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U.S. Department of Homeland Security  
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services  
Administrative Appeals Office (AAO)  
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., MS 2090  
Washington, DC 20529-2090



U.S. Citizenship  
and Immigration  
Services

B5

DATE: JUN 19 2012 OFFICE: TEXAS SERVICE CENTER

IN RE:

PETITION: Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as a Member of the Professions Holding an Advanced Degree or an Alien of Exceptional Ability Pursuant to Section 203(b)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(2)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:

INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the AAO inappropriately applied the law in reaching its decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen with the field office or service center that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$630. The specific requirements for filing such a motion can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. **Do not file any motion directly with the AAO.** Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires any motion to be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,

Perry Rhew  
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The Director, Texas Service Center, denied the employment-based immigrant visa petition, which is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner is a computer programming services business. It seeks to employ the beneficiary permanently in the United States as a computer programmer pursuant to section 203(b)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(2). As required by statute, a Form ETA 750,<sup>1</sup> Application for Alien Employment Certification approved by the Department of Labor (DOL), accompanied the petition. The director determined that the petitioner had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage beginning on the priority date of the visa petition and denied the petition accordingly. The director also determined that the petitioner had failed to demonstrate that the beneficiary qualified for the second preference classification.

The record shows that the appeal is properly filed, timely and makes a specific allegation of error in law or fact. The procedural history in this case is documented by the record and incorporated into the decision. Further elaboration of the procedural history will be made only as necessary.

As set forth in the director's August 25, 2009 denial, the first issue in this case is whether the petitioner has the ability to pay the proffered wage as of the priority date and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence.

In pertinent part, section 203(b)(2) of the Act provides immigrant classification to members of the professions holding advanced degrees or their equivalent and whose services are sought by an employer in the United States. An advanced degree is a United States academic or professional degree or a foreign equivalent degree above the baccalaureate level. 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k)(2). The regulation further states: "A United States baccalaureate degree or a foreign equivalent degree followed by at least five years of progressive experience in the specialty shall be considered the equivalent of a master's degree. If a doctoral degree is customarily required by the specialty, the alien must have a United States doctorate or a foreign equivalent degree." *Id.*

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) states in pertinent part:

*Ability of prospective employer to pay wage.* Any petition filed by or for an employment-based immigrant which requires an offer of employment must be accompanied by evidence that the prospective United States employer has the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner must demonstrate this ability at the time the priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. Evidence of this ability shall be either in the form of copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements.

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<sup>1</sup> After March 28, 2005, the correct form to apply for alien employment certification is the ETA Form 9089.

The petitioner must demonstrate the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, which is the date the Form ETA 750 was accepted for processing by any office within the employment system of the DOL. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(d).

Here, the Form ETA 750 was accepted on November 2, 2004. The proffered wage as stated on the Form ETA 750 is \$1,571.20 per week (\$81,702.40 per year).

The evidence in the record of proceeding shows that the petitioner is a multi-member limited liability company (LLC).<sup>2</sup> On the Form ETA 750, signed by the beneficiary on October 6, 2004, she claims to have been employed by the petitioner since May 2002.

The petitioner must establish that its job offer to the beneficiary is a realistic one. Because the filing of a Form ETA 750 establishes a priority date for any immigrant petition later based on the Form ETA 750, the petitioner must establish that the job offer was realistic as of the priority date and that the offer remained realistic for each year thereafter, until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. The petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is an essential element in evaluating whether a job offer is realistic. *See Matter of Great Wall*, 16 I&N Dec. 142 (Acting Reg. Comm. 1977); *see also* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2). In evaluating whether a job offer is realistic, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) requires the petitioner to demonstrate financial resources sufficient to pay the beneficiary's proffered wages, although the totality of the circumstances affecting the petitioning business will be considered if the evidence warrants such consideration. *See Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (Reg. Comm. 1967).

In determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage during a given period, USCIS will first examine whether the petitioner employed and paid the beneficiary during that period. If the petitioner establishes by documentary evidence that it employed the beneficiary at a salary equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the evidence will be considered *prima facie* proof of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. The proffered wage is \$81,702.40. The record of proceeding contains copies of Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Forms W-2 that were issued by the petitioner to the beneficiary as shown in the table below:

- In 2004, the petitioner did not submit any wage forms.

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<sup>2</sup> An LLC is an entity formed under state law by filing articles of organization. An LLC may be classified for federal income tax purposes as if it were a sole proprietorship, a partnership or a corporation. If the LLC has only one owner, it will automatically be treated as a sole proprietorship unless an election is made to be treated as a corporation. If the LLC has two or more owners, it will automatically be considered to be a partnership unless an election is made to be treated as a corporation. If the LLC does not elect its classification, a default classification of partnership (multi-member LLC) or disregarded entity (taxed as if it were a sole proprietorship) will apply. *See* 26 C.F.R. § 301.7701-3. The election referred to is made using IRS Form 8832, Entity Classification Election.

- In 2005, the Form W-2 stated total wages of \$37,500.00 (a deficiency of \$44,202.40).
- In 2006, the Form W-2 stated total wages of \$41,250.00 (a deficiency of \$40,452.40).
- In 2007, the Form W-2 stated total wages of \$54,000.00 (a deficiency of \$27,702.40).
- In 2008, the Form W-2 stated total wages of \$75,600.00 (a deficiency of \$6,102.40).
- In 2009, the petitioner provided pay stubs issued to the beneficiary for January, February and March, totaling \$6,300.00 per month (averaging to \$75,600.00 per year).

If, as in this case, the petitioner does not establish that it employed and paid the beneficiary an amount at least equal to the proffered wage throughout the designated period, then USCIS will next examine the net income figure reflected on the petitioner's federal income tax return, without consideration of depreciation or other expenses. *River Street Donuts, LLC v. Napolitano*, 558 F.3d 111 (1<sup>st</sup> Cir. 2009); *Taco Especial v. Napolitano*, 696 F. Supp. 2d 873 (E.D. Mich. 2010), *aff'd*, No. 10-1517 (6<sup>th</sup> Cir. filed Nov. 10, 2011). Reliance on federal income tax returns as a basis for determining a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is well established by judicial precedent. *Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava*, 632 F. Supp. 1049, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (citing *Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman*, 736 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1984)); *see also Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh*, 719 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Texas 1989); *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); *Ubeda v. Palmer*, 539 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982), *aff'd*, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983). Reliance on the petitioner's gross receipts and wage expense is misplaced. Showing that the petitioner's gross receipts exceeded the proffered wage is insufficient. Similarly showing that the petitioner paid wages in excess of the proffered wage is insufficient.

In *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. at 1084, the court held that the Immigration and Naturalization Service, now USCIS, had properly relied on the petitioner's net income figure, as stated on the petitioner's corporate income tax returns, rather than the petitioner's gross income. The court specifically rejected the argument that USCIS should have considered income before expenses were paid rather than net income. *See Taco Especial v. Napolitano*, 696 F. Supp. 2d at 881 (gross profits overstate an employer's ability to pay because it ignores other necessary expenses).

With respect to depreciation, the court in *River Street Donuts* noted:

The AAO recognized that a depreciation deduction is a systematic allocation of the cost of a tangible long-term asset and does not represent a specific cash expenditure during the year claimed. Furthermore, the AAO indicated that the allocation of the depreciation of a long-term asset could be spread out over the years or concentrated into a few depending on the petitioner's choice of accounting and depreciation methods. Nonetheless, the AAO explained that depreciation represents an actual cost of doing business, which could represent

either the diminution in value of buildings and equipment or the accumulation of funds necessary to replace perishable equipment and buildings. Accordingly, the AAO stressed that even though amounts deducted for depreciation do not represent current use of cash, neither does it represent amounts available to pay wages.

We find that the AAO has a rational explanation for its policy of not adding depreciation back to net income. Namely, that the amount spent on a long term tangible asset is a "real" expense.

*River Street Donuts* at 118. "[USCIS] and judicial precedent support the use of tax returns and the net income figures in determining petitioner's ability to pay. Plaintiffs' argument that these figures should be revised by the court by adding back depreciation is without support." *Chi-Feng Chang* at 537 (emphasis added).

The proffered wage is \$81,702.40. The petitioner's federal income tax returns Forms 1065<sup>3</sup> stated its net income as detailed below.

- In 2004, the Form 1065 stated net income of -\$6,594.00.
- In 2005, the Form 1065 stated net income of -\$3,222.00.
- In 2006, the Form 1065 stated net income of -\$1,764.00.
- In 2007, the Form 1065 stated net income of -\$9,803.00.
- In 2008, the Form 1065 stated net income of -\$7,114.00.
- In 2009, the petitioner did not provide a copy of its tax return.

Therefore, for the years 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009, the petitioner did not have sufficient net income to pay the proffered wage. It is noted that, in 2004 and 2005, the petitioner's gross receipts were less than the proffered wage. Therefore, even if every dollar earned was spent on the proffered wage, it would still have been insufficient.

As an alternate means of determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage, USCIS may review the petitioner's net current assets. Net current assets are the difference between the petitioner's current assets and current liabilities.<sup>4</sup> An LLC's year-end current assets are shown on

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<sup>3</sup> For an LLC, where an LLC's income is exclusively from a trade or business, USCIS considers net income to be the figure shown on Line 22 of the Form 1065, U.S. Partnership Income Tax Return. However, where an LLC has income, credits, deductions or other adjustments from sources other than a trade or business, they are reported on Schedule K. If the Schedule K has relevant entries for additional income or additional credits, deductions or other adjustments, net income is found on page 4 of IRS Form 1065 at line 1 of the Analysis of Net Income (Loss) of Schedule K.

<sup>4</sup> According to *Barron's Dictionary of Accounting Terms* 117 (3<sup>rd</sup> ed. 2000), "current assets" consist of items having (in most cases) a life of one year or less, such as cash, marketable securities, inventory and prepaid expenses. "Current liabilities" are obligations payable (in most cases) within

Schedule L, lines 1 through 6. Its year-end current liabilities are shown on lines 15 through 17. If the total of a LLC's end-of-year net current assets and the wages paid to the beneficiary (if any) are equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the petitioner is expected to be able to pay the proffered wage using those net current assets. The petitioner's tax return demonstrates its end-of-year net current assets as shown in the table below.

- In 2004, the Form 1065 stated net current assets of \$0.00.
- In 2005, the Form 1065 stated net current assets of \$0.00.
- In 2006, the Form 1065 stated net current assets of \$0.00.
- In 2007, the Form 1065 stated net current assets of \$0.00.
- In 2008, the Form 1065 stated net current assets of \$0.00.
- In 2009, the petitioner did not provide a copy of its tax return.

Therefore, for the years 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009, the record shows that the petitioner did not have sufficient net current assets to pay the proffered wage.

Therefore, from the date the Form ETA 750 was accepted for processing by the DOL, the petitioner had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage as of the priority date through an examination of wages paid to the beneficiary, or its net income or net current assets.

On appeal, counsel asserts that the director's decision is based on an incorrect interpretation of the petitioner's financial records, and that it has provided evidence sufficient to show that it has the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner further asserts that USCIS must consider the totality of the circumstances in its determination of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage.

The petitioner asserts that as sole owners, the LLC's members' assets and personal liabilities may be considered in determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage.

Contrary to the petitioner's claim, the evidence of record (including the petitioner's Forms 1065 tax return) demonstrate that it is an LLC and it is an elementary rule that an LLC or a corporation is a separate and distinct legal entity from its owners, shareholders, and members. *See Matter of M*, 8 I&N Dec. 24 (BIA 1958), *Matter of Aphrodite Investments, Ltd.*, 17 I&N Dec. 530 (Comm. 1980), and *Matter of Tessel*, 17 I&N Dec. 631 (Act. Assoc. Comm. 1980). Furthermore, a petitioner may not make material changes to a petition or evidence in an effort to make a deficient petition conform to USCIS requirements. *See Matter of Izummi*, 22 I&N Dec. 169, 176 (Assoc. Comm'r 1988). Consequently, the personal assets or other enterprises or corporations cannot be considered in determining the petitioning LLC's ability to pay the proffered wage. The court stated, "nothing in the governing regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 204.5, permits [USCIS] to consider the financial resources of individuals or entities who have no legal obligation to pay the wage." *See Sitar v. Ashcroft*, 2003

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one year, such accounts payable, short-term notes payable, and accrued expenses (such as taxes and salaries). *Id.* at 118.

WL 22203713 (D.Mass. Sept. 18, 2003). Therefore, USCIS may not look to the assets of the LLC's owners or of other entities to satisfy the LLC's ability to pay the proffered wage.

Counsel contends that the petitioner need not pay the proffered wage if it has paid the prevailing wage, citing *Masonry Masters, Inc. v. Thornburgh*, 742 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1990), *remanded* in 875 F.2d 898 (D.C. Cir. 1989). That holding is not binding outside the District of Columbia, and it does not stand for the proposition that a petitioner's unsupported assertions have greater weight than its tax returns. The Court held that USCIS should not require a petitioner to show the ability to pay more than the prevailing wage. Counsel has not shown a difference between the proffered wage and the prevailing wage in this proceeding, and the petitioning organization is not located in the District of Columbia. *See also, Masonry Masters, Inc. v. Thornburgh*, 875 F.2d 898 (D.C. Cir. 1989).

The petitioner infers that its cash balances should be considered in assessing its ability to pay the proffered wage, and submits a copy of its bank statements. Contrary to the petitioner's claim, reliance on the balances in the petitioner's bank account is misplaced. First, bank statements are not among the three types of evidence, enumerated in 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2), required to illustrate a petitioner's ability to pay a proffered wage. While this regulation allows additional material "in appropriate cases," the petitioner in this case has not demonstrated why the documentation specified at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) is inapplicable or otherwise paints an inaccurate financial picture of the petitioner. Second, bank statements show the amount in an account on a given date, and cannot show the sustainable ability to pay a proffered wage. Third, no evidence was submitted to demonstrate that the funds reported on the petitioner's bank statements somehow reflect additional available funds that were not reflected on its tax return(s), such as the petitioner's taxable income (income minus deductions) or the cash specified on Schedule L that was considered above in determining the petitioner's net current assets.

USCIS may consider the overall magnitude of the petitioner's business activities in its determination of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. *See Matter of Sonegawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612. The petitioning entity in *Sonegawa* had been in business for over 11 years and routinely earned a gross annual income of about \$100,000. During the year in which the petition was filed in that case, the petitioner changed business locations and paid rent on both the old and new locations for five months. There were large moving costs and also a period of time when the petitioner was unable to do regular business. The Regional Commissioner determined that the petitioner's prospects for a resumption of successful business operations were well established. The petitioner was a fashion designer whose work had been featured in *Time* and *Look* magazines. Her clients included Miss Universe, movie actresses, and society matrons. The petitioner's clients had been included in the lists of the best-dressed California women. The petitioner lectured on fashion design at design and fashion shows throughout the United States and at colleges and universities in California. The Regional Commissioner's determination in *Sonegawa* was based in part on the petitioner's sound business reputation and outstanding reputation as a couturiere. As in *Sonegawa*, USCIS may, at its discretion, consider evidence relevant to the petitioner's financial ability that falls outside of a petitioner's net income and net current assets. USCIS may consider such factors as the number of years the petitioner has been doing business, the established historical growth of the petitioner's

business, the overall number of employees, the occurrence of any uncharacteristic business expenditures or losses, the petitioner's reputation within its industry, whether the beneficiary is replacing a former employee as is stated here or an outsourced service, or any other evidence that USCIS deems relevant to the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage.

In assessing the totality of the circumstances in this individual case, it is concluded that the petitioner has not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner has not established the existence of any facts paralleling those in *Sonegawa*. The petitioner has not established that the relevant years were uncharacteristically unprofitable years or difficult periods for its business. The petitioner has also not established its reputation within the industry or whether the beneficiary is replacing as an employee or outsourced service.

Accordingly, the evidence submitted does not establish that the petitioner had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date.

A second issue in this case is whether the petitioner has submitted sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the beneficiary is qualified for the second preference classification.

On appeal, counsel asserts that the beneficiary has obtained a bachelor's degree and a master's degree in statistics; and that such is sufficient to demonstrate her educational classification.

The beneficiary possesses a bachelor's degree and a master's degree in statistics from Sadar Patel University in Vallabha, India in April 1994 and April 1996, respectively. The issue in this case is whether the beneficiary's master's degree or bachelor's degree in statistics and five years of experience constitute a foreign degree equivalent to a U.S. baccalaureate degree in computer science.

As noted above, the DOL certified the Form ETA 750 in this matter. The DOL's role is limited to determining whether there are sufficient workers who are able, willing, qualified, and available and whether the employment of the alien will adversely affect the wages and working conditions of workers in the United States similarly employed. Section 212(a)(5)(A)(i) of the Act; 20 C.F.R. § 656.1(a).

It is significant that none of the above inquiries assigned to the DOL, or the remaining regulations implementing these duties under 20 C.F.R. § 656, involve a determination as to whether or not the alien is qualified for a specific immigrant classification or even the job offered. This fact has not gone unnoticed by federal circuit courts. See *Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman*, 736 F. 2d 1305, 1309 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1984); *Madany v. Smith*, 696 F.2d 1008, 1012-1013 (D.C. Cir. 1983).

A United States baccalaureate degree is generally found to require four years of education. *Matter of Shah*, 17 I&N Dec. 244 (Reg'l Comm'r 1977). This decision involved a petition filed under 8 U.S.C. §1153(a)(3) as amended in 1976. At that time, this section provided:

Visas shall next be made available . . . to qualified immigrants who are members of the professions . . . .

The Act added section 203(b)(2)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. §1153(b)(2)(A), which provides:

Visas shall be made available . . . to qualified immigrants who are members of the professions holding advanced degrees or their equivalent . . . .

Significantly, the statutory language used prior to *Matter of Shah*, 17 I&N Dec. at 244, is identical to the statutory language used subsequent to that decision but for the requirement that the immigrant hold an advanced degree or its equivalent. The Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference, published as part of the House of Representatives Conference Report on the Act, provides that “[in] considering equivalency in category 2 advanced degrees, it is anticipated that the alien must have a bachelor’s degree with at least five years progressive experience in the professions.” H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 955, 101<sup>st</sup> Cong., 2<sup>nd</sup> Sess. 1990, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6784, 1990 WL 201613 at 6786 (Oct. 26, 1990).

At the time of enactment of section 203(b)(2) of the Act in 1990, it had been almost thirteen years since *Matter of Shah* was issued. Congress is presumed to have intended a four-year degree when it stated that an alien “must have a bachelor’s degree” when considering equivalency for second preference immigrant visas. The AAO must assume that Congress was aware of the agency’s previous treatment of a “bachelor’s degree” under the Act when the new classification was enacted and did not intend to alter the agency’s interpretation of that term. *See Lorillard v. Pons*, 434 U.S. 575, 580-81 (1978) (Congress is presumed to be aware of administrative and judicial interpretations where it adopts a new law incorporating sections of a prior law). In fact, the Senate Conference Report for the Act presumes that a baccalaureate is a “4-year course of undergraduate study.” S. Rep. No. 101-55 at 20 (1989). *See also* 56 Fed. Reg. 60897, 60900 (Nov. 29, 1991) (an alien must have at least a bachelor’s degree).

In 1991, when the final rule for 8 C.F.R. § 204.5 was published in the Federal Register, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (the Service), responded to criticism that the regulation required an alien to have a bachelor’s degree as a minimum and that the regulation did not allow for the substitution of experience for education. After reviewing section 121 of the Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-649 (1990), and the Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference, the Service specifically noted that both the Act and the legislative history indicate that an alien must have at least a bachelor’s degree:

The Act states that, in order to qualify under the second classification, alien members of the professions must hold “advanced degrees or their equivalent.” As the legislative history . . . indicates, the equivalent of an advanced degree is “a bachelor’s degree with at least five years progressive experience in the professions.” Because neither the Act nor its legislative history indicates that bachelor’s or advanced degrees must be United States degrees, the Service will recognize foreign equivalent degrees. But both the Act and its legislative history make clear that, in order to qualify as a professional under the third classification or to have experience equating to an advanced degree under the second, *an alien must have at least a bachelor’s degree.*

56 Fed. Reg. 60897, 60900 (Nov. 29, 1991) (emphasis added).

There is no provision in the statute or the regulations that would allow a beneficiary to qualify under section 203(b)(2) of the Act as a member of the professions holding an advanced degree with anything less than a full baccalaureate degree (plus the requisite five years of progressive post baccalaureate experience in the specialty). More specifically, a three-year bachelor's degree will not be considered to be the "foreign equivalent degree" to a United States baccalaureate degree. *Matter of Shah*, 17 I&N Dec. at 245. Where the analysis of the beneficiary's credentials relies on work experience alone or a combination of multiple lesser degrees, the result is the "equivalent" of a bachelor's degree rather than a "foreign equivalent degree."<sup>5</sup> In order to have experience and education equating to an advanced degree under section 203(b)(2) of the Act, the beneficiary must have a single degree that is the "foreign equivalent degree" to a United States baccalaureate degree (plus the requisite five years of progressive experience in the specialty). 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k)(2).

The degree must also be from a college or university. Specifically, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k)(3)(i)(B) requires the submission of an "official academic record showing that the alien has a United States baccalaureate degree or a foreign equivalent degree" (plus evidence of five years of progressive experience in the specialty). For classification as a member of the professions, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(l)(3)(ii)(C) requires the submission of "an official college or university record showing the date the baccalaureate degree was awarded and the area of concentration of study." The AAO cannot conclude that the evidence required to demonstrate that an alien is an advanced degree professional is any less than the evidence required to show that the alien is a professional. To do so would undermine the congressionally mandated classification scheme by allowing a lesser evidentiary standard for the more restrictive visa classification. *Silverman v. Eastrich Multiple Investor Fund, L.P.*, 51 F. 3d 28, 31 (3<sup>rd</sup> Cir. 1995) *quoted in APWU v. Potter*, 343 F.3d 619, 626 (2<sup>nd</sup> Cir. Sep 15, 2003) (the basic tenet of statutory construction, to give effect to all provisions, is equally applicable to regulatory construction).

Moreover, the commentary accompanying the proposed advanced degree professional regulation specifically states that a "baccalaureate means a bachelor's degree received *from a college or university*, or an equivalent degree." (Emphasis added.) 56 Fed. Reg. 30703, 30306 (July 5, 1991). Compare 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k)(3)(ii)(A) (relating to aliens of exceptional ability requiring the submission of "an official academic record showing that the alien has a degree, *diploma, certificate or similar award* from a college, university, *school or other institution of learning* relating to the area of exceptional ability").

The director stated in his decision that a three year bachelor's degree in statistics from India was not the foreign equivalent to a bachelor's degree in computer science from an accredited institution of

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<sup>5</sup> Compare 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(D)(5) (defining for purposes of a nonimmigrant visa classification, the "equivalence to completion of a college degree" as including, in certain cases, a specific combination of education and experience). The regulations pertaining to the immigrant classification sought in this matter do not contain similar language.

higher learning in the United States. On appeal, counsel asserts on behalf of the petitioner that the beneficiary's Master of Science degree from the Sardar Patel University constitutes a foreign equivalent degree to a U.S. academic or professional degree above the baccalaureate level.

The petitioner submitted a credentials evaluation, dated February 6, 2001 from [REDACTED] for the Foundation for International Services. The evaluation describes the beneficiary's diplomas from Sardar Patel University located in Vallabh Vidyanagar, India, as a bachelor of science degree in statistics, which is the equivalent to three years of university-level credit in statistics from an accredited college or university in the United States; a diploma from Sardar Patel University in India as a master's degree in statistics, which is the equivalent to a master's degree in statistics from an accredited college or university in the United States; and a post-bachelor diploma from Sardar Patel University in computer science and is the equivalent to a bachelor's degree in computer science from an accredited college or university in the United States. The evaluation concludes that the beneficiary has the equivalent of a bachelor's degree in computer science and a master's degree in statistics from an accredited college or university in the United States. The AAO notes that the evaluator does not go into great detail as to how she reached her conclusions. USCIS uses an evaluation by a credentials evaluation organization of a person's foreign education as an advisory opinion only. Where an evaluation is not in accord with previous equivalencies or is in any way questionable, it may be discounted or given less weight. *Matter of Sea, Inc.*, 19 I&N Dec. 817 (Comm. 1988).

Furthermore, according to its website, AACRAO, which created EDGE is "a nonprofit, voluntary, professional association of more than 11,000 higher education admissions and registration professionals who represent approximately 2,600 institutions and agencies in the United States and in over 40 countries." See <http://www.aacrao.org/About-AACRAO.aspx> (accessed May 29, 2012 and incorporated into the record of proceeding). Its mission "is to provide professional development, guidelines and voluntary standards to be used by higher education officials regarding the best practices in records management, admissions, enrollment management, administrative information technology and student services." *Id.* In *Confluence Intern., Inc. v. Holder*, 2009 WL 825793 (D. Minn. March 27, 2009), a federal district court determined that the AAO provided a rational explanation for its reliance on information provided by AACRAO to support its decision.

According to the login page, EDGE is "a web-based resource for the evaluation of foreign educational credentials" that is continually updated and revised by staff and members of AACRAO. [REDACTED] "AACRAO EDGE Login." <http://aacraoedge.aacrao.org/index.php> (accessed May 29, 2012 and incorporated into the record of proceeding). In *Tisco Group, Inc. v. Napolitano*, 2010 WL 3464314 (E.D.Mich. August 30, 2010), a federal district court found that USCIS had properly weighed the evaluations submitted and the information obtained from EDGE to conclude that the alien's three-year foreign "baccalaureate" and foreign "Master's" degree were comparable to a U.S. bachelor's degree. In *Sunshine Rehab Services, Inc.*, 2010 WL 3325442 (E.D.Mich. August 20, 2010), a federal district court upheld a USCIS conclusion that the alien's three-year bachelor's degree was not a foreign equivalent degree to a U.S. bachelor's degree. Specifically, the court concluded that USCIS was entitled to prefer the information in EDGE and did not abuse its discretion in reaching its conclusion. The court also

noted that the labor certification itself required a degree and did not allow for the combination of education and experience. The reasoning in these decisions is persuasive.

USCIS may, in its discretion, use as advisory opinions statements submitted as expert testimony. However, where an opinion is not in accord with other information or is in any way questionable, USCIS is not required to accept or may give less weight to that evidence. *Matter of Caron International*, 19 I&N Dec. 791, 795 (Comm'r 1988); *Matter of Sea, Inc.*, 19 I&N Dec. 817, 820 (Comm'r 1988).

According to EDGE, the beneficiary's Indian master's degree is comparable to a U.S. bachelor's degree, not to a U.S. master's degree. Therefore, in order to be classified as an advanced degree professional, and to meet the requirements of the Form ETA 750, the beneficiary must have five years of progressive work experience. The record, however, does not contain evidence of this progressive experience. 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(1). The record also does not establish that the beneficiary's master's degree in statistics is equivalent to a U.S. bachelor's degree in computer science.

Because the beneficiary has neither (1) a U.S. degree above a baccalaureate or a foreign equivalent degree in computer science nor (2) a U.S. baccalaureate degree or foreign equivalent degree in computer science and five years of progressive experience in the specialty, the beneficiary does not qualify for preference visa classification as an advanced degree professional under section 203(b)(2) of the Act.

Moreover, when determining whether a beneficiary is eligible for a preference immigrant visa, USCIS may not ignore a term of the alien labor certification, nor may it impose additional requirements. *See Madany*, 696 F.2d at 1015. USCIS must examine "the language of the labor certification job requirements" in order to determine what the job requires. *Id.* The only rational manner by which USCIS can be expected to interpret the meaning of terms used to describe the requirements of a job in an alien labor certification is to examine the certified job offer *exactly* as it is completed by the prospective employer. *See Rosedale Linden Park Company v. Smith*, 595 F. Supp. 829, 833 (D.D.C. 1984) (emphasis added). USCIS's interpretation of the job's requirements, as stated on the alien labor certification must involve reading and applying *the plain language* of the alien labor certification application form. *See id.* at 834. USCIS cannot and should not reasonably be expected to look beyond the plain language of the alien labor certification that DOL has formally issued or otherwise attempt to divine the employer's intentions through some sort of reverse engineering of the alien labor certification.

Regarding the minimum level of education and experience required for the proffered position in this matter, Part A of the alien labor certification reflects the following requirements:

Block 14:

Education: M.S. or B.S. degree with five years of experience in computer science

Experience: 5 years in the job offered

Block 15: Experience The candidate must have proficiency in Visual Basic, Oracle, SQL Server, HTML/DHTML, Visual Basic/Javascript and ASP, Microsoft certification preferred.

For the reasons stated above, the beneficiary does not have the education and experience required for the job as specified on the alien labor certification.

The beneficiary does not have a "United States baccalaureate degree or a foreign equivalent degree," and five years of progressive experience, and, thus, does not qualify for preference visa classification under section 203(b)(2) of the Act. Accordingly, even if the AAO were to accept counsel's claims with respect to the beneficiary's educational qualifications, the record demonstrates that the petitioner has failed to establish its ability to pay the proffered wage. For these reasons, considered both in sum and as separate grounds for denial, the petition may not be approved.

The burden of proof in these proceedings rests solely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The petitioner has not met that burden.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed.