


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
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


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
IN RE:

Petitioner:
Beneficiary



PETITION: Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as a Member of the Professions Holding an Advanced Degree or an Alien of Exceptional Ability Pursuant to Section 203(b)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(2)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:



INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

Robert P. Wiemann, Chief
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The Director, California Service Center, denied the employment-based immigrant visa petition, which is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner is a general and cosmetic dentistry office. It seeks to employ the beneficiary permanently in the United States as a dentist pursuant to section 203(b)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(2). In pertinent part, section 203(b)(2) of the Act provides immigrant classification to members of the professions holding advanced degrees or their equivalent and whose services are sought by an employer in the United States. As required by statute, the petition was accompanied by certification from the Department of Labor. The director determined that the petitioner had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage beginning on the priority date of the visa petition and denied the petition accordingly.

On appeal, counsel submits a brief. For the reasons discussed below, the petitioner has not overcome the director's valid basis for denial.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) states, in pertinent part:

Ability of prospective employer to pay wage. Any petition filed by or for an employment-based immigrant which requires an offer of employment must be accompanied by evidence that the prospective United States employer has the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner must demonstrate this ability at the time the priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. Evidence of this ability shall be in the form of copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements.

The petitioner must demonstrate the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, the day the Form ETA 750 was accepted for processing by any office within the employment system of the Department of Labor. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(d). Here, the Form ETA 750 was accepted for processing on September 30, 2002. The corrected proffered wage as stated on the Form ETA 750 is \$2,437 per week, which amounts to \$126,724 annually. On the Form ETA 750B, signed by the beneficiary, the beneficiary did not claim to have worked for the petitioner.

On the petition, the petitioner claimed to have an establishment date in 1990, a gross annual income of \$450,000, a net income of \$150,000 and four employees. In support of the petition, the petitioner submitted no evidence relating to its finances.

Because the director deemed the evidence submitted insufficient to demonstrate the petitioner's continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, on September 22, 2005, the director requested additional evidence pertinent to that ability. In accordance with 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2), the director specifically requested that the petitioner provide copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements to demonstrate its continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date.

In response, the petitioner submitted Form 1120S U.S. Income Tax Returns for an S Corporation for the petitioner for the years 2002 through 2004. The tax returns reflect the following information for the following years:

	2002	2003	2004
Net income	\$113,467	\$102,195	\$91,519
Current Assets	\$3,531	\$10,489	\$2,728 ¹
Current Liabilities	\$0	\$6,617	\$6,560
Net current assets	\$3,531	\$3,872	(\$3,832)

In addition, the petitioner submitted its quarterly wage reports for 2004 and 2005 and the individual tax returns of the petitioner's sole shareholder for 2003.

The director determined that the evidence submitted did not establish that the petitioner had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, and denied the petition.

On appeal, counsel misstates several facts. Specifically, counsel asserts that the annual proffered wage is \$122,044, based on 52 weeks at \$2,437. The product of \$2,437 times 52 weeks, however, is \$126,724. Thus, the director did not err in listing the proffered wage at \$126,724. Counsel also misstates the petitioner's net income for 2002 as \$102,847, when it was actually \$113,467. Finally, counsel characterizes the petitioner's total assets in 2002, 2003 and 2004 as its "net assets."

Counsel asserts that the petitioner's net income combined with its "net assets" demonstrates the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. Counsel further requests that the petitioner's continuous operations be considered.

Where the petitioner has submitted the requisite initial documentation required in the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2), Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) will first examine whether the petitioner employed and paid the beneficiary during the relevant period. If the petitioner establishes by documentary evidence that it employed the beneficiary at a salary equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the evidence will be considered *prima facie* proof of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. In the instant case, the petitioner did not establish that it employed and paid the beneficiary the full proffered wage in 2002, 2003 or 2004.

If the petitioner does not establish that it employed and paid the beneficiary an amount at least equal to the proffered wage during that period, CIS will next examine the net income figure reflected on the petitioner's federal income tax return, without consideration of depreciation or other expenses. Reliance on federal income tax returns as a basis for determining a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is well established by judicial precedent. *Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava*, 632 F. Supp. 1049, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (citing *Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman*, 736 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1984)); *see also Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh*, 719 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Texas

¹ This sum includes the petitioner's negative cash value claimed in 2004.

1989); *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); *Ubeda v. Palmer*, 539 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982), *aff'd*, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983). Showing that the petitioner's gross receipts exceeded the proffered wage is insufficient. Similarly, showing that the petitioner paid wages in excess of the proffered wage is insufficient. In *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. at 1084, the court held that the Immigration and Naturalization Service, now CIS, had properly relied on the petitioner's net income figure, as stated on the petitioner's corporate income tax returns, rather than the petitioner's gross income. The court specifically rejected the argument that the Service should have considered income before expenses were paid rather than net income.

Nevertheless, the petitioner's net income is not the only statistic that can be used to demonstrate a petitioner's ability to pay a proffered wage. If the net income the petitioner demonstrates it had available during that period, if any, added to the wages paid to the beneficiary during the period, if any, do not equal the amount of the proffered wage or more, CIS will review the petitioner's assets. We reject, however, counsel's argument that the petitioner's total assets should have been considered in the determination of the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner's total assets include depreciable assets that the petitioner uses in its business. Those depreciable assets will not be converted to cash during the ordinary course of business and will not, therefore, become funds available to pay the proffered wage. Further, the petitioner's total assets must be balanced by the petitioner's liabilities. Otherwise, they cannot properly be considered in the determination of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. Rather, CIS will consider *net current assets* as an alternative method of demonstrating the ability to pay the proffered wage.

Net current assets are the difference between the petitioner's current assets and current liabilities.² A corporation's year-end current assets are shown on Schedule L, lines 1(d) through 6(d). Its year-end current liabilities are shown on lines 16(d) through 18(d). If a corporation's end-of-year net current assets are equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the petitioner is expected to be able to pay the proffered wage out of those net current assets.

Finally, we will not combine net income with net current assets. Net income is calculated over a period of time (12 months on the tax returns) while net current assets reflect funds as of a specific date (the last day of the accounting period on the tax returns). Counsel provides no accounting principle that would allow us to combine these figures to obtain a meaningful number.

The petitioner has not demonstrated that it paid any wages to the beneficiary during 2002, 2003 or 2004. In those years, the petitioner shows a net income of only \$113,467, \$102,195 and \$91,519 and minimal or negative net current assets. The petitioner has not, therefore, demonstrated the ability to pay the proffered wage out of its net income or net current assets.

² According to *Barron's Dictionary of Accounting Terms* 117 (3rd ed. 2000), "current assets" consist of items having (in most cases) a life of one year or less, such as cash, marketable securities, inventory and prepaid expenses. "Current liabilities" are obligations payable (in most cases) within one year, such as accounts payable, short-term notes payable, and accrued expenses (such as taxes and salaries). *Id.* at 118.

The petitioner's reliance on the income of its sole shareholder is not persuasive. A corporation, even a Chapter S corporation, is a separate and distinct legal entity from its owners or stockholders. *See Matter of Tessel*, 17 I&N Dec. 631 (Act. Assoc. Comm. 1980); *Matter of Aphrodite Investments Limited*, 17 I&N Dec. 530 (Comm. 1980); *Matter of M-*, 8 I&N Dec. 24 (BIA 1958; A.G. 1958). CIS will not consider the financial resources of individuals or entities who have no legal obligation to pay the wage. *See Sitar Restaurant v. Ashcroft*, 2003 WL 22203713, *3 (D. Mass. Sept. 18, 2003). Regardless, the petitioner only submitted the individual income tax returns for its sole shareholder for 2003. This document does not relate to the petitioner's ability to pay in 2002 or 2004. Thus, the petitioner has not demonstrated that any other funds were available to pay the proffered wage. Counsel provides no legal authority for the proposition that the continued operations of the petitioner can establish an ability to pay the proffered wage where the financial statements are insufficient.

Finally, neither counsel nor the petitioner has asserted that the beneficiary, as a dentist, would generate sufficient additional income to cover the difference between the petitioner's net income and the proffered wage. Without a detailed discussion supported by documentation explaining how the beneficiary's employment as a dentist will significantly increase profits for the petitioner, any analysis we provided on this issue would be pure speculation.

The petitioner failed to submit evidence sufficient to demonstrate that it had the ability to pay the proffered wage as of 2002. Therefore, the petitioner has not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date.

The burden of proof in these proceedings rests solely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The petitioner has not met that burden.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.