






U.S. Citizenship  
and Immigration  
Services

(b)(6)



DATE: **JAN 28 2013** OFFICE: NEBRASKA SERVICE CENTER

FILE: 

IN RE: Petitioner:  
Beneficiary: 

PETITION: Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as a Member of the Professions Holding an Advanced Degree or an Alien of Exceptional Ability Pursuant to Section 203(b)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(2).

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:

SELF-REPRESENTED

INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the AAO inappropriately applied the law in reaching its decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen in accordance with the instructions on Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$630. The specific requirements for filing such a motion can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. **Do not file any motion directly with the AAO.** Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires any motion to be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,

Ron Rosenberg  
Acting Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The Director, Nebraska Service Center (director), denied the employment-based immigrant visa petition. The petitioner appealed the decision to the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO). The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner describes itself as a garment wholesale company. It seeks to permanently employ the beneficiary in the United States as a marketing specialist. The petitioner requests classification of the beneficiary as a Member of the Professions Holding an Advanced Degree or an Alien of Exceptional Ability Pursuant to Section 203(b)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(2).

The petition is accompanied by an ETA Form 9089, Application for Permanent Employment Certification certified by the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL). The priority date of the petition, which is the date the DOL accepted the labor certification for processing, is March 15, 2011. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(d).

The director's decision denying the petition concludes that the beneficiary did not possess the minimum experience required to perform the offered position by the priority date. Further, the director concluded that the experience letter for [REDACTED] was unacceptable because an investigation revealed that the corporation ceased operation in 1999. Therefore, it would have been impossible for the beneficiary to have gained the required five years of experience with [REDACTED] from 1997 to 2002 as claimed in the ETA Form 9089.

The record shows that the appeal is properly filed and makes a specific allegation of error in law or fact. The procedural history in this case is documented by the record and incorporated into the decision. Further elaboration of the procedural history will be made only as necessary.

The AAO conducts appellate review on a *de novo* basis. See *Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004). The AAO considers all pertinent evidence in the record, including new evidence properly submitted upon appeal.<sup>1</sup>

The beneficiary must meet all of the requirements of the offered position set forth on the labor certification by the priority date of the petition. 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(1), (12). See *Matter of Wing's Tea House*, 16 I&N Dec. 158, 159 (Act. Reg. Comm. 1977); see also *Matter of Katigbak*, 14 I&N Dec. 45, 49 (Reg. Comm. 1971).

In evaluating the labor certification to determine the required qualifications for the position, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) may not ignore a term of the labor certification, nor may it impose additional requirements. See *Matter of Silver Dragon Chinese Restaurant*, 19 I&N Dec. 401, 406 (Comm'r 1986). See also, *Madany v. Smith*, 696 F.2d 1008 (D.C. Cir. 1983); *K.R.K. Irvine, Inc. v. Landon*, 699 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1983); *Stewart Infra-Red Commissary of Massachusetts, Inc. v. Coomey*, 661 F.2d 1 (1<sup>st</sup> Cir. 1981).

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<sup>1</sup> The submission of additional evidence on appeal is allowed by the instructions to the Form I-290B, which are incorporated into the regulations by 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(1).

Where the job requirements in a labor certification are not otherwise unambiguously prescribed, e.g., by regulation, USCIS must examine “the language of the labor certification job requirements” in order to determine what the petitioner must demonstrate about the beneficiary’s qualifications. *Madany*, 696 F.2d at 1015. The only rational manner by which USCIS can be expected to interpret the meaning of terms used to describe the requirements of a job in a labor certification is to “examine the certified job offer *exactly* as it is completed by the prospective employer.” *Rosedale Linden Park Company v. Smith*, 595 F. Supp. 829, 833 (D.D.C. 1984)(emphasis added). USCIS’s interpretation of the job’s requirements, as stated on the labor certification must involve “reading and applying *the plain language* of the [labor certification].” *Id.* at 834 (emphasis added). USCIS cannot and should not reasonably be expected to look beyond the plain language of the labor certification or otherwise attempt to divine the employer’s intentions through some sort of reverse engineering of the labor certification.

The labor certification states that the beneficiary qualifies for the offered position based on experience as a marketing manager with [REDACTED] in the Philippines from January 1, 1997 until February 28, 2002. The beneficiary signed the labor certification under a declaration that the contents are true and correct under penalty of perjury.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(1) states:

Specific requirements for initial supporting documents for the various employment-based immigrant classifications are set forth in this section. In general, ordinary legible photocopies of such documents (except for labor certifications from the Department of Labor) will be acceptable for initial filing and approval. However, at the discretion of the director, original documents may be required in individual cases. Evidence relating to qualifying experience or training shall be in the form of letter(s) from current or former employer(s) or trainer(s) and shall include the name, address, and title of the writer, and a specific description of the duties performed by the alien or of the training received. If such evidence is unavailable, other documentation relating to the alien’s experience or training will be considered.

*Matter of Ho*, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591-592 (BIA 1988), states:

Doubt cast on any aspect of the petitioner’s proof may, of course, lead to a reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining evidence offered in support of the visa petition...[i]t is incumbent upon the petitioner to resolve the inconsistencies by independent objective evidence. Attempts to explain or reconcile the conflicting accounts, absent competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth, in fact, lies, will not suffice.

The director noted an inconsistency in the experience letter from [REDACTED] concerning its claim that the beneficiary was employed with the company from 1996 to 2002. However, an investigation of the experience letter provided that the company ceased operation in 1999. On November 16, 2011, the director sent the petitioner a request for evidence seeking an explanation for the discrepancy. On

February 7, 2012, the petitioner submitted another employment letter of explanation from the purported author of the original experience letter. However, the letter is silent concerning the director's finding that the company had ceased operation in 1999. The purported author merely claimed that as of the writing of the new letter, the company had ceased operation. The letter neither confirms nor denies the director's finding that the company ceased operation in 1999. The director reviewed the letter and found it more likely than not that the employment letter was unacceptable in establishing the beneficiary's claimed work experience and denied the Form 1-140 accordingly.

On appeal, the petitioner states [REDACTED] temporarily ceased operation on June 8, 2011, and that the director misinterpreted the new employment letter. In an attempt to establish that the beneficiary continued to be employed as a marketing manager after 1999 with [REDACTED] the petitioner provided a copy of Home Development Mutual Fund Remittances, a verification from the Filipino SSS office, a Philippine Health Insurance Corp document, old pay slips, and a sworn statement from the beneficiary.

Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm'r 1998) (citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg'l Comm'r 1972)).

The purpose of the request for evidence is to elicit further information that clarifies whether eligibility for the benefit sought has been established, as of the time the petition is filed. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 103.2(b)(8) and (12). The failure to submit requested evidence that precludes a material line of inquiry shall be grounds for denying the petition. 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(14). As in the present matter, where a petitioner has been put on notice of a deficiency in the evidence and has been given an opportunity to respond to that deficiency, the AAO will not accept evidence offered for the first time on appeal. See *Matter of Soriano*, 19 I&N Dec. 764 (BIA 1988); *Matter of Obaighena*, 19 I&N Dec. 533 (BIA 1988). If the petitioner had wanted the submitted evidence to be considered, it should have submitted the documents in response to the director's request for evidence. *Id.* Under the circumstances, the AAO need not, and does not, consider the sufficiency of the evidence submitted on appeal. Consequently, the appeal will be dismissed.

Further, even if we accepted the new evidence provided in the appeal, we have found inconsistencies and find it is more likely than not that [REDACTED] was not conducting business after 1999. For example, the evidence from home development mutual fund gives a different business address for [REDACTED]. The evidence from the Philippine Health Insurance Corp., payroll stubs, and the Filipino SSS office is handwritten or computer generated, which cannot be considered independent and objective.

Thus, we affirm the director's decision that the petitioner failed to establish that the beneficiary met the minimum requirements of the offered position set forth on the labor certification as of the priority date. Therefore, the beneficiary does not qualify for classification as an advanced degree professional under section 203(b)(2) of the Act.

Beyond the decision of the director, the petitioner has also failed to establish its ability to pay the proffered wage as of the priority date and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2).

In determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage, USCIS first examines whether the petitioner has paid the beneficiary the full proffered wage each year from the priority date. If the petitioner has not paid the beneficiary the full proffered wage each year, USCIS will next examine whether the petitioner had sufficient net income or net current assets to pay the difference between the wage paid, if any, and the proffered wage.<sup>2</sup> If the petitioner's net income or net current assets is not sufficient to demonstrate the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage, USCIS may also consider the overall magnitude of the petitioner's business activities. *See Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (Reg. Comm'r 1967).

In the instant case, the petitioner did not employ the beneficiary or pay the beneficiary the full proffered wage in 2011 and its net income and net current assets were not equal or greater to the proffered wage for 2011. Further, the petitioner failed to establish that factors similar to *Sonogawa* existed in the instant case, which would permit a conclusion that the petitioner had the ability to pay the proffered wage.

Accordingly, after considering the totality of the circumstances, the petitioner has also failed to establish its continuing ability to pay the proffered wage to the beneficiary since the priority date.

The burden of proof in these proceedings rests solely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The petitioner has not met that burden.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed.

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<sup>2</sup> *See River Street Donuts, LLC v. Napolitano*, 558 F.3d 111 (1<sup>st</sup> Cir. 2009); *Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava*, 632 F. Supp. 1049, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); *Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman*, 736 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1984)); *Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh*, 719 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Texas 1989); *K.C.P. Food Co. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); *Ubeda v. Palmer*, 539 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982), *aff'd*, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983); and *Taco Especial v. Napolitano*, 696 F. Supp. 2d 873 (E.D. Mich. 2010).