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FILE:



Office: VERMONT SERVICE CENTER

Date: 11 07 2005

IN RE:

Petitioner:

Beneficiary:




PETITION: Immigrant petition for Alien Worker as a Skilled Worker or Professional pursuant to section 203(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:



INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

  
Robert P. Wiemann, Director  
Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The preference visa petition was denied by the Director, Vermont Service Center, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner is a landscaper. It seeks to employ the beneficiary permanently in the United States as a landscaper. As required by statute, the petition is accompanied by a Form ETA 750, Application for Alien Employment Certification, approved by the Department of Labor. The director determined that the petitioner had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage beginning on the priority date of the visa petition. The director denied the petition accordingly.

On appeal, the counsel submits a brief and additional evidence.

Section 203(b)(3)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(i), provides for the granting of preference classification to qualified immigrants who are capable, at the time of petitioning for classification under this paragraph, of performing skilled labor (requiring at least two years training or experience), not of a temporary nature, for which qualified workers are not available in the United States.

The regulation 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) states in pertinent part:

*Ability of prospective employer to pay wage.* Any petition filed by or for an employment-based immigrant which requires an offer of employment must be accompanied by evidence that the prospective United States employer has the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner must demonstrate this ability at the time the priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. Evidence of this ability shall be in the form of copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements.

The petitioner must demonstrate the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, which is the date the Form ETA 750 Application for Alien Employment Certification, was accepted for processing by any office within the employment system of the U.S. Department of Labor. The petitioner must also demonstrate that, on the priority date, the beneficiary had the qualifications stated on its Form ETA 750 Application for Alien Employment Certification as certified by the U.S. Department of Labor and submitted with the instant petition. *Matter of Wing's Tea House*, 16 I&N Dec. 158 (Act. Reg. Comm. 1977).

Here, the Form ETA 750 was accepted on December 29, 1997. The proffered wage as stated on the Form ETA 750 is \$12.13 per hour (\$25,230.40 per year). The Form ETA 750 states that the position requires two years experience.

With the petition, counsel submitted the following documents: the original Form ETA 750, Application for Alien Employment Certification, approved by the Department of Labor, copies of documentation concerning the beneficiary's qualifications as well as other documentation.

Because the Director determined the evidence submitted was insufficient to demonstrate the petitioner's continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, the Vermont Service Center on March 10, 2003, requested evidence pertinent to that issue.

Consistent with 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2), the Service Center requested pertinent evidence of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date. The Service Center specifically requested:

Submit the complete U.S. federal income tax return(s), with all schedules (including Schedule L, Balance Sheet) and attachments, for your business for the period ended February 28, 1998. If your business is organized as a corporation, submit the corporate tax returns. If the business is organized as a sole proprietorship, submit the owner's individual tax return (Form 1040) as well as Schedule C relating to the business.

As an alternative, you may submit annual reports for the period ended February 28, 1998, which are accompanied by, audited or reviewed financial statements.

If your business reports income for tax purposes based upon a fiscal year, submit the appropriate evidence that relates to the date of filing.

If the beneficiary was employed by you in 1997\1998, submit copies of the beneficiary's Form W-2 Wage and Tax Statement(s) showing how much the beneficiary was paid by your business.

In response to the Request for Evidence of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, counsel submitted or resubmitted the petitioner's Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Form 1120 tax returns for years 1997 and 2002.

The tax returns demonstrated the following financial information concerning the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage of \$25,230.40 per year from the priority date.

- In 2002, the Form 1120 stated taxable income<sup>1</sup> of \$770.00.
- In 1997, the Form 1120 stated taxable income of <\$15,839.00><sup>2</sup>.

On appeal, counsel asserts:

- A) The decision of the Center Director is arbitrary, capricious, erroneous as a matter of law and against the weight of the evidence.
- B) The Petitioner has been in business since 1970 and has never missed a payroll. This evidences sufficient ability to pay the proffered wage.
- C) Wages paid of \$142,661 in 1997 and \$129,106 in 2002 is evidence that the Petitioner's tax return shows sufficient ability to pay beneficiary the proffered salary of \$22,076.00 [sic \$25,230.40] per year.
- D) Petitioner's 2002 tax return shows business profit.
- E) The Petitioner has never employed beneficiary.

<sup>1</sup> IRS Form 1120, Line 28.

<sup>2</sup> The symbols <a number> indicate a negative number, or in the context of a tax return or other financial statement, a loss, that is below zero.

Counsel also contends that *Matter of Sonogawa* is case precedent supporting its position, and that prior AAO decisions allow the assets of business owners to be considered when determining the ability to pay the proffered wage.

In determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage during a given period, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) will first examine whether the petitioner employed and paid the beneficiary during that period. If the petitioner establishes by documentary evidence that it employed the beneficiary at a salary equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the evidence will be considered *prima facie* proof of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. Here, the petitioner did not employ the beneficiary according to counsel's statement on appeal.

Alternatively, in determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage, CIS will examine the net income figure reflected on the petitioner's federal income tax return, without consideration of depreciation or other expenses. Reliance on federal income tax returns as a basis for determining a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is well established by judicial precedent. *████████ Restaurant Corp. v. Sava*, 632 F.Supp. 1049, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (citing *Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman*, 736 F.2d 1305, (9th Cir. 1984) ); see also *Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh*, 719 F.Supp. 532 (N.D. Texas 1989); *████████ Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F.Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); *Ubeda v. Palmer*, 539 F.Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982), aff'd, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983). In *████████ Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, the court held that the Service had properly relied on the petitioner's net income figure, as stated on the petitioner's corporate income tax returns, rather than the petitioner's gross income. *Supra* at 1084. The court specifically rejected the argument that the INS, now CIS, should have considered income before expenses were paid rather than net income. Finally, no precedent exists that would allow the petitioner to "add back to net cash the depreciation expense charged for the year." *Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh, Supra* at 537. See also *Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava, Supra* at 1054.

If the net income the petitioner demonstrates it had available during that period, if any, added to the wages paid to the beneficiary during the period, if any, do not equal the amount of the proffered wage or more, CIS will review the petitioner's assets. The petitioner's net current assets can be considered in the determination of the ability to pay the proffered wage especially when there is failure of the petitioner to demonstrate it has taxable income to pay the proffered wage. In the subject case, as set forth above, petitioner did not have taxable income to pay the proffered wage at any time for the years 1997 and 2002 for which petitioner's tax returns are offered for evidence.

CIS will consider *net current assets* as an alternative method of demonstrating the ability to pay the proffered wage. Net current assets are the difference between the petitioner's current assets and current liabilities.<sup>3</sup> A corporation's year-end current assets are shown on Schedule L, lines 1 through 6. That schedule is included with, as in this instance, the petitioner's filing of Form 1120 federal tax return. The petitioner's year-end current liabilities are shown on lines 16 through 18. If a corporation's end-of-year net current assets are equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the petitioner is expected to be able to pay the proffered wage.

Examining the two Form 1120 U.S. Income Tax Returns submitted by petitioner, Schedule L found in each of those returns indicates current assets never exceeded its current liabilities.

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<sup>3</sup> According to *Barron's Dictionary of Accounting Terms* 117 (3<sup>rd</sup> ed. 2000), "current assets" consist of items having (in most cases) a life of one year or less, such as cash, marketable securities, inventory and prepaid expenses. "Current liabilities" are obligations payable (in most cases) within one year, such accounts payable, short-term notes payable, and accrued expenses (such as taxes and salaries). *Id.* at 118.

- In 1997, petitioner's Form 1120 return stated current assets of \$58,176.00 and \$54,736.00 in current liabilities. Therefore, the petitioner had \$3,440.00 in current net assets for 1997. Since the proffered wage was \$25,230.40 per year, this sum is less than the proffered wage.
- In 2002, petitioner's Form 1120 return stated current assets of \$30,547.00 and \$80,616.00 in current liabilities. Therefore, the petitioner had a <\$50,069.00> in current net assets for 2002. Since the proffered wage was \$25,230.40 per year, this sum is less than the proffered wage.

Therefore, for the years 1997 and 2002, from the date the Form ETA 750 was accepted for processing by the U. S. Department of Labor, the petitioner had not established that it had the ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage at the time of filing through an examination of its current assets.

Counsel asserts in his brief accompanying the appeal that allowance should be given for depreciation expenses and the costs to purchase equipment, as is also mentioned in a letter dated February 3, 2004, submitted from an accountant. According to regulation,<sup>4</sup> copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements are the means by which petitioner's ability to pay is determined. Petitioner's counsel advocates that we ignore or add depreciation taken as a deduction in those years' tax returns to eliminate the abovementioned deficiencies. Petitioner's counsel cited no legal precedent for his position. Since depreciation is a deduction in the calculation of taxable income on tax Form 1120, this method would eliminate depreciation as a factor in the calculation of taxable income.

There is established legal precedent against counsel's contention that depreciation may be a source to pay the proffered wage. The court in *Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburg*, 719 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Tex. 1989) noted:

Plaintiffs also contend that depreciation amounts on the 1985 and 1986 returns are non-cash deductions. Plaintiffs thus request that the court *sua sponte* add back to net cash the depreciation expense charged for the year. Plaintiffs cite no legal authority for this proposition. This argument has likewise been presented before and rejected. *See Elatos*, 632 F. Supp. at 1054. [CIS] and judicial precedent support the use of tax returns and the *net income figures* in determining petitioner's ability to pay. Plaintiffs' argument that these figures should be revised by the court by adding back depreciation is without support. (Original emphasis.) *Chi-Feng* at 537.

As stated above, following established legal precedent, CIS relied on the petitioner's net income without consideration of any depreciation deductions, in its determinations of the ability to pay the proffered wage on and after the priority date.

Counsel also includes in the above assertion on appeal "costs to purchase equipment", It is clear that counsel is combining petitioner's taxable income each year with the monies expended as stated on Schedule "L" as depreciable assets. CIS will consider separately, but not in combination, the taxable income and the net current assets of a business to determine the ability of a petitioner to pay the proffered wage on the priority date.

Counsel's additive calculation cannot be concluded to outweigh the evidence presented in the two corporate tax returns as submitted by petitioner that by any test demonstrates that petitioner could not pay the proffered

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<sup>4</sup> 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2), *Supra*.

wage from the day the Form ETA 750 was accepted for processing by any office within the employment system of the Department of Labor.

Counsel relies upon *Matter of Sonogawa*. *Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (BIA 1967), relates to petitions filed during uncharacteristically unprofitable or difficult years but only in a framework of profitable or successful years. The petitioning entity in *Sonogawa* had been in business for over 11 years and routinely earned a gross annual income of about \$100,000. During the year in which the petition was filed in that case, the petitioner changed business locations and paid rent on both the old and new locations for five months. There were large moving costs and also a period of time when the petitioner was unable to do regular business. The Regional Commissioner determined that the petitioner's prospects for a resumption of successful business operations were well established. The petitioner was a fashion designer whose work had been featured in *Time* and *Look* magazines. Her clients included Miss Universe, movie actresses, and society matrons. The petitioner's clients had been included in the lists of the best-dressed California women. The petitioner lectured on fashion design at design and fashion shows throughout the United States and at colleges and universities in California. The Regional Commissioner's determination in *Sonogawa* was based in part on the petitioner's sound business reputation and outstanding reputation as a couturiere.

No unusual circumstances have been shown to exist in this case to parallel those in *Sonogawa*, nor has it been established that 1997 or 2002 were an uncharacteristically unprofitable years for the petitioner.

We reject the petitioner's assertion that the petitioner's total assets should have been considered in the determination of the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner's total assets include depreciable assets that the petitioner uses in its business. Those depreciable assets will not be converted to cash during the ordinary course of business and will not, therefore, become funds available to pay the proffered wage. Further, the petitioner's total assets must be balanced by the petitioner's liabilities. Otherwise, they cannot properly be considered in the determination of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage.

The burden of proof in these proceedings rests solely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The petitioner has not met that burden. The documentation now submitted by petitioner does not establish that petitioner had the ability to pay the proffered wage on the priority date.

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**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed.