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
U.S. Department of Homeland Security  
U. S. Citizenship and Immigration Services  
Office of Administrative Appeals MS 2090  
Washington, DC 20529-2090




U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services

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
Petitioner:

Beneficiary:



PETITION: Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as a Skilled Worker or Professional pursuant to Section 203(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:



INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. Please refer to 8 C.F.R. § 103.5 for the specific requirements. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$585. Any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider, as required by 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i).

Perry Rhew  
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The preference visa petition was denied by the Director, Nebraska Service Center, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed. The director's decision will be withdrawn in part and affirmed in part.

The petitioner is a plastics manufacturer. It seeks to employ the beneficiary permanently in the United States as a floorperson (molding department). The director determined that the petitioner had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage beginning on the priority date of the visa petition. The director also determined that the record lacks an original Form ETA 750 certified by the United States Department of Labor (DOL). The director denied the petition accordingly.

The record shows that the appeal is properly filed, timely and makes a specific allegation of error in law or fact. The procedural history in this case is documented by the record and incorporated into the decision. Further elaboration of the procedural history will be made only as necessary.

As set forth in the director's February 15, 2007 denial, the two issues in this case are (1) whether or not the petitioner has the ability to pay the proffered wage as of the priority date and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence; and (2) whether the record contains an original Form ETA 750 certified by the DOL.

Section 203(b)(3)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(i), provides for the granting of preference classification to qualified immigrants who are capable, at the time of petitioning for classification under this paragraph, of performing skilled labor (requiring at least two years training or experience), not of a temporary nature, for which qualified workers are not available in the United States.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) states in pertinent part:

*Ability of prospective employer to pay wage.* Any petition filed by or for an employment-based immigrant which requires an offer of employment must be accompanied by evidence that the prospective United States employer has the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner must demonstrate this ability at the time the priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. Evidence of this ability shall be either in the form of copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements.

The petitioner must demonstrate the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, which is the date the Form ETA 750, Application for Alien Employment Certification, was accepted for processing by any office within the employment system of the DOL. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(d). The petitioner must also demonstrate that, on the priority date, the beneficiary had the qualifications stated on its Form ETA 750, Application for Alien Employment Certification, as certified by the DOL and submitted with the instant petition. *Matter of Wing's Tea House*, 16 I&N Dec. 158 (Act. Reg. Comm. 1977).

Here, according to the copy of the Form ETA 750 in the record of proceeding, the Form ETA 750 was accepted on April 25, 2001. The proffered wage as stated on the copy of Form ETA 750 is \$46,040.80 per year.

The AAO maintains plenary power to review each appeal on a *de novo* basis. 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) ("On appeal from or review of the initial decision, the agency has all the powers which it would have in making the initial decision except as it may limit the issues on notice or by rule."); *see also, Janka v. U.S. Dept. of Transp., NTSB*, 925 F.2d 1147, 1149 (9th Cir. 1991). The AAO's *de novo* authority has been long recognized by the federal courts. *See, e.g. Dor v. INS*, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989). The AAO considers all pertinent evidence in the record, including new evidence properly submitted upon appeal.<sup>1</sup>

**On appeal, counsel asserts that the petitioner's business is substantial.** Counsel cites several unpublished AAO cases for the proposition that where the petitioner has sufficient cash to pay the proffered salary, the petitioner may establish its ability to pay the wage despite showing a loss on its tax returns. While 8 C.F.R. § 103.3(c) provides that precedent decisions of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) are binding on all its employees in the administration of the Act, unpublished decisions are not similarly binding. Precedent decisions must be designated and published in bound volumes or as interim decisions. 8 C.F.R. § 103.9(a). **Counsel also submits a letter dated January 15, 2008, from [REDACTED] which states that the petitioner has the ability to pay the proffered wage based on its annual net income.** Counsel also submits the first page of the petitioner's IRS Forms 1120S for 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006.

The evidence in the record of proceeding shows that the petitioner is structured as an S corporation. On the petition, the petitioner claimed to have been established in 1968 and to currently employ 70 workers.<sup>2</sup> According to the tax returns in the record, the petitioner's fiscal year is based on a

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<sup>1</sup> The submission of additional evidence on appeal is allowed by the instructions to the Form I-290B, which are incorporated into the regulations by the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(1). The record in the instant case provides no reason to preclude consideration of any of the documents newly submitted on appeal. *See Matter of Soriano*, 19 I&N Dec. 764 (BIA 1988).

<sup>2</sup> In general, 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) requires annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements as evidence of a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. That regulation further provides: "In a case where the prospective United States employer employs 100 or more workers, the director *may* accept a statement from a financial officer of the organization which establishes the prospective employer's ability to pay the proffered wage." (Emphasis added). The petitioner submitted a letter dated July 5, 2006, from the petitioner's President stating that the petitioner employs over 100 employees and referring to a letter from the petitioner's accountant which states "we can assure you that [the petitioner] has the financial wherewithal to provide [the beneficiary] with his compensation." However, as noted by the director, since the petitioner stated that it employed 70 workers on the petition, and since the petitioner declined to establish its number of employees in response to the director's request for evidence, the director exercised his discretion to not accept the statement from the petitioner's President as evidence of its ability to pay the proffered wage.

calendar year. On the copy of Form ETA 750B, signed by the beneficiary on March 8, 2001, the beneficiary claimed to have worked full-time for the petitioner as a machinist from April 1998 to November 2000, and as a floorperson from November 2000 to the date he signed the Form ETA 750B.

The petitioner must establish that its job offer to the beneficiary is a realistic one. Because the filing of an ETA 750 labor certification application establishes a priority date for any immigrant petition later based on the ETA 750, the petitioner must establish that the job offer was realistic as of the priority date and that the offer remained realistic for each year thereafter, until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. The petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is an essential element in evaluating whether a job offer is realistic. *See Matter of Great Wall*, 16 I&N Dec. 142 (Acting Reg. Comm. 1977); *see also* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2). In evaluating whether a job offer is realistic, USCIS requires the petitioner to demonstrate financial resources sufficient to pay the beneficiary's proffered wages, although the totality of the circumstances affecting the petitioning business will be considered if the evidence warrants such consideration. *See Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (Reg. Comm. 1967).

In determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage during a given period, USCIS will first examine whether the petitioner employed and paid the beneficiary during that period. If the petitioner establishes by documentary evidence that it employed the beneficiary at a salary equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the evidence will be considered *prima facie* proof of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. In the instant case, the beneficiary's IRS Forms W-2 for 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006 show compensation received from the petitioner, as shown in the table below.

- In 2001, the Form W-2 stated compensation of \$17,209.63.
- In 2002, the Form W-2 stated compensation of \$19,941.46.
- In 2003, the Form W-2 stated compensation of \$20,682.71.
- In 2004, the Form W-2 stated compensation of \$23,955.21.
- In 2005, the Form W-2 stated compensation of \$30,275.08.
- In 2006, the Form W-2 stated compensation of \$28,852.26.

Therefore, for the years 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006, the petitioner has not established that it employed and paid the beneficiary the full proffered wage, but it did establish that it paid partial wages each year. Since the proffered wage is \$46,040.80 per year, the petitioner must establish that it can pay the difference between the wages actually paid to the beneficiary and the proffered wage, which is \$28,831.17, \$26,099.34, \$25,358.09, \$22,085.59, \$15,765.72 and \$17,188.54 in 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006, respectively.

If the petitioner does not establish that it employed and paid the beneficiary an amount at least equal to the proffered wage during that period, USCIS will next examine the net income figure reflected on the petitioner's federal income tax return, without consideration of depreciation or other expenses. *River Street Donuts, LLC v. Napolitano*, 558 F.3d 111 (1<sup>st</sup> Cir. 2009). Reliance on federal

income tax returns as a basis for determining a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is well established by judicial precedent. *Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava*, 632 F. Supp. 1049, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (citing *Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman*, 736 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1984)); see also *Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh*, 719 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Texas 1989); *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); *Ubeda v. Palmer*, 539 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982), *aff'd*, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983). Reliance on the petitioner's gross receipts and wage expense is misplaced. Showing that the petitioner's gross receipts exceeded the proffered wage is insufficient. Similarly, showing that the petitioner paid wages in excess of the proffered wage is insufficient.

In *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. at 1084, the court held that the Immigration and Naturalization Service, now USCIS, had properly relied on the petitioner's net income figure, as stated on the petitioner's corporate income tax returns, rather than the petitioner's gross income. The court specifically rejected the argument that USCIS should have considered income before expenses were paid rather than net income.

With respect to depreciation, the court in *River Street Donuts* noted:

The AAO recognized that a depreciation deduction is a systematic allocation of the cost of a tangible long-term asset and does not represent a specific cash expenditure during the year claimed. Furthermore, the AAO indicated that the allocation of the depreciation of a long-term asset could be spread out over the years or concentrated into a few depending on the petitioner's choice of accounting and depreciation methods. Nonetheless, the AAO explained that depreciation represents an actual cost of doing business, which could represent either the diminution in value of buildings and equipment or the accumulation of funds necessary to replace perishable equipment and buildings. Accordingly, the AAO stressed that even though amounts deducted for depreciation do not represent current use of cash, neither does it represent amounts available to pay wages.

We find that the AAO has a rational explanation for its policy of not adding depreciation back to net income. Namely, that the amount spent on a long term tangible asset is a "real" expense.

*River Street Donuts* at 116. "[USCIS] and judicial precedent support the use of tax returns and the net income figures in determining petitioner's ability to pay. Plaintiffs' argument that these figures should be revised by the court by adding back depreciation is without support." *Chi-Feng Chang* at 537 (emphasis added).

The record before the director closed on April 16, 2007, with the receipt by the director of the petitioner's submissions in response to the director's request for evidence. As of that date, the petitioner's 2006 federal income tax return was the most recent return available. The petitioner's tax

returns demonstrate its net income for 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006, as shown in the table below.

- In 2001, the Form 1120S stated net income of \$111,860.00.
- In 2002, the Form 1120S stated net income of \$283,775.00.
- In 2003, the Form 1120S stated net income of \$260,388.00.
- In 2004, the Form 1120S stated net income of \$321,732.00.
- In 2005, the Form 1120S stated net income of \$1,031,161.00.
- In 2006, the Form 1120S stated net income of \$1,076,342.00.

Where an S corporation's income is exclusively from a trade or business, USCIS considers net income to be the figure for ordinary income, shown on line 21 of page one of the petitioner's IRS Form 1120S. However, where an S corporation has income, credits, deductions or other adjustments from sources other than a trade or business, they are reported on Schedule K. If the Schedule K has relevant entries for additional income, credits, deductions or other adjustments, net income is found on line 23 (1997-2003) line 17e (2004-2005) or line 18 (2006) of Schedule K. *See* Instructions for Form 1120S, 2006, at <http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i1120s.pdf> (accessed December 15, 2009) (indicating that Schedule K is a summary schedule of all shareholder's shares of the corporation's income, deductions, credits, etc.). Because the petitioner did not provide its Schedule K for 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004 or 2005, we are unable to determine the petitioner's actual net income from the first page of its tax returns for 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004 or 2005. The net income listed above for 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004 and 2005 is derived from line 21 of page one of the petitioner's IRS Form 1120S and it is not a comprehensive and accurate representation of the petitioner's net income and cannot be relied upon. Therefore, for the years 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004 and 2005, the petitioner did not establish that it had sufficient net income to pay the difference between the wages actually paid to the beneficiary and the proffered wage, as it failed to provide its Schedule Ks for those years. For the year 2006, the petitioner established that it had sufficient net income to pay the difference between the wages actually paid to the beneficiary and the proffered wage, as it provided its Schedule K for 2006.

As an alternate means of determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage, USCIS may review the petitioner's net current assets. Net current assets are the difference between the petitioner's current assets and current liabilities.<sup>3</sup> A corporation's year-end current assets are shown on Schedule L, lines 1 through 6. Its year-end current liabilities are shown on lines 16 through 18. If the total of a corporation's end-of-year net current assets and the wages paid to the beneficiary (if any) are equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the petitioner is expected to be able to pay the proffered wage using those net current assets. The petitioner did not provide Schedule L to its tax

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<sup>3</sup>According to *Barron's Dictionary of Accounting Terms* 117 (3<sup>rd</sup> ed. 2000), "current assets" consist of items having (in most cases) a life of one year or less, such as cash, marketable securities, inventory and prepaid expenses. "Current liabilities" are obligations payable (in most cases) within one year, such accounts payable, short-term notes payable, and accrued expenses (such as taxes and salaries). *Id.* at 118.

returns for 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004 or 2005. Thus, we are unable to calculate the petitioner's net current assets for those years. Therefore, for the years 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004 and 2005, the petitioner did not establish that it had sufficient net current assets to pay the difference between the wages actually paid to the beneficiary and the proffered wage.

Therefore, from the date the Form ETA 750 was accepted for processing by the DOL, the petitioner had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage as of the priority date through an examination of wages paid to the beneficiary, or its net income or net current assets, except for 2006.

On appeal, counsel asserts that the petitioner's business is substantial. USCIS may consider the overall magnitude of the petitioner's business activities in its determination of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. *See Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (BIA 1967). The petitioning entity in *Sonogawa* had been in business for over 11 years and routinely earned a gross annual income of about \$100,000. During the year in which the petition was filed in that case, the petitioner changed business locations and paid rent on both the old and new locations for five months. There were large moving costs and also a period of time when the petitioner was unable to do regular business. The Regional Commissioner determined that the petitioner's prospects for a resumption of successful business operations were well established. The petitioner was a fashion designer whose work had been featured in *Time* and *Look* magazines. Her clients included Miss Universe, movie actresses, and society matrons. The petitioner's clients had been included in the lists of the best-dressed California women. The petitioner lectured on fashion design at design and fashion shows throughout the United States and at colleges and universities in California. The Regional Commissioner's determination in *Sonogawa* was based in part on the petitioner's sound business reputation and outstanding reputation as a couturiere. As in *Sonogawa*, USCIS may, at its discretion, consider evidence relevant to the petitioner's financial ability that falls outside of a petitioner's net income and net current assets. USCIS may consider such factors as the number of years the petitioner has been doing business, the established historical growth of the petitioner's business, the overall number of employees, the occurrence of any uncharacteristic business expenditures or losses, the petitioner's reputation within its industry, whether the beneficiary is replacing a former employee or an outsourced service, or any other evidence that USCIS deems relevant to the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage.

In the instant case, the petitioner was established in 1969 and has been in business for over 40 years. It had substantial gross receipts in 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006, but paid modest officer compensation each of those years.<sup>4</sup> It also paid salaries and wages of \$307,114.00, \$317,070.00, \$317,685.00, \$316,445.00, \$320,561.00 and \$332,497.00 in 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006, respectively. The petitioner currently employs the beneficiary in the proffered position. Thus,

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<sup>4</sup> The petitioner's gross receipts were \$6,406,422.00, \$6,250,350.00, \$6,705,850.00, \$8,880,181.00, \$11,278,514.00 and \$13,467,965.00 in 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006, respectively. It paid officer compensation of \$3,451.00, \$41,208.00, \$31,213.00, \$77,188.00, \$209,266.00, and \$219,603.00 in 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006, respectively.

assessing the totality of the circumstances in this individual case, it is concluded that the petitioner has established that it had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage.

The evidence submitted establishes that the petitioner had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date. This portion of the director's decision is accordingly withdrawn.

However, the record lacks an original Form ETA 750. The regulations at 8 C.F.R. §§ 204.5(a)(2) and 204.5(l)(3)(i) require that any Form I-140 petition filed under the preference category of Section 203(b)(3) of the Act be accompanied by a labor certification.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b) provides:

Submitting copies of documents. Application and petition forms must be submitted in the original. Forms and documents issued to support an application or petition, *such as labor certifications*, Form IAP-66, medical examinations, affidavits, formal consultations, and other statements, must be submitted in the original unless previously filed with [USCIS].

(emphasis added).

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g) provides: "In general, ordinary legible photocopies of such documents (*except for labor certifications from the Department of Labor*) will be acceptable for initial filing and approval." (emphasis added). Counsel has not provided any authority permitting USCIS to accept a photocopy of the ETA 750. The regulation at 20 C.F.R. § 656.30(e) provides for the issuance of duplicate labor certifications by the DOL only upon the written request of a consular or immigration officer. The record contains no evidence that the petitioner has obtained an official duplicate labor certification or requested the director to do so. This portion of the director's decision is affirmed. Therefore, the petition may not be approved.

The burden of proof in these proceedings rests solely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The petitioner has not met that burden.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed.