U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Office of Administrative Appeals MS 2090
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U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services

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File: [redacted] Office: TEXAS SERVICE CENTER Date: APR 2 2 2009
SRC 06 258 51736

IN RE: Petitioner: [redacted]
Beneficiary:

Petition: Immigrant petition for Alien Worker as a Skilled Worker or Professional pursuant to section 203(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:

[redacted]

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. Please refer to 8 C.F.R. § 103.5 for the specific requirements. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of $585. Any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider, as required by 8 C.F.R. 103.5(a)(1)(i).

John F. Grissom
Acting Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The preference visa petition was denied by the Director, Texas Service Center, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner operates an Indian/Pakistani restaurant. It seeks to employ the beneficiary permanently in the United States as a cook. As required by statute, the petition is accompanied by a Form ETA 750 Application for Alien Employment Certification certified by the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL).[1] The director determined that the petitioner had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage beginning on the priority date of the visa petition. The director denied the petition accordingly.

The record demonstrated that the appeal was properly filed, was timely, and made a specific allegation of error in law or fact. The procedural history in this case is documented by the record and incorporated into the decision. Further elaboration of the procedural history will be made only as necessary.

As set forth in the director's denial dated March 30, 2007, the single issue in this case is whether or not the petitioner has the ability to pay the proffered wage as of the priority date and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence.

Section 203(b)(3)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(i), provides for the granting of preference classification to qualified immigrants who are capable, at the time of petitioning for classification under this paragraph, of performing

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[1] The AAO notes that this case involves the substitution of a beneficiary on the labor certification. Substitution of beneficiaries was formerly permitted by the DOL. The DOL had published an interim final rule, which limited the validity of an approved labor certification to the specific alien named on the labor certification application. *See* 56 Fed. Reg. 54925, 54930 (October 23, 1991). The interim final rule eliminated the practice of substitution. On December 1, 1994, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, acting under the mandate of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in *Kooritzky v. Reich*, 17 F.3d 1509 (D.C. Cir. 1994), issued an order invalidating the portion of the interim final rule, which eliminated substitution of labor certification beneficiaries. The *Kooritzky* decision effectively led 20 C.F.R. §§ 656.3(c)(1) and (2) to read the same as the regulations had read before November 22, 1991, and allow the substitution of a beneficiary. Following the *Kooritzky* decision, the DOL processed substitution requests pursuant to a May 4, 1995 DOL Field Memorandum, which reinstated procedures in existence prior to the implementation of the Immigration Act of 1990 (IMMACT 90). The DOL delegated responsibility for substituting labor certification beneficiaries to U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) based on a Memorandum of Understanding, which was recently rescinded. *See* 72 Fed. Reg. 27904 (May 17, 2007) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. § 656). The DOL's final rule became effective July 16, 2007 and prohibits the substitution of alien beneficiaries on permanent labor certification applications and resulting certifications. As the filing of the instant case predates the rule, substitution would be allowed for the present petition.

skilled labor (requiring at least two years training or experience), not of a temporary nature, for which qualified workers are not available in the United States.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) states in pertinent part:

> *Ability of prospective employer to pay wage.* Any petition filed by or for an employment-based immigrant which requires an offer of employment must be accompanied by evidence that the prospective United States employer has the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner must demonstrate this ability at the time the priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. Evidence of this ability shall be either in the form of copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements.

The petitioner must demonstrate the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, which is the date the Form ETA 750 Application for Alien Employment Certification was accepted for processing by any office within the employment system of the DOL. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(d). The petitioner must also demonstrate that, on the priority date, the beneficiary had the qualifications stated on its Form ETA 750 Application for Alien Employment Certification as certified by the DOL and submitted with the instant petition. *Matter of Wing's Tea House*, 16 I&N Dec. 158 (Act. Reg. Comm. 1977).

Here, the Form ETA 750 was accepted on April 30, 2001.[2] The proffered wage as stated on the Form ETA 750 is $10.00 per hour ($23,400.00 per year).[3] The Form ETA 750 states that the position requires two years of experience in the proffered position.

The AAO maintains plenary power to review each appeal on a de novo basis. 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) ("On appeal from or review of the initial decision, the agency has all the powers which it would have in making the initial decision except as it may limit the issues on notice or by rule."); *see also, Janka v. U.S. Dept. of Transp., NTSB*, 925 F.2d 1147, 1149 (9th Cir. 1991). The AAO's de novo authority has been long recognized by the federal courts. *See, e.g. Dor v. INS*, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d

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[2] It has been approximately eight years since the Application for Alien Employment Certification has been accepted and the proffered wage established. According to the employer certification that is part of the application, Form ETA 750 Part A, Section 23 b., states "The wage offered equals or exceeds the prevailing wage and I [the employer] guarantee that, if a labor certification is granted, the wage paid to the alien when the alien begins work will equal or exceed the prevailing wage which is applicable at the time the alien begins work." However, the petitioner must show in accordance with the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(a)(2) that it can pay the proffered wage from the time of the priority date.

[3] The AAO notes that the proffered waged is based upon a 45-hour work week.

Cir. 1989). The AAO considers all pertinent evidence in the record, including new evidence properly submitted upon appeal.[4]

Relevant evidence in the record includes copies of the following documents: the original Form ETA 750 Application for Alien Employment Certification approved by the DOL; the petitioner's U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Form 1120S tax returns for 2001, 2002, 2004, and 2005 and s IRS Form 1120S tax returns for 2004 and 2005[5]; accounting statements

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[4] The submission of additional evidence on appeal is allowed by the instructions to the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) Form I-290B, which are incorporated into the regulations by the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(1). The record in the instant case provides no reason to preclude consideration of any of the documents newly submitted on appeal. *See Matter of Soriano*, 19 I&N Dec. 764 (BIA 1988).

[5] On the petition, the petitioner's name is with an employer identification number of The certified labor certification is in the name of Although different street addresses are listed on the petition and labor certification, the job opportunity remains in Norcross, Georgia. There is a letter in the record of proceeding from the petitioner's accountant, dated January 15, 2007 explaining the petitioner's business structure and organization. It states the following:

> t is located at a property owned by a Georgia corporation. Both these companies are under the same management and control. is the principal officer of both c and He holds hundred percent stocks in these companies.

A review of the Georgia Secretary of State's online public inquiry database indicates that these are two separate corporations. Georgia Secretary of State, *available at* http://corp.sos.state.ga.us/corp/soskb/csearch.asp (last visited April 9, 2009). Of note is that both were administratively dissolved in May of 2008 and, as of April 9, 2009, are not reinstated or in good status. USCIS must evaluate the overall financial position of a petitioner to determine whether the employer is making a realistic job offer and has the overall financial ability to satisfy the proffered wage. *See Matter of Great Wall*, 16 I&N Dec. 142 (Acting Reg. Comm. 1977).

Because a corporation is a separate and distinct legal entity from its owners and shareholders, the assets of its shareholders or of other enterprises or corporations cannot be considered in determining the petitioning corporation's ability to pay the proffered wage. *See Matter of Aphrodite Investments, Ltd.*, 17 I&N Dec. 530 (Comm. 1980). In a similar case, the court in *Sitar v. Ashcroft*, 2003 WL 22203713 (D.Mass. Sept. 18, 2003) stated, "nothing in the governing regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 204.5, permits [USCIS] to consider the financial resources of individuals or entities who have no legal obligation to pay the wage."

regarding the financial status of the petitioner's company and . in 2006[6]; and documentation concerning the beneficiary's qualifications.

The evidence in the record of proceeding shows that the petitioner is structured as an S corporation. On the petition, the petitioner claimed to have been established in 1996 and to currently employ three workers. According to the tax returns in the record, the petitioner's fiscal year is based on a calendar year. The net annual income and gross annual income stated on the petition were $10,000.00 and $502,000.00[7] respectively. On the Form ETA 750, signed by the beneficiary on December 16, 2006, the beneficiary did not claim to have worked for the petitioner.

The petitioner must establish that its job offer to the beneficiary is a realistic one. Because the filing of a Form ETA 750 labor certification application establishes a priority date for any immigrant petition later based on the Form ETA 750, the petitioner must establish that the job offer was realistic as of the priority date and that the offer remained realistic for each year thereafter, until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. The petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is an essential element in evaluating whether a job offer is realistic. *See Matter of Great Wall*, 16 I&N Dec. 142 (Acting Reg. Comm. 1977). *See also* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2). In evaluating whether a job offer is realistic, USCIS requires the petitioner to demonstrate financial resources sufficient to pay the beneficiary's proffered wages, although the totality of the circumstances affecting the petitioning business will be considered if the evidence warrants such consideration. *See Matter of Sonegawa,* 12 I&N Dec. 612 (BIA 1967).

In determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage during a given period, USCIS will first examine whether the petitioner employed and paid the beneficiary during that period. If the petitioner establishes by documentary evidence that it employed the beneficiary at a salary equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the evidence will be considered *prima facie* proof of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. In the instant case, the petitioner has not established

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[6] There is no indication that the financial statements submitted were audited, and they were not accompanied by an auditor's report. The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) makes clear that where a petitioner relies on financial statements to demonstrate its ability to pay the proffered wage, those financial statements must be audited. The AAO cannot conclude that they are audited statements. Unaudited financial statements are the representations of management. The unsupported representations of management are not reliable evidence and are insufficient to demonstrate the ability to pay the proffered wage. See also footnote number five regarding piercing the corporate veil.

[7] The AAO notes that no tax return included in the record of proceeding indicates that the petitioner maintains this amount of gross annual income per year. *Matter of Ho*, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591 (BIA 1988) states:

> Doubt cast on any aspect of the petitioner's proof may, of course, lead to a reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining evidence offered in support of the visa petition.

that it employed and paid the beneficiary the full proffered wage from the priority date. The Form ETA 750 states that the beneficiary has not worked for the petitioner.

If the petitioner does not establish that it employed and paid the beneficiary an amount at least equal to the proffered wage during that period, USCIS will next examine the net income figure reflected on the petitioner's federal income tax return, without consideration of depreciation or other expenses. Reliance on federal income tax returns as a basis for determining a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is well established by judicial precedent. *Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava*, 632 F.Supp. 1049, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (citing *Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman*, 736 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1984)); *see also Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh*, 719 F.Supp. 532 (N.D. Texas 1989); *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F.Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); *Ubeda v. Palmer*, 539 F.Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982), *aff'd*, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983). Reliance on the petitioner's gross sales and profits that exceeded the proffered wage is misplaced. Showing that the petitioner's gross sales and profits exceeded the proffered wage is insufficient. Similarly, showing that the petitioner paid wages in excess of the proffered wage is insufficient.

The petitioner's tax returns demonstrate the following financial information concerning the petitioner's ability to pay:

- In 2001, the IRS Form 1120S stated net income of $48,387.00.[8]
  In 2002, the IRS Form 1120S stated net income of $79,514.00.
  In 2004, the IRS Form 1120S stated net income of $2,734.00.
- In 2005, the IRS Form 1120S stated net income of $3,499.00.

The petitioner did not have sufficient net income to pay the proffered wage for 2004 and 2005. The AAO notes that USCIS sent a Request for Evidence (RFE) to the petitioner on November 8, 2006 asking it to submit its IRS Form 1120S for 2003 among other pieces of evidence, but the petitioner never submitted this document. The petitioner has therefore not demonstrated its ability to pay the proffered salary for 2003. The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) states that the director may request additional evidence in appropriate cases. Although specifically and clearly requested by the director, the petitioner declined to provide copies of its 2003 IRS Form 1120. The tax return would have demonstrated the amount of taxable income the petitioner reported to the IRS and further reveal its ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner's failure to submit these documents cannot be

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[8] The AAO notes that where an S corporation's income is exclusively from a trade or business, USCIS considers net income to be the figure for ordinary income, shown on line 21 of page one of the petitioner's Form 1120S. The instructions on the Form 1120S, U.S. Income Tax Return for an S Corporation, state on page one, "Caution, Include only trade or business income and expenses on lines 1a through 21." The AAO also notes that, on the petition, the petitioner's name is with an employer identification number of Accordingly, the AAO has analyzed the tax returns submitted with the same employer identification number. The returns state the company name as for 2001 and 2002 and as for 2004 and 2005.

excused. The failure to submit requested evidence that precludes a material line of inquiry shall be grounds for denying the petition. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(14).

If the net income the petitioner demonstrates it had available during the period, if any, added to the wages paid to the beneficiary during the period, if any, do not equal the amount of the proffered wage or more, USCIS will review the petitioner's assets. The petitioner's total assets include depreciable assets that the petitioner uses in its business. Those depreciable assets will not be converted to cash during the ordinary course of business and will not, therefore, become funds available to pay the proffered wage. Further, the petitioner's total assets must be balanced by the petitioner's liabilities. Otherwise, they cannot properly be considered in the determination of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. Rather, USCIS will consider net current assets as an alternative method of demonstrating the ability to pay the proffered wage.

Net current assets are the difference between the petitioner's current assets and current liabilities.[9] A corporation's year-end current assets are shown on Schedule L, lines 1 through 6 of the IRS Form 1120S and include cash-on-hand. Its year-end current liabilities are shown on lines 16 through 18. If the total of a corporation's end-of-year net current assets and the wages paid to the beneficiary (if any) are equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the petitioner is expected to be able to pay the proffered wage using those net current assets.

- The petitioner's net current assets during 2004 were -$2,569.00.
- The petitioner's net current assets during 2005 were -$6,564.00.

Based on the petitioner's net current assets, it cannot demonstrate its ability to pay the proffered wage.

Accordingly, from the priority date or when the Form ETA 750 was accepted for processing by the DOL, the petitioner had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage through an examination of wages paid to the beneficiary, its net income, or its net current assets except for tax years 2001 and 2002.

The AAO notes that the petitioner has filed two Form I-140 petitions with USCIS, including that for the beneficiary, since 2003. The petitioner has not established by evidence that it has the ability to pay the proffered wage for each I-140 beneficiary from the priority date until each beneficiary obtains permanent residence. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2).[10]

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[9] According to *Barron's Dictionary of Accounting Terms* 117 (3rd ed. 2000), "current assets" consist of items having (in most cases) a life of one year or less, such as cash, marketable securities, inventory and prepaid expenses. "Current liabilities" are obligations payable (in most cases) within one year, such as accounts payable, short-term notes payable, and accrued expenses (such as taxes and salaries). *Id.* at 118.

[10] Further, the petitioner would be obligated to pay the beneficiary of each petition the prevailing wage in accordance with DOL regulations.

On appeal, counsel asserts that the petitioner's restaurant is located on a piece of property worth $1.5 million, both of which are owned by [redacted][1] Counsel also states that the petitioner experienced financial losses in 2004 and 2005 due to extensive repairs and renovation and due to the lack of a good cook, which the petitioner expects will soon change.

Matter of Sonegawa, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (BIA 1967), relates to petitions filed during uncharacteristically unprofitable or difficult years but only in a framework of profitable or successful years. The petitioning entity in *Sonegawa* had been in business for over 11 years and routinely earned a gross annual income of about $100,000. During the year in which the petition was filed in that case, the petitioner changed business locations and paid rent on both the old and new locations for five months. There were large moving costs and also a period of time when the petitioner was unable to do regular business. The Regional Commissioner determined that the petitioner's prospects for a resumption of successful business operations were well established. The petitioner was a fashion designer whose work had been featured in *Time* and *Look* magazines. Her clients included Miss Universe, movie actresses, and society matrons. The petitioner's clients had been included in the lists of the best-dressed California women. The petitioner lectured on fashion design at design and fashion shows throughout the United States and at colleges and universities in California. The Regional Commissioner's determination in *Sonegawa* was based in part on the petitioner's sound business reputation and outstanding reputation as a couturiere.

No unusual circumstances have been shown to exist in this case to parallel those in *Sonegawa*, nor has it been established by evidence that 2004 or 2005 were uncharacteristically unprofitable years for the petitioner. The AAO notes that counsel has not submitted any evidence of the petitioner's reputation, repairs, and renovation. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)).

Counsel urges USCIS to consider that the petitioner's financial position is improving, as evidenced by the accounting statements regarding the financial status of the petitioner's company and the petitioner's company in 2006, and that the company plans to add more rooms and stores to the property in order to generate more income. Counsel has produced no further evidence to this effect. The assertions of counsel do not constitute evidence. *Matter of Obaigbena*, 19 I&N Dec. 533, 534

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[11] Because a corporation is a separate and distinct legal entity from its owners and shareholders, the assets of its shareholders or of other enterprises or corporations cannot be considered in determining the petitioning corporation's ability to pay the proffered wage. *See Matter of Aphrodite Investments, Ltd.*, 17 I&N Dec. 530 (Comm. 1980). In a similar case, the court in *Sitar v. Ashcroft*, 2003 WL 22203713 (D.Mass. Sept. 18, 2003) stated, "nothing in the governing regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 204.5, permits [USCIS] to consider the financial resources of individuals or entities who have no legal obligation to pay the wage." Furthermore, even if this piece of property were owned by the petitioner, this property would not represent financial resources that would not be reflected in the petitioner's federal tax returns. Nor is real property typically liquidated or encumbered to pay employee wages.

(BIA 1988); *Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez*, 17 I&N Dec. 503, 506 (BIA 1980). Against the projection of future earnings, *Matter of Great Wall*, 16 I&N Dec. 142, 144-145 (Acting Reg. Comm. 1977) states:

> I do not feel, nor do I believe the Congress intended, that the petitioner, who admittedly could not pay the offered wage at the time the petition was filed, should subsequently become eligible to have the petition approved under a new set of facts hinged upon probability and projections, even beyond the information presented on appeal.

Counsel argues that consideration of the beneficiary's potential to increase the petitioner's revenues is appropriate and establishes with even greater certainty that the petitioner has more than adequate ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner has not, however, provided any standard or criterion for the evaluation of such earnings. For example, the petitioner has not demonstrated by means of evidence that the beneficiary will replace less productive workers or has a reputation that would increase the number of customers.

The evidence submitted fails to establish that the petitioner has the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date.

The burden of proof in these proceedings rests solely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The petitioner has not met that burden.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.