


identifying data deleted to  
prevent clearly unwarranted  
invasion of personal privacy



U.S. Citizenship  
and Immigration  
Services

B6

**PUBLIC COPY**




FILE: EAC 03 266 50880 Office: VERMONT SERVICE CENTER Date: **JUL 05 2006**

IN RE: Petitioner: [Redacted]  
Beneficiary: [Redacted]

PETITION: Immigrant petition for Alien Worker as a Skilled Worker or Professional pursuant to section 203(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:



INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

Robert P. Wiemann, Chief  
Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The preference visa petition was denied by the Director, Vermont Service Center, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner is a restaurant. It seeks to employ the beneficiary permanently in the United States as a cook. As required by statute, the petition is accompanied by a Form ETA 750, Application for Alien Employment Certification, approved by the U. S. Department of Labor. The director determined that the petitioner had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage beginning on the priority date of the visa petition. The director denied the petition accordingly.

Section 203(b)(3)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(i), provides for the granting of preference classification to qualified immigrants who are capable, at the time of petitioning for classification under this paragraph, of performing skilled labor (requiring at least two years training or experience), not of a temporary nature, for which qualified workers are not available in the United States.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) states in pertinent part:

*Ability of prospective employer to pay wage.* Any petition filed by or for an employment-based immigrant which requires an offer of employment must be accompanied by evidence that the prospective United States employer has the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner must demonstrate this ability at the time the priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. Evidence of this ability shall be in the form of copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements.

The regulation at 8 CFR § 204.5(l)(3)(ii) states, in pertinent part:

(A) *General.* Any requirements of training or experience for skilled workers, professionals, or other workers must be supported by letters from trainers or employers giving the name, address, and title of the trainer or employer, and a description of the training received or the experience of the alien.

(B) *Skilled workers.* If the petition is for a skilled worker, the petition must be accompanied by evidence that the alien meets the educational, training or experience, and any other requirements of the individual labor certification, meets the requirements for Schedule A designation, or meets the requirements for the Labor Market Information Pilot Program occupation designation. The minimum requirements for this classification are at least two years of training or experience.

The petitioner must demonstrate the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, which is the date the Form ETA 750 Application for Alien Employment Certification, was accepted for processing by any office within the employment system of the U.S. Department of Labor. The petitioner must also demonstrate that, on the priority date, the beneficiary had the qualifications stated on its Form ETA 750 Application for Alien Employment Certification as certified by the U.S. Department of Labor and submitted with the instant petition. *Matter of Wing's Tea House*, 16 I&N Dec. 158 (Act. Reg. Comm. 1977).

Here, the Form ETA 750 was accepted on March 19, 2001. The proffered wage as stated on the Form ETA 750 is \$13.50 per hour (\$28,080.00 per year). The Form ETA 750 states that the position requires two years of experience.

On appeal, counsel submits a legal brief and additional evidence.

With the petition, counsel submitted copies of the following documents: the original Form ETA 750, Application for Alien Employment Certification, approved by the U.S. Department of Labor; U.S. Internal Revenue Service Form tax returns for 2000, 2001, and 2002; and, copies of documentation concerning the beneficiary's qualifications as well as other documentation.

Because the director determined the evidence submitted with the petition was insufficient to demonstrate the petitioner's continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, consistent with 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2), the director requested on June 7, 2004, pertinent evidence of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date.

The director requested evidence, among other documents, in the form of copies of business bank accounts records for 2001, and, the beneficiary's W-2 Wage and Tax Statements.

In response to the request for evidence, among other documents, counsel submitted copies of business bank accounts records for 2001.

The director denied the petition on January 4, 2005, finding that the evidence submitted did not establish that the petitioner had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date.

On appeal, counsel asserts that the case precedent of *Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (BIA 1967) is controlling in this matter based upon the factual circumstances.

Counsel has submitted the following documents to accompany the appeal statement: a legal brief; page one of the petitioner's U.S. federal tax return for 2001; a page from the 2003 tax return; and, a business bank account summary March 1, 2001 to March 30, 2001.

In determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage during a given period, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) will first examine whether the petitioner employed and paid the beneficiary during that period. If the petitioner establishes by documentary evidence that it employed the beneficiary at a salary equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the evidence will be considered *prima facie* proof of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. Evidence was submitted to show that the petitioner employed the beneficiary since October 1997 as Cook (and as an Assistant Cook from July 1995). Wage information was submitted. There are three pay statements in equal amounts of \$473.79 for three weeks pay in November 2004 as well as the beneficiary's personal tax returns indicating wages received without W-2 Wage and Tax statements to indicate their source.<sup>1</sup>

Alternatively, in determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage, CIS will examine the net income figure reflected on the petitioner's federal income tax return, without consideration of depreciation or

---

<sup>1</sup> The petitioner has submitted the beneficiary's tax returns but has not submitted proof that it paid the income reported on those returns as wages. Apparent from the returns, the beneficiary operated a catering services business that produced substantial income.

other expenses. Reliance on federal income tax returns as a basis for determining a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is well established by judicial precedent. *Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava*, 632 F.Supp. 1049, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (citing *Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman*, 736 F.2d 1305, (9th Cir. 1984) ); *see also Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh*, 719 F.Supp. 532 (N.D. Texas 1989); *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F.Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); *Ubeda v. Palmer*, 539 F.Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982), *aff'd*, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983). In *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, the court held that the Service had properly relied on the petitioner's net income figure, as stated on the petitioner's corporate income tax returns, rather than the petitioner's gross income. *Supra* at 1084. The court specifically rejected the argument that CIS should have considered income before expenses were paid rather than net income. Finally, no precedent exists that would allow the petitioner to "add back to net cash the depreciation expense charged for the year." *Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh, Supra* at 537. *See also Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava, Supra* at 1054.

The tax returns<sup>2</sup> demonstrated the following financial information concerning the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage of \$28,080.00 per year from the priority date of March 19, 2001:

- In 2001, the Form 1120S stated taxable income of \$5,534.00.
- In 2002, the Form 1120S stated taxable income of \$12,599.00.

The petitioner's net current assets can be considered in the determination of the ability to pay the proffered wage especially when there is a failure of the petitioner to demonstrate that it has taxable income to pay the proffered wage. In the subject case, as set forth above, the petitioner did not have taxable income sufficient to pay the proffered wage at any time between the years 2001 through 2002 for which the petitioner's tax returns are offered for evidence.

CIS will consider *net current assets* as an alternative method of demonstrating the ability to pay the proffered wage. Net current assets are the difference between the petitioner's current assets and current liabilities.<sup>3</sup> A corporation's year-end current assets are shown on Schedule L, lines 1 through 6. That schedule is included with, as in this instance, the petitioner's filing of Form 1120S federal tax return. The petitioner's year-end current liabilities are shown on lines 16 through 18. If a corporation's end-of-year net current assets are equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the petitioner is expected to be able to pay the proffered wage.

Examining the Form 1120S U.S. Income Tax Returns submitted by the petitioner, Schedule L found in each of those returns indicates the following:

- In 2001, petitioner's Form 1120S return<sup>4</sup> stated current assets of \$23,653.00 and \$46,258.00 in current liabilities. Therefore, the petitioner had <\$22,605.00><sup>5</sup> in net current assets. Since the proffered wage is \$28,080.00 per year, this sum is less than the proffered wage.

---

<sup>2</sup> Tax returns submitted for years prior to the priority date, have little probative value to show the ability to pay the proffered wage. In 2000, the petitioner's tax return stated a taxable income loss of <\$6,492.00>. The symbols <a number> indicate a negative number, or in the context of a tax return or other financial statement, a loss, that is below zero.

<sup>3</sup> According to *Barron's Dictionary of Accounting Terms* 117 (3<sup>rd</sup> ed. 2000), "current assets" consist of items having (in most cases) a life of one year or less, such as cash, marketable securities, inventory and prepaid expenses. "Current liabilities" are obligations payable (in most cases) within one year, such as accounts payable, short-term notes payable, and accrued expenses (such as taxes and salaries). *Id.* at 118.

<sup>4</sup> The photocopy copy received has a line through the hundreds column of the current assets and liabilities

- In 2002, petitioner's Form 1120S return stated current assets of \$6,874.00 and \$22,829.00 in current liabilities. Therefore, the petitioner had <\$15,955.00> in net current assets. Since the proffered wage is \$28,080.00 per year, this sum is less than the proffered wage.

Therefore, for the period 2001 through 2002 from the date the Form ETA 750 was accepted for processing by the U. S. Department of Labor, the petitioner had not established that it had the ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage at the time of filing through an examination of its net current assets.

Counsel asserts in his brief accompanying the appeal that there are another ways to determine the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage from the priority date. According to regulation,<sup>6</sup> copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements are the means by which petitioner's ability to pay is determined.

Counsel advocates the use of the cash balance of the two business accounts to show the ability to pay the proffered wage. Counsel's reliance on the balances in the petitioner's bank account is misplaced. First, bank statements are not among the three types of evidence, enumerated in 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2), required to illustrate a petitioner's ability to pay a proffered wage. While this regulation allows additional material "in appropriate cases," the petitioner in this case has not demonstrated why the documentation specified at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) is inapplicable or otherwise paints an inaccurate financial picture of the petitioner. Second, bank statements show the amount in an account on a given date, and cannot show the sustainable ability to pay a proffered wage. Third, no evidence was submitted to demonstrate that the funds reported on the petitioner's bank statements somehow reflect additional available funds that were not reflected on its tax return, such as the cash specified on Schedule L that will be considered below in determining the petitioner's net current assets.

In the totality of all the evidence submitted in this case, there is evidence to demonstrate that the petitioner's business was in a modestly profitable period in 2001 and 2002. For the years 2001 through 2002, the taxable income for the petitioner was \$5,534.00 and \$12,599.00 respectively. The net current asset value for those years is negative, <\$22,605.00> and <\$15,955.00> respectively for years 2001 and 2002. Therefore, the petitioner did not have sufficient funds to pay the proffered wage of \$28,080.00 per year from taxable income available or net current assets. Counsel has stated, in his well-reasoned brief in this matter, that the petitioner has employed the beneficiary since 1997, but no wage information was submitted.

Counsel cited *Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (BIA 1967). That case relates to petitions filed during uncharacteristically unprofitable or difficult years but only in a framework of profitable or successful years. The petitioning entity in *Sonogawa* had been in business for over 11 years and routinely earned a gross annual income of about \$100,000. During the year in which the petition was filed in that case, the petitioner changed business locations and paid rent on both the old and new locations for five months. There were large moving costs and also a period of time when the petitioner was unable to do regular business. The Regional Commissioner determined that the petitioner's prospects for a resumption of successful business operations were well established. The petitioner was a fashion designer whose work had been featured in *Time* and *Look* magazines. Her clients included Miss Universe, movie actresses, and society matrons. The petitioner's clients had been included in the lists of the best-dressed California women. The petitioner lectured on fashion design at design and fashion shows throughout the United States and at colleges and universities in California.

---

figures so those figures have been interpreted from the obscured copy.

<sup>5</sup> The symbols <a number> indicate a negative number, or in the context of a tax return or other financial statement, a loss, that is below zero.

<sup>6</sup> 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2).

The Regional Commissioner's determination in *Sonegawa* was based in part on the petitioner's sound business reputation and outstanding reputation as a couturiere.

Unusual and unique circumstances have not been shown to exist in this case to parallel those in *Sonegawa*, to establish that the period examined was an uncharacteristically unprofitable period for the petitioner. Counsel asserts that the gross income of the petitioner, and wages paid should be considered (as well as payroll taxes). As has been already stated above, case precedent precludes CIS from regarding these items relied upon by counsel as evidence of the ability to pay.<sup>7</sup> By the evidence presented, the petitioner has not proven its ability to pay the proffered wage.

The evidence submitted does not establish that the petitioner had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date.

Counsel's contentions cannot be concluded to outweigh the evidence presented in the corporate tax returns as submitted by petitioner that shows that the petitioner has not demonstrated its ability to pay the proffered wage from the day the Form ETA 750 was accepted for processing by any office within the employment system of the Department of Labor.

The burden of proof in these proceedings rests solely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The petitioner has not met that burden.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed.

---

<sup>7</sup> *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F.Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); *Ubeda v. Palmer*, 539 F.Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982), aff'd, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983). Wages paid and payroll taxes are expenses and once paid cannot be also used as assets. To do otherwise would be duplicative of the petitioner's finances.