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U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U. S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Office of Administrative Appeals MS 2090
Washington, DC 20529-2090

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services

B6

[redacted]

FILE: [redacted] Office: TEXAS SERVICE CENTER Date: AUG 2 0 2010

IN RE: Petitioner: Beneficiary: [redacted]

PETITION: Immigrant petition for Alien Worker as a Skilled Worker or Professional Pursuant to Section 203(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:

[redacted]

INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied by us in reaching our decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. The specific requirements for filing such a request can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of $585. Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires that any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,

Perry Rhew
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The Director, Texas Service Center, denied the employment-based immigrant visa petition, which is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner is a design company. It seeks to employ the beneficiary permanently in the United States as a Project Engineer. As required by statute, an ETA Form 9089, Application for Permanent Employment Certification, approved by the Department of Labor (DOL), accompanied the petition. Upon reviewing the petition, the director determined that the petitioner failed to demonstrate that the beneficiary satisfied the minimum level of education stated on the labor certification.

The AAO conducts appellate review on a *de novo* basis. *See Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004).

Section 203(b)(3)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(i), provides for the granting of preference classification to qualified immigrants who are capable, at the time of petitioning for classification under this paragraph, of performing skilled labor (requiring at least two years training or experience), not of a temporary nature, for which qualified workers are not available in the United States. Section 203(b)(3)(A)(ii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(ii), also provides for the granting of preference classification to qualified immigrants who hold baccalaureate degrees and are members of the professions.

To be eligible for approval, a beneficiary must have all the education, training, and experience specified on the labor certification as of the petition's priority date. *See Matter of Wing's Tea House*, 16 I&N 158 (Act. Reg. Comm. 1977). Here, the ETA Form 9089 was accepted for processing on June 30, 2006.[1] The Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker (Form I-140) was filed on March 19, 2007.

The proffered position's requirements are found on ETA Form 9089 Part H. This section of the application for alien labor certification, "Job Opportunity Information," describes the terms and conditions of the job offered. It is important that the ETA Form 9089 be read as a whole. The instructions for the ETA Form 9089, Part H, provide:

> ***Minimum Education, Training, and Experience Required to Perform the Job Duties.*** Do not duplicate the time requirements. For example, time required in training should not also be listed in education or experience. Indicate whether months or years are required. Do not include restrictive requirements which are not actual business necessities for performance on the job and which would limit consideration of otherwise qualified U.S. workers.

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[1] If the petition is approved, the priority date is also used in conjunction with the Visa Bulletin issued by the Department of State to determine when a beneficiary can apply for adjustment of status or for an immigrant visa abroad. Thus, the importance of reviewing the *bona fides* of a job opportunity as of the priority date is clear.

On the ETA Form 9089, the job duties for the proffered position are listed in part H.11. as follows:

> Direct, coordinate & exercise authority for planning, organization & completion of projects for high-end kitchen/cabinetry design company, organize project staff according to project requirements. Assign personnel to specific phases of projects. Review design for compliance with engineering principles, company standards & customer contact. Evaluate & approve design changes, specifications and drawing releases.

Regarding the minimum level of education and experience required for the proffered position in this matter, Part H of the labor certification reflects the following requirements: Part H, Items 4 and 4-B of the labor certification indicate that the minimum educational requirement for the proffered position is a Bachelor's degree in engineering. Part H., Item 7 indicates that the petitioner will accept architecture as an alternate field of study. Part H., Item 9 indicates that a foreign educational equivalent is acceptable. Part H., Item 6 indicates that, in addition to a bachelor's degree in engineering or architecture, the position requires one of experience in the job offered. Part H., Item 8 indicates that no alternate combination of education and experience is acceptable for the position.

To determine whether a beneficiary is eligible for a preference immigrant visa, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) must ascertain whether the alien is, in fact, qualified for the certified job. USCIS will not accept a degree equivalency or an unrelated degree when a labor certification plainly and expressly requires a candidate with a specific degree. In evaluating the beneficiary's qualifications, USCIS must look to the job offer portion of the labor certification to determine the required qualifications for the position. USCIS may not ignore a term of the labor certification, nor may it impose additional requirements. *See Matter of Silver Dragon Chinese Restaurant*, 19 I&N Dec. 401, 406 (Comm. 1986). *See also*, *Madany*, 696 F.2d at 1008; *K.R.K. Irvine, Inc.*, 699 F.2d at 1006; *Stewart Infra-Red Commissary of Massachusetts, Inc. v. Coomey*, 661 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1981).

As set forth above, the proffered position requires a Bachelor's degree in engineering or architecture and one year of experience in the job offered.

On the ETA Form 9089, signed by the beneficiary, the beneficiary represented that the highest level of achieved education related to the requested occupation was a Bachelor's degree in engineering. He listed the institution of study where that education was obtained as Senior School on Antioquia Institutional University, and the year completed as 1991.

In support of the beneficiary's educational qualifications, the petitioner provided transcripts and a certificate from [redacted] which shows that the beneficiary was awarded the title of Technical Designer of Architecture and Engineering (Titulo de Tecnologo Delineante de Arquitectura e Ingeniera) in 1991. In addition, the petitioner submitted an evaluation from [redacted] of the University of Southern California which concluded that the beneficiary's title of Technical Designer of Architecture and Engineering was equivalent to three years of study towards a Bachelor of Science Degree in the field of engineering. Mr. [redacted] further concluded that the beneficiary's title, in combination with the beneficiary's work experience, was the equivalent of a

Bachelor of Science degree in Engineering from an accredited institution of higher education in the United States.

The director denied the petition on December 21, 2007. He determined that the beneficiary's title of Technical Designer of Architecture and Engineering (Titulo de Tecnologo Delineante de Arquitectura e Ingeniera) could not be accepted as a foreign equivalent degree to a U.S. bachelor's degree in engineering or architecture.

On appeal, the petitioner submitted an evaluation of the beneficiary's academic credentials dated January 25, 2008 prepared by Mr. of the Trustforte Corporation. In addition to the beneficiary's title of Technical Designer of Architecture and Engineering from the evaluation considers courses completed by the beneficiary at the Politecnico Colombiano Jaime Isaza Cadavidad from 1991 to 1995 and at the Universidad Nacional de Colombia from 1996 to 2000. The petitioner has not clearly established the beneficiary was awarded a degree by either of these institutions. The evaluation concludes, based on the combination of the beneficiary's title of Technical Designer of Architecture and Engineering and courses completed at these other institutions, that the beneficiary has attained to equivalent of a Bachelor of Science Degree in Engineering from an accredited U.S. college or university.

Part F of the ETA 9089 indicates that the DOL assigned the occupational code of 11-9021 and title Project Engineer, to the proffered position. DOL's occupational codes are assigned based on normalized occupational standards. According to DOL's public online database at *http://online.onetcenter.org/link/summary/11-9021.00* (accessed July 15, 2010) and its description of the position and requirements for the position most analogous to the petitioner's proffered position, the position falls within Job Zone Four requiring a "considerable amount of work-related skill, knowledge, or experience" for the occupation type closest to the proffered position.

According to DOL, two to four years of work-related skill, knowledge, or experience are needed for Job Zone 4 occupations. DOL assigns a standard vocational preparation (SVP) range of 7-8 to Job Zone 4 occupations, which means "[m]ost of these occupations require a four-year bachelor's degree, but some do not." *See http://online.onetcenter.org/link/summary/11-9021.00* (accessed July 15, 2010). Additionally, DOL states the following concerning the training and overall experience required for these occupations:

> A considerable amount of work-related skill, knowledge, or experience is needed for these occupations. For example, an accountant must complete four years of college and work for several years in accounting to be considered qualified.

See id. Because of the requirements of the proffered position and DOL's standard occupational requirements, the proffered position is for a professional, but might also be considered under the skilled worker category.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(l)(3)(ii)(C) states the following:

> If the petition is for a professional, the petition must be accompanied by evidence that the alien holds a United States baccalaureate degree or a foreign equivalent degree and by evidence that the alien is a member of the professions. Evidence of a baccalaureate degree shall be in the form of an official college or university record showing the date the baccalaureate degree was awarded and the area of concentration of study. To show that the alien is a member of the professions, the petitioner must submit evidence that the minimum of a baccalaureate degree is required for entry into the occupation.

The above regulation uses a singular description of foreign equivalent degree. Thus, the plain meaning of the regulatory language concerning the professional classification sets forth the requirement that a beneficiary must produce one degree that is determined to be the foreign equivalent of a U.S. baccalaureate degree in order to be qualified as a professional for third preference visa category purposes.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 204(5)(l)(3)(ii)(B) states the following:

> If the petition is for a skilled worker, the petition must be accompanied by evidence that the alien meets the educational, training or experience, and any other requirements of the individual labor certification, meets the requirements for Schedule A designation, or meets the requirements for the Labor Market Information Pilot Program occupation designation. The minimum requirements for this classification are at least two years of training or experience.

The above regulation requires that the alien meet the requirements of the labor certification.

Because the petition's proffered position qualifies for consideration under both the professional and skilled worker categories, the AAO will apply the regulatory requirements from both provisions to the facts of the case at hand, beginning with the professional category.

Initially, however, we will provide an explanation of the general process of procuring an employment-based immigrant visa and the roles and respective authority of both agencies involved.

As noted above, the Form ETA 9089 in this matter is certified by the DOL. Thus, at the outset, it is useful to discuss the DOL's role in this process. Section 212(a)(5)(A)(i) of the Act provides:

> In general.-Any alien who seeks to enter the United States for the purpose of performing skilled or unskilled labor is inadmissible, unless the Secretary of Labor has determined and certified to the Secretary of State and the Attorney General that-
>
> > (I) there are not sufficient workers who are able, willing, qualified (or equally qualified in the case of an alien described in clause (ii)) and available at the time of application for a visa and admission to the United States and at the place where the alien is to perform such skilled or unskilled labor, and

> (II) the employment of such alien will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of workers in the United States similarly employed.

It is significant that none of the above inquiries assigned to the DOL, or the remaining regulations implementing these duties under 20 C.F.R. § 656, involve a determination as to whether the position and the alien are qualified for a specific immigrant classification. This fact has not gone unnoticed by Federal Circuit Courts:

> There is no doubt that the authority to make preference classification decisions rests with INS. The language of section 204 cannot be read otherwise. *See Castaneda-Gonzalez v. INS*, 564 F.2d 417, 429 (D.C. Cir. 1977). In turn, DOL has the authority to make the two determinations listed in section 212(a)(14).[2] Id. at 423. The necessary result of these two grants of authority is that section 212(a)(14) determinations are not subject to review by INS absent fraud or willful misrepresentation, but all matters relating to preference classification eligibility not expressly delegated to DOL remain within INS' authority.
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> * * *
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> Given the language of the Act, the totality of the legislative history, and the agencies' own interpretations of their duties under the Act, we must conclude that Congress did not intend DOL to have primary authority to make any determinations other than the two stated in section 212(a)(14). If DOL is to analyze alien qualifications, it is for the purpose of "matching" them with those of corresponding United States workers so that it will then be "in a position to meet the requirement of the law," namely the section 212(a)(14) determinations.

Madany v. Smith, 696 F.2d 1008, 1012-1013 (D.C. Cir. 1983).

Relying in part on *Madany*, 696 F.2d at 1008, the Ninth circuit stated:

> [I]t appears that the DOL is responsible only for determining the availability of suitable American workers for a job and the impact of alien employment upon the domestic labor market. It does not appear that the DOL's role extends to determining if the alien is qualified for the job for which he seeks sixth preference status. That determination appears to be delegated to the INS under section 204(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1154(b), as one of the determinations incident to the INS's decision whether the alien is entitled to sixth preference status.

K.R.K. Irvine, Inc. v. Landon, 699 F.2d 1006, 1008 (9th Cir. 1983). The court relied on an amicus brief from the DOL that stated the following:

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[2] Based on revisions to the Act, the current citation is section 212(a)(5)(A) as set forth above.

> The labor certification made by the Secretary of Labor ... pursuant to section 212(a)(14) of the ... [Act] ... is binding as to the findings of whether there are able, willing, qualified, and available United States workers for the job offered to the alien, and whether employment of the alien under the terms set by the employer would adversely affect the wages and working conditions of similarly employed United States workers. *The labor certification in no way indicates that the alien offered the certified job opportunity is qualified (or not qualified) to perform the duties of that job.*

(Emphasis added.) *Id.* at 1009. The Ninth Circuit, citing *K.R.K. Irvine, Inc.*, 699 F.2d at 1006, revisited this issue, stating:

> The Department of Labor ("DOL") must certify that insufficient domestic workers are available to perform the job and that the alien's performance of the job will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of similarly employed domestic workers. *Id.* § 212(a)(14), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(14). The INS then makes its own determination of the alien's entitlement to sixth preference status. *Id.* § 204(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1154(b). *See generally K.R.K. Irvine, Inc. v. Landon*, 699 F.2d 1006, 1008 9th Cir.1983).
>
> The INS, therefore, may make a de novo determination of whether the alien is in fact qualified to fill the certified job offer.

Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman, 736 F. 2d 1305, 1309 (9th Cir. 1984).

Therefore, it is the DOL's responsibility to certify the terms of the labor certification, but it is the responsibility of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) to determine if the petition and the alien beneficiary are eligible for the classification sought. For classification as a member of the professions, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(l)(3)(ii)(C) requires that the alien had a U.S. baccalaureate degree or a foreign equivalent degree and be a member of the professions. Additionally, the regulation requires the submission of "an official *college or university* record showing the date the baccalaureate degree was awarded and the area of concentration of study." (Emphasis added.)

In 1991, when the final rule for 8 C.F.R. § 204.5 was published in the Federal Register, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (now USCIS or the Service), responded to criticism that the regulation required an alien to have a bachelor's degree as a minimum and that the regulation did not allow for the substitution of experience for education. After reviewing section 121 of the Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-649 (1990), and the Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference, the Service specifically noted that both the Act and the legislative history indicate that an alien must have at least a bachelor's degree: "[B]oth the Act and its legislative history make clear that, in order to qualify as a professional under the third classification or to have experience equating to an advanced degree under the second, *an alien must have at least a bachelor's degree.*" 56 Fed. Reg. 60897, 60900 (November 29, 1991)(emphasis added).

Moreover, it is significant that both the statute, section 203(b)(3)(A)(ii) of the Act, and relevant regulations use the word "degree" in relation to professionals. A statute should be construed under the assumption that Congress intended it to have purpose and meaningful effect. *Mountain States Tel. & Tel. v. Pueblo of Santa Ana*, 472 U.S. 237, 249 (1985); *Sutton v. United States*, 819 F.2d. 1289m 1295 (5th Cir. 1987). It can be presumed that Congress' narrow requirement in of a "degree" for members of the professions is deliberate. Significantly, in another context, Congress has broadly referenced "the possession of a degree, diploma, certificate, or similar award from a college, university, school, or other institution of learning." Section 203(b)(2)(C) (relating to aliens of exceptional ability). Thus, the requirement at section 203(b)(3)(A)(ii) that an eligible alien both have a baccalaureate "degree" and be a member of the professions reveals that a member of the professions must have a *degree* and that a diploma or certificate from an institution of learning other than a college or university is a potentially similar but distinct type of credential. Thus, even if we did not require "a" degree that is the foreign equivalent of a U.S. baccalaureate degree, we would not consider education earned at an institution other than a college or university.

The evaluation by Mr. [redacted] of the University of Southern California relies on combination of the beneficiary's title of Technical Designer of Architecture and Engineering and work experience to reach the "equivalent" of a degree, which is not a bachelor's degree based on a single degree in the required field listed on the certified labor certification. The evaluation by Mr. [redacted] of The Trustforte Corporation relies on a combination of the beneficiary's title of Technical Designer of Architecture and Engineering and courses completed at other institutions to reach the "equivalent" of a degree. Like the combination of the beneficiary's title and work experience, the combination of the beneficiary's title and courses completed at other institutions is not a bachelor's degree based on a single degree in the required field listed on the certified labor certification.

There is no provision in the statute or the regulations that would allow a beneficiary to qualify under section 203(b)(3)(A)(ii) of the Act with anything less than a full baccalaureate degree. More specifically, a three-year bachelor's degree will not be considered to be the "foreign equivalent degree" to a United States baccalaureate degree. Where the analysis of the beneficiary's credentials relies on work experience alone or a combination of multiple lesser degrees, the result is the "equivalent" of a bachelor's degree rather than a single-source "foreign equivalent degree." In order to have experience and education equating to a bachelor's degree under section 203(b)(3)(A)(ii) of the Act, the beneficiary must have a single degree that is the "foreign equivalent degree" to a United States baccalaureate degree.

Because the beneficiary does not have a "United States baccalaureate degree or a foreign equivalent degree," from a college or university in the required field of study listed on the certified labor certification, the beneficiary does not qualify for preference visa classification under section 203(b)(3)(A)(ii) of the Act as he does not have the minimum level of education required for the equivalent of a bachelor's degree.

We are cognizant of the recent decision in *Grace Korean United Methodist Church v. Michael Chertoff*, 437 F. Supp. 2d 1174 (D. Or. 2005), which finds that U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) "does not have the authority or expertise to impose its strained definition of 'B.A.

or equivalent' on that term as set forth in the labor certification." In contrast to the broad precedential authority of the case law of a United States circuit court, the AAO is not bound to follow the published decision of a United States district court in matters arising within the same district. *See Matter of K-S-*, 20 I&N Dec. 715 (BIA 1993). Although the reasoning underlying a district judge's decision will be given due consideration when it is properly before the AAO, the analysis does not have to be followed as a matter of law. *Id.* at 719. The court in *Grace Korean* makes no attempt to distinguish its holding from the Circuit Court decisions cited above. Instead, as legal support for its determination, the court cited to a case holding that the United States Postal Service has no expertise or special competence in immigration matters. *Grace Korean United Methodist Church*, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 1179 (citing *Tovar v. U.S. Postal Service*, 3 F.3d 1271, 1276 (9th Cir. 1993)). On its face, *Tovar* is easily distinguishable from the present matter since USCIS, through the authority delegated by the Secretary of Homeland Security, is charged by statute with the enforcement of the United States immigration laws and not with the delivery of mail. *See* section 103(a) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a).

Additionally, we also note the recent decision in *Snapnames.com, Inc. v. Michael Chertoff*, 2006 WL 3491005 (D. Or. Nov. 30, 2006). In that case, the labor certification application specified an educational requirement of four years of college and a 'B.S. or foreign equivalent.' The district court determined that 'B.S. or foreign equivalent' relates solely to the alien's educational background, precluding consideration of the alien's combined education and work experience. *Snapnames.com, Inc.* at *11-13. Additionally, the court determined that the word 'equivalent' in the employer's educational requirements was ambiguous and that in the context of skilled worker petitions (where there is no statutory educational requirement), deference must be given to the employer's intent. *Snapnames.com, Inc.* at *14. However, in professional and advanced degree professional cases, where the beneficiary is statutorily required to hold a baccalaureate degree, the USCIS properly concluded that a single foreign degree or its equivalent is required. *Snapnames.com, Inc.* at *17, 19.

In the instant case, unlike the labor certification in *Snapnames.com, Inc.*, the petitioner's intent regarding educational equivalence is clearly stated on the Form ETA 9089 and does not include alternatives to a bachelor's degree. The court in *Snapnames.com, Inc.* recognized that even though the labor certification may be prepared with the alien in mind, USCIS has an independent role in determining whether the alien meets the labor certification requirements. *Id.* at *7. Thus, the court concluded that where the plain language of those requirements does not support the petitioner's asserted intent, USCIS "does not err in applying the requirements as written." *Id. See also Maramjaya v. USCIS,* Civ. Act No. 06-2158 (RCL) (D.C. Cir. March 26, 2008)(upholding an interpretation that a "bachelor's or equivalent" requirement necessitated a single four-year degree). In this matter, the Form ETA 9089 does not specify an equivalency to the requirement of a Bachelor's degree in engineering or architecture.

Where the job requirements in a labor certification are not otherwise unambiguously prescribed, e.g., by professional regulation, USCIS must examine "the language of the labor certification job requirements" in order to determine what the petitioner must demonstrate about the beneficiary's qualifications. *Madany*, 696 F.2d at 1015. The only rational manner by which USCIS can be

expected to interpret the meaning of terms used to describe the requirements of a job in a labor certification is to "examine the certified job offer *exactly* as it is completed by the prospective employer." *Rosedale Linden Park Company v. Smith*, 595 F. Supp. 829, 833 (D.D.C. 1984)(emphasis added). USCIS's interpretation of the job's requirements, as stated on the labor certification must involve "reading and applying *the plain language* of the [labor certification application form]." *Id.* at 834 (emphasis added). USCIS cannot and should not reasonably be expected to look beyond the plain language of the labor certification that DOL has formally issued or otherwise attempt to divine the employer's intentions through some sort of reverse engineering of the labor certification.

Further, the employer's subjective intent may not be dispositive of the meaning of the actual minimum requirements of the proffered position. *Maramjaya v. USCIS,* Civ. Act. No. 06-2158, 14 n. 7. Thus, USCIS agrees that the best evidence of the petitioner's intent concerning the actual minimum educational requirements of the proffered position is evidence of how it expressed those requirements to DOL during the labor certification process and not afterwards to USCIS. The timing of such evidence is needed to ensure inflation of those requirements is not occurring in an effort to fit the beneficiary's credentials into requirements that do not seem on their face to include what the beneficiary has.

On January 21, 2010, the AAO issued a request for evidence to the petitioner. The AAO also noted that the petitioner did not specify on the ETA Form 9089 that the minimum academic requirements of a bachelor's degree in engineering or architecture might be met through a combination of lesser degrees and/or a quantifiable amount of work experience or other educational experiences. The AAO stated that a title of Technical Designer of Architecture and Engineering is equivalent to three years or three and a half years of undergraduate study in the United States and that the labor certification application, as certified, did not demonstrate that the petitioner would accept a combination of degrees that are individually less than a single-source U.S. bachelor's degree or its foreign equivalent and/or a quantifiable amount of work experience when the labor market test was conducted.

To determine whether a beneficiary is eligible for a preference immigrant visa, USCIS must ascertain whether the alien is, in fact, qualified for the certified job. USCIS will not accept a degree equivalency or an unrelated degree when a labor certification plainly and expressly requires a candidate with a specific degree. In evaluating the beneficiary's qualifications, USCIS must look to the job offer portion of the labor certification to determine the required qualifications for the position. USCIS may not ignore a term of the labor certification, nor may it impose additional requirements. *See Matter of Silver Dragon Chinese Restaurant*, 19 I&N Dec. 401, 406 (Comm. 1986). *See also*, *Madany*, 696 F.2d at 1008; *K.R.K. Irvine, Inc.*, 699 F.2d at 1006; *Stewart Infra-Red Commissary of Massachusetts, Inc. v. Coomey*, 661 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1981).

In response to the request for evidence, counsel submits a copy of the recruitment report, copies of postings on New Jersey's Job Bank and other websites, copies of newspaper advertisements, copy of a notice of the employee referral program and a copy of the Notice of Job Availability. The petitioner's recruitment report states that the petitioner will "accept any suitable combination of education and experience which has been professionally evaluated to equate to a Bachelor's degree

in Engineering." Similarly, the Notice of Job Availability states "Employer will accept foreign degree or any combination of education and experience which is the evaluated equivalent to a bachelor's Degree in the US."

However, the newspaper and website postings state that the position requires a bachelor's degree in engineering or architecture and one year of experience. Further, the petitioner's recruitment report states that no applications were received in response to either the advertisements or notice of filing. Therefore, it is not clear that the petitioner would actually accept less than a full bachelor's degree.

Moreover, as advised in the request for evidence issued to the petitioner by this office, we have reviewed the Electronic Database for Global Education (EDGE) created by the American Association of Collegiate Registrars and Admissions Officers (AACRAO).[3] According to its website, www.aacrao.org, is "a nonprofit, voluntary, professional association of more than 10,000 higher education admissions and registration professionals who represent approximately 2,500 institutions in more than 30 countries." Its mission "is to provide professional development, guidelines and voluntary standards to be used by higher education officials regarding the best practices in records management, admissions, enrollment management, administrative information technology and student services." According to the registration page for EDGE, http://aacraoedge.aacrao.org/register/index/php, EDGE is "a web-based resource for the evaluation of foreign educational credentials." Authors for EDGE are not merely expressing their personal opinions. Rather, they must work with a publication consultant and a Council Liaison with AACRAO's National Council on the Evaluation of Foreign Educational Credentials. "An Author's Guide to Creating AACRAO International Publications" 5-6 (First ed. 2005), available for download at *www. Aacrao.org/publications/guide to creating international publications.pdf.* If placement recommendations are included, the Council Liaison works with the author to give feedback and the publication is subject to final review by the entire Council. *Id.* at 11-12.

EDGE provides a great deal of information about the educational system in Colombia, and while it confirms that Titulo de Tecnologo is "awarded after completion of 3 - 3.5 years of study at a *instituto tecnológico* (technical institute)" and "represents attainment of a level of education comparable to 3 - 3.5 years of university study in the United States," it does not suggest that such a degree from Colombia may be deemed a foreign equivalent degree to a U.S. baccalaureate.

The ETA Form 9089 does not provide that the minimum academic requirements of a Bachelor's degree in engineering or architecture might be met through three years of college or some other formula other than that explicitly stated on the ETA Form 9089. Thus, the alien does not qualify as a skilled worker as he does not meet the terms of the labor certification as explicitly expressed or as extrapolated from the evidence of its intent about those requirements during the labor certification

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[3] In *Confluence Intern., Inc. v. Holder,* 2009 WL 825793 (D.Minn. March 27, 2009), the District Court in Minnesota determined that the AAO provided a rational explanation for its reliance on information provided by the American Association of Collegiate Registrar and Admissions Officers to support its decision.

process.

The beneficiary does not have a United States baccalaureate degree or a foreign equivalent degree, and, thus, does not qualify for preference visa classification under section 203(b)(3)(A)(ii) of the Act.

Further, the record does not establish that the petitioner had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage. The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) states:

> *Ability of prospective employer to pay wage.* Any petition filed by or for an employment-based immigrant which requires an offer of employment must be accompanied by evidence that the prospective United States employer has the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner must demonstrate this ability at the time the priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. Evidence of this ability shall be either in the form of copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements.

The petitioner must demonstrate the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, which is the date the ETA Form 9089 was accepted for processing by any office within the employment system of the DOL. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(d). Here, the ETA Form 9089 was accepted on June 30, 2006. The proffered wage as stated on the ETA Form 9089 is $37.35 per hour ($77,688.00 per year).

The evidence in the record of proceeding shows that the petitioner is structured as a New Jersey LLC and reported its income on schedule C of its member's Form 1040 individual tax return since it is a single member LLC. For a single-member LLC taxed as a sole proprietorship, USCIS considers net income to be the figure shown on Schedule C, Line 31 of Form 1040.[4] On the ETA Form 9089, signed by the beneficiary, the beneficiary claimed to have worked for the petitioner since February 1, 2002.

The petitioner must establish that its job offer to the beneficiary is a realistic one. Because the filing of an ETA 9089 labor certification application establishes a priority date for any immigrant petition later based on the ETA 9089, the petitioner must establish that the job offer was realistic as of the

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[4] Although taxed as a sole proprietor, a LLC's owner or member enjoys limited liability similar to owners of a corporation. A LLC, like a corporation is a legal entity separate and distinct from its owners. The debts and obligations of the company generally are not the debts and obligations of the owners or anyone else. An investor's liability is limited to his or her initial investment. As the owners and others only are liable to their initial investments, the total income and assets of the owners and others and their ability, if they wished, to pay the company's debts and obligations, cannot be utilized to demonstrate the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner must show the ability to pay the proffered wage out of its own funds. Similarly, unlike a sole proprietorship, USCIS will not consider the single member's adjusted gross income as the LLC's net income and will not consider the single member's other liquefiable assets and personal liabilities as part of the petitioner's ability to pay.

priority date and that the offer remained realistic for each year thereafter, until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. The petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is an essential element in evaluating whether a job offer is realistic. *See Matter of Great Wall*, 16 I&N Dec. 142 (Acting Reg. Comm. 1977); *see also* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2). In evaluating whether a job offer is realistic, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) requires the petitioner to demonstrate financial resources sufficient to pay the beneficiary's proffered wages, although the totality of the circumstances affecting the petitioning business will be considered if the evidence warrants such consideration. *See Matter of Sonegawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (Reg. Comm. 1967).

In determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage during a given period, USCIS will first examine whether the petitioner employed and paid the beneficiary during that period. If the petitioner establishes by documentary evidence that it employed the beneficiary at a salary equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the evidence will be considered *prima facie* proof of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. In the instant case, the record of proceeding contains copies of Forms W-2, Wage and Tax Statement, issued by the petitioner to the beneficiary for the years 2005 through 2009.[5] These show that the beneficiary was paid $48,769.24 in 2006, $52,000 in 2007, $45,900.00 in 2008, and $57,040.00 in 2009. The petitioner must establish its ability to pay the difference between the proffered wage and wages actually paid to the beneficiary: $28,918.76 in 2006; $25,688.00 in 2007; $31,788.00 in 2008; and $20,648.00 in 2009.

If the petitioner does not establish that it employed and paid the beneficiary an amount at least equal to the proffered wage during that period, USCIS will next examine the net income figure reflected on the petitioner's federal income tax return, without consideration of depreciation or other expenses. *River Street Donuts, LLC v. Napolitano*, 558 F.3d 111 (1st Cir. 2009). Reliance on federal income tax returns as a basis for determining a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is well established by judicial precedent. *Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava*, 632 F. Supp. 1049, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (*citing Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman*, 736 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1984)); *see also Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh*, 719 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Texas 1989); *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); *Ubeda v. Palmer*, 539 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982), *aff'd*, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983). Reliance on the petitioner's gross sales and profits and wage expense is misplaced. Showing that the petitioner's gross sales and profits exceeded the proffered wage is insufficient. Similarly, showing that the petitioner paid wages in excess of the proffered wage is insufficient.

In *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. at 1084, the court held that the Immigration and Naturalization Service, now CIS, had properly relied on the petitioner's net income figure, as stated on the petitioner's corporate income tax returns, rather than the petitioner's gross income. The court

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[5] As noted above, the petitioner is only required to establish its ability to pay the proffered wage as of the priority date, which in this case is June 30, 2006. Therefore, the petitioner is not required to establish its ability to pay the proffered wage in 2005. However, the 2005 Form W-2 will be considered generally in determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage, as will the petitioner's 2005 Schedule C, Form 1040, which is also in the record.

specifically rejected the argument that the Service should have considered income before expenses were paid rather than net income.

With respect to depreciation, the court in *River Street Donuts* noted:

> The AAO recognized that a depreciation deduction is a systematic allocation of the cost of a tangible long-term asset and does not represent a specific cash expenditure during the year claimed. Furthermore, the AAO indicated that the allocation of the depreciation of a long-term asset could be spread out over the years or concentrated into a few depending on the petitioner's choice of accounting and depreciation methods. Nonetheless, the AAO explained that depreciation represents an actual cost of doing business, which could represent either the diminution in value of buildings and equipment or the accumulation of funds necessary to replace perishable equipment and buildings. Accordingly, the AAO stressed that even though amounts deducted for depreciation do not represent current use of cash, neither does it represent amounts available to pay wages.
>
> We find that the AAO has a rational explanation for its policy of not adding depreciation back to net income. Namely, that the amount spent on a long term tangible asset is a "real" expense.

River Street Donuts at 116. "[USCIS] and judicial precedent support the use of tax returns and the *net income figures* in determining petitioner's ability to pay. Plaintiffs' argument that these figures should be revised by the court by adding back depreciation is without support." *Chi-Feng Chang* at 537 (emphasis added).

As noted above, for a single-member LLC taxed as a sole proprietorship, USCIS considers net income to be the figure shown on Schedule C, Line 31 of Form 1040. The petitioner's tax returns demonstrate its net income for the years 2006 through 2008,[6] as shown in the table below.

- In 2006, Schedule C of Form 1040 stated net income of $1,784.00.
- In 2007, Schedule C of Form 1040 stated net income of -$75,797.00.
- In 2008, Schedule C of Form 1040 stated net income of $71,547.00.

In 2008, the petitioner had sufficient net income to pay the difference between the proffered wage and wages actually paid to the beneficiary. However, for the years 2006 and 2007, the petitioner did not have sufficient net income to pay the difference between the proffered wage and wages actually paid to the beneficiary.

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[6] The record closed on March 2, 2010 with the receipt by this office of the petitioner's submissions in response to the request for evidence. As of that date, the petitioner's 2009 federal income tax return was not yet due. Therefore, the petitioner's income tax return for 2008 is the most recent return available.

If the net income the petitioner demonstrates it had available during that period, if any, added to the wages paid to the beneficiary during the period, if any, do not equal the amount of the proffered wage or more, USCIS will review the petitioner's net current assets. Net current assets are the difference between the petitioner's current assets and current liabilities.[7] The net current assets of a single-member LLC are not listed on tax returns, but would be listed on an audited balance sheet. However, the petitioner has not submitted audited financial statements. Therefore, the petitioner has failed to establish that it had sufficient net current assets to pay the proffered wage in 2006 or 2007.

Therefore, from the date the Form ETA 9089 was accepted for processing by the DOL, the petitioner had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage as of the priority date through an examination of wages paid to the beneficiary, net income or net current assets.

On appeal, counsel asserts that there is another way to determine the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. Specifically, counsel states that the petitioner's bank statements establish its ability to pay the proffered wage. Counsel's reliance on the balances in the petitioner's bank accounts is misplaced. First, bank statements are not among the three types of evidence, enumerated in 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2), required to illustrate a petitioner's ability to pay a proffered wage. While this regulation allows additional material "in appropriate cases," the petitioner in this case has not demonstrated why the documentation specified at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) is inapplicable or otherwise paints an inaccurate financial picture of the petitioner. Second, bank statements show the amount in an account on a given date, and cannot show the sustainable ability to pay a proffered wage. Third, the petitioner's assets, such as cash, must be balanced by the petitioner's liabilities. Otherwise, they cannot properly be considered in the determination of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. The bank statements provide evidence of an asset. However, counsel has not provided any information regarding the petitioner's liabilities. Therefore, the petitioner's bank statements are insufficient to establish its ability to pay the proffered wage.

Counsel also cites *Matter of Sonegawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 and states that the years 2006 and 2007 were "uncharacteristically slow" for the petitioner. The decision in *Sonegawa* related to a petition filed during uncharacteristically unprofitable or difficult years in a framework of profitable or successful years. The petitioning entity in *Sonegawa* had been in business for over 11 years and routinely earned a gross annual income of about $100,000.00. During the year in which the petition was filed in that case, the petitioner changed business locations and paid rent on both the old and new locations for five months. There were large moving costs and also a period of time when the petitioner was unable to do regular business. The Regional Commissioner determined that the petitioner's prospects for a resumption of successful business operations were well established. The petitioner was a fashion designer whose work had been featured in *Time* and *Look* magazines.

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[7]According to *Barron's Dictionary of Accounting Terms* 117 (3rd ed. 2000), "current assets" consist of items having (in most cases) a life of one year or less, such as cash, marketable securities, inventory and prepaid expenses. "Current liabilities" are obligations payable (in most cases) within one year, such accounts payable, short-term notes payable, and accrued expenses (such as taxes and salaries). *Id.* at 118.

Clients included Miss Universe, movie actresses, and society matrons. The petitioner's clients had been included in lists of the best-dressed California women. The petitioner lectured on fashion design at design and fashion shows throughout the United States and at colleges and universities in California. The Regional Commissioner's determination in *Sonegawa* was based in part on the petitioner's sound business reputation and outstanding reputation as a couturiere.

In this matter, although counsel states that 2006 and 2007 were uncharacteristically slow years, there is no evidence in the record to support this assertion. The assertions of counsel do not constitute evidence. *Matter of Obaigbena*, 19 I&N Dec. 533, 534 (BIA 1988); *Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez*, 17 I&N Dec. 503, 506 (BIA 1980). To the contrary, the petitioner's tax returns show that the petitioner's gross receipts were higher in 2006 than in any other year for which there is information in the record. Further, the petitioner did not establish a pattern of profitable or successful years – the petitioner's net income was negative in 2005 and 2007, and was less than $2,000.00 in 2006. Thus, assessing the totality of the circumstances in this individual case, it is concluded that the petitioner has not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage.

The burden of proof in these proceedings rests solely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The petitioner has not met that burden.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.