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U.S. Citizenship
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Services

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File:

SRC 06 209 52636

Office: TEXAS SERVICE CENTER

Date:

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IN RE:

Petitioner:

Beneficiary:

Petition:


Immigrant petition for Alien Worker as a Skilled Worker or Professional pursuant to section 203(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. Please refer to 8 C.F.R. § 103.5 for the specific requirements. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$585. Any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider, as required by 8 C.F.R. 103.5(a)(1)(i).


John F. Grissom, Acting Chief
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The preference visa petition was denied by the Director, Texas Service Center, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner operates a full service printing and graphic design firm. It seeks to employ the beneficiary permanently in the United States as a graphic designer. As required by statute, the petition is accompanied by a Form ETA 750 Application for Alien Employment Certification certified by the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL). The director determined that the petitioner had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage beginning on the priority date of the visa petition or that the beneficiary possesses the requisite education for the position. The director denied the petition accordingly.

The record demonstrated that the appeal was properly filed, timely, and made a specific allegation of error in law or fact. The procedural history in this case is documented by the record and incorporated into the decision. Further elaboration of the procedural history will be made only as necessary.

As set forth in the director's denial dated March 28, 2007, the basis for denial of this case was whether or not the petitioner has the ability to pay the proffered wage as of the priority date and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence and whether or not the beneficiary has the required educational background for the position.

Section 203(b)(3)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(i), provides for the granting of preference classification to qualified immigrants who are capable, at the time of petitioning for classification under this paragraph, of performing skilled labor (requiring at least two years training or experience), not of a temporary nature, for which qualified workers are not available in the United States.

Section 203(b)(3)(A)(ii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(ii), provides for granting preference classification to qualified immigrants who hold baccalaureate degrees and are members of the professions.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) states in pertinent part:

Ability of prospective employer to pay wage. Any petition filed by or for an employment-based immigrant which requires an offer of employment must be accompanied by evidence that the prospective United States employer has the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner must demonstrate this ability at the time the priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. Evidence of this ability shall be either in the form of copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements.

The petitioner must demonstrate the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, which is the date the Form ETA 750 Application for Alien Employment Certification was accepted for processing by any office within the employment system of the DOL. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(d). The petitioner must also demonstrate that, on the priority date, the beneficiary had the qualifications stated on its Form ETA 750 Application for Alien Employment Certification as certified by the DOL and submitted with the instant petition. *Matter of Wing's Tea House*, 16 I&N Dec. 158 (Act. Reg. Comm. 1977).

Here, the Form ETA 750 was accepted on November 22, 2002.¹ The proffered wage as stated on the Form ETA 750 is \$33,800.00 per year. The Form ETA 750 states that the position requires a four-year Bachelor of Fine Arts degree in Graphic Design and nine months of experience in the proffered position.

The AAO maintains plenary power to review each appeal on a de novo basis. 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) ("On appeal from or review of the initial decision, the agency has all the powers which it would have in making the initial decision except as it may limit the issues on notice or by rule."); *see also*, *Janka v. U.S. Dept. of Transp., NTSB*, 925 F.2d 1147, 1149 (9th Cir. 1991). The AAO's de novo authority has been long recognized by the federal courts. *See, e.g. Dor v. INS*, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989). The AAO considers all pertinent evidence in the record, including new evidence properly submitted upon appeal.²

Relevant evidence in the record includes copies of the following documents: the original Form ETA 750 Application for Alien Employment Certification approved by the DOL; the petitioner's U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Form 1120S tax returns for 2002 through 2005; the beneficiary's IRS Form W-2 Wage and Tax statements for 2002 through 2005; the beneficiary's IRS Form 1040 and 1040A tax returns for 2002, 2004, and 2005; the beneficiary's New York State tax returns for 2004 and 2005³; a letter from the petitioner's accountant stating the company's recent financial

¹ It has been over six years since the Application for Alien Employment Certification has been accepted and the proffered wage established. According to the employer certification that is part of the application, ETA Form 750 Part A, Section 23 b., states "The wage offered equals or exceeds the prevailing wage and I [the employer] guarantee that, if a labor certification is granted, the wage paid to the alien when the alien begins work will equal or exceed the prevailing wage which is applicable at the time the alien begins work." However, the petitioner must show in accordance with the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(a)(2) that it can pay the proffered wage from the time of the priority date.

² The submission of additional evidence on appeal is allowed by the instructions to the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) Form I-290B, which are incorporated into the regulations by the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(1). The record in the instant case provides no reason to preclude consideration of any of the documents newly submitted on appeal. *See Matter of Soriano*, 19 I&N Dec. 764 (BIA 1988).

³ The AAO notes that state tax returns do not constitute regulatory-prescribed ability to pay evidence.

circumstances⁴; a copy of [REDACTED] May 4, 2004 Memo regarding the ability to pay; and copies of documentation concerning the beneficiary's qualifications.

The evidence in the record of proceeding shows that the petitioner is structured as an S corporation. On the petition, the petitioner claimed to have been established in 1987 and to currently employ 14 workers. According to the tax returns in the record, the petitioner's fiscal year is based on a calendar year. The gross annual income stated on the petition was \$1,800,949.00. The petitioner did not state the net annual income on the petition. On the Form ETA 750, signed by the beneficiary on June 20, 2002, the beneficiary claimed to have worked for the petitioner since August of 2001.

On appeal, counsel asserts that the beneficiary has worked for and received the proffered wage from the petitioner since 2002.⁵ Counsel cites the [REDACTED] May 4, 2004 Memo regarding the ability to pay.⁶ Counsel urges USCIS to consider depreciation and the financial circumstances the

⁴ The AAO notes that this letter, dated August 16, 2006, states, among other things, that the events of September 11, 2001 and depreciation have adversely affected the petitioner's financial status. The AAO will discuss both of these issues subsequently within this decision.

⁵ The AAO notes that the beneficiary claimed to have been working for the petitioner since August of 2001 on the Form ETA 750. *Matter of Ho*, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591-592 (BIA 1988) states:

It is incumbent on the petitioner to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence, and attempts to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies, absent competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth, in fact, lies, will not suffice.

⁶ Counsel claims that the petitioner has paid the beneficiary at the proffered wage rate since 2002. Thus, according to the language in [REDACTED] memorandum, it has established its continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date. Counsel asserts that [REDACTED] makes a clear distinction between past and current salaries and since he used the conjunction "or" in the context of evidence that the petitioner "has paid or currently is paying the proffered wage," counsel urges USCIS to consider the wage rate paid in 2002 through 2005 as satisfying that particular method of demonstrating a petitioning entity's ability to pay.

The Yates' memorandum relied upon by counsel provides guidance to adjudicators to review a record of proceeding and make a positive determination of a petitioning entity's ability to pay if, in the context of the beneficiary's employment, "[t]he record contains credible verifiable evidence that the petitioner is not only is employing the beneficiary but also has paid or currently is paying the proffered wage."

The AAO consistently adjudicates appeals in accordance with the Yates memorandum. However, counsel's interpretation of the language in that memorandum is overly broad and does not comport with the plain language of the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) set forth in the memorandum as authority for the policy guidance therein. The regulation requires that a petitioning entity demonstrate its *continuing* ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date. If USCIS and the AAO were to interpret and apply the Yates memorandum as counsel urges, then in

petitioner experienced around the events of September 11, 2001 within its analysis of the petitioner's ability to pay. Counsel also asserts that the beneficiary has a bachelor's degree in fine arts and that he has been employed as a graphic designer since August of 2001. Accompanying the appeal, counsel submits a legal brief.

The petitioner must establish that its job offer to the beneficiary is a realistic one. Because the filing of an ETA 750 labor certification application establishes a priority date for any immigrant petition later based on the ETA 750, the petitioner must establish that the job offer was realistic as of the priority date and that the offer remained realistic for each year thereafter, until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. The petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is an essential element in evaluating whether a job offer is realistic. *See Matter of Great Wall*, 16 I&N Dec. 142 (Acting Reg. Comm. 1977). *See also* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2). In evaluating whether a job offer is realistic, USCIS requires the petitioner to demonstrate financial resources sufficient to pay the beneficiary's proffered wages, although the totality of the circumstances affecting the petitioning business will be considered if the evidence warrants such consideration. *See Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (BIA 1967).

In determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage during a given period, USCIS will first examine whether the petitioner employed and paid the beneficiary during that period. If the petitioner establishes by documentary evidence that it employed the beneficiary at a salary equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the evidence will be considered *prima facie* proof of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. In the instant case, the petitioner has not established that it employed and paid the beneficiary the full proffered wage from the priority date.

Counsel submitted the beneficiary's IRS Form W-2 Wage and Tax statements for 2002 through 2005 in the amounts of \$33,280.00, \$30,155.56, \$36,720.00, and \$35,360.00 respectively. The 2002 IRS Form W-2 was issued by the petitioner to the beneficiary. However, the employer's name listed on the IRS Form W-2 Wage and Tax statement for 2003 through 2005 is listed as [REDACTED], located in Miami, Florida.⁷ Thus, the petitioner has not demonstrated that the beneficiary

this particular factual context, the clear language in the regulation would be usurped by an interoffice guidance memorandum without binding legal effect. The petitioner must demonstrate its continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, which in this case is November 22, 2002. Thus, the petitioner must show its ability to pay the proffered wage not only in 2002, when counsel claims it actually began paying the proffered wage rate, but it must also show its continuing ability to pay the proffered wage in 2003 through 2005. Demonstrating that the petitioner is paying the proffered wage in a specific year may suffice to show the petitioner's ability to pay for that year, but the petitioner must still demonstrate its ability to pay for the rest of the pertinent period of time.

⁷ The AAO notes that counsel claims that these IRS Forms W-2 establish that the beneficiary was paid wages, but USCIS may not consider the assets of other enterprises or corporations linked to the petitioner's company within its analysis of the petitioner's ability to pay. Because a corporation is a separate and distinct legal entity from its owners and shareholders, the assets of its shareholders or of other enterprises or corporations cannot be considered in determining the petitioning corporation's ability to pay the proffered wage. *See Matter of Aphrodite Investments, Ltd.*, 17 I&N Dec. 530

worked for the petitioner in 2003 through 2005. In the instant case, the petitioner has not established that it employed and paid the beneficiary the full proffered wage from the priority date as noted above. Since the proffered wage is \$33,800.00 per year, the petitioner must establish that it can pay the beneficiary the difference between wages actually paid and the proffered wage, which is \$520.00 in 2002.

If the petitioner does not establish that it employed and paid the beneficiary an amount at least equal to the proffered wage during that period, USCIS will next examine the net income figure reflected on the petitioner's federal income tax return, without consideration of depreciation or other expenses. Reliance on federal income tax returns as a basis for determining a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is well established by judicial precedent. *Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava*, 632 F.Supp. 1049, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (citing *Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman*, 736 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1984)); see also *Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh*, 719 F.Supp. 532 (N.D. Texas 1989); *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F.Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); *Ubeda v. Palmer*, 539 F.Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982), *aff'd*, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983). Reliance on the petitioner's gross sales and profits that exceeded the proffered wage is misplaced. Showing that the petitioner's gross sales and profits exceeded the proffered wage is insufficient. Similarly, showing that the petitioner paid wages in excess of the proffered wage is insufficient.

The petitioner's appellate argument that its depreciation expenses should be considered as cash is misplaced. In *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, the court held that the Immigration and Naturalization Service, now USCIS, had properly relied on the petitioner's net income figure, as stated on the petitioner's corporate income tax returns, rather than the petitioner's gross income. *Id.* at 1084. The court specifically rejected the argument that USCIS should have considered income before expenses were paid rather than net income. The court in *Chi-Feng Chang* further noted:

Plaintiffs also contend that depreciation amounts on the 1985 and 1986 returns are non-cash deductions. Plaintiffs thus request that the court *sua sponte* add back to net cash the depreciation expense charged for the year. Plaintiffs cite no legal authority for this proposition. This argument has likewise been presented before and rejected. See *Elatos*, 632 F. Supp. at 1054. [USCIS] and judicial precedent support the use of tax returns and the *net income figures* in determining petitioner's ability to pay. Plaintiffs' argument that these figures should be revised by the court by adding back depreciation is without support.

(Emphasis in original.) *Chi-Feng Chang* 719 F. Supp. at 537. Therefore the petitioner cannot establish its ability to pay the proffered wage through depreciation as an asset.

(Comm. 1980). In a similar case, the court in *Sitar v. Ashcroft*, 2003 WL 22203713 (D.Mass. Sept. 18, 2003) stated, "nothing in the governing regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 204.5, permits [USCIS] to consider the financial resources of individuals or entities who have no legal obligation to pay the wage."

The petitioner's tax returns demonstrate the following financial information concerning the petitioner's ability to pay:

- In 2002, the Form 1120S stated net income of -\$288,983.00.⁸
- In 2003, the Form 1120S stated net income of -\$188,679.00.
- In 2004, the Form 1120S stated net income of -\$192,192.00.
- In 2005, the Form 1120S stated net income of -\$125,546.00.

Since the proffered wage is \$33,800.00 per year, the petitioner did not have sufficient net income to pay the proffered wage or the difference between wages actually paid and the proffered wage for 2002.

If the net income the petitioner demonstrates it had available during the period, if any, added to the wages paid to the beneficiary during the period, if any, do not equal the amount of the proffered wage or more, USCIS will review the petitioner's assets. The petitioner's total assets include depreciable assets that the petitioner uses in its business. Those depreciable assets will not be converted to cash during the ordinary course of business and will not, therefore, become funds available to pay the proffered wage. Further, the petitioner's total assets must be balanced by the petitioner's liabilities. Otherwise, they cannot properly be considered in the determination of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. Rather, USCIS will consider net current assets as an alternative method of demonstrating the ability to pay the proffered wage.

Net current assets are the difference between the petitioner's current assets and current liabilities.⁹ A corporation's year-end current assets are shown on Schedule L, lines 1 through 6 and include cash-on-hand. **Its year-end current liabilities are shown on lines 16 through 18.** If the total of a corporation's end-of-year net current assets and the wages paid to the beneficiary (if any) are equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the petitioner is expected to be able to pay the proffered wage using those net current assets.

- The petitioner's net current assets during 2002 were -\$162,386.00.
- The petitioner's net current assets during 2003 were -\$88,951.00.
- The petitioner's net current assets during 2004 were -\$258,723.00.
- The petitioner's net current assets during 2005 were -\$281,362.00.

Based on the petitioner's net current assets, it cannot demonstrate its ability to pay the proffered wage even if the petitioner's net current assets are combined with wages paid to the beneficiary.

⁸ The AAO notes that net income is listed on line 21 of the IRS Form 1120S.

⁹ According to *Barron's Dictionary of Accounting Terms* 117 (3rd ed. 2000), "current assets" consist of items having (in most cases) a life of one year or less, such as cash, marketable securities, inventory and prepaid expenses. "Current liabilities" are obligations payable (in most cases) within one year, such as accounts payable, short-term notes payable, and accrued expenses (such as taxes and salaries). *Id.* at 118.

Therefore, for the period for which tax returns were submitted, the petitioner did not have sufficient net current assets to pay the proffered wage.

Accordingly, from the priority date or when the Form ETA 750 was accepted for processing by the DOL, the petitioner had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage through an examination of wages paid to the beneficiary, its net income, or its net current assets.

Counsel asserts in her brief accompanying the appeal that there are other ways to determine the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage from the priority date. Counsel submits a letter from the petitioner's accountant stating the company's recent financial circumstances with the brief. The letter urges USCIS to consider the financial circumstances the petitioner experienced around the events of September 11, 2001 within its analysis of the petitioner's ability to pay, as the petitioner had significant net profits prior to that event. The record of proceeding contains no evidence specifically connecting the petitioner's business decline to the events of September 11, 2001, not even a statement from the petitioner showing a loss or claiming difficulty in doing business specifically because of that event. A mere broad statement by the petitioner's accountant that, because of the nature of the petitioner's industry, its business was impacted adversely by the events of September 11, 2001, cannot by itself, demonstrate the petitioner's continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date. Rather, such a general statement merely suggests, without supporting evidence, that the petitioner's financial status might have appeared stronger had it not been for the events of September 11, 2001.

Matter of Sonogawa, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (BIA 1967), relates to petitions filed during uncharacteristically unprofitable or difficult years but only in a framework of profitable or successful years. The petitioning entity in *Sonogawa* had been in business for over 11 years and routinely earned a gross annual income of about \$100,000. During the year in which the petition was filed in that case, the petitioner changed business locations and paid rent on both the old and new locations for five months. There were large moving costs and also a period of time when the petitioner was unable to do regular business. The Regional Commissioner determined that the petitioner's prospects for a resumption of successful business operations were well established. The petitioner was a fashion designer whose work had been featured in *Time* and *Look* magazines. Her clients included Miss Universe, movie actresses, and society matrons. The petitioner's clients had been included in the lists of the best-dressed California women. The petitioner lectured on fashion design at design and fashion shows throughout the United States and at colleges and universities in California. The Regional Commissioner's determination in *Sonogawa* was based in part on the petitioner's sound business reputation and outstanding reputation as a couturiere.

No unusual circumstances have been shown to exist in this case to parallel those in *Sonegawa*, nor has it been established by evidence that 2002 through 2005 were uncharacteristically unprofitable years for the petitioner.

Counsel also cites *Full Gospel Portland Church v. Thornburgh*, 730 F. Supp. 441 (D.D.C. 1988) within her brief. The decision in *Full Gospel* is not binding here. Although the AAO may consider the reasoning of the decision, the AAO is not bound to follow the published decision of a United States district court in cases arising within the same district. See *Matter of K-S-*, 20 I&N Dec. 715 (BIA 1993). Further, the decision in *Full Gospel* is distinguishable from the instant case. The court in *Full Gospel* ruled that USCIS should consider the pledges of parishioners in determining a church's ability to pay wages. Here, counsel's assertion is that USCIS should treat its depreciation as evidence of its ability to pay, even though depreciation is an expense and is very different from a parishioner's pledge to give money to a church.

The evidence submitted fails to establish that the petitioner has the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date.

To be eligible for approval, a beneficiary must have the education and experience specified on the labor certification as of the petition's filing date, which is November 22, 2002. See *Matter of Wing's Tea House*, 16 I&N Dec. 158 (Act. Reg. Comm. 1977).

To determine whether a beneficiary is eligible for an employment based immigrant visa, USCIS must examine whether the alien's credentials meet the requirements set forth in the labor certification. USCIS must look to the job offer portion of the labor certification to determine the required qualifications for the position. USCIS may not ignore a term of the labor certification, nor may it impose additional requirements. See *Matter of Silver Dragon Chinese Restaurant*, 19 I&N Dec. 401, 406 (Comm. 1986). See also, *Mandany v. Smith*, 696 F.2d 1008, (D.C. Cir. 1983); *K.R.K. Irvine, Inc. v. Landon*, 699 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1983); *Stewart Infra-Red Commissary of Massachusetts, Inc. v. Coomey*, 661 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1981).

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(l)(3)(ii)(C) provides:

(C) **Professionals.** If the petition is for a professional, the petition must be accompanied by evidence that the alien holds a United States baccalaureate degree or a foreign equivalent degree and by evidence that the alien is a member of the professions. Evidence of a baccalaureate degree shall be in the form of an official college or university record showing the date the baccalaureate degree was awarded and the area of concentration of study. To show that the alien is a member of the professions, the petitioner must submit evidence showing that the minimum of a baccalaureate degree is required for entry into the occupation.

The Form ETA 750 states that the position requires a four-year Bachelor of Fine Arts degree in Graphic Design and nine months of experience in the proffered position. Counsel has submitted the

beneficiary's diploma from the Fashion Institute of Technology in New York stating that he received a Bachelor of Fine Arts in May of 2000. Counsel also submitted the beneficiary's transcript from the Fashion Institute of Technology. Though it is clear that the beneficiary did take many courses in Graphic Design, counsel has not established that the beneficiary majored in that area. It does appear that the beneficiary's degree was four years in duration.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(l)(3) provides:

(ii) *Other documentation*—

(A) *General.* Any requirements of training or experience for skilled workers, professionals, or other workers must be supported by letters from trainers or employers giving the name, address, and title of the trainer or employer, and a description of the training received or the experience of the alien.

(B) *Skilled workers.* If the petition is for a skilled worker, the petition must be accompanied by evidence that the alien meets the educational, training or experience, and any other requirements of the individual labor certification, meets the requirements for Schedule A designation, or meets the requirements for the Labor Market Information Pilot Program occupation designation. The minimum requirements for this classification are at least two years of training or experience.

The AAO finds the letter submitted by Imaging Solutions to lack a description of the type of work that the beneficiary did for that company from October 2000 to August 2001.¹⁰ Thus, the letter fails to provide a description of the experience of the alien as required by 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(l)(3)(ii)(A) and therefore is not acceptable evidence that the beneficiary has the qualifying nine months of experience as required by the proffered position. Guidance is provided at 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(2)(i) in situations where prescribed regulatory evidence is established to be unavailable.

The director noted in her March 28, 2007 decision letter that the petitioner had failed to submit evidence that indicated that the beneficiary has the required degree. However, in her brief on appeal, counsel included additional evidence to this effect.

The burden of proof in these proceedings rests solely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The petitioner has not met that burden.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.

¹⁰ The AAO notes that the letter listed the employment as temporary, so it is not clear whether or not the beneficiary worked full-time and received nine full months of qualifying experience.