


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U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U. S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Office of Administrative Appeals MS 2090
Washington, DC 20529-2090




U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services



B6

FILE:  Office: NEBRASKA SERVICE CENTER Date: DEC 17 2010

IN RE: Petitioner: 
Beneficiary: 

PETITION: Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as an Other Worker pursuant to Section 203(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:




INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied by us in reaching our decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. The specific requirements for filing such a request can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$630. Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires that any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,


Perry Rhew
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The Director, Nebraska Service Center, denied the preference visa petition. The matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner is a steel construction company. It seeks to employ the beneficiary permanently in the United States as a maintenance and repair worker ("mechanical technician"). As required by statute, the petition is accompanied by a labor certification application approved by the United States Department of Labor (DOL). The director determined that the labor certification did not support the visa category that the petitioner requested. The director denied the petition accordingly.

The record shows that the appeal is properly filed, timely and makes a specific allegation of error in law or fact. The procedural history in this case is documented by the record and incorporated into the decision. Further elaboration of the procedural history will be made only as necessary.

As set forth in the director's December 1, 2008 denial, the issue in this case is whether the petition was filed under the correct category as the labor certification requires three years of college, four years of training, and eight years of experience, however, the petition was filed as one for an "other worker" instead of for a "skilled worker." On appeal, we have identified additional issues: whether the petitioner submitted evidence of its ability to pay the proffered wage and whether the petitioner documented that the beneficiary had the requisite experience as of the priority date.

Section 203(b)(3)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(iii), provides for the granting of preference classification to qualified immigrants who are capable, at the time of petitioning for classification under this paragraph, of performing unskilled labor, not of a temporary nature, for which qualified workers are not available in the United States. Section 203(b)(3)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(i), provides for the granting of preference classification to qualified immigrants who are capable, at the time of petitioning for classification under this paragraph, of performing skilled labor (requiring at least two years training or experience), not of a temporary nature, for which qualified workers are not available in the United States.

The AAO maintains plenary power to review each appeal on a de novo basis. *Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004). The AAO considers all pertinent evidence in the record, including new evidence properly submitted upon appeal.¹

Here, the Form I-140 was filed on October 9, 2007. On Part 2.g. of the Form I-140, the petitioner indicated that it was filing the petition for an other worker.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(i) provides in pertinent part:

¹ The submission of additional evidence on appeal is allowed by the instructions to the Form I-290B, which are incorporated into the regulations by the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(1). The record in the instant case provides no reason to preclude consideration of any of the documents newly submitted on appeal. See *Matter of Soriano*, 19 I&N Dec. 764 (BIA 1988).

(4) Differentiating between skilled and other workers. The determination of whether a worker is a skilled or other worker will be based on the requirements of training and/or experience placed on the job by the prospective employer, as certified by the Department of Labor.

In this case, the labor certification indicates that three years of college in the field of mechanics, four years of training, and eight years of experience as a mechanical technician with knowledge in mechanical and electrical works is required for the proffered position. However, the petitioner requested the other worker classification on the Form I-140, which requires less than two years of experience. There is no provision in statute or regulation that compels United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) to readjudicate a petition under a different visa classification in response to a petitioner's request to change it, once the decision has been rendered.

On appeal, the petitioner stated that the beneficiary has the equivalent of two years and six months of college under the theory that three years of experience is equivalent to one year of education. The beneficiary's qualifications are irrelevant to the question of whether the labor certification requires education and/or experience for the petition to be considered under the unskilled worker category. USCIS must look to the job offer portion of the labor certification to determine the required qualifications for the position. USCIS may not ignore a term of the labor certification, nor may it impose additional requirements. *See Matter of Silver Dragon Chinese Restaurant*, 19 I&N Dec. 401, 406 (Comm. 1986). *See also, Mandany v. Smith*, 696 F.2d 1008, (D.C. Cir. 1983); *K.R.K. Irvine, Inc. v. Landon*, 699 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1983); *Stewart Infra-Red Commissary of Massachusetts, Inc. v. Coomey*, 661 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1981). The labor certification as submitted requires three years of college, four years of training, and eight years of experience in the job offered. In this matter, the appropriate remedy would be to file another petition, request the proper classification, submit the proper fee, and required documentation.

An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. *See Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States*, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), *aff'd*, 345 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2003); *see also Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004) (noting that the AAO conducts appellate review on a *de novo* basis). With regard to the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) states in pertinent part:

Ability of prospective employer to pay wage. Any petition filed by or for an employment-based immigrant which requires an offer of employment must be accompanied by evidence that the prospective United States employer has the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner must demonstrate this ability at the time the priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. Evidence of this ability shall be either in the form of copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements.

The petitioner must demonstrate the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, which is the date the Form ETA 750, Application for Alien Employment Certification, was accepted for processing by any office within the employment system of the DOL. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(d). The petitioner must also demonstrate that, on the priority date, the beneficiary had the qualifications stated on its Form ETA 750, Application for Alien Employment Certification, as certified by the DOL and submitted with the instant petition. *Matter of Wing's Tea House*, 16 I&N Dec. 158 (Act. Reg. Comm. 1977).

Here, the Form ETA 750 was accepted on April 30, 2001. The proffered wage as stated on the Form ETA 750 is \$19.60 per hour (\$40,768 per year).

The evidence in the record of proceeding does not establish the petitioner's business organization. On the petition, the petitioner claimed to have been established in 1999 and to currently employ 175 workers. On the Form ETA 750B, signed by the beneficiary on April 20, 2001, the beneficiary stated that he began working for the petitioner in December 1990.

The petitioner must establish that its job offer to the beneficiary is a realistic one. Because the filing of an ETA 750 labor certification application establishes a priority date for any immigrant petition later based on the ETA 750, the petitioner must establish that the job offer was realistic as of the priority date and that the offer remained realistic for each year thereafter, until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. The petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is an essential element in evaluating whether a job offer is realistic. *See Matter of Great Wall*, 16 I&N Dec. 142 (Acting Reg. Comm. 1977); *see also* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2). In evaluating whether a job offer is realistic, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) requires the petitioner to demonstrate financial resources sufficient to pay the beneficiary's proffered wages, although the totality of the circumstances affecting the petitioning business will be considered if the evidence warrants such consideration. *See Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (Reg. Comm. 1967).

In determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage during a given period, USCIS will first examine whether the petitioner employed and paid the beneficiary during that period. If the petitioner establishes by documentary evidence that it employed the beneficiary at a salary equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the evidence will be considered *prima facie* proof of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner submitted a Form W-2 for 2006 that states that the petitioner paid the beneficiary \$47,429.72. While this amount is sufficient to establish the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage in 2006 alone, the petitioner did not submit W-2 statements for any other year from the priority date onward. The petitioner must establish its ability to pay for each other year from 2001 to 2005.

If the petitioner does not establish that it employed and paid the beneficiary an amount at least equal to the proffered wage during that period, USCIS will next examine the net income figure reflected on the petitioner's federal income tax return, without consideration of depreciation or other expenses. *River Street Donuts, LLC v. Napolitano*, 558 F.3d 111 (1st Cir. 2009); *Taco Especial v. Napolitano*, 696 F. Supp. 2d. 873, 881 (E.D. Mich. 2010). Reliance on federal income tax returns as a basis for determining a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is well established by judicial

precedent. *Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava*, 632 F. Supp. 1049, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (citing *Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman*, 736 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1984)); see also *Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh*, 719 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Texas 1989); *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); *Ubeda v. Palmer*, 539 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982), *aff'd*, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983). Reliance on the petitioner's gross receipts and wage expense is misplaced. Showing that the petitioner's gross receipts exceeded the proffered wage is insufficient. Similarly, showing that the petitioner paid wages in excess of the proffered wage is insufficient.

In *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. at 1084, the court held that the Immigration and Naturalization Service, now USCIS, had properly relied on the petitioner's net income figure, as stated on the petitioner's corporate income tax returns, rather than the petitioner's gross income. The court specifically rejected the argument that USCIS should have considered income before expenses were paid rather than net income. See *Taco Especial v. Napolitano*, 696 F. Supp. 2d. at 881 (gross profits overstate an employer's ability to pay because it ignores other necessary expenses).

With respect to depreciation, the court in *River Street Donuts* noted:

The AAO recognized that a depreciation deduction is a systematic allocation of the cost of a tangible long-term asset and does not represent a specific cash expenditure during the year claimed. Furthermore, the AAO indicated that the allocation of the depreciation of a long-term asset could be spread out over the years or concentrated into a few depending on the petitioner's choice of accounting and depreciation methods. Nonetheless, the AAO explained that depreciation represents an actual cost of doing business, which could represent either the diminution in value of buildings and equipment or the accumulation of funds necessary to replace perishable equipment and buildings. Accordingly, the AAO stressed that even though amounts deducted for depreciation do not represent current use of cash, neither does it represent amounts available to pay wages.

We find that the AAO has a rational explanation for its policy of not adding depreciation back to net income. Namely, that the amount spent on a long term tangible asset is a "real" expense.

River Street Donuts, 558 F.3d at 116. "[USCIS] and judicial precedent support the use of tax returns and the *net income figures* in determining petitioner's ability to pay. Plaintiffs' argument that these figures should be revised by the court by adding back depreciation is without support." *Chi-Feng Chang*, 719 F.Supp. at 537 (emphasis added).

The petitioner submitted no information concerning its financial position. In general, 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) requires annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements as evidence of a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. That provides further provides: "In a case where the prospective United States employer employs 100 or more workers, the director may accept a statement from a financial officer of the organization which establish the prospective employer's

ability to pay the proffered wage.” (Emphasis added.) The petitioner did not submit any evidence of its ability to pay the proffered wage in 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2007, or any year thereafter pursuant to the documents required under 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2). Additionally, the record does not contain any statement from the petitioner’s financial officer that it employs over 100 workers. Without that evidence, we are unable to determine that the petitioner had the ability to pay the proffered wage.

USCIS may consider the overall magnitude of the petitioner’s business activities in its determination of the petitioner’s ability to pay the proffered wage. *See Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (BIA 1967). The petitioning entity in *Sonogawa* had been in business for over 11 years and routinely earned a gross annual income of about \$100,000. During the year in which the petition was filed in that case, the petitioner changed business locations and paid rent on both the old and new locations for five months. There were large moving costs and also a period of time when the petitioner was unable to do regular business. The Regional Commissioner determined that the petitioner’s prospects for a resumption of successful business operations were well established. The petitioner was a fashion designer whose work had been featured in *Time* and *Look* magazines. Her clients included Miss Universe, movie actresses, and society matrons. The petitioner’s clients had been included in the lists of the best-dressed California women. The petitioner lectured on fashion design at design and fashion shows throughout the United States and at colleges and universities in California. The Regional Commissioner’s determination in *Sonogawa* was based in part on the petitioner’s sound business reputation and outstanding reputation as a couturiere. As in *Sonogawa*, USCIS may, at its discretion, consider evidence relevant to the petitioner’s financial ability that falls outside of a petitioner’s net income and net current assets. USCIS may consider such factors as the number of years the petitioner has been doing business, the established historical growth of the petitioner’s business, the overall number of employees, the occurrence of any uncharacteristic business expenditures or losses, the petitioner’s reputation within its industry, whether the beneficiary is replacing a former employee or an outsourced service, or any other evidence that USCIS deems relevant to the petitioner’s ability to pay the proffered wage.

The petitioner presented no evidence that it had one off year or any information about its financial picture for any of the years at issue. The only evidence in the record established the petitioner’s ability to pay the proffered wage in 2006, but the record contains no evidence for 2001 through 2005 or 2007. Additionally, the petitioner submitted no evidence of its reputation to liken its situation to that of *Sonogawa*. Thus, assessing the totality of the circumstances in this individual case, it is concluded that the petitioner has not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the difference between the actual wage paid to the beneficiary and the proffered wage.

Regarding the beneficiary’s qualifications for the position, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(l)(3)(ii) specifies that:

- (A) *General*. Any requirements of training or experience for skilled workers, professionals, or other workers must be supported by letters from trainers or

employers giving the name, address, and title of the trainer or employer, and a description of the training received

The Form ETA 750 requires eight years of experience before the April 30, 2001 priority date as a mechanical technician with "adequate knowledge in Mechanical & Electrical works" in addition to three years of college with a degree in Electronics in the major field of study of "Mechanical" and four years of training. The petitioner submitted no letters as required by 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(1)(3)(ii) to document the beneficiary's experience. In addition, the petitioner submitted no evidence that the beneficiary ever attended a college or university; it submitted evidence that the beneficiary completed his elementary, middle, and high school education. Instead, the petitioner stated that the beneficiary has the equivalent of two years and six months of college under the theory that three years of experience is equivalent to one year of education. First, that equivalence applies to non-immigrant H-1B petitions, not to immigrant petitions. *See* 8 CFR § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(D)(5). Second, the petitioner submitted no evidence of any of the beneficiary's experience. As a result, we are unable to conclude that the beneficiary had eight years of full-time experience at the time of the priority date or that he had three years at a college or university culminating in a degree in Electronics or in the field of Mechanics or four years of training.

On appeal, counsel states that the petition should not be rejected because the beneficiary is overqualified for the position and that the requirements for the position were reasonable as determined by the DOL. DOL's certification of the Form ETA 750 does not supercede USCIS's review and evaluation of the criteria the petitioner must prove in order to establish that the petition is approvable, and that includes a review of the whether or not the beneficiary is qualified for the proffered position, which in this case, is governed by 203(b)(3)(A)(i) of the Act and 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(1)(3). In this case, the petitioner presented no evidence that the beneficiary met the requirements of the labor certification.

The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and alternative basis for denial. In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, that burden has not been met.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.