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
File: **LIN 06 123 53343** Office: NEBRASKA SERVICE CENTER Date: **JUN 01 2009**



IN RE: Petitioner:
Beneficiary:

Petition: Immigrant petition for Alien Worker as a Skilled Worker or Professional pursuant to section 203(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:



INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

John F. ~~Crisom~~
Acting Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The preference visa petition was denied by the Director, Nebraska Service Center, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be sustained.

The petitioner operates a transportation business. It seeks to employ the beneficiary permanently in the United States as a trucking supervisor. As required by statute, the petition is accompanied by a Form ETA 750 Application for Alien Employment Certification certified by the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL). The director determined that the petitioner had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage beginning on the priority date of the visa petition. The director denied the petition accordingly.

The record demonstrated that the appeal was properly filed, was timely, and made a specific allegation of error in law or fact. The procedural history in this case is documented by the record and incorporated into the decision. Further elaboration of the procedural history will be made only as necessary.

As set forth in the director's denial dated May 7, 2007, the basis for denial of this case was whether or not the petitioner has the ability to pay the proffered wage as of the priority date and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence.

Section 203(b)(3)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(i), provides for the granting of preference classification to qualified immigrants who are capable, at the time of petitioning for classification under this paragraph, of performing skilled labor (requiring at least two years training or experience), not of a temporary nature, for which qualified workers are not available in the United States.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) states in pertinent part:

Ability of prospective employer to pay wage. Any petition filed by or for an employment-based immigrant which requires an offer of employment must be accompanied by evidence that the prospective United States employer has the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner must demonstrate this ability at the time the priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. Evidence of this ability shall be either in the form of copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements.

The petitioner must demonstrate the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, which is the date the Form ETA 750 Application for Alien Employment Certification was accepted for processing by any office within the employment system of the DOL. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(d). The petitioner must also demonstrate that, on the priority date, the beneficiary had the qualifications stated on its Form ETA 750 Application for Alien Employment Certification as certified

by the DOL and submitted with the instant petition. *Matter of Wing's Tea House*, 16 I&N Dec. 158 (Act. Reg. Comm. 1977).

Here, the Form ETA 750 was accepted on November 5, 2003.¹ The proffered wage as stated on the Form ETA 750 is \$27.50 per hour (\$57,200.00 per year). The Form ETA 750 states that the position requires two years and six months of experience in the proffered position or in the related occupation of truck driver and the special requirement of triple trailer endorsement.

The AAO maintains plenary power to review each appeal on a de novo basis. 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) ("On appeal from or review of the initial decision, the agency has all the powers which it would have in making the initial decision except as it may limit the issues on notice or by rule."); *see also, Janka v. U.S. Dept. of Transp., NTSB*, 925 F.2d 1147, 1149 (9th Cir. 1991). The AAO's de novo authority has been long recognized by the federal courts. *See, e.g. Dor v. INS*, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989). The AAO considers all pertinent evidence in the record, including new evidence properly submitted upon appeal.²

Relevant evidence in the record includes copies of the following documents: the original Form ETA 750 Application for Alien Employment Certification approved by the DOL; the petitioner's U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Form 1120S tax returns for 2003 to 2005; the petitioner's IRS Form 1096 Annual Summary and Transmittal of U.S. Information Returns for 2006 in the amount of \$4,631,601.17³; the petitioner's Illinois State Tax Returns for 2003 to 2005⁴; financial statements regarding the petitioning company for 2006⁵; the Dias 99 Corporation's IRS Forms 1099-MISC for

¹ It has been approximately five and a half years since the Application for Alien Employment Certification has been accepted and the proffered wage established. According to the employer certification that is part of the application, Form ETA 750 Part A, Section 23 b., states "The wage offered equals or exceeds the prevailing wage and I [the employer] guarantee that, if a labor certification is granted, the wage paid to the alien when the alien begins work will equal or exceed the prevailing wage which is applicable at the time the alien begins work." However, the petitioner must show in accordance with the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(a)(2) that it can pay the proffered wage from the time of the priority date.

² The submission of additional evidence on appeal is allowed by the instructions to the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) Form I-290B, which are incorporated into the regulations by the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(1). The record in the instant case provides no reason to preclude consideration of any of the documents newly submitted on appeal. *See Matter of Soriano*, 19 I&N Dec. 764 (BIA 1988).

³ The AAO notes that counsel has submitted the petitioner's IRS Form 1096 for 2006 as evidence of its ability to pay the proffered salary, but counsel has not specifically delineated to whom and for what amounts the petitioner paid out \$4,631,601.17 that year.

⁴ The AAO notes that state tax returns do not constitute regulatory-prescribed ability to pay evidence.

⁵ There is no indication that the financial statements submitted were audited, and they were not accompanied by an auditor's report. The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) makes clear that where a petitioner relies on financial statements to demonstrate its ability to pay the proffered wage, those

2004 to 2006 issued by the petitioner in the amounts of \$159,161.00, \$259,756.00, and \$541,569.73 respectively and the beneficiary's IRS Forms 1099-MISC for 2004 to 2006 issued by the Dias 99 Corporation in the amounts of \$20,300.00, \$26,300.00, and \$20,100.00 respectively⁶; and documentation concerning the beneficiary's qualifications.

The evidence in the record of proceeding shows that the petitioner is structured as an S corporation. On the petition, the petitioner claimed to have been established in 1996 and to employ four workers currently. According to the tax returns in the record, the petitioner's fiscal year is based on a calendar year. The net annual income and gross annual income stated on the petition were \$810,945.00 and \$3,830,917.00 respectively. On the Form ETA 750, signed by the beneficiary on October 13, 2003, the beneficiary did not claim to have worked for the petitioner.

The petitioner must establish that its job offer to the beneficiary is a realistic one. Because the filing of a Form ETA 750 labor certification application establishes a priority date for any immigrant petition later based on the Form ETA 750, the petitioner must establish that the job offer was realistic as of the priority date and that the offer remained realistic for each year thereafter, until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. The petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is an essential element in evaluating whether a job offer is realistic. *See Matter of Great Wall*, 16 I&N Dec. 142 (Acting Reg. Comm. 1977). *See also* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2). USCIS requires the petitioner to demonstrate financial resources sufficient to pay the beneficiary's proffered wages, although the totality of the circumstances affecting the petitioning business will be considered if the evidence warrants such consideration. *See Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (BIA 1967).

In determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage, USCIS will first examine whether

financial statements must be audited. The AAO cannot conclude that they are audited statements. Unaudited financial statements are the representations of management. The unsupported representations of management are not reliable evidence and are insufficient to demonstrate the ability to pay the proffered wage.

⁶ The AAO notes that counsel has shown that the beneficiary owns the Dias 99 Corporation. Counsel submitted these IRS Forms 1099-MISC as evidence of wages that it paid to the beneficiary from 2004 to 2006. The record of proceeding does not, however, state the beneficiary's work capacity for the Dias 99 Corporation or whether he got paid by the petitioner in the capacity of a trucking supervisor or as the owner of the company. In general, wages already paid to a beneficiary while working at a different company are not available to prove the ability to pay the wage proffered to the beneficiary at the priority date of the petition and continuing to the present. Moreover, there is no evidence that the beneficiary's position at the Dias 99 Corporation involves the same duties as those set forth in the Form ETA 750. Consequently, the AAO will not consider the funds that the petitioner paid to this corporation to be wages paid to the beneficiary. The AAO also notes that a search of the Illinois Secretary of State's online public inquiry database reflects that the beneficiary still owns the Dias 99 Corporation. Illinois Secretary of State's Cyber Drive, *available at* <http://www.ilsos.gov/corporatellc/> (last visited April 30, 2009). The record of proceeding does not make clear why the beneficiary would take the position with the petitioner's company. The job offer must be realistic in nature. *See Matter of Great Wall*, 16 I&N Dec. 142 (Acting Reg. Comm. 1977).

the petitioner paid the beneficiary during that period. If the petitioner establishes by documentary evidence that it employed the beneficiary at a salary equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the evidence will be considered *prima facie* proof of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. In the instant case, the petitioner has not established that it paid the beneficiary the full proffered wage from the priority date.

If the petitioner does not establish that it paid the beneficiary an amount at least equal to the proffered wage during that period, USCIS will next examine the net income figure reflected on the petitioner's federal income tax return, without consideration of depreciation or other expenses. Reliance on federal income tax returns as a basis for determining a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is well established by judicial precedent. *Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava*, 632 F.Supp. 1049, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (citing *Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman*, 736 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1984)); *see also Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh*, 719 F.Supp. 532 (N.D. Texas 1989); *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F.Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); *Ubeda v. Palmer*, 539 F.Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982), *aff'd*, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983). Reliance on the petitioner's gross sales and profits that exceeded the proffered wage is misplaced. Showing that the petitioner's gross sales and profits exceeded the proffered wage is insufficient. Similarly, showing that the petitioner paid wages in excess of the proffered wage is insufficient.

The petitioner's tax returns demonstrate the following financial information concerning the petitioner's ability to pay:

- In 2003, the IRS Form 1120S stated net income of \$111,862.00.⁷
- In 2004, the IRS Form 1120S stated net income of -\$94,805.00.
- In 2005, the IRS Form 1120S stated net income of \$39,103.00.

The petitioner did not have sufficient net income to pay the proffered wage for 2004 and 2005. The petitioner demonstrated its ability to pay in 2003 since its net income is greater than the proffered wage.

If the net income the petitioner demonstrates it had available during the period, if any, added to the wages paid to the beneficiary during the period, if any, do not equal the amount of the proffered wage or more, USCIS will review the petitioner's assets. The petitioner's total assets include depreciable assets that the petitioner uses in its business. Those depreciable assets will not be converted to cash during the ordinary course of business and will not, therefore, become funds available to pay the proffered wage. Further, the petitioner's total assets must be balanced by the petitioner's liabilities. Otherwise, they cannot properly be considered in the determination of the

⁷ The AAO notes that where an S corporation's income is exclusively from a trade or business, USCIS considers net income to be the figure for ordinary income, shown on line 21 of page one of the petitioner's Form 1120S. The instructions on the Form 1120S, U.S. Income Tax Return for an S Corporation, state on page one, "Caution, Include only trade or business income and expenses on lines 1a through 21."

petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. Rather, USCIS will consider net current assets as an alternative method of demonstrating the ability to pay the proffered wage.

Net current assets are the difference between the petitioner's current assets and current liabilities.⁸ A corporation's year-end current assets are shown on Schedule L, lines 1 through 6, of the IRS Form 1120S and include cash-on-hand. Its year-end current liabilities are shown on lines 16 through 18. If the total of a corporation's end-of-year net current assets and the wages paid to the beneficiary (if any) are equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the petitioner is expected to be able to pay the proffered wage using those net current assets.

- The petitioner's net current assets during 2004 were \$5,200.00.
- The petitioner's net current assets during 2005 were \$46,275.00.

Based on the petitioner's net current assets, it cannot demonstrate its ability to pay the proffered wage for 2004 and 2005.

Accordingly, from the priority date or when the Form ETA 750 was accepted for processing by the DOL, the petitioner had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage through an examination of wages paid to the beneficiary, its net income, or its net current assets.

On appeal, counsel asserts the petitioner's depreciation expenses should be considered as cash and be added back into the petitioner's net income. This argument is misplaced. In *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, the court held that the Immigration and Naturalization Service, now USCIS, had properly relied on the petitioner's net income figure, as stated on the petitioner's corporate income tax returns, rather than the petitioner's gross income. *Id.* at 1084. The court specifically rejected the argument that USCIS should have considered income before expenses were paid rather than net income. The court in *Chi-Feng Chang* further noted:

Plaintiffs also contend that depreciation amounts on the 1985 and 1986 returns are non-cash deductions. Plaintiffs thus request that the court *sua sponte* add back to net cash the depreciation expense charged for the year. Plaintiffs cite no legal authority for this proposition. This argument has likewise been presented before and rejected. *See Elatos*, 632 F. Supp. at 1054. [USCIS] and judicial precedent support the use of tax returns and the *net income figures* in determining petitioner's ability to pay. Plaintiffs' argument that these figures should be revised by the court by adding back depreciation is without support.

⁸ According to *Barron's Dictionary of Accounting Terms* 117 (3rd ed. 2000), "current assets" consist of items having (in most cases) a life of one year or less, such as cash, marketable securities, inventory and prepaid expenses. "Current liabilities" are obligations payable (in most cases) within one year, such as accounts payable, short-term notes payable, and accrued expenses (such as taxes and salaries). *Id.* at 118.

(Emphasis in original.) *Chi-Feng Chang* 719 F. Supp. at 537. Therefore the petitioner cannot establish its ability to pay the proffered wage by showing depreciation as an asset.⁹

USCIS may consider the overall magnitude of the petitioner's business activities in its determination of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. *Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (BIA 1967), relates to petitions filed during uncharacteristically unprofitable or difficult years but only in a framework of profitable or successful years. The petitioning entity in *Sonogawa* had been in business for over 11 years and routinely earned a gross annual income of about \$100,000. During the year in which the petition was filed in that case, the petitioner changed business locations and paid rent on both the old and new locations for five months. There were large moving costs and also a period of time when the petitioner was unable to do regular business. The Regional Commissioner determined that the petitioner's prospects for a resumption of successful business operations were well established. The petitioner was a fashion designer whose work had been featured in *Time* and *Look* magazines. Her clients included Miss Universe, movie actresses, and society matrons. The petitioner's clients had been included in the lists of the best-dressed California women. The petitioner lectured on fashion design at design and fashion shows throughout the United States and at colleges and universities in California. The Regional Commissioner's determination in *Sonogawa* was based in part on the petitioner's sound business reputation and outstanding reputation as a couturiere.

No unusual circumstances have been shown to exist in this case to parallel those in *Sonogawa*, nor has it been established that 2004 and 2005 were uncharacteristically unprofitable years for the petitioner. However, the petitioner has been in business since 1996, maintained gross sales of \$3,830,917.00 and \$5,208,443.00 for 2004 and 2005, and spent \$1,809,355.00 and \$2,999,309.00 on the cost of labor for only four employees for those years.

Although USCIS will not consider gross income without also considering the expenses that were incurred to generate that income, the overall magnitude of the entity's business activities should be considered when the entity's ability to pay is marginal or borderline. *See Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (Reg. Comm. 1967). Thus, assessing the totality of circumstances in this individual case, it is concluded that the petitioner has proven its financial strength and viability and has the ability to pay the proffered wage.

The burden of proof in these proceedings rests solely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The petitioner has met that burden.

⁹ Counsel cites three unpublished AAO decisions in which depreciation expenses were added back into the petitioner's income in order to make positive ability to pay determinations. The AAO notes that, while 8 C.F.R. § 103.3(c) provides that precedent decisions of USCIS are binding on all its employees in the administration of the Act, unpublished decisions are not similarly binding. Precedent decisions must be designated and published in bound volumes or as interim decisions. 8 C.F.R. § 103.9(a).

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ORDER: The appeal is sustained.