

identifying data deleted to
prevent clearly unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy



U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services

PUBLIC COPY

B 6



FILE: [REDACTED] Office: NEBRASKA SERVICE CENTER Date: **NOV 13 2009**
LIN 08 010 50463

IN RE: Petitioner: [REDACTED]
Beneficiary: [REDACTED]

PETITION: Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as a Skilled Worker or Professional pursuant to Section 203(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:



INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. Please refer to 8 C.F.R. § 103.5 for the specific requirements. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$585. Any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider, as required by 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i).

Perry Rhew
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The preference visa petition was denied by the Director, Nebraska Service Center, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner is a pizza prep and delivery business. It seeks to employ the beneficiary permanently in the United States as a first line supervisor/manager of retail workers. As required by statute, the petition is accompanied by a Form ETA 750, Application for Alien Employment Certification, approved by the United States Department of Labor (DOL). The director determined that the petitioner had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage beginning on the priority date of the visa petition. The director further determined that the petitioner had not established that the beneficiary met the education, training, or experience requirements of the labor certification at the time of filing, April 30, 2001. The director denied the petition accordingly.

The record shows that the appeal is properly filed, timely and makes a specific allegation of error in law or fact. The procedural history in this case is documented by the record and incorporated into the decision. Further elaboration of the procedural history will be made only as necessary.

As set forth in the director's July 22, 2009 denial, the issues in this case are whether or not the petitioner has the ability to pay the proffered wage as of the priority date and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence and whether or not the petitioner has established that the beneficiary met the education, training, or experience requirements of the labor certification at the time of filing the labor certification, April 30, 2001.

Section 203(b)(3)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(i), provides for the granting of preference classification to qualified immigrants who are capable, at the time of petitioning for classification under this paragraph, of performing skilled labor (requiring at least two years training or experience), not of a temporary nature, for which qualified workers are not available in the United States.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) states in pertinent part:

Ability of prospective employer to pay wage. Any petition filed by or for an employment-based immigrant which requires an offer of employment must be accompanied by evidence that the prospective United States employer has the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner must demonstrate this ability at the time the priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. Evidence of this ability shall be either in the form of copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements.

The petitioner must demonstrate the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, which is the date the Form ETA 750, Application for Alien Employment Certification, was accepted for processing by any office within the employment system of the DOL. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(d). The petitioner must also demonstrate that, on the priority date, the beneficiary had the

qualifications stated on its Form ETA 750, Application for Alien Employment Certification, as certified by the DOL and submitted with the instant petition. *Matter of Wing's Tea House*, 16 I&N Dec. 158 (Act. Reg. Comm. 1977).

Here, the Form ETA 750 was accepted on April 30, 2001. The proffered wage as stated on the Form ETA 750 is \$750 per week (\$39,000 per year). The Form ETA 750 states that the position requires two years of college, one month of training, and three years of experience in the job offered of first line supervisor/ manager of retail workers. The Form ETA 750 also requires the beneficiary to have proficiency in English, Spanish, and Urdu.

The AAO maintains plenary power to review each appeal on a *de novo* basis. 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) ("On appeal from or review of the initial decision, the agency has all the powers which it would have in making the initial decision except as it may limit the issues on notice or by rule."); *see also, Janka v. U.S. Dept. of Transp., NTSB*, 925 F.2d 1147, 1149 (9th Cir. 1991). The AAO's *de novo* authority has been long recognized by the federal courts. *See, e.g. Dor v. INS*, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989). The AAO considers all pertinent evidence in the record, including new evidence properly submitted upon appeal.¹

The evidence in the record of proceeding shows that the petitioner was structured as a sole proprietorship in 2001 through 2003 and as an S corporation in 2004 through 2008. On the petition, the petitioner claimed to have been established on September 23, 1998 and to currently employ 30 workers. According to the tax returns in the record, the petitioner's fiscal year is based on a calendar year. On the Form ETA 750B, signed by the beneficiary on April 26, 2001, the beneficiary claimed to have worked for the petitioner from September 1998 to the present (April 26, 2001).²

¹ The submission of additional evidence on appeal is allowed by the instructions to the Form I-290B, which are incorporated into the regulations by the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(1). The record in the instant case provides no reason to preclude consideration of any of the documents newly submitted on appeal. *See Matter of Soriano*, 19 I&N Dec. 764 (BIA 1988).

² The AAO notes that on Form G-325A, Biographic Information, signed by the beneficiary on August 14, 2007, in conjunction with Form I-485, Application to Register Permanent Residence or Adjust Status, the beneficiary lists his experience with the petitioner from April 2001 to the present (August 14, 2007). *Matter of Ho*, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591-592 (BIA 1988) states:

Doubt cast on any aspect of the petitioner's proof may, of course, lead to a reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining evidence offered in support of the visa petition.

* * *

It is incumbent on the petitioner to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence, and attempts to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies, absent competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth, in fact, lies, will not suffice.

The petitioner must establish that its job offer to the beneficiary is a realistic one. Because the filing of an ETA 750 labor certification application establishes a priority date for any immigrant petition later based on the ETA 750, the petitioner must establish that the job offer was realistic as of the priority date and that the offer remained realistic for each year thereafter, until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. The petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is an essential element in evaluating whether a job offer is realistic. *See Matter of Great Wall*, 16 I&N Dec. 142 (Acting Reg. Comm. 1977); *see also* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2). In evaluating whether a job offer is realistic, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) requires the petitioner to demonstrate financial resources sufficient to pay the beneficiary's proffered wages, although the totality of the circumstances affecting the petitioning business will be considered if the evidence warrants such consideration. *See Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (Reg. Comm. 1967).

In determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage during a given period, USCIS will first examine whether the petitioner employed and paid the beneficiary during that period. If the petitioner establishes by documentary evidence that it employed the beneficiary at a salary equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the evidence will be considered *prima facie* proof of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. In the instant case, the petitioner has not established that it employed and paid the beneficiary the full proffered wage during any relevant timeframe including the period from the priority date of April 30, 2001 or subsequently.³

If the petitioner does not establish that it employed and paid the beneficiary an amount at least equal to the proffered wage during that period, USCIS will next examine the net income figure reflected on the petitioner's federal income tax return, without consideration of depreciation or other expenses. *River Street Donuts, LLC v. Napolitano*, 558 F.3d 111 (1st Cir. 2009). Reliance on federal income tax returns as a basis for determining a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is well established by judicial precedent. *Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava*, 632 F. Supp. 1049, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (*citing Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman*, 736 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1984)); *see also Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh*, 719 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Texas 1989); *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); *Ubeda v. Palmer*, 539 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982), *aff'd*, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983).

In addition, Section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Act provides:

Misrepresentation. – (i) In general. – Any alien who, by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to procure (or has sought to procure or has procured) a visa, other documentation, or admission into the United States or other benefit provided under this Act is inadmissible.

³ The petitioner has not submitted any Forms W-2, Wage and Tax Statements, or Forms 1099-MISC, Miscellaneous Income, on behalf of the beneficiary to show that it employed the beneficiary in any of the pertinent years (2001 through 2008). In fact, the petitioner stated, in response to a request for evidence (RFE) issued by the director, that the “beneficiary is not being paid by the petitioner and no W-2’s were ever issued to him.”

In 2001 through 2003 the petitioner was organized as a sole proprietorship, a business in which one person operates the business in his or her personal capacity. Black's Law Dictionary 1398 (7th Ed. 1999). Unlike a corporation, a sole proprietorship does not exist as an entity apart from the individual owner. See *Matter of United Investment Group*, 19 I&N Dec. 248, 250 (Comm. 1984). Therefore the sole proprietor's adjusted gross income, assets and personal liabilities are also considered as part of the petitioner's ability to pay. Sole proprietors report income and expenses from their businesses on their individual (Form 1040) federal tax return each year. The business-related income and expenses are reported on Schedule C and are carried forward to the first page of the tax return. Sole proprietors must show that they can cover their existing business expenses as well as pay the proffered wage out of their adjusted gross income or other available funds. In addition, sole proprietors must show that they can sustain themselves and their dependents. *Ubeda v. Palmer*, 539 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982), *aff'd*, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983).

In *Ubeda*, 539 F. Supp. at 650, the court concluded that it was highly unlikely that a petitioning entity structured as a sole proprietorship could support himself, his spouse and five dependents on a gross income of slightly more than \$20,000 where the beneficiary's proposed salary was \$6,000 or approximately thirty percent (30%) of the petitioner's gross income.

In the instant case, the sole proprietor supported a family of one in 2001 and a family of three in 2002 and 2003. The sole proprietor's tax returns reflect the following information for the following years:

Sole proprietor's adjusted gross income (Form 1040, line 33 in 2001, line 35 in 2002, and line 34 in 2003)

2001	\$21,633
2002	\$20,509
2003	\$21,890

In 2001 through 2003, the sole proprietor's adjusted gross income of \$21,633, \$20,509, and \$21,890, respectively fails to cover the proffered wage of \$39,000. It is improbable that the sole proprietor could support himself and his family on a deficit, which is what remains after reducing the adjusted gross income by the amount required to pay the proffered wage.

In 2004 through 2008 the petitioner was organized as an S corporation. In *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. at 1084, the court held that the Immigration and Naturalization Service, now USCIS, had properly relied on the petitioner's net income figure, as stated on the petitioner's corporate income tax returns, rather than the petitioner's gross income. The court specifically rejected the argument that USCIS should have considered income before expenses were paid rather than net income.

With respect to depreciation, the court in *River Street Donuts* noted:

The AAO recognized that a depreciation deduction is a systematic allocation of

the cost of a tangible long-term asset and does not represent a specific cash expenditure during the year claimed. Furthermore, the AAO indicated that the allocation of the depreciation of a long-term asset could be spread out over the years or concentrated into a few depending on the petitioner's choice of accounting and depreciation methods. Nonetheless, the AAO explained that depreciation represents an actual cost of doing business, which could represent either the diminution in value of buildings and equipment or the accumulation of funds necessary to replace perishable equipment and buildings. Accordingly, the AAO stressed that even though amounts deducted for depreciation do not represent current use of cash, neither does it represent amounts available to pay wages.

We find that the AAO has a rational explanation for its policy of not adding depreciation back to net income. Namely, that the amount spent on a long term tangible asset is a "real" expense.

River Street Donuts at 116. “[USCIS] and judicial precedent support the use of tax returns and the *net income figures* in determining petitioner’s ability to pay. Plaintiffs’ argument that these figures should be revised by the court by adding back depreciation is without support.” *Chi-Feng Chang* at 537 (emphasis added).

The record before the director closed on April 23, 2009 with the receipt by the director of the petitioner’s submissions in response to the director’s request for evidence. The petitioner’s tax returns demonstrate its net income for 2004 through 2008, as shown in the table below.

- In 2004, the Form 1120S stated net income⁴ of \$52,833.
- In 2005, the Form 1120S stated net income of \$25,525.
- In 2006, the Form 1120S stated net income of \$68,284.
- In 2007, the Form 1120S stated net income of \$98,822.
- In 2008, the Form 1120S stated net income of \$70,991.

⁴ Where an S corporation’s income is exclusively from a trade or business, USCIS considers net income to be the figure for ordinary income, shown on line 21 of page one of the petitioner’s IRS Form 1120S. However, where an S corporation has income, credits, deductions or other adjustments from sources other than a trade or business, they are reported on Schedule K. If the Schedule K has relevant entries for additional income, credits, deductions or other adjustments, net income is found on line 23 (1997-2003) line 17e (2004-2005) line 18 (2006 through 2008) of Schedule K. See Instructions for Form 1120S, 2006, at <http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i1120s.pdf> (accessed November 21, 2008) (indicating that Schedule K is a summary schedule of all shareholder’s shares of the corporation’s income, deductions, credits, etc.). Because the petitioner had additional income, credits, deductions, or other adjustments shown on its Schedule K for 2005 through 2007, the petitioner’s net income is found on Schedule K of its tax return for 2005 through 2007.

Therefore, for the year 2005, the petitioner did not have sufficient net income to pay the proffered wage.

As an alternate means of determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage, USCIS may review the petitioner's net current assets. Net current assets are the difference between the petitioner's current assets and current liabilities.⁵ A corporation's year-end current assets are shown on Schedule L, lines 1 through 6. Its year-end current liabilities are shown on lines 16 through 18. If the total of a corporation's end-of-year net current assets and the wages paid to the beneficiary (if any) are equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the petitioner is expected to be able to pay the proffered wage using those net current assets. The petitioner's tax returns demonstrate its end-of-year net current assets for 2005, as shown in the table below.⁶

- In 2005, the Form 1120S stated net current assets of \$2,311.

Therefore, for the year 2005, the petitioner did not have sufficient net current assets to pay the proffered wage of \$39,000.

Therefore, from the date the Form ETA 750 was accepted for processing by the DOL, the petitioner had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage as of the priority date through an examination of wages paid to the beneficiary, or its net income or net current assets.

On appeal, counsel asserts that the petitioner has established its ability to pay the proffered wage of \$39,000 based on its 2003 Form 1065, U.S. Return of Partnership Income, as the salary and wages paid out are "far above the proffered wage, hence showing the employer's ability to pay the wages." Counsel further claims that the petitioner had similar income for the years 2001 and 2002.

Counsel is mistaken. In 2001 through 2003, the petitioner showed its partnership income on its Form 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Returns. The address and the Employer ID Number (EIN) are not the same for the partnership and the petitioner, and therefore, they cannot be considered the same entity.⁷ Furthermore, while the partnership showed wages paid of \$47,344, there is no evidence that any of those wages were paid to the beneficiary. In general, wages already paid to others are not available to prove the ability to pay the wage proffered to the beneficiary at the priority

⁵According to *Barron's Dictionary of Accounting Terms* 117 (3rd ed. 2000), "current assets" consist of items having (in most cases) a life of one year or less, such as cash, marketable securities, inventory and prepaid expenses. "Current liabilities" are obligations payable (in most cases) within one year, such accounts payable, short-term notes payable, and accrued expenses (such as taxes and salaries). *Id.* at 118.

⁶ The petitioner has already established its ability to pay the proffered wage of \$39,000 in 2004 and 2006 through 2008 from its net income in those years.

⁷ The court in *Sitar v. Ashcroft*, 2003 WL 22203713 (D.Mass. Sept. 18, 2003) stated, "nothing in the governing regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 204.5, permits [USCIS] to consider the financial resources of individuals or entities who have no legal obligation to pay the wage."

date of the petition and continuing to the present. The AAO will not consider wages paid out by another entity when determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage.⁸

USCIS may consider the overall magnitude of the petitioner's business activities in its determination of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. See *Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (BIA 1967). The petitioning entity in *Sonogawa* had been in business for over 11 years and

⁸ The AAO notes that the sole proprietor lists a partnership, [REDACTED], on its 2002 and 2003 Forms 1040 under Schedule E. It is unclear whether or not this partnership is with the beneficiary. If the partnership is with the beneficiary, the record in this case also lacks conclusive evidence as to whether the petition is based on a bona fide job offer or whether the pre-existing business relationship may have influenced the labor certification.

Under 20 C.F.R. §§ 626.20(c)(8) and 656.3, the petitioner has the burden when asked to show that a valid employment relationship exists, that a *bona fide* job opportunity is available to U.S. workers. See *Matter of Amger Corp.*, 87-INA-545 (BALCA 1987). A relationship invalidating a *bona fide* job offer may arise where the beneficiary is related to the petitioner by "blood" or it may "be financial, by marriage, or through friendship." See *Matter of Summart 374*, 00-INA-93 (BALCA May 15, 2000). Where the person applying for a position owns the petitioner, it is not a *bona fide* offer. See *Bulk Farms, Inc. v. Martin*, 963 F.2d 1286 (9th Cir. 1992) (denied labor certification application for president, sole shareholder and chief cheese maker even where no person qualified for position applied). In *Matter of Silver Dragon Chinese Restaurant*, 19 I&N Dec. 401 (Comm. 1986), the commissioner noted that while it is not an automatic disqualification for an alien beneficiary to have an interest in a petitioning business, if the alien beneficiary's true relationship to the petitioning business is not apparent in the labor certification proceedings, it causes the certifying officer to fail to examine more carefully whether the position was clearly open to qualified U.S. workers and whether U.S. workers were rejected solely for lawful job-related reasons. That case relied upon a Department of Labor advisory opinion in invalidating the labor certification. The regulation at 20 C.F.R. § 656.30(d) provides that [USCIS], the Department of State or a court may invalidate a labor certification upon a determination of fraud or willful misrepresentation of a material fact involving the application for labor certification.

In *Hall v. McLaughlin*, 864 F.2d 868 (D.C. Cir. 1989), the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the alien's appeal from the Secretary of Labor's denial of his labor certification application. The court found that where the alien was the founder and corporate president of the petitioning corporation, absent a genuine employment relationship, the alien's ownership in the corporation was the functional equivalent of self-employment.

Given that the beneficiary may be in partnership with the petitioner, the facts of the instant case suggest that this may too be the functional equivalent of self-employment. The observations noted above suggest that further investigation, including consultation with the Department of Labor may be warranted, in order to determine whether any family, business, or personal relationship between the petitioner and the beneficiary represents an impediment to the approval of any employment-based visa petition filed by this petitioner on behalf of this beneficiary.

routinely earned a gross annual income of about \$100,000. During the year in which the petition was filed in that case, the petitioner changed business locations and paid rent on both the old and new locations for five months. There were large moving costs and also a period of time when the petitioner was unable to do regular business. The Regional Commissioner determined that the petitioner's prospects for a resumption of successful business operations were well established. The petitioner was a fashion designer whose work had been featured in *Time* and *Look* magazines. Her clients included Miss Universe, movie actresses, and society matrons. The petitioner's clients had been included in the lists of the best-dressed California women. The petitioner lectured on fashion design at design and fashion shows throughout the United States and at colleges and universities in California. The Regional Commissioner's determination in *Sonegawa* was based in part on the petitioner's sound business reputation and outstanding reputation as a couturiere. As in *Sonegawa*, USCIS may, at its discretion, consider evidence relevant to the petitioner's financial ability that falls outside of a petitioner's net income and net current assets. USCIS may consider such factors as the number of years the petitioner has been doing business, the established historical growth of the petitioner's business, the overall number of employees, the occurrence of any uncharacteristic business expenditures or losses, the petitioner's reputation within its industry, whether the beneficiary is replacing a former employee or an outsourced service, or any other evidence that USCIS deems relevant to the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage.

In the instant case, the petitioner's tax returns indicate it was established in 1998 and incorporated in 2003. The petitioner has provided tax returns for the years 2001 through 2008 with only the 2004 and the 2006 through 2008 tax returns establishing the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage of \$39,000. There also is not enough evidence to establish that the business has met all of its obligations in the past or to establish its historical growth. In addition, there is no evidence of the petitioner's reputation throughout the industry or of any temporary and uncharacteristic disruption in its business activities. Thus, assessing the totality of the circumstances in this individual case, it is concluded that the petitioner has not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage.

The evidence submitted does not establish that the petitioner had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date.

The second issue in this case is whether the petitioner has established that the beneficiary met the education, training, and experience requirements of the labor certification at the time of filing, April 30, 2001.

The petitioner must demonstrate that, on the priority date, the beneficiary had the qualifications stated on its labor certification application, as certified by the DOL and submitted with the instant petition. *Matter of Wing's Tea House*, 16 I&N Dec. 158 (Act. Reg. Comm. 1977). Here, the labor certification application was accepted on April 30, 2001.

Counsel does not address this issue on appeal.⁹

To determine whether a beneficiary is eligible for an employment-based immigrant visa, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) must examine whether the alien's credentials meet the requirements set forth in the labor certification. In evaluating the beneficiary's qualifications, USCIS must look to the job offer portion of the labor certification to determine the required qualifications for the position. USCIS may not ignore a term of the labor certification, nor may it impose additional requirements. *See Matter of Silver Dragon Chinese Restaurant*, 19 I&N Dec. 401, 406 (Comm. 1986). *See also, Mandany v. Smith*, 696 F.2d 1008, (D.C. Cir. 1983); *K.R.K. Irvine, Inc. v. Landon*, 699 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1983); *Stewart Infra-Red Commissary of Massachusetts, Inc. v. Coomey*, 661 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1981). According to the plain terms of the labor certification, the applicant must have two years of college, one month of training and three years of experience in the job offered. In addition, the applicant must also be proficient in English, Spanish, and Urdu.

The beneficiary set forth his credentials on the labor certification and signed his name under a declaration that the contents of the form are true and correct under the penalty of perjury. On the section of the labor certification eliciting information of the beneficiary's work experience, he represented that he has been employed by the petitioner since September 1998.¹⁰ He also indicated that he was employed by Taco Bell, Chico Mall, Chico, CA, as a manager from January 1991 through September 1998. In addition, on the section of the labor certification eliciting information of the beneficiary's education, he stated that he had a high school certificate from DJ College, Karachi, Pakistan and attended LaGuardia College, New York from 1989 to 1991, attended Chico State University, Chico, CA from 1991 through 1994, and attended Butte College, Oroville, CA from August 1991 through February 1999.

In his request for evidence, dated March 12, 2009, the director requested that the petitioner submit evidence that the beneficiary obtained the required experience in the job offered before April 30, 2001. The director specifically informed the petitioner that "evidence of experience must be in the form of letter(s) from current or former employer(s) giving the name, address, and title of the employer and a description of the experience of the alien, including specific dates of the employment and specific duties."

In response, counsel stated:

The beneficiary was working as a manager at Taco Bell in Chico, California for almost seven years. Since this was more than a decade ago, the beneficiary is still in the process of getting a verification letter from Taco Bell for the period that he was

⁹ It should be noted that counsel's failure to address this issue on appeal could have led to a summary dismissal. As stated in 8 C.F.R. § 103.3(a)(1)(v), an appeal shall be summarily dismissed if the party concerned fails to identify specifically any erroneous conclusion of law or statement of fact for the appeal. The petitioner here has not specifically identified any erroneous conclusion of law or statement of fact and has not provided any additional evidence regarding this issue on appeal.

¹⁰ *Supra* n. 2.

employed by them. The employment verification letter would be issued by April 24, 2009 and would be forwarded to you office.

The experience letter is not in the record of proceeding, and although the director noted in his decision that the petitioner had not demonstrated that the beneficiary met the minimum requirements at the time the Form ETA 750 was accepted, counsel did not address this issue on appeal.

The petitioner has not established its continuing ability to pay the proffered wage and has not established that the beneficiary met the minimum requirements of the labor certification at the time the labor certification was accepted for processing, April 30, 2001. Therefore, the petition may not be approved.

The burden of proof in these proceedings rests solely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The petitioner has not met that burden.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.