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U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Administrative Appeals Office (AAO)
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., MS 2090
Washington, DC 20529-2090



U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services



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
DATE: OCT 12 2011 OFFICE: NEBRASKA SERVICE CENTER

FILE:

IN RE: Petitioner:
Beneficiary:

PETITION: Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as a Member of the Professions Holding an Advanced Degree or an Alien of Exceptional Ability Pursuant to Section 203(b)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(2)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:



INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied by us in reaching our decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. The specific requirements for filing such a request can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$630. Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires that any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,

Perry Rhew
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The Director, Nebraska Service Center, denied the employment-based immigrant visa petition, which is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner is an export, import, wholesale, and resale business. It seeks to employ the beneficiary permanently in the United States as a human resources manager pursuant to section 203(b)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(2). As required by statute, an ETA Form 9089, Application for Permanent Employment Certification, which the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) approved, accompanied the petition. Upon reviewing the petition, the director determined that the beneficiary did not meet the specified job requirements or qualify for the classification sought. Specifically, the director determined that the beneficiary did not possess the requisite education. The director also determined that the petitioner had not sufficiently demonstrated a subsidiary relationship between its business and that of [REDACTED] & [REDACTED] and Subsidiaries.

On appeal, counsel submits a brief and additional evidence. The AAO will uphold the director's decision. The AAO will conclude that the beneficiary did not possess the requisite education for the position. Beyond the decision of the director, the AAO will conclude that the petitioner has demonstrated its subsidiary relationship with M & D Fragrances & Cosmetics Inc. and Subsidiaries, but that the petitioner has not demonstrated its ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered salary from the priority date onwards.

In pertinent part, section 203(b)(2) of the Act provides immigrant classification to members of the professions holding advanced degrees or their equivalent and whose services are sought by an employer in the United States. An advanced degree is a U.S. academic or professional degree or a foreign equivalent degree above the baccalaureate level. 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k)(2). The regulation further states: "A United States baccalaureate degree or a foreign equivalent degree followed by at least five years of progressive experience in the specialty shall be considered the equivalent of a master's degree. If a doctoral degree is customarily required by the specialty, the alien must have a U.S. doctorate or a foreign equivalent degree." *Id.*

I. EDUCATIONAL EQUIVALENCY

The beneficiary earned a foreign three-year Bachelor of Arts degree in English, sociology, and psychology from Bangalore University in India in 1984 and a foreign two-year Master of Arts degree in sociology from Osmania University in India in 1986. Thus, the issues are whether those credentials qualify the beneficiary for the classification sought and meet the specified job requirements.

Eligibility for the Classification Sought

As noted above, DOL certified the ETA Form 9089 in this matter. DOL determines whether there are sufficient workers who are able, willing, qualified and available and whether the employment of the

alien will adversely affect the wages and working conditions of workers in the United States similarly employed. Section 212(a)(5)(A)(i) of the Act; 20 C.F.R. § 656.1(a).

It is significant that none of the above inquiries Congress assigned to DOL, or the remaining regulations implementing these duties under 20 C.F.R. § 656, involve a determination as to whether or not the alien is qualified for a specific immigrant classification or even the job offered. Rather, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) determines whether the alien is qualified under the alien employment certification requirements. *Matter of Wing's Tea House*, 16 I&N Dec. 160 (Acting Reg'l Comm'r 1977). Federal courts have recognized this division of authority. See *Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman*, 736 F. 2d 1305, 1309 (9th Cir. 1984); *Madany v. Smith*, 696 F.2d 1008, 1012-1013 (D.C. Cir. 1983).

A U.S. baccalaureate degree generally requires four years of education. *Matter of Shah*, 17 I&N Dec. 244 (Reg'l. Comm'r. 1977). This decision involved a petition filed under 8 U.S.C. §1153(a)(3) as amended in 1976. At that time, this section provided:

Visas shall next be made available . . . to qualified immigrants who are members of the professions

The Act added section 203(b)(2)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. §1153(b)(2)(A), which provides:

Visas shall be made available . . . to qualified immigrants who are members of the professions holding advanced degrees or their equivalent

Significantly, the statutory language used prior to *Matter of Shah*, 17 I&N Dec. at 244 is identical to the statutory language used subsequent to that decision but for the requirement that the immigrant hold an advanced degree or its equivalent. The Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference, published as part of the House of Representatives Conference Report on the Act, provides that “[in] considering equivalency in category 2 advanced degrees, it is anticipated that the alien must have a bachelor’s degree with at least five years progressive experience in the professions.” H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 955, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess. 1990, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6784, 1990 WL 201613 at *6786 (Oct. 26, 1990).

At the time of enactment of section 203(b)(2) of the Act in 1990, it had been almost thirteen years since *Matter of Shah* was issued. Congress is presumed to have intended a four-year degree when it stated that an alien “must have a bachelor’s degree” when considering equivalency for second preference immigrant visas. The AAO must assume that Congress was aware of the agency’s previous treatment of a “bachelor’s degree” under the Act when the new classification was enacted and did not intend to alter the agency’s interpretation of that term. See *Lorillard v. Pons*, 434 U.S. 575, 580-81 (1978) (Congress is presumed to be aware of administrative and judicial interpretations where it adopts a new law incorporating sections of a prior law). In fact, the Senate Conference Report for the Act presumes that a baccalaureate is a “4-year course of undergraduate study.” S. Rep. No. 101-55 at 20 (1989). See also 56 Fed. Reg. 60897, 60900 (Nov. 29, 1991) (an alien must have at least a bachelor’s degree).

In 1991, when the final rule for 8 C.F.R. § 204.5 appeared in the Federal Register, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (the Service) (now USCIS), responded to criticism that the regulation required an alien to have a bachelor's degree as a minimum and that the regulation did not allow for the substitution of experience for education. After reviewing section 121 of the Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-649 (1990), and the Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference, the Service specifically noted that both the Act and the legislative history indicate that an alien must have at least a bachelor's degree:

The Act states that, in order to qualify under the second classification, alien members of the professions must hold "advanced degrees or their equivalent." As the legislative history . . . indicates, the equivalent of an advanced degree is "a bachelor's degree with at least five years progressive experience in the professions." Because neither the Act nor its legislative history indicates that bachelor's or advanced degrees must be United States degrees, the Service will recognize foreign equivalent degrees. But both the Act and its legislative history make clear that, in order to qualify as a professional under the third classification or to have experience equating to an advanced degree under the second, *an alien must have at least a bachelor's degree.*

56 Fed. Reg. 60897, 60900 (Nov. 29, 1991) (emphasis added).

There is no provision in the statute or the regulations that would allow a beneficiary to qualify under section 203(b)(2) of the Act as a member of the professions holding an advanced degree with anything less than a full baccalaureate degree (plus the requisite five years of progressive experience in the specialty). More specifically, USCIS will not consider a three-year bachelor's degree as a "foreign equivalent degree" to a U.S. baccalaureate degree. *Matter of Shah*, 17 I&N Dec. at 245. Where the analysis of the beneficiary's credentials relies on work experience alone or a combination of multiple lesser degrees, the result is the "equivalent" of a bachelor's degree rather than a "foreign equivalent degree."¹ In order to have experience and education equating to an advanced degree under section 203(b)(2) of the Act, the beneficiary must have a single degree that is the "foreign equivalent degree" to a U.S. baccalaureate degree (plus the requisite five years of progressive experience in the specialty). 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k)(2).

The petitioner submitted an evaluation from [REDACTED] of the American Evaluation Institute dated April 7, 2005. [REDACTED] concludes that the beneficiary possesses the equivalent to a Master of Arts degree in sociology in the United States. He states that the beneficiary has completed the equivalent to six years of university level education in the United States and notes that both of the beneficiary's programs were accredited. [REDACTED] finds that the beneficiary completed a total of 160 credits.

¹ Compare 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(D)(5) (defining for purposes of a nonimmigrant visa classification, the "equivalence to completion of a college degree" as including, in certain cases, a specific combination of education and experience). The regulations pertaining to the immigrant classification sought in this matter do not contain similar language.

In his October 1, 2008 decision, the director discussed how he used the Electronic Database for Global Education (EDGE) as a tool to help analyze the beneficiary's educational background. According to its website, the American Association of Collegiate Registrars and Admissions Officers (AACRAO), which created EDGE is "a nonprofit, voluntary, professional association of more than 11,000 higher education admissions and registration professionals who represent more than 2,600 institutions and agencies in the United States and in over 40 countries around the world." See <http://www.aacrao.org/About-AACRAO.aspx> (accessed September 26, 2011 and incorporated into the record of proceeding). Its mission "is to provide professional development, guidelines and voluntary standards to be used by higher education officials regarding the best practices in records management, admissions, enrollment management, administrative information technology and student services." *Id.* In *Confluence Intern., Inc. v. Holder*, 2009 WL 825793 (██████████ March 27, 2009), a federal district court determined that the AAO provided a rational explanation for its reliance on information provided by AACRAO to support its decision.

According to the login page, EDGE is "a web-based resource for the evaluation of foreign educational credentials" that is continually updated and revised by staff and members of AACRAO. ██████████, Director of International Education Services, "AACRAO EDGE Login," <http://aacraoedge.aacrao.org/> (accessed September 26, 2011 and incorporated into the record of proceeding). In *Tisco Group, Inc. v. Napolitano*, 2010 WL 3464314 (██████████ August 30, 2010), a federal district court found that USCIS had properly weighed the evaluations submitted and the information obtained from EDGE to conclude that the alien's three-year foreign "baccalaureate" and foreign "Master's" degree were comparable to a U.S. bachelor's degree. In ██████████ ██████████ (██████████ August 20, 2010), a federal district court upheld a USCIS conclusion that the alien's three-year bachelor's degree was not a foreign equivalent degree to a U.S. bachelor's degree. Specifically, the court concluded that USCIS was entitled to prefer the information in EDGE and did not abuse its discretion in reaching its conclusion. The court also noted that the alien employment certification itself required a degree and did not allow for the combination of education and experience.

In the section related to the Indian educational system, EDGE further provides that a Bachelor of Arts degree is three years in duration and represents attainment of a level of education comparable to three years of university study in the United States. In addition, EDGE states that a master's degree following a three-year degree is comparable to a U.S. baccalaureate. This information is inconsistent with the credentials evaluation that counsel submitted. *Matter of Ho*, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591-592 (BIA 1988), states:

It is incumbent on the petitioner to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence, and attempts to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies, absent competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth, in fact, lies, will not suffice.

Counsel did not address this inconsistency on appeal.

Counsel has asserted that there are several one-year master's degree programs in the United States and has submitted information documenting these programs' existence. Counsel therefore asserts that the beneficiary's combined five years of university level education is equivalent to a U.S. master's degree. The AAO notes that the beneficiary did not attend any of the programs in the United States whose information counsel has submitted so this argument is not persuasive.

Counsel has also submitted a copy of *Grace Korean United Methodist Church v. Chertoff*, 437 F. Supp. 2d 1174 (D. Or. 2005). In this case, a federal district court held that USCIS "does not have the authority or expertise to impose its strained definition of 'B.A. or equivalent' on that term as set forth in the labor certification." *Id.* at 1179. Although the reasoning underlying a district judge's decision will be given due consideration when it is properly before the AAO, the analysis does not have to be followed as a matter of law. See *Matter of K-S-*, 20 I&N Dec. 715, 719 (BIA 1993). A judge in the same district, however, subsequently held that the assertion that DOL certification precludes USCIS from considering whether the alien meets the educational requirements specified in the labor certification is wrong. *Snapnames.com, Inc. v. Chertoff*, 2006 WL 3491005 *5 (D. Or. Nov. 30, 2006).

Because the beneficiary has neither (1) a U.S. advanced degree or foreign equivalent degree, nor (2) a U.S. baccalaureate degree or foreign equivalent degree and five years of progressive experience in the specialty, she does not qualify for preference visa classification as an advanced degree professional under section 203(b)(2) of the Act.

Qualifications for the Job Offered

Relying in part on *Madany*, 696 F.2d at 1008, the U.S. Federal Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (Ninth Circuit) stated:

[I]t appears that the DOL is responsible only for determining the availability of suitable American workers for a job and the impact of alien employment upon the domestic labor market. It does not appear that the DOL's role extends to determining if the alien is qualified for the job for which he seeks sixth preference status. That determination appears to be delegated to the INS under section 204(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1154(b), as one of the determinations incident to the INS's decision whether the alien is entitled to sixth preference status.

K.R.K. Irvine, Inc. v. Landon, 699 F.2d 1006, 1008 (9th Cir. 1983). The court relied on an amicus brief from DOL that stated the following:

The labor certification made by the Secretary of Labor ... pursuant to section 212(a)(5) of the ... [Act] ... is binding as to the findings of whether there are able, willing, qualified, and available United States workers for the job offered to the alien, and whether employment of the alien under the terms set by the employer would adversely affect the wages and working conditions of similarly employed United States workers. *The labor certification in no way indicates that the alien offered the*

certified job opportunity is qualified (or not qualified) to perform the duties of that job.

(Emphasis added.) *Id.* at 1009. The Ninth Circuit, citing *K.R.K. Irvine, Inc.*, 699 F.2d at 1006, revisited this issue, stating: “The INS, therefore, may make a de novo determination of whether the alien is in fact qualified to fill the certified job offer.” *Tongatapu*, 736 F. 2d at 1309. *See also Matter of Wing's Tea House*, 16 I&N Dec. at 160.

The key to determining the job qualifications is found on ETA Form 9089 Part H. This section of the application for alien employment certification, “Job Opportunity Information,” describes the terms and conditions of the job offered. It is important that the ETA Form 9089 be read as a whole.

Moreover, when determining whether a beneficiary is eligible for a preference immigrant visa, USCIS may not ignore a term of the alien employment certification, nor may it impose additional requirements. *See Madany*, 696 F.2d at 1015. USCIS must examine “the language of the labor certification job requirements” in order to determine what the job requires. *Id.* The only rational manner by which USCIS can be expected to interpret the meaning of terms used to describe the requirements of a job in an alien employment certification is to examine the certified job offer *exactly* as it is completed by the prospective employer. *See Rosedale Linden Park Company v. Smith*, 595 F. Supp. 829, 833 (D.D.C. 1984) (emphasis added). USCIS’s interpretation of the job’s requirements, as stated on the alien employment certification must involve reading and applying *the plain language* of the alien employment certification application form. *See id.* at 834. USCIS cannot and should not reasonably be expected to look beyond the plain language of the alien employment certification that DOL has formally issued or otherwise attempt to divine the employer’s intentions through some sort of reverse engineering of the alien employment certification.

In this matter, Part H, line 4, of the alien employment certification reflects that a master’s degree in human resources, sociology, or business administration is the minimum level of education required. Line 6 reflects that no experience in the proffered position is required. Line 8 reflects that no combination of education or experience is acceptable in the alternative. Line 9 reflects that a foreign educational equivalent is acceptable.

The beneficiary earned a foreign three-year Bachelor of Arts degree in English, sociology, and psychology from [REDACTED] in India in 1984 and a foreign two-year Master of Arts degree in sociology from [REDACTED] in India in 1986.

The beneficiary does not have a U.S. master’s degree or a foreign equivalent degree. The beneficiary also does not have a U.S. baccalaureate degree or a foreign equivalent degree followed by five years of progressive experience in the specialty. Thus, the beneficiary does not qualify for preference visa classification under section 203(b)(2) of the Act. In addition, the beneficiary does not meet the job requirements on the alien employment certification.

II. ABILITY TO PAY

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) states in pertinent part:

Ability of prospective employer to pay wage. Any petition filed by or for an employment-based immigrant which requires an offer of employment must be accompanied by evidence that the prospective United States employer has the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner must demonstrate this ability at the time the priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. Evidence of this ability shall be either in the form of copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements.

The petitioner must demonstrate the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, which is the date the ETA Form 9089, Application for Permanent Employment Certification, was accepted for processing by any office within the employment system of the DOL. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(d). The petitioner must also demonstrate that, on the priority date, the beneficiary had the qualifications stated on its ETA Form 9089, Application for Permanent Employment Certification, as certified by the DOL and submitted with the instant petition. *Matter of Wing's Tea House*, 16 I&N Dec. 158 (Acting Reg'l Comm'r 1977).

Here, the ETA Form 9089 was accepted on October 12, 2005. The proffered wage as stated on the ETA Form 9089 is \$38.31 per hour (\$79,684.80 per year).

The evidence in the record of proceeding shows that [REDACTED] and Subsidiaries is structured as an S corporation. On the petition, the petitioner claimed to have been established in 1993 and to currently employ 43 workers. According to the tax returns in the record, [REDACTED] and Subsidiaries' fiscal year is based on a calendar year.

The petitioner must establish that its job offer to the beneficiary is a realistic one. Because the filing of an ETA Form 9089 labor certification application establishes a priority date for any immigrant petition later based on the ETA Form 9089, the petitioner must establish that the job offer was realistic as of the priority date and that the offer remained realistic for each year thereafter, until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. The petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is an essential element in evaluating whether a job offer is realistic. See *Matter of Great Wall*, 16 I&N Dec. 142 (Acting Reg'l Comm'r 1977); see also 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2). In evaluating whether a job offer is realistic, USCIS requires the petitioner to demonstrate financial resources sufficient to pay the beneficiary's proffered wages, although the totality of the circumstances affecting the petitioning business will be considered if the evidence warrants such consideration. See *Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (Reg'l Comm'r 1967).

In determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage during a given period, USCIS will first examine whether the petitioner employed and paid the beneficiary during that period. If the petitioner establishes by documentary evidence that it employed the beneficiary at a salary equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the evidence will be considered *prima facie* proof of the

petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. In the instant case, the petitioner has not established that it paid the beneficiary the full proffered wage during any relevant timeframe including the period from the priority date in 2005 or subsequently.

If the petitioner does not establish that it employed and paid the beneficiary an amount at least equal to the proffered wage during that period, USCIS will next examine the net income figure reflected on the petitioner's federal income tax return, without consideration of depreciation or other expenses. *River Street Donuts, LLC v. Napolitano*, 558 F.3d 111 (1st Cir. 2009); *Taco Especial v. Napolitano*, 696 F. Supp. 2d 873 (E.D. Mich. 2010). Reliance on federal income tax returns as a basis for determining a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is well established by judicial precedent. *Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava*, 632 F. Supp. 1049, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (citing *Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman*, 736 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1984)); see also *Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh*, 719 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Texas 1989); *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); *Ubeda v. Palmer*, 539 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982), *aff'd*, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983). Reliance on the petitioner's gross receipts and wage expense is misplaced. Showing that the petitioner's gross receipts exceeded the proffered wage is insufficient. Similarly, showing that the petitioner paid wages in excess of the proffered wage is insufficient.

In *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. at 1084, the court held that the Immigration and Naturalization Service, now USCIS, had properly relied on the petitioner's net income figure, as stated on the petitioner's corporate income tax returns, rather than the petitioner's gross income. The court specifically rejected the argument that USCIS should have considered income before expenses were paid rather than net income. See *Taco Especial v. Napolitano*, 696 F. Supp. 2d at 881 (gross profits overstate an employer's ability to pay because it ignores other necessary expenses).

The record before the director closed on September 4, 2008 with the receipt by the director of the petitioner's submissions in response to the director's request for evidence. As of that date, [REDACTED] and Subsidiaries' federal income tax return was due. Therefore, [REDACTED] and Subsidiaries' income tax return for 2007 is the most recent return available.² The tax returns submitted demonstrate [REDACTED] and Subsidiaries' net income for 2005 and 2007, as shown in the table below.

² The AAO notes that the director had determined that the petitioner had not sufficiently demonstrated a subsidiary relationship between its business and that of [REDACTED]. However, on appeal, the petitioner submitted [REDACTED] and Subsidiaries' tax return, which demonstrates that the petitioner in fact is one of its subsidiaries. Notwithstanding, because a corporation is a separate and distinct legal entity from its owners and shareholders, the assets of its shareholders or of other enterprises or corporations cannot be considered in determining the petitioning corporation's ability to pay the proffered wage. See *Matter of Aphrodite Investments, Ltd.*, 17 I&N Dec. 530 (Comm'r 1980). In a similar case, the court in *Sitar v. Ashcroft*, 2003 WL 22203713 (D.Mass. Sept. 18, 2003) stated, "nothing in the governing regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 204.5, permits [USCIS] to consider the financial resources of individuals or entities who have no legal obligation to pay the wage." The AAO finds that the petitioner's holding

- In 2005, the Form 1120S stated net income³ of \$187,147.00.
- In 2007, the Form 1120S stated net income⁴ of -\$6,859,176.00.

The petitioner also submitted an audited financial statement for [REDACTED] and Subsidiaries for 2006, which indicates a net income for that year of \$523,041.00. Therefore, for the years 2005 and 2006, [REDACTED] and Subsidiaries did have sufficient net income to pay the proffered wage. For 2007, [REDACTED] and Subsidiaries did not have sufficient net income to pay the proffered wage.

As an alternate means of determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage, USCIS may review the petitioner's net current assets. Net current assets are the difference between the petitioner's current assets and current liabilities.⁵ A corporation's year-end current assets are shown on Schedule L, lines 1 through 6. Its year-end current liabilities are shown on lines 16 through 18. If the total of a corporation's end-of-year net current assets and the wages paid to the beneficiary (if any) are equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the petitioner is expected to be able to pay the proffered wage using those net current assets. [REDACTED] and Subsidiaries' tax return for 2007 demonstrates its end-of-year net current assets for that year, as shown in the table below.

- In 2007, the Form 1120S stated net current assets of -\$769,381.00.

company, [REDACTED] does not have the legal obligation to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage. Notwithstanding, for the sake of thoroughness, the AAO will analyze the tax returns submitted.

³ Where an S corporation's income is exclusively from a trade or business, USCIS considers net income to be the figure for ordinary income, shown on line 21 of page one of the petitioner's IRS Form 1120S. However, where an S corporation has income, credits, deductions or other adjustments from sources other than a trade or business, they are reported on Schedule K. If the Schedule K has relevant entries for additional income, credits, deductions or other adjustments, net income is found on line 17e for 2005 and on line 18 for 2007 of Schedule K. See Instructions for Form 1120S, at <http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i1120s.pdf> (accessed September 26, 2011) (indicating that Schedule K is a summary schedule of all shareholders' shares of the corporation's income, deductions, credits, etc.).

⁴ Because the petitioner had additional income and deductions shown on its Schedule K for 2007, the petitioner's net income is found on Schedule K of its tax return.

⁵ According to *Barron's Dictionary of Accounting Terms* 117 (3rd ed. 2000), "current assets" consist of items having (in most cases) a life of one year or less, such as cash, marketable securities, inventory and prepaid expenses. "Current liabilities" are obligations payable (in most cases) within one year, such as accounts payable, short-term notes payable, and accrued expenses (such as taxes and salaries). *Id.* at 118.

Therefore, for 2007, [REDACTED] and Subsidiaries did not have sufficient net current assets to pay the proffered wage. As previously stated, though, [REDACTED] and Subsidiaries had no legal obligation to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage anyway.

Therefore, from the date the ETA Form 9089 was accepted for processing by the DOL, the petitioner had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage as of the priority date through an examination of wages paid to the beneficiary, net income, or net current assets.

USCIS may consider the overall magnitude of the petitioner's business activities in its determination of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. *See Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (Reg'l Comm'r 1967). The petitioning entity in *Sonogawa* had been in business for over 11 years and routinely earned a gross annual income of about \$100,000. During the year in which the petition was filed in that case, the petitioner changed business locations and paid rent on both the old and new locations for five months. There were large moving costs and also a period of time when the petitioner was unable to do regular business. The Regional Commissioner determined that the petitioner's prospects for a resumption of successful business operations were well established. The petitioner was a fashion designer whose work had been featured in *Time* and *Look* magazines. Her clients included Miss Universe, movie actresses, and society matrons. The petitioner's clients had been included in the lists of the best-dressed California women. The petitioner lectured on fashion design at design and fashion shows throughout the United States and at colleges and universities in California. The Regional Commissioner's determination in *Sonogawa* was based in part on the petitioner's sound business reputation and outstanding reputation as a couturiere. As in *Sonogawa*, USCIS may, at its discretion, consider evidence relevant to the petitioner's financial ability that falls outside of a petitioner's net income and net current assets. USCIS may consider such factors as the number of years the petitioner has been doing business, the established historical growth of the petitioner's business, the overall number of employees, the occurrence of any uncharacteristic business expenditures or losses, the petitioner's reputation within its industry, whether the beneficiary is replacing a former employee or an outsourced service, or any other evidence that USCIS deems relevant to the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage.

In the instant case, [REDACTED] and Subsidiaries maintained -\$6,859,176.00 in net income and -\$769,381.00 in net current assets for 2007. The petitioner also failed to demonstrate its ability to pay for 2005 to 2007. Thus, assessing the totality of the circumstances in this individual case, it is concluded that the petitioner has not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date.

The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and alternative basis for denial. In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, that burden has not been met.

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ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.