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U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Administrative Appeals Office (AAO)
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., MS 2090
Washington, DC 20529-2090



U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services



B5

Date: JUL 12 2012

Office: NEBRASKA SERVICE CENTER



IN RE: Petitioner:
Beneficiary:



PETITION: Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as a Member of the Professions Holding an Advanced Degree or an Alien of Exceptional Ability Pursuant to Section 203(b)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(2)


ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:



INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the AAO inappropriately applied the law in reaching its decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen in accordance with the instructions on Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$630. The specific requirements for filing such a motion can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. **Do not file any motion directly with the AAO.** Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires any motion to be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,

Perry Rhew
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The Director, Nebraska Service Center, denied the immigrant visa petition. The petitioner appealed this denial to the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO), and, on November 16, 2010, the AAO dismissed the appeal. Counsel filed a motion to reopen and a motion to reconsider (MTR) the AAO's decision in accordance with 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. The motion will be granted, the previous decision of the AAO will be affirmed, and the petition will be denied.

The petitioner is a software development and consulting company. It seeks to employ the beneficiary permanently in the United States as a software consultant. As required by statute, the petition is accompanied by a Form ETA 750, Application for Alien Employment Certification, approved by the United States Department of Labor (the DOL). The director determined that the beneficiary did not satisfy the minimum level of education stated on the labor certification and, therefore, the beneficiary cannot be found qualified for classification as a member of the professions holding an advanced degree. The director denied the petition accordingly. The AAO affirmed this determination on appeal. The AAO also determined that the petitioner had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage beginning on the priority date of the visa petition.

*In pertinent part, section 203(b)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(2), provides immigrant classification to members of the professions holding advanced degrees or their equivalent and whose services are sought by an employer in the United States. An advanced degree is a United States academic or professional degree or a foreign equivalent degree above the baccalaureate level. 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k)(2). The regulation further states: "A United States baccalaureate degree or a foreign equivalent degree followed by at least five years of progressive experience in the specialty shall be considered the equivalent of a master's degree. If a doctoral degree is customarily required by the specialty, the alien must have a United States doctorate or a foreign equivalent degree." *Id.**

In dismissing the appeal, the AAO noted that the instant Form I-140 was filed on July 13, 2007. On Part 2.d. of the Form I-140, the petitioner indicated that it was filing the petition for a member of the professions holding an advanced degree or an alien of exceptional ability. The AAO concluded that the beneficiary did not satisfy the minimum level of education stated on the labor certification and that the petitioner had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage beginning on the priority date of the visa petition.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(2) states in pertinent part:

Requirements for motion to reopen. A motion to reopen must state the new facts to be provided in the reopened proceeding and be supported by affidavits or other documentary evidence. . . .

On motion, counsel submits additional evidence. Counsel submits additional educational evaluations as well as the petitioner's income tax returns for 2003 through 2009, and asserts that this new evidence proves that the beneficiary satisfied the minimum level of education stated on the labor certification and that the petitioner had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on

the priority date. The motion to reopen thus qualifies for consideration under 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(2) because the petitioner is providing new facts with supporting documentation not previously submitted.

The beneficiary possesses a three-year Bachelor of Science Degree from the University of Delhi and a Post-Graduate Diploma in Systems Management from the National Institute of Information Technology (NIIT) in India. Thus, the issues are whether either the Bachelor of Science degree or Post-Graduate Diploma is a foreign equivalent degree to a U.S. baccalaureate degree or, if not, whether it is appropriate to consider the combination of the Bachelor of Science degree and Post-Graduate Diploma. We must also consider whether the beneficiary meets the job requirements of the proffered job as set forth on the labor certification.

Eligibility for the Classification Sought

As noted above, the Form ETA 750 in this matter is certified by the DOL. The DOL's role is limited to determining whether there are sufficient workers who are able, willing, qualified and available and whether the employment of the alien will adversely affect the wages and working conditions of workers in the United States similarly employed. Section 212(a)(5)(A)(i) of the Act; 20 C.F.R. § 656.1(a).

It is significant that none of the above inquiries assigned to the DOL, or the remaining regulations implementing these duties under 20 C.F.R. § 656, involve a determination as to whether or not the alien is qualified for a specific immigrant classification or even the job offered. This fact has not gone unnoticed by federal circuit courts. *See Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman*, 736 F. 2d 1305, 1309 (9th Cir. 1984); *Madany v. Smith*, 696 F.2d 1008, 1012-1013 (D.C. Cir. 1983).

A United States baccalaureate degree is generally found to require four years of education. *Matter of Shah*, 17 I&N Dec. 244 (Reg'l. Comm'r. 1977). This decision involved a petition filed under 8 U.S.C. §1153(a)(3) as amended in 1976. At that time, this section provided:

Visas shall next be made available . . . to qualified immigrants who are members of the professions

The Act added section 203(b)(2)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. §1153(b)(2)(A), which provides:

Visas shall be made available . . . to qualified immigrants who are members of the professions holding advanced degrees or their equivalent

Significantly, the statutory language used prior to *Matter of Shah*, 17 I&N Dec. at 244, is identical to the statutory language used subsequent to that decision but for the requirement that the immigrant hold an advanced degree or its equivalent. The Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference, published as part of the House of Representatives Conference Report on the Act, provides that "[in] considering equivalency in category 2 advanced degrees, it is anticipated that the alien must have a bachelor's degree with at least five years progressive experience in the professions." H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 955, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess. 1990, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6784, 1990

WL 201613 at *6786 (Oct. 26, 1990).

At the time of enactment of section 203(b)(2) of the Act in 1990, it had been almost thirteen years since *Matter of Shah* was issued. Congress is presumed to have intended a four-year degree when it stated that an alien “must have a bachelor’s degree” when considering equivalency for second preference immigrant visas. We must assume that Congress was aware of the agency’s previous treatment of a “bachelor’s degree” under the Act when the new classification was enacted and did not intend to alter the agency’s interpretation of that term. See *Lorillard v. Pons*, 434 U.S. 575, 580-81 (1978) (Congress is presumed to be aware of administrative and judicial interpretations where it adopts a new law incorporating sections of a prior law). See also 56 Fed. Reg. 60897, 60900 (Nov. 29, 1991) (an alien must have at least a bachelor’s degree).

In 1991, when the final rule for 8 C.F.R. § 204.5 was published in the Federal Register, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (the Service), responded to criticism that the regulation required an alien to have a bachelor’s degree as a minimum and that the regulation did not allow for the substitution of experience for education. After reviewing section 121 of the Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-649 (1990), and the Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference, the Service specifically noted that both the Act and the legislative history indicate that an alien must have at least a bachelor’s degree:

The Act states that, in order to qualify under the second classification, alien members of the professions must hold “advanced degrees or their equivalent.” As the legislative history . . . indicates, the equivalent of an advanced degree is “a bachelor’s degree with at least five years progressive experience in the professions.” Because neither the Act nor its legislative history indicates that bachelor’s or advanced degrees must be United States degrees, the Service will recognize foreign equivalent degrees. But both the Act and its legislative history make clear that, in order to qualify as a professional under the third classification or to have experience equating to an advanced degree under the second, *an alien must have at least a bachelor’s degree.*

56 Fed. Reg. 60897, 60900 (Nov. 29, 1991) (emphasis added).

There is no provision in the statute or the regulations that would allow a beneficiary to qualify under section 203(b)(2) of the Act as a member of the professions holding an advanced degree with anything less than a full baccalaureate degree (plus the requisite five years of progressive experience in the specialty). More specifically, a three-year bachelor’s degree will not be considered to be the “foreign equivalent degree” to a United States baccalaureate degree. *Matter of Shah*, 17 I&N Dec. at 245. Where the analysis of the beneficiary’s credentials relies on work experience alone or a combination of multiple lesser degrees, the result is the “equivalent” of a bachelor’s degree rather than a “foreign equivalent degree.”¹ In order to have experience and education equating to an

¹ Compare 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(D)(5) (defining for purposes of a nonimmigrant visa classification, the “equivalence to completion of a college degree” as including, in certain cases, a specific combination of education and experience). The regulations pertaining to the immigrant

advanced degree under section 203(b)(2) of the Act, the beneficiary must have a single degree that is the “foreign equivalent degree” to a United States baccalaureate degree (plus the requisite five years of progressive experience in the specialty). 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k)(2).

For this classification, advanced degree professional, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k)(3)(i)(B) requires the submission of an “official academic record showing that the alien has a United States baccalaureate degree or a foreign equivalent degree” (plus evidence of five years of progressive experience in the specialty). For classification as a member of the professions, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(l)(3)(ii)(C) requires the submission of “an official college or university record showing the date the baccalaureate degree was awarded and the area of concentration of study.” We cannot conclude that the evidence required to demonstrate that an alien is an advanced degree professional is any less than the evidence required to show that the alien is a professional. To do so would undermine the congressionally mandated classification scheme by allowing a lesser evidentiary standard for the more restrictive visa classification. Moreover, the commentary accompanying the proposed advanced degree professional regulation specifically states that a “baccalaureate means a bachelor’s degree received *from a college or university*, or an equivalent degree.” (Emphasis added.) 56 Fed. Reg. 30703, 30306 (July 5, 1991). Compare 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k)(3)(ii)(A) (relating to aliens of exceptional ability requiring the submission of “an official academic record showing that the alien has a degree, *diploma, certificate or similar award* from a college, university, *school or other institution of learning* relating to the area of exceptional ability”).

The minimum level of education required for the proffered position is set forth in part 14 of the Form ETA 750. Specifically, Part 14 states that the proffered position requires four years of college and a “B.S. or equiv. degree” in computer science, science, engineering, math or equivalent.

The beneficiary set forth his credentials on the labor certification and signed his name, under a declaration that the contents of the form are true and correct under the penalty of perjury. On the section of the labor certification eliciting information of the beneficiary’s education, he states that he attended the University of Delhi and received a three-year Bachelor of Science degree.

The record contains the following educational evaluation submitted on motion:

- An evaluation from Career Consulting International. The evaluation is dated December 13, 2010. The evaluation is signed by [REDACTED]. The evaluation describes the beneficiary’s three-year bachelor of science degree as being the equivalent of a U.S. four-year Bachelor of Science degree.
- An evaluation from European-American University. The evaluation is dated December 11, 2010. The evaluation is signed by [REDACTED]. The evaluation describes the beneficiary’s three-year bachelor of science degree as being the equivalent of a U.S. Bachelor of Science degree.

classification sought in this matter do not contain similar language.

USCIS may, in its discretion, use as advisory opinions statements submitted as expert testimony. *See Matter of Caron International*, 19 I&N Dec. 791, 795 (Commr. 1988). However, USCIS is ultimately responsible for making the final determination regarding an alien's eligibility for the benefit sought. *Id.* The submission of letters from experts supporting the petition is not presumptive evidence of eligibility. USCIS may evaluate the content of the letters as to whether they support the alien's eligibility. *See id.* USCIS may give less weight to an opinion that is not corroborated, in accord with other information or is in any way questionable. *Id.* at 795. *See also Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Commr. 1998) (citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Commr. 1972)); *Matter of D-R-*, 25 I&N Dec. 445 (BIA 2011)(expert witness testimony may be given different weight depending on the extent of the expert's qualifications or the relevance, reliability, and probative value of the testimony).

This [REDACTED] evaluations are not persuasive in establishing that a three-year bachelor's degree from India is equivalent to a four-year U.S. bachelor's degree in any subject. The evaluations go on at length about Carnegie Units and Indian degrees in general, concluding that the beneficiary's three-year degree is equivalent to a U.S. baccalaureate. However, although the evaluations attempt to assign a value to the beneficiary's courses, the rationale behind these credit assignments is not substantiated. Essentially, the evaluations attempt to inflate the beneficiary's three-years of education to a number of credits equal to a four-year U.S. bachelor's degree without having any basis to do so.

[REDACTED] has coauthored an article with [REDACTED]. The record contains no evidence that this article was published in a peer-reviewed publication or anywhere other than the Internet. The article includes *British colleges that accept three-year degrees for admission to graduate school* but concedes that "a number of other universities" would not accept three-year degrees for admission to graduate school. Similarly, the article lists some U.S. universities that accept three-year degrees for admission to graduate school but acknowledges that others do not. In fact, the article concedes:

None of the members of N.A.C.E.S. who were approached were willing to grant equivalency to a bachelor's degree from a regionally accredited institution in the United States, although we heard anecdotally that one, W.E.S. had been interested in doing so.

In this process, we encountered a number of the objections to equivalency that have already been discussed.

[REDACTED] commented thus,

"Contrary to your statement, a degree from a three-year "Bologna Process" bachelor's degree program in Europe will NOT be accepted as a degree by the majority of universities in the United States. Similarly, the majority do not accept a bachelor's degree from a three-year program in India or any other country except England. England is a unique situation because of the specialized nature of Form VI."

* * *

raise similar objections to

“The Indian educational system, along with that of Canada and some other countries, generally adopted the UK-pattern 3-year degree. But the UK retained the important preliminary A level examinations. These examinations are used for advanced standing credit in the UK; we follow their lead, and use those examinations to constitute the an [sic] additional year of undergraduate study. The combination of these two entities is equivalent to a 4-year US Bachelor’s degree.

The Indian educational system dropped that advanced standing year. You enter a 3-year Indian degree program directly from Year 12 of your education. In the US, there are no degree programs entered from a stage lower than Year 12, and there are no 3-year degree programs. Without the additional advanced standing year, there’s no equivalency.

Additionally, these materials do not examine whether those few U.S. institutions that may accept a three-year degree for graduate admission do so on the condition that the holder of a three-year degree complete extra credits.

On motion, counsel states that the “Service misapplied the standard of review in concluding that Beneficiary’s 3-years Indian Bachelor’s of Science degree is not equivalent to a U.S. baccalaureate degree.” However, in visa petition proceedings, the burden is on the petitioner to establish eligibility for the benefit sought. *See Matter of Brantigan*, 11 I&N Dec. 493 (BIA 1966). The petitioner must prove by a preponderance of evidence that the beneficiary is fully qualified for the benefit sought. *Matter of Martinez*, 21 I&N Dec. 1035, 1036 (BIA 1977); *Matter of Patel*, 19 I&N Dec. 774 (BIA 1988); *Matter of Soo Hoo*, 11 I&N Dec. 151 (BIA 1965).

On motion, counsel also references minutes from an American Immigration Lawyers Association (AILA) teleconference liaison meeting with the Nebraska Service Center on April 19, 2006. The AAO is bound by the Act, agency regulations, precedent decisions of the agency and published decisions from the circuit court of appeals within the circuit where the action arose. *See N.L.R.B. v. Askkenazy Property Management Corp.* 817 F. 2d 74, 75 (9th Cir. 1987) (administrative agencies are not free to refuse to follow precedent in cases originating within the circuit); *R.L. Inv. Ltd. Partners v. INS*, 86 F. Supp. 2d 1014, 1022 (D. Haw. 2000), *aff’d*, 273 F.3d 874 (9th Cir. 2001) (unpublished agency decisions and agency legal memoranda are not binding under the APA, even when they are published in private publications or widely circulated).

Because the beneficiary does not have a “United States baccalaureate degree or a foreign equivalent degree,” the beneficiary does not qualify for preference visa classification under section 203(b)(2) of the Act as he does not have the minimum level of education required for the equivalent of an

advanced degree. Furthermore, as noted in the AAO's November 16, 2010 decision, the beneficiary's NIIT program cannot qualify the beneficiary for the classification as an advanced degree professional sought because, *inter alia*, NIIT is not a college or university. See 8 C.F.R. §204.5(k)(3)(i)(B).

Ability to Pay the Proffered Wage

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) states in pertinent part:

Ability of prospective employer to pay wage. Any petition filed by or for an employment-based immigrant which requires an offer of employment must be accompanied by evidence that the prospective United States employer has the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner must demonstrate this ability at the time the priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. Evidence of this ability shall be either in the form of copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements.

The petitioner must demonstrate the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, which is the date the Form ETA 750 was accepted for processing by any office within the employment system of the DOL. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(d).

Here, the Form ETA 750 was accepted on October 29, 2003. The proffered wage as stated on the Form ETA 750 is \$91,000.00 per year.

The petitioner must establish that its job offer to the beneficiary is a realistic one. Because the filing of a Form ETA 750 establishes a priority date for any immigrant petition later based on the Form ETA 750, the petitioner must establish that the job offer was realistic as of the priority date and that the offer remained realistic for each year thereafter, until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. The petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is an essential element in evaluating whether a job offer is realistic. See *Matter of Great Wall*, 16 I&N Dec. 142 (Acting Reg. Comm. 1977); see also 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2). In evaluating whether a job offer is realistic, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) requires the petitioner to demonstrate financial resources sufficient to pay the beneficiary's proffered wages, although the totality of the circumstances affecting the petitioning business will be considered if the evidence warrants such consideration. See *Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (Reg. Comm. 1967).

In determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage during a given period, USCIS will first examine whether the petitioner employed and paid the beneficiary during that period. If the petitioner establishes by documentary evidence that it employed the beneficiary at a salary equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the evidence will be considered *prima facie* proof of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage.

The beneficiary's Forms W-2 for 2006 through 2009 shows compensation received from the petitioner as detailed in the table below.

Year	Beneficiary's actual Compensation	Proffered wage	Wage increase needed to pay the proffered wage
2009	\$82,860	\$91,000	\$8,140
2008	\$68,720.82	\$91,000	\$22,279.18
2007	\$80,715.72	\$91,000	\$10,284.28
2006	\$58,368.30	\$91,000	\$32,631.70
2005	\$0	\$91,000	\$91,000
2004	\$0	\$91,000	\$91,000
2003	\$0	\$91,000	\$91,000

Here, the petitioner has established that it paid the beneficiary wages less than the full proffered wage from 2006 through 2009. The petitioner has not established that it paid the beneficiary any wages from 2003 through 2005. Therefore, the petitioner must establish that it can pay the difference between the wages actually paid to the beneficiary and the proffered wage from 2006 through 2009 and the full proffered wage from 2003 through 2005.

If, as in this case, the petitioner has not established that it paid the beneficiary an amount at least equal to the proffered wage during the required period, USCIS will next examine the net income figure reflected on the petitioner's federal income tax return, without consideration of depreciation or other expenses. *River Street Donuts, LLC v. Napolitano*, 558 F.3d 111 (1st Cir. 2009); *Taco Especial v. Napolitano*, 696 F. Supp. 2d 873 (E.D. Mich. 2010), *aff'd*, No. 10-1517 (6th Cir. filed Nov. 10, 2011). Reliance on federal income tax returns as a basis for determining a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is well established by judicial precedent. *Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava*, 632 F. Supp. 1049, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (citing *Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman*, 736 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1984)); *see also Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh*, 719 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Texas 1989); *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); *Ubeda v. Palmer*, 539 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982), *aff'd*, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983). Reliance on the petitioner's gross receipts and wage expense is misplaced. Showing that the petitioner's gross receipts exceeded the proffered wage is insufficient. Similarly, showing that the petitioner paid wages in excess of the proffered wage is insufficient.

In *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. at 1084, the court held that the Immigration and Naturalization Service, now USCIS, had properly relied on the petitioner's net income figure, as stated on the petitioner's corporate income tax returns, rather than the petitioner's gross income. The court specifically rejected the argument that USCIS should have considered income before expenses were paid rather than net income. *See Taco Especial v. Napolitano*, 696 F. Supp. 2d at 881 (gross profits overstate an employer's ability to pay because it ignores other necessary expenses).

With respect to depreciation, the court in *River Street Donuts* noted:

The AAO recognized that a depreciation deduction is a systematic allocation of the cost of a tangible long-term asset and does not represent a specific cash

expenditure during the year claimed. Furthermore, the AAO indicated that the allocation of the depreciation of a long-term asset could be spread out over the years or concentrated into a few depending on the petitioner's choice of accounting and depreciation methods. Nonetheless, the AAO explained that depreciation represents an actual cost of doing business, which could represent either the diminution in value of buildings and equipment or the accumulation of funds necessary to replace perishable equipment and buildings. Accordingly, the AAO stressed that even though amounts deducted for depreciation do not represent current use of cash, neither does it represent amounts available to pay wages.

We find that the AAO has a rational explanation for its policy of not adding depreciation back to net income. Namely, that the amount spent on a long term tangible asset is a "real" expense.

River Street Donuts at 118. “[USCIS] and judicial precedent support the use of tax returns and the *net income figures* in determining petitioner’s ability to pay. Plaintiffs’ argument that these figures should be revised by the court by adding back depreciation is without support.” *Chi-Feng Chang* at 537 (emphasis added).

On motion, the petitioner submitted its 2003 through 2009 tax returns. The petitioner’s tax returns show its net income as detailed in the table below.²

Year	Net Income
2009	\$120,676
2008	\$139,812
2007	\$178,667
2006	\$161,590
2005	\$118,767
2004	\$41,208
2003	\$7,520

² Where an S corporation’s income is exclusively from a trade or business, USCIS considers net income to be the figure for ordinary income, shown on line 21 of page one of the petitioner’s IRS Form 1120S. However, where an S corporation has income, credits, deductions or other adjustments from sources other than a trade or business, they are reported on Schedule K. If the Schedule K has relevant entries for additional income, credits, deductions or other adjustments, net income is found on line 17e (2005) or line 18 (2006-2010) of Schedule K. See Instructions for Form 1120S, at <http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i1120s.pdf> (accessed August 9, 2011) (indicating that Schedule K is a summary schedule of all shareholders’ shares of the corporation’s income, deductions, credits, etc.). The petitioner was a C corporation in 2003, 2004, and 2005.

In five of the relevant years, it appears initially that the petitioner had sufficient net income to pay the difference between the wages actually paid and the proffered wage. However, the AAO is unable to determine if the petitioner's net income is sufficient to pay the proffered wage because USCIS electronic records show that the petitioner has filed thousands of other Forms I-140 and I-129 petitions since the priority date. If the instant petition were the only petition filed by the petitioner, the petitioner would be required to produce evidence of its ability to pay the proffered wage to the single beneficiary of the instant petition. However, where a petitioner has filed multiple petitions for multiple beneficiaries which have been pending simultaneously, the petitioner must produce evidence that its job offers to each beneficiary are realistic, and therefore that it has the ability to pay the proffered wages to each of the beneficiaries of its pending petitions, as of the priority date of each petition and continuing until the beneficiary of each petition obtains lawful permanent residence. See *Matter of Great Wall*, 16 I&N Dec. 142, 144-145 (Acting Reg'l Comm'r 1977) (petitioner must establish ability to pay as of the date of the Form MA 7-50B job offer, the predecessor to the Form ETA 750 and ETA Form 9089). See also 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2). Therefore we cannot conclude that the petitioner has established that it can pay the proffered wage of all sponsored workers. The petitioner must address this issue in any further filings.

Net current assets are the difference between the petitioner's current assets and current liabilities.³ A corporation's year-end current assets are shown on Schedule L, lines 1 through 6. Its year-end current liabilities are shown on lines 16 through 18. If the total of a corporation's end-of-year net current assets and the wages paid to the beneficiary (if any) are equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the petitioner is expected to be able to pay the proffered wage using those net current assets.

The petitioner's tax returns demonstrate its end-of-year net current assets as shown in the following table.

Year	Net Current Assets
2009	\$485,011
2008	\$1,583,205
2007	\$1,456,313
2006	\$1,498,844
2005	\$1,709,380
2004	\$567,572
2003	\$666,129

In each of the relevant years, it appears initially the petitioner had sufficient net current assets to pay the difference between the wages actually paid and the proffered wage. However, we are unable to

³ According to *Barron's Dictionary of Accounting Terms* 117 (3rd ed. 2000), "current assets" consist of items having (in most cases) a life of one year or less, such as cash, marketable securities, inventory and prepaid expenses. "Current liabilities" are obligations payable (in most cases) within one year, such accounts payable, short-term notes payable, and accrued expenses (such as taxes and salaries). *Id.* at 118.

conclude that the petitioner's net current assets are sufficient to satisfy the proffered wage to all of the sponsored beneficiaries. The record in the instant case contains minimal information about the proffered wages for the beneficiaries of those petitions, about the current immigration or employment status of the beneficiaries, whether the beneficiaries have withdrawn from the visa process, or whether the petitioner has withdrawn its job offers to the beneficiaries.

Since the petitioner has not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage as of the priority date through an examination of wages paid to the beneficiary, or its net income or net current assets, USCIS may consider the overall magnitude of the petitioner's business activities in its determination of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. See *Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612.

The petitioning entity in *Sonogawa* had been in business for over 11 years and routinely earned a gross annual income of about \$100,000. During the year in which the petition was filed in that case, the petitioner changed business locations and paid rent on both the old and new locations for five months. There were large moving costs and also a period of time when the petitioner was unable to do regular business. The Regional Commissioner determined that the petitioner's prospects for a resumption of successful business operations were well established. The petitioner was a fashion designer whose work had been featured in *Time* and *Look* magazines. Her clients included Miss Universe, movie actresses, and society matrons. The petitioner's clients had been included in the lists of the best-dressed California women. The petitioner lectured on fashion design at design and fashion shows throughout the United States and at colleges and universities in California. The Regional Commissioner's determination in *Sonogawa* was based in part on the petitioner's sound business reputation and outstanding reputation as a couturiere.

As in *Sonogawa*, USCIS may, at its discretion, consider evidence relevant to the petitioner's financial ability that falls outside of a petitioner's net income and net current assets. USCIS may consider such factors as the number of years the petitioner has been doing business, the established historical growth of the petitioner's business, the overall number of employees, the occurrence of any uncharacteristic business expenditures or losses, the petitioner's reputation within its industry, whether the beneficiary is replacing a former employee or an outsourced service, or any other evidence that USCIS deems relevant to the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage.

The AAO recognizes that the petitioner has been in business since 1998. Nevertheless, the evidence submitted does not reflect a pattern of significant growth or the occurrence of an uncharacteristic business expenditure or loss that would explain its inability to pay the proffered wage from the priority date. To the contrary, the petitioner's gross receipts appear to be declining. In 2009, the petitioner has approximately \$6 million less in gross receipts than in previous years. In addition, no evidence has been presented to show that the petitioner has a sound and outstanding business reputation as in *Sonogawa*. Unlike *Sonogawa*, the petitioner has not submitted any evidence reflecting the company's reputation or historical growth since its inception in 1998. Nor has it included any evidence or detailed explanation of the corporation's milestone achievements. Finally, the presence of other pending immigrant and nonimmigrant petitions calls into question its ability to pay the proffered wage to the beneficiary. The job offer does not appear realistic, evaluating the

totality of the circumstances. Thus, assessing the totality of the circumstances in this individual case, it is concluded that the petitioner has not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage.

The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and alternative basis for denial.

The burden of proof in these proceedings rests solely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The petitioner has not sustained that burden. Accordingly, the motion will be granted, the previous decision of the AAO will be affirmed, and the petition will be denied.

ORDER: The motion to reopen is granted and the decision of the AAO dated November 16, 2010 is affirmed. The petition is denied.