



U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services

PUBLIC COPY
identifying data deleted to
prevent clearly unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy

B6

FILE: [REDACTED]
SRC-04-250-51337

Office: TEXAS SERVICE CENTER

Date: APR 24 2007

IN RE: Petitioner:
Beneficiary:

[REDACTED]

PETITION: Immigrant petition for Alien Worker as a Skilled Worker or Professional pursuant to section 203(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:

[REDACTED]

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

Robert P. Wiemann for

Robert P. Wiemann, Chief
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The preference visa petition was denied by the Acting Director (Director), Texas Service Center, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner is a travel agent. It seeks to employ the beneficiary permanently in the United States as a travel agency manager (flight reservations manager). As required by statute, the petition is accompanied by a Form ETA 750, Application for Alien Employment Certification, approved by the Department of Labor (DOL). The director determined that the petitioner had not established its continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage beginning on the priority date of the visa petition. The director noted that the financial evidence submitted by the petitioner was not in the petitioner's name. The director denied the petition accordingly.

The record shows that the appeal is properly filed, timely and makes a specific allegation of error in law or fact. The procedural history in this case is documented by the record and incorporated into the decision. Further elaboration of the procedural history will be made only as necessary.

As set forth in the director's August 5, 2005 denial, the single issue in this case is whether or not the petitioner has the ability to pay the proffered wage as of the priority date and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence.

Section 203(b)(3)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(i), provides for the granting of preference classification to qualified immigrants who are capable, at the time of petitioning for classification under this paragraph, of performing skilled labor (requiring at least two years training or experience), not of a temporary nature, for which qualified workers are not available in the United States.

The regulation 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) states in pertinent part:

Ability of prospective employer to pay wage. Any petition filed by or for an employment-based immigrant which requires an offer of employment must be accompanied by evidence that the prospective United States employer has the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner must demonstrate this ability at the time the priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. Evidence of this ability shall be in the form of copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements.

The petitioner must demonstrate the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, which is the date the Form ETA 750 Application for Alien Employment Certification, was accepted for processing by any office within the employment system of the U.S. Department of Labor. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(d). The petitioner must also demonstrate that, on the priority date, the beneficiary had the qualifications stated on its Form ETA 750 Application for Alien Employment Certification as certified by the U.S. Department of Labor and submitted with the instant petition. *Matter of Wing's Tea House*, 16 I&N Dec. 158 (Act. Reg. Comm. 1977).

Here, the Form ETA 750 was accepted on April 23, 2001. The proffered wage as stated on the Form ETA 750 is \$36,775 per year. The Form ETA 750 states that the position requires four years of experience in the job offered.

The AAO takes a *de novo* look at issues raised in the denial of this petition. *See Dor v. INS*, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989)(noting that the AAO reviews appeals on a *de novo* basis). The AAO considers all

pertinent evidence in the record, including new evidence properly submitted upon appeal¹. Relevant evidence in the record includes the petitioner's corporate and trade names documents, the petitioner's federal tax returns for 2000 through 2003, bank statements of the petitioner's business checking account covering the period from January 2001 through April 2005, and Form 1099 for 2003 and 2004 issued by the petitioner to the beneficiary. The record does not contain any other evidence relevant to the petitioner's ability to pay the wage.

The evidence in the record of proceeding shows that the petitioner is structured as a C corporation. According to the tax returns in the record, the petitioner's fiscal year is based on a calendar year. On the petition, the petitioner claimed to have been established in 1995, to have a gross annual income of \$115,000, and to currently employ three workers. On the Form ETA 750B, signed by the beneficiary on October 28, 2003, the beneficiary claimed to have worked for the petitioner since December 2002.

On appeal, counsel submits assumed name records from Harris County, Texas and a certification of incorporation issued by the Texas Secretary of State to show that the petitioner was established under the name of [REDACTED] and has different trade names, including [REDACTED] as used in the instant petition. Counsel asserts that the petitioner's tax returns filed under the name of 2001 [REDACTED] demonstrate that the petitioner had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage of \$36,775 per year as of the priority date of April 23, 2001 to the present.

The petitioner must establish that its job offer to the beneficiary is a realistic one. Because the filing of an ETA 750 labor certification application establishes a priority date for any immigrant petition later based on the ETA 750, the petitioner must establish that the job offer was realistic as of the priority date and that the offer remained realistic for each year thereafter, until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. The petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is an essential element in evaluating whether a job offer is realistic. *See Matter of Great Wall*, 16 I&N Dec. 142 (Acting Reg. Comm. 1977). *See also* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2). In evaluating whether a job offer is realistic, Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) requires the petitioner to demonstrate financial resources sufficient to pay the beneficiary's proffered wages, although the totality of the circumstances affecting the petitioning business will be considered if the evidence warrants such consideration. *See Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (Reg. Comm. 1967).

The evidence submitted on appeal demonstrates that the petitioner has different trade names, including [REDACTED]. The AAO concurs with counsel's assertions and will consider all evidence under the name of [REDACTED] in determining the petitioner's ability to pay in the instant case although the record does not contain any evidence of the initial assumed name filing for the exact name of the petitioner ([REDACTED]).

In determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage during a given period, CIS will first examine whether the petitioner employed and paid the beneficiary during that period. If the petitioner establishes by documentary evidence that it employed the beneficiary at a salary equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the evidence will be considered *prima facie* proof of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. In the instant case, the petitioner did not submit any evidence for the beneficiary's compensation for 2001 and 2002, but submitted the beneficiary's 1099 forms for 2003 and 2004. The submitted 1099 forms show that the

¹ The submission of additional evidence on appeal is allowed by the instructions to the Form I-290B, which are incorporated into the regulations by the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(1). The record in the instant case provides no reason to preclude consideration of any of the documents newly submitted on appeal. *See Matter of Soriano*, 19 I&N Dec. 764 (BIA 1988).

petitioner hired and paid the beneficiary \$12,135 in 2003 and \$16,250 in 2004, which is \$24,640 and \$20,525 less than the proffered wage respectively. Therefore, the petitioner has not established that it employed and paid the beneficiary the full proffered wage from the priority date in 2001 onwards. The petitioner is obligated to demonstrate that it could pay the full proffered wage in 2001 and 2002, and that it could pay the difference of \$24,640 in 2003 and \$20,525 in 2004 between wages actually paid to the beneficiary and the proffered wage.

If the petitioner does not establish that it employed and paid the beneficiary an amount at least equal to the proffered wage during that period, CIS will next examine the net income figure reflected on the petitioner's federal income tax return, without consideration of depreciation or other expenses contrary to the petitioner's assertions. Reliance on federal income tax returns as a basis for determining a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is well established by judicial precedent. *Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava*, 632 F. Supp. 1049, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (citing *Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman*, 736 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1984)); see also *Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh*, 719 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Texas 1989); *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); *Ubeda v. Palmer*, 539 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982), *aff'd*, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983). Reliance on the petitioner's total income and wage expense is misplaced. Showing that the petitioner's total income exceeded the proffered wage is insufficient. Similarly, showing that the petitioner paid wages in excess of the proffered wage is insufficient.

In *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. at 1084, the court held that the Immigration and Naturalization Service, now CIS, had properly relied on the petitioner's net income figure, as stated on the petitioner's corporate income tax returns, rather than the petitioner's gross income. The letter from the petitioner's accountant asserts that the depreciation expense is not actual expenses, thus should be considered as part of ability to pay the proffered wage in the instant case. The petitioner's and its accountant's reliance on the petitioner's depreciation in determining its ability to pay the proffered wage is misplaced. The court in *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava* specifically rejected the argument that the Service should have considered income before expenses were paid rather than net income. The court in *Chi-Feng Chang* further noted:

Plaintiffs also contend the depreciation amounts on the 1985 and 1986 returns are non-cash deductions. Plaintiffs thus request that the court *sua sponte* add back to net cash the depreciation expense charged for the year. Plaintiffs cite no legal authority for this proposition. This argument has likewise been presented before and rejected. See *Elatos*, 632 F. Supp. at 1054. [CIS] and judicial precedent support the use of tax returns and the *net income figures* in determining petitioner's ability to pay. Plaintiffs' argument that these figures should be revised by the court by adding back depreciation is without support.

(Emphasis in original.) *Chi-Feng* at 537.

The record contains copies of the petitioner's tax returns for 2000 through 2003. Since the priority date in the instant case is April 23, 2001, the petitioner's 2000 tax return is not necessarily dispositive. The record before the director closed on July 12, 2005 with the receipt by the director of the petitioner's submissions in response to the request for evidence (RFE). As of that date the petitioner's federal tax return for 2004 was not available yet because the petitioner filed Form 7004 Application for Automatic Extension of Time to File Corporation Income Tax Return. Therefore, the petitioner's tax returns for 2001 through 2003 are only available tax returns to be considered. The tax returns demonstrate the following financial information concerning the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage of \$36,775 per year from the priority date:

In 2001, the Form 1120 stated a net income² of \$4,335.

In 2002, the Form 1120 stated a net income of \$4,495.

In 2003, the Form 1120 stated a net income of \$(8,669).

Therefore, for the years 2001 and 2002, the petitioner did not have sufficient net income to pay the full proffered wage of \$36,775; for the year 2003, the petitioner did not have sufficient net income to pay the difference of \$24,640 between wages actually paid to the beneficiary and the proffered wage that year.

If the net income the petitioner demonstrates it had available during that period, if any, added to the wages paid to the beneficiary during the period, if any, do not equal the amount of the proffered wage or more, CIS will review the petitioner's assets. The petitioner's total assets include depreciable assets that the petitioner uses in its business. Those depreciable assets will not be converted to cash during the ordinary course of business and will not, therefore, become funds available to pay the proffered wage. Further, the petitioner's total assets must be balanced by the petitioner's liabilities. Otherwise, they cannot properly be considered in the determination of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. Rather, CIS will consider net current assets as an alternative method of demonstrating the ability to pay the proffered wage.

Net current assets are the difference between the petitioner's current assets and current liabilities.³ A corporation's year-end current assets are shown on Schedule L, lines 1 through 6. Its year-end current liabilities are shown on lines 16 through 18. If the total of a corporation's end-of-year net current assets and the wages paid to the beneficiary (if any) are equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the petitioner is expected to be able to pay the proffered wage using those net current assets.

The petitioner's net current assets during 2001 were \$27,230.

The petitioner's net current assets during 2002 were \$28,150.

The petitioner's net current assets during 2003 were \$19,481.

Therefore, for the years 2001 and 2002, the petitioner did not have sufficient net current assets to pay the full proffered wage of \$36,775; for the year 2003, the petitioner did not have sufficient net current assets to pay the difference of \$24,640 between wages actually paid to the beneficiary and the proffered wage that year.

Therefore, from the date the Form ETA 750 was accepted for processing by the U. S. Department of Labor, the petitioner had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage as of the priority date through an examination of wages paid to the beneficiary, its net income or its net current assets.

The record of proceeding contains the bank statements of the petitioner's business checking accounts covering the period from January 2001 to April 2005. However, counsel's reliance on the balance in the petitioner's bank account is misplaced. First, bank statements are not among the three types of evidence, enumerated in 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2), required to illustrate a petitioner's ability to pay a proffered wage. While this regulation allows additional material "in appropriate cases," the petitioner in this case has not demonstrated

²Ordinary income (loss) from trade or business activities as reported on Line 28 of the Form 1120.

³According to *Barron's Dictionary of Accounting Terms* 117 (3rd ed. 2000), "current assets" consist of items having (in most cases) a life of one year or less, such as cash, marketable securities, inventory and prepaid expenses. "Current liabilities" are obligations payable (in most cases) within one year, such accounts payable, short-term notes payable, and accrued expenses (such as taxes and salaries). *Id.* at 118.

why the documentation specified at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) is inapplicable or otherwise paints an inaccurate financial picture of the petitioner. Second, bank statements show the amount in an account on a given date, and cannot show the sustainable ability to pay a proffered wage. Third, no evidence was submitted to demonstrate that the funds reported on the petitioner's bank statements somehow reflect additional available funds that were not reflected on its tax return, such as the petitioner's taxable income (income minus deductions) or the cash specified on Schedule L that was considered in determining the petitioner's net current assets.

In response to the director's RFE counsel cited *Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (BIA 1967), which relates to petitions filed during uncharacteristically unprofitable or difficult years but only in a framework of profitable or successful years. The petitioning entity in *Sonogawa* had been in business for over 11 years and routinely earned a gross annual income of about \$100,000. During the year in which the petition was filed in that case, the petitioner changed business locations and paid rent on both the old and new locations for five months. There were large moving costs and also a period of time when the petitioner was unable to do regular business. The Regional Commissioner determined that the petitioner's prospects for a resumption of successful business operations were well established. The petitioner was a fashion designer whose work had been featured in *Time* and *Look* magazines. Her clients included Miss Universe, movie actresses, and society matrons. The petitioner's clients had been included in the lists of the best-dressed California women. The petitioner lectured on fashion design at design and fashion shows throughout the United States and at colleges and universities in California. The Regional Commissioner's determination in *Sonogawa* was based in part on the petitioner's sound business reputation and outstanding reputation as a couturiere.

No unusual circumstances have been shown to exist in this case to parallel those in *Sonogawa*, nor has it been established that the years 2001, 2002 and 2003 were uncharacteristically unprofitable years but only in a framework of profitable or successful years for the petitioner.

The petitioner's assertions on appeal cannot be concluded to outweigh the evidence presented in the tax returns as submitted by the petitioner that demonstrates that the petitioner could not pay the proffered wage from the day the Form ETA 750 was accepted for processing by the Department of Labor.

In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, that burden has not been met.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.