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U.S. Department of Homeland Security  
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services  
Administrative Appeals Office (AAO)  
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., MS 2090  
Washington, DC 20529-2090



U.S. Citizenship  
and Immigration  
Services

B5



DATE: **MAY 11 2012** Office: NEBRASKA SERVICE CENTER

FILE:

IN RE: Petitioner:   
Beneficiary:

PETITION: Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as a Member of the Professions Holding an Advanced Degree or an Alien of Exceptional Ability Pursuant to Section 203(b)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(2)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:



INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied by us in reaching our decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. The specific requirements for filing such a request can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$630. Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires that any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,

Perry Rhew  
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The preference visa petition was denied by the Director, Nebraska Service Center, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner is an ornamental plant nursery business. It seeks to permanently employ the beneficiary in the United States as a horticulturist/soil and plant scientist. As required by statute, the petition is accompanied by a Form ETA 750, Application for Alien Employment Certification, approved by the United States Department of Labor (DOL). The director determined that the petitioner had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage beginning on the priority date of the visa petition. The director denied the petition accordingly.

The record shows that the appeal is properly filed, timely and makes a specific allegation of error in law or fact. The procedural history in this case is documented by the record and incorporated into the decision. Further elaboration of the procedural history will be made only as necessary.

As set forth in the director's November 2, 2009 denial, the issue in this case is whether the petitioner has established its ability to pay the proffered wage as of the priority date and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence.

The regulation 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) states in pertinent part:

*Ability of prospective employer to pay wage.* Any petition filed by or for an employment-based immigrant which requires an offer of employment must be accompanied by evidence that the prospective United States employer has the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner must demonstrate this ability at the time the priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. Evidence of this ability shall be either in the form of copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements.

The petitioner must demonstrate the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, which is the date the Form ETA 750 was accepted for processing by any office within the employment system of the DOL. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(d). The petitioner must also demonstrate that, on the priority date, the beneficiary had the qualifications stated on its Form ETA 750 as certified by the DOL and submitted with the instant petition. *Matter of Wing's Tea House*, 16 I&N Dec. 158 (Act. Reg. Comm. 1977).

Here, the Form ETA 750 was accepted on May 1, 2001. The proffered wage as stated on the Form ETA 750 is \$44,430.00 per year. The Form ETA 750 states that the position requires a master's degree in horticulture and three years of experience in the job offered or three years of experience in a related occupation.

The AAO conducts appellate review on a *de novo* basis. *See Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004). The AAO considers all pertinent evidence in the record, including new evidence properly submitted upon appeal.<sup>1</sup>

The evidence in the record of proceeding shows that the petitioner is structured as a sole proprietorship. On the petition, the petitioner claimed to have been established on March 23, 1994 and to currently employ 1 worker. On the Form ETA 750B dated July 22, 2002, the beneficiary claims to have been employed by the petitioner since September 1997.

The petitioner must establish that its job offer to the beneficiary is a realistic one. Because the filing of a Form ETA 750 establishes a priority date for any immigrant petition later based on the Form ETA 750, the petitioner must establish that the job offer was realistic as of the priority date and that the offer remained realistic for each year thereafter, until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. The petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is an essential element in evaluating whether a job offer is realistic. *See Matter of Great Wall*, 16 I&N Dec. 142 (Acting Reg. Comm. 1977); *see also* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2). In evaluating whether a job offer is realistic, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) requires the petitioner to demonstrate financial resources sufficient to pay the beneficiary's proffered wages, although the totality of the circumstances affecting the petitioning business will be considered if the evidence warrants such consideration. *See Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (Reg. Comm. 1967).

In determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage during a given period, USCIS will first examine whether the petitioner employed and paid the beneficiary during that period. If the petitioner establishes by documentary evidence that it employed the beneficiary at a salary equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the evidence will be considered *prima facie* proof of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage.

The petitioner submitted on appeal a copy of IRS Forms W-2 allegedly issued by the petitioner to the beneficiary as shown below:

- In 2001, the Form W-2 stated total wages of \$29,000.00.
- In 2002, the Form W-2 stated total wages of \$29,000.00.
- In 2003, the Form W-2 stated total wages of \$29,000.00.
- In 2004, the Form W-2 stated total wages of \$29,000.00.
- In 2005, the Form W-2 stated total wages of \$29,000.00.
- In 2006, the Form W-2 stated total wages of \$29,000.00.
- In 2007, the Form W-2 stated total wages of \$29,000.00.
- In 2008, the Form W-2 stated total wages of \$32,857.50.

If, as in this case, the petitioner does not establish that it employed and paid the beneficiary an amount at least equal to the proffered wage during that period, USCIS will next examine the net

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<sup>1</sup> The submission of additional evidence on appeal is allowed by the instructions to the Form I-290B, which are incorporated into the regulations at 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(1).

income figure reflected on the petitioner's federal income tax return, without consideration of depreciation or other expenses. *River Street Donuts, LLC v. Napolitano*, 558 F.3d 111 (1<sup>st</sup> Cir. 2009); *Taco Especial v. Napolitano*, 696 F. Supp. 2d 873 (E.D. Mich. 2010), *aff'd*, No. 10-1517 (6th Cir. filed Nov. 10, 2011). Reliance on federal income tax returns as a basis for determining a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is well established by judicial precedent. *Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava*, 632 F. Supp. 1049, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (citing *Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman*, 736 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1984)); *see also Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh*, 719 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Texas 1989); *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); *Ubeda v. Palmer*, 539 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982), *aff'd*, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983). Reliance on the petitioner's gross receipts and wage expense is misplaced. Showing that the petitioner's gross receipts exceeded the proffered wage is insufficient. Similarly showing that the petitioner paid wages in excess of the proffered wage is insufficient.

A sole proprietorship is a business in which one person operates the business in his or her personal capacity. Black's Law Dictionary 1398 (7th Ed. 1999). Unlike a corporation, a sole proprietorship is not legally separate from its owner. Therefore, the sole proprietor's income, liquefiable assets, and personal liabilities are also considered as part of the petitioner's ability to pay. Sole proprietors report income and expenses from their businesses on their individual (Form 1040) federal tax return each year. The business-related income and expenses are reported on Schedule C (or, if a farm, Schedule F) and are carried forward to the first page of the tax return. Where the sole proprietor is unincorporated, the gross income is taken from the IRS Form 1040, line 33, 35 and 37, respectively. Sole proprietors must show that they can cover their existing business expenses as well as pay the proffered wage. In addition, they must show that they can sustain themselves and their dependents. *Ubeda v. Palmer*, 539 F. Supp. 647, *aff'd*, 703 F.2d 571.

In *Ubeda*, 539 F. Supp. at 650, the court concluded that it was highly unlikely that a petitioning entity structured as a sole proprietorship could support himself, his spouse and five dependents on a gross income of slightly more than \$20,000 where the beneficiary's proposed salary was \$6,000 or approximately thirty percent (30%) of the petitioner's gross income.

In the instant case, the sole proprietor's IRS Forms 1040 reflect his adjusted gross income (AGI) as follows:

- In 2001, the proprietor's IRS Form 1040 stated AGI of -\$18,678.00.
- In 2002, the proprietor's IRS Form 1040 stated AGI of -\$39,531.00.
- In 2003, the proprietor's IRS Form 1040 stated AGI of -\$30,392.00.
- In 2004, the proprietor's IRS Form 1040 stated AGI of -\$61,368.00.
- In 2005, the proprietor's IRS Form 1040 stated AGI of -\$67,056.00.
- In 2006, the proprietor's IRS Form 1040 stated AGI of -\$38,140.00.
- In 2007, the proprietor's IRS Form 1040 stated AGI of -\$15,974.00.
- In 2008, the proprietor's IRS Form 1040 stated AGI of \$873.00.

Therefore, the sole proprietor has failed to establish his ability to pay the proffered wage as of the priority date. Even if the petitioner's AGI amounts exceeded the proffered wage amounts, the sole proprietor must show that he can sustain himself and his dependents by listing his personal household expenses. *See Ubeda v. Palmer, supra.*

With respect to the sole proprietor's personal expenses, the petitioner listed his annual household expenses for July to December 2008 and January through June 2009, which when averaged are \$928.00 per month.

On appeal, counsel asserts that the petitioner's personal assets including: net current assets, bank account balances, real estate values, business crop and inventory, business machinery and equipment, and business motor vehicles, should be taken into consideration in determining his ability to pay the proffered wage.

The petitioner submitted as evidence a copy of its Certificate of Deposit (CD) Maturity Notice from [REDACTED] dated November 21, 2009 which shows an available balance of \$103,543.68. The bank statement also shows that the CD account was opened June 3, 2006. Although this is evidence of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage in 2006 and thereafter, the documentation is insufficient to demonstrate the ability of the petitioner to pay the proffered wage beginning in 2001.

On appeal, counsel asserts that the balances (cash on hand) in the sole proprietor's business checking accounts are sufficient to demonstrate his ability to pay the proffered wage. Counsel provides a copy of business checking account statements. The petitioner's reliance on the balances in the business bank account is misplaced. First, business checking account bank statements are not among the three types of evidence, enumerated in 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2), required to illustrate a petitioner's ability to pay a proffered wage. While this regulation allows additional material "in appropriate cases," the sole proprietor in this case has not demonstrated why the documentation specified at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) is inapplicable or otherwise paints an inaccurate financial picture of the petitioner. Second, no evidence was submitted to demonstrate that the funds reported on the business checking account bank statements somehow reflect additional available funds that were not reflected on these tax returns. These funds are likely shown on Schedule C of the sole proprietor's tax returns as gross receipts and expenses.

Counsel asserts that the petitioner's line of credit should be taken into consideration in accessing the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. Contrary to counsel's assertions, in calculating the ability to pay the proffered wage, USCIS will not augment the petitioner's net income or net current assets by adding in its credit limits, bank lines, or lines of credit. A "bank line" or "line of credit" is a bank's unenforceable commitment to make loans to a particular borrower up to a specified maximum during a specified time period. A line of credit is not a contractual or legal obligation on the part of the bank. *See Barron's Dictionary of Finance and Investment Terms*, 45 (1998).

Since the line of credit is a “commitment to loan” and not an existent loan, the petitioner has not established that the unused funds from the line of credit are available at the time of filing the petition. A petitioner must establish eligibility at the time of filing; a petition cannot be approved at a future date after the petitioner becomes eligible under a new set of facts. *See Matter of Katigbak*, 14 I&N Dec. 45, 49 (Comm. 1971). Moreover, the petitioner’s existent loans will be reflected in the balance sheet provided in the tax return or audited financial statement and will be fully considered in the evaluation of the petitioner’s net current assets. Comparable to the limit on a credit card, the line of credit cannot be treated as cash or as a cash asset. However, if the petitioner wishes to rely on a line of credit as evidence of ability to pay, the petitioner must submit documentary evidence, such as a detailed business plan and audited cash flow statements, to demonstrate that the line of credit will augment and not weaken its overall financial position. Finally, USCIS will give less weight to loans and debt as a means of paying salary since the debts will increase the firm’s liabilities and will not improve its overall financial position. Although lines of credit and debt are an integral part of any business operation, USCIS must evaluate the overall financial position of a petitioner to determine whether the employer is making a realistic job offer and has the overall financial ability to satisfy the proffered wage. *See Matter of Great Wall*, 16 I&N Dec. 142 (Acting Reg. Comm. 1977).

The petitioner submits unaudited financial statements (profit and loss statements) for 2006, 2007, and 2008. The petitioner’s reliance on unaudited financial records is misplaced. The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) makes clear that where a petitioner relies on financial statements to demonstrate its ability to pay the proffered wage, those financial statements must be audited. As there is no accountant’s report accompanying these statements, the AAO cannot conclude that they are audited statements. Unaudited financial statements are the representations of management. The unsupported representations of management are not reliable evidence and are insufficient to demonstrate the ability to pay the proffered wage. Regardless, these statements do not cover the petitioner’s financial status in 2001 through 2005. Furthermore, the financial statements only show a part of the overall picture.

The petitioner submitted on appeal copies of a quitclaim deed, property reports, and a warranty deed of land owned by the sole proprietor. Counsel infers that the value of the sole proprietor’s real property should be considered in determining his ability to pay the proffered wage. Contrary to counsel’s claim, real estate is not a readily liquefiable asset. Further, it is unlikely that the sole proprietor would sell such significant assets to pay the beneficiary’s wage. It is speculative to claim that funds from the sale of real property would be available specifically to be used to pay the proffered wage. *See Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)). Further, any funds which may be generated from the sale of any of the real property would only be available at some point in the future. A petitioner must establish its ability to pay from the date of the priority date, which in this case is May 1, 2001. A petition cannot be approved at a future date after eligibility is established under a new set of facts. *Matter of Katigbak*, 14 I&N Dec. 45, 49 (Comm. 1971).

Counsel asserts on appeal that the beneficiary, as an employee, has played a major role in the growth of the petitioner’s business which in effect offsets and will continue to offset the

beneficiary's wages. However, in this instance, no detail or documentation has been provided to explain how the beneficiary's employment as a horticulturist has and will significantly increase the sole proprietor's profits or cause the business to grow. This hypothesis cannot be concluded to outweigh the evidence presented in the petitioner's Form 1040 tax returns. Against the projection of future earnings, *Matter of Great Wall*, 16 I&N Dec. 142, 144-145 (Acting Reg. Comm. 1977) states:

I do not feel, nor do I believe the Congress intended, that the petitioner, who admittedly could not pay the offered wage at the time the petition was filed, should subsequently become eligible to have the petition approved under a new set of facts hinged upon probability and projections, even beyond the information presented on appeal.

Counsel's assertions and the evidence presented on appeal cannot be concluded to outweigh the evidence of record that demonstrates that the petitioner could not pay the proffered wage from the day the Form ETA 750 was accepted for processing by the DOL.

USCIS may consider the overall magnitude of the petitioner's business activities in its determination of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. *See Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612. The petitioning entity in *Sonogawa* had been in business for over 11 years and routinely earned a gross annual income of about \$100,000. During the year in which the petition was filed in that case, the petitioner changed business locations and paid rent on both the old and new locations for five months. There were large moving costs and also a period of time when the petitioner was unable to do regular business. The Regional Commissioner determined that the petitioner's prospects for a resumption of successful business operations were well established. The petitioner was a fashion designer whose work had been featured in *Time* and *Look* magazines. Her clients included Miss Universe, movie actresses, and society matrons. The petitioner's clients had been included in the lists of the best-dressed California women. The petitioner lectured on fashion design at design and fashion shows throughout the United States and at colleges and universities in California. The Regional Commissioner's determination in *Sonogawa* was based in part on the petitioner's sound business reputation and outstanding reputation as a couturiere. As in *Sonogawa*, USCIS may, at its discretion, consider evidence relevant to the petitioner's financial ability that falls outside of a petitioner's net income and net current assets. USCIS may consider such factors as the number of years the petitioner has been doing business, the established historical growth of the petitioner's business, the overall number of employees, the occurrence of any uncharacteristic business expenditures or losses, the petitioner's reputation within its industry, whether the beneficiary is replacing a former employee or an outsourced service, or any other evidence that USCIS deems relevant to the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage.

In this matter, the totality of the circumstances does not establish that the petitioner had or has the ability to pay the proffered wage beginning in 2001. There are no facts paralleling those found in *Sonogawa* that are present in the instant matter to a degree sufficient to establish that the petitioner had the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner has not demonstrated the occurrence of any uncharacteristic business expenditures or losses in the relevant years. The

petitioner infers that he has been in business since 1994 and that he anticipates a steady increase in his income. Reliance on the petitioner's future receipts and wage expense is misplaced. Showing that the petitioner's gross receipts are expected to exceed the proffered wage is insufficient. The petitioner has not shown through professionally prepared audited financial documents that the anticipated increase in income will be significant enough to allow it to pay the beneficiary's wage. Regardless, future projections of increased income are insufficient to demonstrate the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage beginning in 2001. Overall, the record is not persuasive in establishing that the job offer was realistic in the relevant years.

Beyond the decision of the director, under 20 C.F.R. §§ 626.20(c)(8) and 656.3, the petitioner has the burden when asked to show that a valid employment relationship exists, that a *bona fide* job opportunity is available to U.S. workers. See *Matter of Amger Corp.*, 87-INA-545 (BALCA 1987). A relationship invalidating a *bona fide* job offer may arise where the beneficiary is related to the petitioner by "blood" or it may "be financial, by marriage, or through friendship." See *Matter of Sunmart 374*, 00-INA-93 (BALCA May 15, 2000). It appears that the petitioner and beneficiary may be in a familial or financial relationship that could preclude the existence of a valid employment relationship. They share the same family name, and the beneficiary appears from the addresses in the record to live with the sole proprietor. Accordingly, if the appeal were not being dismissed for reasons set forth herein, this would call into question the bona fides of the job offer.

The burden of proof in these proceedings rests solely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The petitioner has not met that burden.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed.