


identifying data deleted to
prevent clearly unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy



U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services

PUBLIC COPY

B6




FILE: LIN 06 119 51630 Office: NEBRASKA SERVICE CENTER Date: OCT 01 2007

IN RE: Petitioner: [Redacted]
Beneficiary: [Redacted]

PETITION: Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as a Skilled Worker or Professional Pursuant to Section 203(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:



INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

Robert P. Wiemann, Chief *for*
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The preference visa petition was denied by the Director, Nebraska Service Center, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner is a dry cleaning and alteration business. It seeks to employ the beneficiary permanently in the United States as a shop and alteration tailor. As required by statute, a Form ETA 750, Application for Alien Employment Certification approved by the Department of Labor, accompanied the petition. The director determined that the petitioner had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage beginning on the priority date of the visa petition and denied the petition accordingly.

The record shows that the appeal is properly filed, timely and makes a specific allegation of error in law or fact. The procedural history in this case is documented by the record and incorporated into this decision. Further elaboration of the procedural history will be made only as necessary.

As set forth in the director's original August 9, 2006 denial, the single issue in this case is whether or not the petitioner has the ability to pay the proffered wage as of the priority date and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence.

Section 203(b)(3)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(i), provides for the granting of preference classification to qualified immigrants who are capable, at the time of petitioning for classification under this paragraph, of performing skilled labor (requiring at least two years training or experience), not of a temporary or seasonal nature, for which qualified workers are not available in the United States.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) states, in pertinent part:

Ability of prospective employer to pay wage. Any petition filed by or for an employment-based immigrant which requires an offer of employment must be accompanied by evidence that the prospective United States employer has the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner must demonstrate this ability at the time the priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. Evidence of this ability shall be either in the form of copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements. In a case where the prospective United States employer employs 100 or more workers, the director may accept a statement from a financial officer of the organization which establishes the prospective employer's ability to pay the proffered wage. In appropriate cases, additional evidence, such as profit/loss statements, bank account records, or personnel records, may be submitted by the petitioner or requested by [Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS)].

The petitioner must demonstrate the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, which is the date the Form ETA 750 was accepted for processing by any office within the employment system of the Department of Labor. *See* 8 CFR § 204.5(d). The priority date in the instant petition is November 17, 2003. The proffered wage as stated on the Form ETA 750 is \$23,500 annually.

The AAO maintains plenary power to review each appeal on a de novo basis. 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) ("On appeal from or review of the initial decision, the agency has all the powers which it would have in making the initial decision except as it may limit the issues on notice or by rule."); *see also, Janka v. U.S. Dept. of Transp., NTSB*, 925 F.2d 1147, 1149 (9th Cir. 1991). The AAO's de novo authority has been long recognized by the federal courts. *See, e.g. Dor v. INS*, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989). The AAO considers all pertinent

evidence in the record, including new evidence properly submitted upon appeal¹. Relevant evidence submitted on appeal includes counsel's brief and a letter, dated August 28, 2006, from [REDACTED]. Other relevant evidence includes a copy of an Interoffice Memorandum, dated May 4, 2004, from William R. Yates, Associate Director for Operations for CIS, entitled *Determination of Ability to Pay under 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2)*, a copy of the petitioner's 2003 Form 1120, U.S. Corporation Income Tax Return, and a copy of the petitioner's 2004 Form 1120S, U.S. Income Tax Return for an S Corporation. The record does not contain any other evidence relevant to the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage.

The petitioner's 2003 Form 1120 reflects a taxable income before net operating loss deduction and special deductions or net income of -\$183 and net current assets of -\$539.

The petitioner's 2004 Form 1120S reflects an ordinary income or net income of \$54,033 (from Schedule K) and net current assets of -\$2,969.

The letter, dated August 28, 2006, from the petitioner's CPA states:

The petitioner repaid \$29,091.00 of the shareholder loans in 2004, therefore on the 2003 Balance Sheet, \$29,091.00 of the shareholder loan should be classified as a current asset and the remaining \$83,470.45 should be classified as long term.

Accordingly, the petitioner's net assets for 2003 are calculated as follows:

	Current Assets	\$28,598.00
Minus	Current Liabilities	46.00
<hr/>		
Equals	Net Current Assets	\$28,552.00

Although the 2003 taxable loss was \$(183.00), this included depreciation expense of \$13,740.00 on assets purchased in previous years.

On appeal, counsel claims that the petitioner has established its ability to pay the proffered wage based on its repayment of the shareholder loans in 2004 of \$29,091.00.

The petitioner must establish that its job offer to the beneficiary is a realistic one. Because the filing of an ETA 750 labor certification application establishes a priority date for any immigrant petition later based on the ETA 750, the petitioner must establish that the job offer was realistic as of the priority date and that the offer remained realistic for each year thereafter, until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. The petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is an essential element in evaluating whether a job offer is realistic. *See Matter of Great Wall*, 16 I&N Dec. 142 (Acting Reg. Comm. 1977). *See also* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2). In evaluating whether a job offer is realistic, CIS requires the petitioner to demonstrate financial resources sufficient to pay the beneficiary's proffered wages, although the totality of the circumstances affecting the petitioning

¹ The submission of additional evidence on appeal is allowed by the instructions to the Form I-290B, which are incorporated into the regulations by the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(1). The record in the instant case provides no reason to preclude consideration of any of the documents newly submitted on appeal. *See Matter of Soriano*, 19 I&N Dec. 764 (BIA 1988).

business will be considered if the evidence warrants such consideration. *See Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (Reg. Comm. 1967).

In determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage, CIS will first examine whether the petitioner employed the beneficiary at the time the priority date was established. If the petitioner establishes by documentary evidence that it employed the beneficiary at a salary equal to or greater than the proffered wage, this evidence will be considered *prima facie* proof of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. In the instant case, on the Form ETA 750B, signed by the beneficiary on November 12, 2003, the beneficiary does not claim the petitioner as a past or present employer. In addition, counsel has not submitted any Forms W-2 or Forms 1099-MISC, Miscellaneous Income, issued by the petitioner for the beneficiary, for either 2003 or 2004. Therefore, the petitioner must establish that it has sufficient funds to pay the entire proffered wage of \$23,500 for 2003 and 2004.

As an alternative means of determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage, CIS will next examine the petitioner's net income figure as reflected on the petitioner's federal income tax return, without consideration of depreciation or other expenses. Reliance on federal income tax returns as a basis for determining a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is well established by judicial precedent. *Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava*, 632 F. Supp. 1049, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (citing *Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman*, 736 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1984)); *see also Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh*, 719 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Tex. 1989); *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F.Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); *Ubeda v. Palmer*, 539 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982), *aff'd.*, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983). In *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc.*, the court held that CIS had properly relied on the petitioner's net income figure, as stated on the petitioner's corporate income tax returns, rather than the petitioner's gross income. 623 F.Supp at 1084. The court specifically rejected the argument that CIS should have considered income before expenses were paid rather than net income. Finally, there is no precedent that would allow the petitioner to "add back to net cash the depreciation expense charged for the year." *See also Elatos Restaurant Corp.*, 632 F. Supp. at 1054. *Chi-Feng Chang* further noted:

Plaintiffs also contend the depreciation amounts on the 1985 and 1986 returns are non-cash deductions. Plaintiffs thus request that the court *sua sponte* add back to net cash the depreciation expense charged for the year. Plaintiffs cite no legal authority for this proposition. This argument has likewise been presented before and rejected. *See Elatos*, 632 F. Supp. at 1054. [CIS] and judicial precedent support the use of tax returns and the *net income figures* in determining petitioner's ability to pay. Plaintiffs' argument that these figures should be revised by the court by adding back depreciation is without support.

(Emphasis in original.) *Chi-Feng* at 537.

For a "C" corporation, CIS considers net income to be the figure shown on line 28 of the petitioner's Form 1120, U.S. Corporation Income Tax Return. The petitioner's 2003 tax return reflects a net income of -\$183. The petitioner could not have paid the proffered wage of \$23,500 from its net income in 2003.

In 2004, the petitioner submitted its tax returns as an "S" corporation. Where an S corporation's income is exclusively from a trade or business, CIS considers net income to be the figure for ordinary income, shown on line 21 of page one of the petitioner's Form 1120S. The instructions on the Form 1120S, U.S. Income Tax Return for an S Corporation, state on page one, "Caution, Include only trade or business income and expenses on lines 1a through 21."

Where an S corporation has income from sources other than from a trade or business, net income is found on Schedule K. The Schedule K form related to the Form 1120 states that an S corporation's total income from its various sources are to be shown not on page one of the Form 1120S, but on lines 1 through 6 of the Schedule K, Shareholders' Shares of Income, Credits, Deductions, etc. See Internal Revenue Service, Instructions for Form 1120S, 2003, at <http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-03/i1120s.pdf>, Instructions for Form 1120S, 2002, at <http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-02/i1120s.pdf>, (accessed February 15, 2005).

In the instant case, the petitioner's 2004 net income from Schedule K was \$54,033. The petitioner could have paid the proffered wage of \$23,500 from its net income in 2004.

Nevertheless, the petitioner's net income is not the only statistic that can be used to demonstrate a petitioner's ability to pay a proffered wage. If the net income the petitioner demonstrates it had available during that period, if any, added to the wages paid to the beneficiary during the period, if any, do not equal the amount of the proffered wage or more, CIS will review the petitioner's assets. The petitioner's total assets include depreciable assets that the petitioner uses in its business. Those depreciable assets will not be converted to cash during the ordinary course of business and will not, therefore, become funds available to pay the proffered wage. Further, the petitioner's total assets must be balanced by the petitioner's liabilities. Otherwise, they cannot properly be considered in the determination of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. Rather, CIS will consider *net current assets* as an alternative method of demonstrating the ability to pay the proffered wage.

Net current assets are the difference between the petitioner's current assets and current liabilities.² A corporation's year-end current assets are shown on Schedule L, lines 1 through 6. Its year-end current liabilities are shown on lines 16 through 18. If a corporation's end-of-year net current assets are equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the petitioner is expected to be able to pay the proffered wage out of those net current assets. The petitioner's net current assets in 2003 and 2004 were -\$539 and -\$2,969, respectively. The petitioner could not have paid the proffered wage of \$23,500 from its net current assets in 2003 and 2004.

On appeal, counsel contends that the petitioner has established its ability to pay the proffered wage based on its repayment of the shareholder loans in 2004 of \$29,091.00. Counsel references the letter from the petitioner's CPA in support of her argument which also mentions the petitioner's 2003 depreciation of \$13,740.00.

Counsel cites no legal precedent for the assertions mentioned above, and, according to regulation,³ copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements are the means by which the petitioner's ability to pay is determined. In addition, while 8 C.F.R. § 103.3(c) provides that precedent decisions of CIS are binding on all its employees in the administration of the Act, unpublished decisions are not similarly binding. Precedent decisions must be designated and published in bound volumes or as interim decisions. 8 C.F.R. § 103.9(a). In addition, the 2003 tax return shows loans to shareholder's at the end of the year to be \$112,561 and in 2004 to be \$122,817. Had the petitioner actually repaid the shareholder loans \$29,091.00 in 2004, the amount

² According to *Barron's Dictionary of Accounting Terms* 117 (3rd ed. 2000), "current assets" consist of items having (in most cases) a life of one year or less, such as cash, marketable securities, inventory and prepaid expenses. "Current liabilities" are obligations payable (in most cases) within one year, such as accounts payable, short-term notes payable, and accrued expenses (such as taxes and salaries). *Id.* at 118.

³ 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2).

of the shareholder loans would have decreased from 2003 to 2004, not increased as shown. The AAO believes that the CPA meant to say that the shareholders repaid \$29,091 to the petitioner in 2004. However, even if this were true, the number for loans to shareholders in 2004 does not equal the \$29,091 increase as claimed by the CPA. The CPA's contention is without merit.

Petitioner's CPA advocates the addition of depreciation taken as a deduction in its 2003 tax return mentioned above to eliminate the abovementioned deficiencies. Petitioner's counsel cited no legal precedent for his position. Since depreciation is a deduction in the calculation of net income on tax Form 1120, this method would eliminate depreciation as a factor in the calculation of net income.

There is established legal precedent against counsel's contention that depreciation may be a source to pay the proffered wage. As stated above, the court in *Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburg*, 719 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Tex. 1989) noted:

"Plaintiffs also contend that depreciation amounts on the 1985 and 1986 returns are non-cash deductions. Plaintiffs thus request that the court *sua sponte* add back to net cash the depreciation expense charged for the year. Plaintiffs cite no legal authority for this proposition. This argument has likewise been presented before and rejected. See *Elatos*, 632 F. Supp. at 1054. CIS and judicial precedent support the use of tax returns and the *net income figures* in determining petitioner's ability to pay. Plaintiffs' argument that these figures should be revised by the court by adding back depreciation is without support. (Original emphasis.) *Chi-Feng* at 537."

As also stated above, following established legal precedent, CIS relied on the petitioner's net income without consideration of any depreciation deductions, in its determinations of the ability to pay the proffered wage on and after the priority date.

It is unclear why counsel or the CPA believes either loans to shareholders or the "pay down" of the loans could be evidence of the ability to pay, but, it is clear that shareholder proceeds, or liabilities for that matter, cannot be evidence of the ability to pay by their very nature. Because a corporation is a separate and distinct legal entity from its owners and shareholders, the assets of its shareholders or of other enterprises or corporations cannot be considered in determining the petitioning corporation's ability to pay the proffered wage. See *Matter of Aphrodite Investments, Ltd.*, 17 I&N Dec. 530 (Comm. 1980). In a similar case, the court in *Sitar v. Ashcroft*, 2003 WL 22203713 (D.Mass. Sept. 18, 2003) stated, "nothing in the governing regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 204.5, permits CIS to consider the financial resources of individuals or entities who have no legal obligation to pay the wage." The fact that the shareholders reduced their personal liabilities for debt owed to the petitioner is not relevant to the matter at hand, which is the ability of the petitioner from its net income or net current assets to pay the proffered wage.

Finally, if the petitioner does not have sufficient net income or net current assets to pay the proffered salary, CIS may consider the overall magnitude of the entity's business activities. Even when the petitioner shows insufficient net income or net current assets, CIS may consider the totality of the circumstances concerning a petitioner's financial performance. See *Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (Reg. Comm. 1967). In *Matter of Sonogawa*, the Regional Commissioner considered an immigrant visa petition, which had been filed by a small "custom dress and boutique shop" on behalf of a clothes designer. The district director denied the petition after determining that the beneficiary's annual wage of \$6,240 was considerably in excess of the employer's net profit of \$280 for the year of filing. On appeal, the Regional Commissioner considered an array of factors beyond the petitioner's simple net profit, including news articles, financial data, the petitioner's reputation and clientele, the number of employees, future business plans, and explanations of the

petitioner's temporary financial difficulties. Despite the petitioner's obviously inadequate net income, the Regional Commissioner looked beyond the petitioner's uncharacteristic business loss and found that the petitioner's expectations of continued business growth and increasing profits were reasonable. *Id.* at 615. Based on an evaluation of the totality of the petitioner's circumstances, the Regional Commissioner determined that the petitioner had established the ability to pay the beneficiary the stipulated wages.

As in *Matter of Sonogawa*, CIS may, at its discretion, consider evidence relevant to a petitioner's financial ability that falls outside of a petitioner's net income and net current assets. CIS may consider such factors as the number of years that the petitioner has been doing business, the established historical growth of the petitioner's business, the overall number of employees, the occurrence of any uncharacteristic business expenditures or losses, the petitioner's reputation within its industry, whether the beneficiary is replacing a former employee or an outsourced service, or any other evidence that CIS deems to be relevant to the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. In this case, the petitioner's tax returns indicate it was incorporated in 1997. The petitioner has provided tax returns for the years 2003 and 2004. However, only the 2004 tax return establishes the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage of \$23,500. There also is not enough evidence to establish that the business has met all of its obligations in the past or to establish its historical growth. In addition, there is no evidence of the petitioner's reputation throughout the industry. Thus, assessing the totality of the circumstances in this individual case, it is concluded that the petitioner has not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage.

The petitioner's 2003 tax return reflects a taxable income before net operating loss deduction and special deductions or net income of -\$183 and net current assets of -\$539. The petitioner could not have paid the proffered wage of \$23,500 from either its net income or its net current assets in 2003.

For the reasons discussed above, the assertions of counsel on appeal and the evidence submitted on appeal does not overcome the decision of the director.

In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, that burden has not been met.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.