manager and the sales and collector supervisor.

On appeal, counsel for the petitioner states that the organizational chart was submitted by the petitioner in response to the director's request for evidence and it reflected additional personnel that were hired after the I-140 petition was filed. The petitioner also provided Forms 1099 for 2011 for the contractors. However, the evidence submitted to support the new organizational chart was for the year 2011 and not for the time when the I-140 was filed in November 2010. The petitioner must establish eligibility at the time of filing the nonimmigrant visa petition. A visa petition may not be approved at a future date after the petitioner or beneficiary becomes eligible under a new set of facts. *Matter of Michelin Tire Corp.*, 17 I&N Dec. 248 (Reg. Comm'r 1978). The petitioner did not provide sufficient evidence of its staffing, including contractors, when the I-140 was filed in November 2010. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm'r 1998) (citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm'r 1972)).

In addition, in response to the director's concern that some of the petitioner's employees were working part-time, counsel on appeal stated that "it is important to emphasize that in the event an employee cannot work in the company for a determined period of time due to insurmountable circumstances, it is not possible to conclude that his tasks, when working, are not considered full

time.” The petitioner failed to establish that the petitioner’s employees, at the time of filing the instant petition, were working on a full-time basis rather than a part-time basis. In addition, even if the petitioner’s employees were working part-time, the petitioner failed to establish that the employees could perform the day-to-day tasks of operating a business while working on a part-time schedule. The petitioner has not clarified the hours worked by each employee and whether it is sufficient time to prevent the beneficiary from being obliged to devote the majority of his time to performing non-qualifying operational duties. It is incumbent upon the petitioner to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence. Any attempt to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies will not suffice unless the petitioner submits competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. *Matter of Ho*, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591-92 (BIA 1988). If USCIS fails to believe that a fact stated in the petition is true, USCIS may reject that fact. Section 204(b) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1154(b); see also *Anetekhai v. INS*, 876 F.2d 1218, 1220 (5th Cir.1989); *Lu-Ann Bakery Shop, Inc. v. Nelson*, 705 F. Supp. 7, 10 (D.D.C.1988); *Systronics Corp. v. INS*, 153 F. Supp. 2d 7, 15 (D.D.C. 2001). The petitioner has not established that the beneficiary would be working in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity in the United States. For this reason, this petition cannot be approved.

The second issue in this proceeding is whether the petitioner has the ability to pay the beneficiary’s proffered wage.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) states, in pertinent part:

Any petition filed by or for an employment-based immigrant which requires an offer of employment must be accompanied by evidence that the *prospective United States employer* has the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner must demonstrate this ability at the time the priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. Evidence of this ability shall be in the form of copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements.

(Emphasis added.)

The petitioner indicates on the Form I-140, at Part 6, that it will pay the beneficiary \$28,800.00 per year.

In response to the director’s request for evidence, the petitioner stated that the petitioner “has the ability to pay the proffered wage in favor of our client, because the company, after of [sic] deduce its cost of sales and expenses, in which there are included the salaries, reached a positive result; inclusive its profit was over of the opportunity cost of the capital in the market.”

Upon review, the petitioner has not established that it has the ability to pay the proffered wage of \$28,800 at the time of filing.

In determining the petitioner’s ability to pay the proffered wage, USCIS will first examine whether the petitioner employed the beneficiary at the time the priority date was established. If the petitioner establishes by documentary evidence that it employed the beneficiary at a salary equal to or greater than the proffered wage, this evidence will be considered *prima facie* proof of the petitioner’s ability

to pay the beneficiary's salary. In this case, the petitioner did not provide evidence that the beneficiary received the salary of \$28,800 in 2010 such as a Form W-2, paystubs, or tax returns. As an alternate means of determining the petitioner's ability to pay, the AAO will next examine the petitioner's net income figure as reflected on the federal income tax return, without consideration of depreciation or other expenses. Reliance on federal income tax returns as a basis for determining a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is well established by judicial precedent. *Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava*, 632 F. Supp. 1049, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (citing *Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman*, 736 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1984)); *see also Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh*, 719 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Texas 1989); *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); *Ubeda v. Palmer*, 539 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982), *aff'd*, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983).

In reviewing Form 1120, U.S. Corporation Income Tax Return, for 2010, the petitioner paid \$67,920 in salaries and wages, and it has a taxable income of \$16,304.00. It is not clear how the petitioner paid the beneficiary's salary of \$28,800.00 and could pay full-time salaries to the additional six employees and contractors when only paying \$67,920.00 in salaries and wages for the year and with a taxable income of \$16,304.00. Although the petitioner had a positive net income, the petitioner did not establish that it can pay the beneficiary's salary in addition to the salaries of the six employees. The petitioner has submitted no evidence to establish that the U.S. employer has the realistic financial ability to directly remunerate the beneficiary. For this additional reason, this petition may not be approved.

An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. *See Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States*, 229 F.Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), *aff'd*, 345 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2003); *see also Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004)(noting that the AAO reviews appeals on a *de novo* basis).

The record lacks substantive job descriptions establishing what job duties the beneficiary performed during his employment abroad, and documentation of the employees employed by the foreign company. Conclusory assertions regarding the beneficiary's employment capacity are not sufficient. Merely repeating the language of the statute or regulations does not satisfy the petitioner's burden of proof. *Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Sava*, 724 F. Supp. 1103, 1108 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), *aff'd*, 905 F. 2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990); *Avyr Associates, Inc. v. Meissner*, 1997 WL 188942 at *5 (S.D.N.Y.). The actual duties themselves will reveal the true nature of the employment. *Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Sava*, 724 F. Supp. at 1108. Based on the evidence submitted, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary was employed by the foreign entity in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity. For this additional reason, this petition cannot be approved.

An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. *See Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States*, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), *aff'd*, 345 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2003); *see also Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004)(noting that the AAO reviews appeals on a *de novo* basis).

In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The petitioner has not sustained that burden.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.