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**U.S. Citizenship
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Services**

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FILE:



Office: VERMONT SERVICE CENTER

Date:

MAR 17 2005

EAC 03 006 51822

IN RE:

Petitioner:



Beneficiary:

PETITION: Immigrant petition for Alien Worker as a Skilled Worker or Professional pursuant to section 203(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:



INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

Robert P. Wiemann, Director
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The preference visa petition was denied by the Director, Vermont Service Center, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner is a motor vehicle repair and service company. It seeks to employ the beneficiary permanently in the United States as a mechanic. As required by statute, a Form ETA 750, Application for Alien Employment Certification approved by the Department of Labor, accompanied the petition. The director determined that the petitioner had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage beginning on the priority date of the visa petition and denied the petition accordingly.

On appeal, counsel submits a brief and no additional evidence.

Section 203(b)(3)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(i), provides for the granting of preference classification to qualified immigrants who are capable, at the time of petitioning for classification under this paragraph, of performing skilled labor (requiring at least two years training or experience), not of a temporary nature, for which qualified workers are not available in the United States.

Section 203(b)(3)(A)(ii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(ii), provides for the granting of preference classification to qualified immigrants who hold baccalaureate degrees and are members of the professions.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) states, in pertinent part:

Ability of prospective employer to pay wage. Any petition filed by or for an employment-based immigrant which requires an offer of employment must be accompanied by evidence that the prospective United States employer has the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner must demonstrate this ability at the time the priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. Evidence of this ability shall be in the form of copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements.

The petitioner must demonstrate the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, the day the Form ETA 750 was accepted for processing by any office within the employment system of the Department of Labor. *See* 8 CFR § 204.5(d). Here, the Form ETA 750 was accepted for processing on April 12, 2001. The proffered wage as stated on the Form ETA 750 is \$35,000 annually. On the Form ETA 750B, signed by the beneficiary, the beneficiary did not claim to have worked for the petitioner.

On the petition, the petitioner claimed to have been established on January 1998, to currently employ four workers but did not list gross annual income¹. In support of the petition, counsel submitted the petitioner's 2001 Form 1120S tax return, an approved Form ETA 750 labor certification application, and a Form G-28.

¹Counsel submitted, with the petition, the petitioner's 2001 tax return showing \$2.3 million in gross income.

Because the director deemed the evidence submitted insufficient to demonstrate the petitioner's continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, the director on February 28, 2003, sent a request for evidence (RFE) seeking additional evidence pertinent to that ability. In accordance with 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2), the director specifically requested that the petitioner provide copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, and any audited or reviewed financial statements to demonstrate its continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date. The RFE specifically requested copies of the Form W-2 Wage and Tax Statements provided to the beneficiary, if employed, and noted that the petitioner's 2001 Form 1120S tax return reported \$2,628 in ordinary income and \$51,059 in current liabilities.

In response, counsel submitted copies of the petitioner's Form 1120S tax returns for the years 2001 and 2002²; 2002 Form W-2s for the beneficiary;³ and a May 12, 2003 affidavit asserting that the returns and W-2s the petitioner has submitted reveal that:

- The petitioner can pay the wage as shown by the deductions for salaries, officer compensation, and depreciation amortization; and,
- Schedule L of the 2001 Form 1120S tax return overstates current liabilities and should be amended to reclassify \$41,000 of the reported \$51,059 short-term liabilities as long-term debt.

The tax returns for the noted years reflect the following information:

	<u>2001</u>	<u>2002</u>
Ordinary Income	\$2,628	\$7,273
Current Assets	\$32,333	\$55,152
Current Liabilities	\$83,392	\$110,487
Net current assets	-\$51,059	-\$35,006

In addition, counsel submitted copies of the petitioner's Forms W-2, Wage and Tax Statements the petitioner issued to the beneficiary in 2002. The Forms W-2 Wage and Tax Statements reflect wages of \$8,000, or \$27,000 less than the proffered wage.

The director determined that the evidence submitted did not establish that the petitioner had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, and, on July 25, 2003, denied the petition.

On appeal, counsel asserts that the director erred in using a test too narrow in scope to adequately determine the petitioner's ability to pay. Counsel likens the petitioner's financial circumstances to those of the employer of *In re Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec 612. *Sonogawa*, however, can only lend authority to those companies filing

² The 2002 tax return provides just enough information for the AAO to calculate the petitioner's ability that year to pay the proffered wage.

³ The May 12, 2003 affidavit asserts the beneficiary has worked part time for the petitioner since April 2002.

visa petitions experiencing uncharacteristically unprofitable or difficult years within the context of years of profitable or successful operations.

The petitioning entity in *Sonegawa* had been in business for over 11 years and routinely earned a gross annual income of about \$100,000. During the year of the filing, the petitioner changed business locations and paid rent on both the old and new locations for five months. There were large moving costs and also a period of time when the petitioner was unable to do regular business. The Regional Commissioner determined that the petitioner's prospects for a resumption of successful business operations were well established. The petitioner was a fashion designer whose work had been featured in *Time* and *Look* magazines. Her clients included Miss Universe, movie actresses, and society matrons. The petitioner's clients had been included in the lists of the best-dressed California women. The petitioner lectured on fashion design at design and fashion shows throughout the United States and at colleges and universities in California. The commissioner based his determination in *Sonegawa* upon that petitioner's sound business reputation and her outstanding reputation as a couturiere.

By contrast counsel has shown no unusual circumstances to parallel those in *Sonegawa*, nor has it been established that 2001 was an uncharacteristically unprofitable year for the petitioner. Counsel can only point to a two-year track record for the petitioner rather than the employer's 11-year company history in *Sonegawa*. Further, by contrast to the company's business and design reputation in *Sonegawa*, counsel has made no such similar claims for the petitioner or for the beneficiary, who has so far only worked part time for the petitioner.

Counsel, furthering expanding upon *Sonegawa*, asserts that having paid the beneficiary \$8,000, plus gross revenues of more than \$2 million, both lend support to the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage in full. Counsel indeed faults the director for failing to give due weight to assertions that depreciation deductions and officer compensation only amount to "paper deductions," particularly with the petitioner's gross revenue exceeding \$2 million in 2001 and 2002. However, a depreciation deduction, while not the result of cash spent in the year claimed, represents value lost as buildings and equipment deteriorate. Although buildings and equipment are depreciated, rather than expensed, this represents the expense of buildings and equipment spread out over a number of years. The diminution in value of buildings and equipment is an actual expense of doing business, whether it is spread over more years or concentrated into fewer. The deduction expense is an accumulation of funds necessary to replace perishable equipment and buildings, and is not available to pay wages.

In *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. at 1084, the court held that the Immigration and Naturalization Service, now CIS, had properly relied on the petitioner's net income figure, as stated on the petitioner's corporate income tax returns, rather than the petitioner's gross income. The court specifically rejected the argument that the Service should have considered income before expenses were paid rather than net income. The court in *Chi-Feng Chang* further noted:

Plaintiffs also contend that depreciation amounts on the 1985 and 1986 returns are non-cash deductions. Plaintiffs thus request that the court *sua sponte* add back to net cash the depreciation expense charged for the year. Plaintiffs cite no legal authority for this

proposition. This argument has likewise been presented before and rejected. *See Elatos*, 632 F. Supp. at 1054. [CIS] and judicial precedent support the use of tax returns and the *net income figures* in determining petitioner's ability to pay. Plaintiffs' argument that these figures should be revised by the court by adding back depreciation is without support. (Original emphasis.) *Chi-Feng* at 537.

Counsel further asserts that the director ignored the sworn assertions of the petitioner's staff accountant. The AAO may, in its discretion, use as advisory opinions statements submitted as expert testimony. However, where an opinion is not in accord with other information or is in any way questionable, the AAO is not required to accept or may give less weight to that evidence. *Matter of Caron International*, 19 I&N Dec. 791 (Comm. 1988).

In determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage during a given period, Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) will first examine whether the petitioner employed and paid the beneficiary during that period. If the petitioner establishes by documentary evidence that it employed the beneficiary at a salary equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the evidence will be considered *prima facie* proof of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. In the instant case, the petitioner did not establish that it employed and paid the beneficiary the full proffered wage in 2001.

If the petitioner does not establish that it employed and paid the beneficiary an amount at least equal to the proffered wage during that period, CIS will next examine the net income figure reflected on the petitioner's federal income tax return, without consideration of depreciation or other expenses. Reliance on federal income tax returns as a basis for determining a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is well established by judicial precedent. *Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava*, 632 F. Supp. 1049, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (citing *Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman*, 736 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1984); *see also Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh*, 719 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Texas 1989); *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); *Ubeda v. Palmer*, 539 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982), *aff'd*, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983). Showing that the petitioner's gross receipts exceeded the proffered wage is insufficient. Similarly, showing that the petitioner paid wages or officer compensation in excess of the proffered wage is insufficient. In *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. at 1084, the court held that the Immigration and Naturalization Service, now CIS, had properly relied on the petitioner's net income figure, as stated on the petitioner's corporate income tax returns, rather than the petitioner's gross income. The court specifically rejected the argument that the Service should have considered income before expenses were paid rather than net income.

Nevertheless, the petitioner's net income is not the only statistic that can be used to demonstrate a petitioner's ability to pay a proffered wage. If the net income the petitioner demonstrates it had available during that period, if any, added to the wages paid to the beneficiary during the period, if any, do not equal the amount of the proffered wage or more, CIS will review the petitioner's assets. We reject, however, counsel's argument that the petitioner's total assets should have been considered in the determination of the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner's total assets include depreciable assets that the petitioner uses in its business. Those depreciable assets will not be converted to cash during the ordinary course of business and will not, therefore, become funds available to pay the proffered wage. Further, the petitioner's total assets must be

balanced by the petitioner's liabilities. Otherwise, they cannot properly be considered in the determination of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. Rather, CIS will consider *net current assets* as an alternative method of demonstrating the ability to pay the proffered wage.

Net current assets are the difference between the petitioner's current assets and current liabilities.⁴ A corporation's year-end current assets are shown on Schedule L, lines 1(d) through 6(d). Its year-end current liabilities are shown on lines 16(d) through 18(d). If a corporation's end-of-year net current assets are equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the petitioner is expected to be able to pay the proffered wage out of those net current assets. The petitioner's net current assets during the year in question, 2001, however, were negative, as shown above. As such, the director's failure to consider the petitioner's net current assets did not prejudice the petitioner's cause.

The petitioner has not demonstrated that it paid the full proffered wage. In 2001, the petitioner shows a net income of only \$2,628, and -\$51,059 in negative net current assets, and has not, therefore, demonstrated the ability to pay the proffered wage out of its net income or net current assets. The petitioner has not demonstrated that any other funds were available to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner has not, therefore, shown the ability to pay the proffered wage during the salient portion of 2001.

Similarly, in 2002, the petitioner shows a net income of only \$7,273, and -\$35,006 in negative net current assets, and has not, therefore, demonstrated the ability to pay the proffered wage or even the difference between the part-time wages paid and the proffered wage out of its net income or net current assets. The petitioner has not demonstrated that any other funds were available to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner has not, therefore, shown the ability to pay the proffered wage during the salient portion of 2001.

The petitioner failed to submit evidence sufficient to demonstrate that it had the ability to pay the proffered wage during the salient portion of 2001 or subsequently during 2002. Therefore, the petitioner has not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date.

The burden of proof in these proceedings rests solely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The petitioner has not met that burden.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.

⁴ According to *Barron's Dictionary of Accounting Terms* 117 (3rd ed. 2000), "current assets" consist of items having (in most cases) a life of one year or less, such as cash, marketable securities, inventory and prepaid expenses. "Current liabilities" are obligations payable (in most cases) within one year, such accounts payable, short-term notes payable, and accrued expenses (such as taxes and salaries). *Id.* at 118.