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
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
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Washington, DC 20529



U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services

B6

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FILE: EAC 04 115 53981 Office: VERMONT SERVICE CENTER Date: JUL 05 2006

IN RE: Petitioner: [Redacted]
Beneficiary: [Redacted]

PETITION: Immigrant petition for Alien Worker as a Skilled Worker or Professional pursuant to section 203(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:



INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

Robert P. Wiemann, Chief
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The preference visa petition was denied by the Director, Vermont Service Center, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner is a restaurant. It seeks to employ the beneficiary permanently in the United States as a restaurant cook. As required by statute, the petition is accompanied by a Form ETA 750, Application for Alien Employment Certification, approved by the U. S. Department of Labor. The director determined that the petitioner had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage beginning on the priority date of the visa petition. The director denied the petition accordingly.

Section 203(b)(3)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(i), provides for the granting of preference classification to qualified immigrants who are capable, at the time of petitioning for classification under this paragraph, of performing skilled labor (requiring at least two years training or experience), not of a temporary nature, for which qualified workers are not available in the United States.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) states in pertinent part:

Ability of prospective employer to pay wage. Any petition filed by or for an employment-based immigrant which requires an offer of employment must be accompanied by evidence that the prospective United States employer has the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner must demonstrate this ability at the time the priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. Evidence of this ability shall be in the form of copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements.

The regulation at 8 CFR § 204.5(l)(3)(ii) states, in pertinent part:

(A) *General.* Any requirements of training or experience for skilled workers, professionals, or other workers must be supported by letters from trainers or employers giving the name, address, and title of the trainer or employer, and a description of the training received or the experience of the alien.

(B) *Skilled workers.* If the petition is for a skilled worker, the petition must be accompanied by evidence that the alien meets the educational, training or experience, and any other requirements of the individual labor certification, meets the requirements for Schedule A designation, or meets the requirements for the Labor Market Information Pilot Program occupation designation. The minimum requirements for this classification are at least two years of training or experience.

The petitioner must demonstrate the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, which is the date the Form ETA 750 Application for Alien Employment Certification, was accepted for processing by any office within the employment system of the U.S. Department of Labor. The petitioner must also demonstrate that, on the priority date, the beneficiary had the qualifications stated on its Form ETA 750 Application for Alien Employment Certification as certified by the U.S. Department of Labor and submitted with the instant petition. *Matter of Wing's Tea House*, 16 I&N Dec. 158 (Act. Reg. Comm. 1977).

Here, the Form ETA 750 was accepted on April 30, 2001.¹ The proffered wage as stated on the Form ETA 750 is \$12.57 per hour (\$26,145.60 per year). The Form ETA 750 states that the position requires 2 years experience.

On appeal, counsel submits a legal brief and additional evidence.

With the petition, counsel submitted copies of the following documents: the original Form ETA 750, Application for Alien Employment Certification, approved by the U.S. Department of Labor; U.S. Internal Revenue Service Form tax returns for 2001 and 2002; and, copies of documentation concerning the beneficiary's qualifications as well as other documentation.

The director denied the petition on September 2, 2004, finding that the evidence submitted did not establish that the petitioner had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date.

On appeal, counsel asserts that the petitioner's total assets, capital stock valuation, and "liabilities and shareholders equity" exceed the proffered wage. Further, counsel contends that there existed a balance in the petitioner's bank checking account sufficient to pay the proffered wage and cites a case decision² of the AAU, now called the AAO.

Counsel has submitted the following documents to accompany the appeal statement: a case decision from the AAO for 1994; bank statements; and, Schedule L from the petitioner's 2001 and 2002 tax returns.

In determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage during a given period, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) will first examine whether the petitioner employed and paid the beneficiary during that period. If the petitioner establishes by documentary evidence that it employed the beneficiary at a salary equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the evidence will be considered *prima facie* proof of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. No evidence was submitted to show that the petitioner employed the beneficiary.

Alternatively, in determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage, CIS will examine the net income figure reflected on the petitioner's federal income tax return, without consideration of depreciation or

¹ It has been approximately five years since the Alien Employment Application has been accepted and the proffered wage established. According to the employer certification that is part of the application, ETA Form 750 Part A, Section 23 b., states "The wage offered equals or exceeds the prevailing wage and I [the employer] guarantee that, if a labor certification is granted, the wage paid to the alien when the alien begins work will equal or exceed the prevailing wage which is applicable at the time the alien begins work."

² Counsel refers to a decision issued by the AAO concerning the ability to pay the proffered wage, and does not provide its published citation. While 8 C.F.R. § 103.3(c) provides that precedent decisions of CIS are binding on all its employees in the administration of the Act, unpublished decisions are not similarly binding. Precedent decisions must be designated and published in bound volumes or as interim decisions. 8 C.F.R. § 103.9(a). The decision cited was not a precedent decision. Precedent decision will name the parties, with a complete caption provided. The AAO reviews appeals on a de novo basis. *See Dor v. INS*, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989) It is worth emphasizing that that each petition filing is a separate proceeding with a separate record. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 103.8(d). In making a determination of statutory eligibility, CIS is limited to the information contained in the record of proceeding. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(16)(ii). Each case has its own particular factual situation and merits.

other expenses. Reliance on federal income tax returns as a basis for determining a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is well established by judicial precedent. *Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava*, 632 F.Supp. 1049, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (citing *Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman*, 736 F.2d 1305, (9th Cir. 1984)); see also *Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh*, 719 F.Supp. 532 (N.D. Texas 1989); *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F.Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); *Ubeda v. Palmer*, 539 F.Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982), aff'd, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983). In *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, the court held that the Service had properly relied on the petitioner's net income figure, as stated on the petitioner's corporate income tax returns, rather than the petitioner's gross income. *Supra* at 1084. The court specifically rejected the argument that CIS should have considered income before expenses were paid rather than net income. Finally, no precedent exists that would allow the petitioner to "add back to net cash the depreciation expense charged for the year." *Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh, Supra* at 537. See also *Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava, Supra* at 1054.

The tax returns demonstrated the following financial information concerning the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage of \$26,145.60 per year from the priority date of April 30, 2001:

- In 2001, the Form 1120S stated taxable income loss³ of <\$119,971.00>.⁴
- In 2002, the Form 1120S stated taxable income loss of <\$92,797.00>.

The petitioner's net current assets can be considered in the determination of the ability to pay the proffered wage especially when there is a failure of the petitioner to demonstrate that it has taxable income to pay the proffered wage. In the subject case, as set forth above, the petitioner did not have taxable income sufficient to pay the proffered wage at any time between the years 2001 through 2002 for which the petitioner's tax returns are offered for evidence.

CIS will consider *net current assets* as an alternative method of demonstrating the ability to pay the proffered wage. Net current assets are the difference between the petitioner's current assets and current liabilities.⁵ A corporation's year-end current assets are shown on Schedule L, lines 1 through 6. That schedule is included with, as in this instance, the petitioner's filing of Form 1120S federal tax return. The petitioner's year-end current liabilities are shown on lines 16 through 18. If a corporation's end-of-year net current assets are equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the petitioner is expected to be able to pay the proffered wage.

Examining the Form 1120S U.S. Income Tax Returns submitted by the petitioner, Schedule L found in each of those returns indicates the following:

- In 2001, petitioner's Form 1120S return stated current assets of \$46,060.00 and \$174,183.00 in current liabilities. Therefore, the petitioner had <\$128,123.00> in net current assets. Since the proffered wage is \$26,145.60 per year, this sum is less than the proffered wage.

³ IRS Form 1120S, Line 21.

⁴ The symbols <a number> indicate a negative number, or in the context of a tax return or other financial statement, a loss, that is below zero.

⁵ According to *Barron's Dictionary of Accounting Terms* 117 (3rd ed. 2000), "current assets" consist of items having (in most cases) a life of one year or less, such as cash, marketable securities, inventory and prepaid expenses. "Current liabilities" are obligations payable (in most cases) within one year, such as accounts payable, short-term notes payable, and accrued expenses (such as taxes and salaries). *Id.* at 118.

- In 2002, petitioner's Form 1120S return stated current assets of \$47,219.00 and \$225,268.00 in current liabilities. Therefore, the petitioner had <\$178,049.00> in net current assets. Since the proffered wage is \$26,145.60 per year, this sum is less than the proffered wage.

Therefore, for the period 2001 through 2003 from the date the Form ETA 750 was accepted for processing by the U. S. Department of Labor, the petitioner had not established that it had the ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage at the time of filing through an examination of its net current assets.

Counsel asserts in her brief accompanying the appeal that there are other ways to determine the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage from the priority date. According to regulation,⁶ copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements are the means by which petitioner's ability to pay is determined.

Counsel asserts that the petitioner's total assets, capital stock valuation, and "liabilities and shareholders equity" exceed the proffered wage, and, that these items are asserted as evidence of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage.

We reject the petitioner's assertion that the petitioner's total assets should have been considered in the determination of the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner's total assets include depreciable assets that the petitioner uses in its business. Those depreciable assets will not be converted to cash during the ordinary course of business and will not, therefore, become funds available to pay the proffered wage. Further, the petitioner's total assets must be balanced by the petitioner's liabilities. Otherwise, they cannot properly be considered in the determination of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage.

Capital stock and paid-in capital are not current asset items but rather the equity of the corporation as such they are unavailable to pay the proffered wage. The unsupported statements of counsel on appeal or in a motion are not evidence and thus are not entitled to any evidentiary weight. *See INS v. Phinpathya*, 464 U.S. 183, 188-89 n.6 (1984); *Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez*, 17 I&N Dec. 503 (BIA 1980).

Counsel contends that "liabilities and shareholders equity" are one of three items, two are mentioned above, that exceed the proffered wage, and, by a logical extension of counsel's blanket statement evidence of the ability to pay the proffered wage. What counsel has not also stated is how "liabilities" are assets available to pay the proffered wage, or how together "liabilities and shareholders equity" perform the same function. By case precedent, CIS and the AAO cannot consider non-corporate assets evidence of the ability to pay the proffered wage. Contrary to counsel's assertion, CIS may not "pierce the corporate veil" and look to the assets of the corporation's owner to satisfy the corporation's ability to pay the proffered wage. It is an elementary rule that a corporation is a separate and distinct legal entity from its owners and shareholders. *See Matter of M*, 8 I&N Dec. 24 (BIA 1958), *Matter of Aphrodite Investments, Ltd.*, 17 I&N Dec. 530 (Comm. 1980), and *Matter of Tessel*, 17 I&N Dec. 631 (Act. Assoc. Comm. 1980). Consequently, assets of its shareholders or of other enterprises or corporations cannot be considered in determining the petitioning corporation's ability to pay the proffered wage.

Counsel contends that there existed monthly balances in the petitioner's bank checking account sufficient to pay the proffered wage. Counsel has not explained how, if the petitioner has suffered large taxable income losses in years 2001 and 2002, (i.e. <\$119,971.00> and <\$92,797.00>), that is possible to have what counsel is contending is a positive cash reserve in its bank account available to pay the proffered wage. Counsel advocates

⁶ 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2).

the use of the cash balance of the two business accounts to show the ability to pay the proffered wage. Counsel's reliance on the balances in the petitioner's bank account is misplaced. First, bank statements are not among the three types of evidence, enumerated in 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2), required to illustrate a petitioner's ability to pay a proffered wage. While this regulation allows additional material "in appropriate cases," the petitioner in this case has not demonstrated why the documentation specified at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) is inapplicable or otherwise paints an inaccurate financial picture of the petitioner. Second, bank statements show the amount in an account on a given date, and cannot show the sustainable ability to pay a proffered wage. Third, no evidence was submitted to demonstrate that the funds reported on the petitioner's bank statements somehow reflect additional available funds that were not reflected on its tax return, such as the cash specified on Schedule L that will be considered below in determining the petitioner's net current assets.

Counsel also includes among her contentions cash stated on Schedule "L" of the tax returns submitted. Correlating the cash amounts stated in counsel's contention with the petitioner's tax return for each year, it is clear that counsel is suggesting combining petitioner's taxable income each year with the cash also received by the business for that year as stated on Schedule "L" as current assets. CIS will consider separately the taxable income and the net current assets of a business to determine the ability of a petitioner to pay the proffered wage on the priority date. To do so would be duplicative of petitioner's taxable income. Also, on Schedule "L" it is the net current asset figure that is important as calculated above. Again, counsel is disregarding the use of Schedule "L", that it is a balance sheet that shows both current assets and current liabilities. Therefore, the cash and other current assets are reduced as is calculated above to reach the net current asset figure.

Counsel has submitted a letter from the petitioner's accountant that states in pertinent part that "... operating income after adding back the non-cash expense of the depreciation and amortization⁷ and the accrued investor interest expense has been positive." Petitioner's accountant is analyzing expenses and deductions that are stated on the balance sheet portion of the tax return known as Schedule L. Petitioner's counsel advocates the addition of depreciation taken as a deduction in those years' tax returns to eliminate the abovementioned deficiencies. Since depreciation is a deduction in the calculation of taxable income on tax Form 1120, this method would eliminate depreciation as a factor in the calculation of taxable income.

There is established legal precedent against counsel's contention that depreciation may be a source to pay the proffered wage. The court in *Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburg*, 719 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Tex. 1989) noted:

Plaintiffs also contend that depreciation amounts on the 1985 and 1986 returns are non-cash deductions. Plaintiffs thus request that the court *sua sponte* add back to net cash the depreciation expense charged for the year. Plaintiffs cite no legal authority for this proposition. This argument has likewise been presented before and rejected. See *Elatos*, 632 F. Supp. at 1054. [CIS] and judicial precedent support the use of tax returns and the *net income figures* in determining petitioner's ability to pay. Plaintiffs' argument that these figures should be revised by the court by adding back depreciation is without support. (Original emphasis.) *Chi-Feng* at 537.

⁷ Intangible assets on a balance sheet are included as "other assets" and they are amortized over a term of years. Amortization is the equivalent of depreciation for those intangibles.

As stated above, following established legal precedent, CIS relied on the petitioner's net income without consideration of any depreciation deductions, in its determinations of the ability to pay the proffered wage on and after the priority date. The accrued investor expense is also a deduction that once expensed cannot also be utilized as an asset. The accountant also refers to cumulative gross income as an indicator of the ability to pay the proffered wage. As already stated above, case precedent provides that it is net income that is probative of the ability to pay the proffered wage, not gross income.

The evidence submitted does not establish that the petitioner had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date.

Counsel's contentions cannot be concluded to outweigh the evidence presented in the corporate tax returns as submitted by petitioner that shows that the petitioner has not demonstrated its ability to pay the proffered wage from the day the Form ETA 750 was accepted for processing by any office within the employment system of the Department of Labor.

The burden of proof in these proceedings rests solely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The petitioner has not met that burden.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.