

identifying data deleted to
prevent clearly unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy

U.S. Department of Homeland Security
20 Mass. Ave., N.W., Rm. 3000
Washington, DC 20529



U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services

PUBLIC COPY



BE

FILE: [REDACTED] Office: VERMONT SERVICE CENTER
EAC 04 112 50211

Date: **JUN 30 2008**

IN RE: Petitioner: [REDACTED]
Beneficiary: [REDACTED]

PETITION: Immigrant petition for Alien Worker as a Skilled Worker or Professional pursuant to section 203(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:



INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

Robert P. Wiemann, Chief
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The preference visa petition was denied by the Director, Vermont Service Center, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner is a golf club. It seeks to employ the beneficiary permanently in the United States as a groundskeeper I. As required by statute, a Form ETA 750, Application for Alien Employment Certification approved by the Department of Labor, accompanied the petition. The Director determined that the petitioner had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage beginning on the priority date of the visa petition and denied the petition accordingly.

The record shows that the appeal is properly filed, timely and makes a specific allegation of error in law or fact. The procedural history in this case is documented by the record and incorporated into this decision. Further elaboration of the procedural history will be made only as necessary.

As set forth in the director's original September 9, 2005 denial, the single issue in this case is whether or not the petitioner has the ability to pay the proffered wage as of the priority date and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence.

Section 203(b)(3)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(i), provides for the granting of preference classification to qualified immigrants who are capable, at the time of petitioning for classification under this paragraph, of performing skilled labor (requiring at least two years training or experience), not of a temporary or seasonal nature, for which qualified workers are not available in the United States.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) states, in pertinent part:

Ability of prospective employer to pay wage. Any petition filed by or for an employment-based immigrant which requires an offer of employment must be accompanied by evidence that the prospective United States employer has the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner must demonstrate this ability at the time the priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. Evidence of this ability shall be either in the form of copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements. In a case where the prospective United States employer employs 100 or more workers, the director may accept a statement from a financial officer of the organization which establishes the prospective employer's ability to pay the proffered wage. In appropriate cases, additional evidence, such as profit/loss statements, bank account records, or personnel records, may be submitted by the petitioner or requested by [Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS)].

The petitioner must demonstrate the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, which is the date the Form ETA 750 was accepted for processing by any office within the employment system of the Department of Labor. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(d). The priority date in the instant petition is October 4, 2001. The proffered wage as stated on the Form ETA 750 is \$15.08 per hour or \$31,366.40 annually.

The AAO maintains plenary power to review each appeal on a de novo basis. 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) ("On appeal from or review of the initial decision, the agency has all the powers which it would have in making the initial decision except as it may limit the issues on notice or by rule."); see also, *Janka v. U.S. Dept. of Transp., NTSB*, 925 F.2d 1147, 1149 (9th Cir. 1991). The AAO's de novo authority has been long recognized by the federal courts. See, e.g. *Dor v. INS*, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989). The AAO considers all pertinent

evidence in the record, including new evidence properly submitted upon appeal¹. Relevant evidence submitted on appeal includes counsel's brief, a copy of a letter, dated September 7, 2001, from Fleet Real Estate Finance acknowledging the petitioner's request for an extension of its line of credit, a copy of a letter, dated September 21, 2001, from Fleet enclosing loan extension documentation, a copy of an executed and notarized mortgage modification/extension agreement, a copy of the petitioner's 2004 Form 1120S, U.S. Income Tax Return for an S Corporation, and copies of the petitioner's bank statements for 2000 and 2001. Other relevant evidence includes copies of the petitioner's 2000 through 2002 Forms 1120S;² a copy of a letter, dated August 23, 2004, from Two River Community Bank describing the petitioner's bank accounts; a copy of a letter, dated August 25, 2003, confirming renewal of the petitioner's line of credit; copies of the petitioner's comparative income statements for eleven months ended November 30, 2004-2003, for eleven months ended November 30, 2003-2002, for eleven months ended November 2002-2001, for eleven months ended November 2001-2000, for eleven months ended November 30, 2000-1999, and for twelve months ended December 31, 1999-1998;³ a copy of a letter, dated August 19, 2004, from [REDACTED], Certified Public Accountant; and copies of the petitioner's bank statements for June 30, 2003 through July 31, 2004. The record does not contain any other evidence relevant to the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage.

The petitioner's 2000⁴ through 2002 Forms 1120S reflect ordinary incomes or net incomes from Schedule K of -\$38,149, \$5,678, and -\$93,827, respectively. The petitioner's 2000 through 2002 Forms 1120S also reflect net current assets of -\$566,675, -\$316,935, and -\$258,959, respectively.

The petitioner's 2004 Form 1120S reflects an ordinary income or net income from Schedule K of \$11,812. Schedule L was not submitted with the tax return, and, therefore, the AAO is unable to determine the petitioner's net current assets for 2004.

On appeal, counsel states that the petitioner has established its ability to pay the proffered wage of \$31,366.40 based on its longevity, its line of credit, and its bank checking account statements.

The petitioner must establish that its job offer to the beneficiary is a realistic one. Because the filing of an ETA 750 labor certification application establishes a priority date for any immigrant petition later based on the ETA 750, the petitioner must establish that the job offer was realistic as of the priority date and that the offer remained realistic for each year thereafter, until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. The petitioner's ability

¹ The submission of additional evidence on appeal is allowed by the instructions to the Form I-290B, which are incorporated into the regulations by the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(1). The record in the instant case provides no reason to preclude consideration of any of the documents newly submitted on appeal. See *Matter of Soriano*, 19 I&N Dec. 764 (BIA 1988).

² It is noted that the petitioner's 2003 Form 1120S was not submitted.

³ Counsel's reliance on unaudited financial records is misplaced. The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) makes clear that where a petitioner relies on financial statements to demonstrate its ability to pay the proffered wage, those financial statements must be audited. As there is no accountant's report accompanying these statements, the AAO cannot conclude that they are audited statements. Unaudited financial statements are the representations of management. The unsupported representations of management are not reliable evidence and are insufficient to demonstrate the ability to pay the proffered wage. Therefore, the AAO will not consider the petitioner's comparative income statements.

⁴ The petitioner's 2000 tax return is for the year before the priority date of October 4, 2001, and, therefore, has little probative value when determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage of \$31,366.40 from the priority date and continuing to the present. Therefore, the AAO will not consider the petitioner's 2000 tax return except when reviewing the totality of the circumstances affecting the petitioner's business if the evidence warrants such consideration.

to pay the proffered wage is an essential element in evaluating whether a job offer is realistic. *See Matter of Great Wall*, 16 I&N Dec. 142 (Acting Reg. Comm. 1977). *See also* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2). In evaluating whether a job offer is realistic, CIS requires the petitioner to demonstrate financial resources sufficient to pay the beneficiary's proffered wages, although the totality of the circumstances affecting the petitioning business will be considered if the evidence warrants such consideration. *See Matter of Sonegawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (Reg. Comm. 1967).

In determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage, CIS will first examine whether the petitioner employed the beneficiary at the time the priority date was established. If the petitioner establishes by documentary evidence that it employed the beneficiary at a salary equal to or greater than the proffered wage, this evidence will be considered *prima facie* proof of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. In the instant case, on the Form ETA 750, signed by the beneficiary on September 28, 2001, the beneficiary does not claim the petitioner as a past or present employer. In addition, counsel has not submitted any Forms W-2, Wage and Tax Statements, or Forms 1099-MISC, Miscellaneous Income, issued by the petitioner on behalf of the beneficiary to show that it employed the beneficiary from 2001 to the present. Therefore, the petitioner has not established that it employed the beneficiary from 2001 to the present. Hence, it must establish its ability to pay the entire proffered wage of \$31,366.40 for the years 2001 through 2004.

As an alternative means of determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage, CIS will next examine the petitioner's net income figure as reflected on the petitioner's federal income tax return, without consideration of depreciation or other expenses. Reliance on federal income tax returns as a basis for determining a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is well established by judicial precedent. *Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava*, 632 F. Supp. 1049, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (citing *Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman*, 736 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1984)); *see also Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh*, 719 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Tex. 1989); *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F.Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); *Ubeda v. Palmer*, 539 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982), *aff'd.*, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983). In *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc.*, the court held that CIS had properly relied on the petitioner's net income figure, as stated on the petitioner's corporate income tax returns, rather than the petitioner's gross income. 623 F.Supp at 1084. The court specifically rejected the argument that CIS should have considered income before expenses were paid rather than net income. The court in *Chi-Feng Chang* further noted:

Plaintiffs also contend the depreciation amounts on the 1985 and 1986 returns are non-cash deductions. Plaintiffs thus request that the court *sua sponte* add back to net cash the depreciation expense charged for the year. Plaintiffs cite no legal authority for this proposition. This argument has likewise been presented before and rejected. *See Elatos*, 632 F. Supp. at 1054. [CIS] and judicial precedent support the use of tax returns and the *net income figures* in determining petitioner's ability to pay. Plaintiffs' argument that these figures should be revised by the court by adding back depreciation is without support.

(Emphasis in original.) *Chi-Feng Chang* at 537.

Where an S corporation's income is exclusively from a trade or business, CIS considers net income to be the figure for ordinary income, shown on line 21 of page one of the petitioner's IRS Form 1120S. However, where an S corporation has income, credits, deductions or other adjustments from sources other than a trade or business, they are reported on Schedule K. If the Schedule K has relevant entries for additional income, credits, deductions or other adjustments, net income is found on line 23 (1997-2003) or line 17e (2004-2005) of Schedule K. *See* Instructions for Form 1120S, at <http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i1120s.pdf> (accessed March 22, 2007) (indicating that Schedule K is a summary schedule of all shareholder's shares of the corporation's income, deductions, credits, etc.). Because the petitioner had additional 2000 through 2002 and

2004 income and deductions shown on its Schedule K, the petitioner's net income is found on Schedule K of its 2000 through 2002 and 2004 tax returns.

In the instant case, the petitioner's net incomes from Schedule K for 2000 through 2002 and 2004 were -\$38,149, \$5,678, -\$93,827, and \$11,812, respectively. The petitioner could not have paid the proffered wage of \$31,366.40 from its net incomes in 2001, 2002, and 2004. (As previously discussed, the petitioner's 2000 tax return will not be considered, and the petitioner did not submit its 2003 tax return).

Nevertheless, the petitioner's net income is not the only statistic that can be used to demonstrate a petitioner's ability to pay a proffered wage. If the net income the petitioner demonstrates it had available during that period, if any, added to the wages paid to the beneficiary during the period, if any, do not equal the amount of the proffered wage or more, CIS will review the petitioner's assets. The petitioner's total assets include depreciable assets that the petitioner uses in its business. Those depreciable assets will not be converted to cash during the ordinary course of business and will not, therefore, become funds available to pay the proffered wage. Further, the petitioner's total assets must be balanced by the petitioner's liabilities. Otherwise, they cannot properly be considered in the determination of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. Rather, CIS will consider *net current assets* as an alternative method of demonstrating the ability to pay the proffered wage.

Net current assets are the difference between the petitioner's current assets and current liabilities.⁵ A corporation's year-end current assets are shown on Schedule L, lines 1 through 6. Its year-end current liabilities are shown on lines 16 through 18. If a corporation's end-of-year net current assets are equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the petitioner is expected to be able to pay the proffered wage out of those net current assets. The petitioner's 2001 and 2002 net current assets were -\$316,935 and -\$258,959, respectively. Schedule L was not submitted with the petitioner's 2004 tax return, and the petitioner did not submit its 2003 tax return. The petitioner could not have paid the proffered wage of \$31,366.40 from its net current assets in 2001 and 2002.

On appeal, counsel claims that the petitioner has established its ability to pay the proffered wage of \$31,366.40 based on its longevity, its line of credit, and its bank statements.

In calculating the ability to pay the proffered salary, CIS will not augment the petitioner's net income or net current assets by adding in the corporation's credit limits, bank lines, or lines of credit. A "bank line" or "line of credit" is a bank's unenforceable commitment to make loans to a particular borrower up to a specified maximum during a specified time period. A line of credit is not a contractual or legal obligation on the part of the bank. See *Barron's Dictionary of Finance and Investment Terms*, 45 (1998).

Since the line of credit is a "commitment to loan" and not an existent loan, the petitioner has not established that the unused funds from the line of credit are available at the time of filing the petition. As noted above, a petitioner must establish eligibility at the time of filing; a petition cannot be approved at a future date after the petitioner becomes eligible under a new set of facts. See *Matter of Katigbak*, 14 I&N Dec. 45, 49 (Comm. 1971). Moreover, the petitioner's existent loans will be reflected in the balance sheet provided in the tax return and will be fully considered in the evaluation of the corporation's net current assets. Comparable to the limit on a credit card, the line of credit cannot be treated as cash or as a cash asset. However, if the petitioner

⁵ According to *Barron's Dictionary of Accounting Terms* 117 (3rd ed. 2000), "current assets" consist of items having (in most cases) a life of one year or less, such as cash, marketable securities, inventory and prepaid expenses. "Current liabilities" are obligations payable (in most cases) within one year, such as accounts payable, short-term notes payable, and accrued expenses (such as taxes and salaries). *Id.* at 118.

wishes to rely on a line of credit as evidence of ability to pay, the petitioner must submit documentary evidence, such as a detailed business plan and audited cash flow statements, to demonstrate that the line of credit will augment and not weaken its overall financial position. Finally, CIS will give less weight to loans and debt as a means of paying salary since the debts will increase the firm's liabilities and will not improve its overall financial position. Although lines of credit and debt are an integral part of any business operation, CIS must evaluate the overall financial position of a petitioner to determine whether the employer is making a realistic job offer and has the overall financial ability to satisfy the proffered wage. *See Matter of Great Wall*, 16 I&N Dec. 142 (Acting Reg. Comm. 1977).

Counsel's reliance on the balances in the petitioner's bank account is misplaced. First, bank statements are not among the three types of evidence, enumerated in 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2), required to illustrate a petitioner's ability to pay a proffered wage. While this regulation allows additional material "in appropriate cases," the petitioner in this case has not demonstrated why the documentation specified at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) is inapplicable or otherwise paints an inaccurate financial picture of the petitioner. Second, bank statements show the amount in an account on a given date, and cannot show the sustainable ability to pay a proffered wage. Third, no evidence was submitted to demonstrate that the funds reported on the petitioner's bank statements somehow reflect additional available funds that were not reflected on its tax returns, such as the petitioner's taxable income (income minus deductions) or the cash specified on Schedule L that was considered in determining the petitioner's net current assets.

In addition, counsel's reliance on unaudited financial records is misplaced. The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) makes clear that where a petitioner relies on financial statements to demonstrate its ability to pay the proffered wage, those financial statements must be audited. As there is no accountant's report accompanying these statements, the AAO cannot conclude that they are audited statements. Unaudited financial statements are the representations of management. The unsupported representations of management are not reliable evidence and are insufficient to demonstrate the ability to pay the proffered wage.

Finally, if the petitioner does not have sufficient net income or net current assets to pay the proffered salary, CIS may consider the overall magnitude of the entity's business activities. Even when the petitioner shows insufficient net income or net current assets, CIS may consider the totality of the circumstances concerning a petitioner's financial performance. *See Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (Reg. Comm. 1967). In *Matter of Sonogawa*, the Regional Commissioner considered an immigrant visa petition, which had been filed by a small "custom dress and boutique shop" on behalf of a clothes designer. The district director denied the petition after determining that the beneficiary's annual wage of \$6,240 was considerably in excess of the employer's net profit of \$280 for the year of filing. On appeal, the Regional Commissioner considered an array of factors beyond the petitioner's simple net profit, including news articles, financial data, the petitioner's reputation and clientele, the number of employees, future business plans, and explanations of the petitioner's temporary financial difficulties. Despite the petitioner's obviously inadequate net income, the Regional Commissioner looked beyond the petitioner's uncharacteristic business loss and found that the petitioner's expectations of continued business growth and increasing profits were reasonable. *Id.* at 615. Based on an evaluation of the totality of the petitioner's circumstances, the Regional Commissioner determined that the petitioner had established the ability to pay the beneficiary the stipulated wages.

As in *Matter of Sonogawa*, CIS may, at its discretion, consider evidence relevant to a petitioner's financial ability that falls outside of a petitioner's net income and net current assets. CIS may consider such factors as the number of years that the petitioner has been doing business, the established historical growth of the petitioner's business, the overall number of employees, the occurrence of any uncharacteristic business expenditures or losses, the petitioner's reputation within its industry, whether the beneficiary is replacing a former employee or an outsourced service, or any other evidence that CIS deems to be relevant to the

petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. In this case, the petitioner's tax returns indicate it was incorporated on July 7, 1994.⁶ The petitioner has provided its tax returns for 2000 through 2002 and 2004, with none of those tax returns establishing the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage of \$31,366.40. In addition, the tax returns are not enough evidence to establish that the business has met all of its obligations in the past or to establish its historical growth. There is also no evidence of the petitioner's reputation throughout the industry or of any temporary and uncharacteristic disruption in its business activities. Furthermore, a review of CIS records indicates that the petitioner has filed an additional three immigrant petitions with the same priority date of October 4, 2001. Therefore, the petitioner must establish that it had sufficient funds to pay all the wages from the priority date and continuing to the present. If the instant petition were the only petition filed by the petitioner, the petitioner would be required to produce evidence of its ability to pay the proffered wage to the single beneficiary of the instant petition. However, where a petitioner has filed multiple petitions for multiple beneficiaries which have been pending simultaneously, the petitioner must produce evidence that its job offers to each beneficiary are realistic, and therefore, that it has the ability to pay the proffered wages to each of the beneficiaries of its pending petitions, as of the priority date of each petition and continuing until the beneficiary of each petition obtains lawful permanent residence. *See Matter of Great Wall*, 16 I&N Dec. 142, 144-145 (Acting Reg. Comm. 1977) (petitioner must establish ability to pay as of the date of the Form MA 7-50B job offer, the predecessor to the Form ETA 750 and Form ETA 9089). *See also* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2). Thus, assessing the totality of the circumstances in this individual case, it is concluded that the petitioner has not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage.

For the reasons discussed above, the assertions of counsel on appeal do not overcome the decision of the director.

In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, that burden has not been met.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.

⁶ It is noted that the Form I-140 submitted by the petitioner states that the petitioner was established in 1996.