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U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U. S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Office of Administrative Appeals MS 2090
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U.S. Citizenship
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FILE: [REDACTED] Office: NEBRASKA SERVICE CENTER
LIN 06 220 52709

Date: **JAN 21 2010**

IN RE: Petitioner: [REDACTED]
Beneficiary: [REDACTED]

PETITION: Immigrant petition for Alien Worker as a Skilled Worker or Professional Pursuant to Section 203(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:

SELF-REPRESENTED

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. Please refer to 8 C.F.R. § 103.5 for the specific requirements. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$585. Any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider, as required by 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i).

Perry Rhew
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The Director, Nebraska Service Center, denied the employment-based immigrant visa petition, which is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner is in the real estate investment business. It seeks to employ the beneficiary permanently in the United States as an Electronics Computer Engineer. As required by statute, an ETA Form 9089, Application for Permanent Employment Certification, approved by the Department of Labor (DOL), accompanied the petition. Upon reviewing the petition, the director determined that the petitioner failed to demonstrate that the beneficiary satisfied the minimum level of education stated on the labor certification.

The AAO maintains plenary power to review each appeal on a *de novo* basis. 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) ("On appeal from or review of the initial decision, the agency has all the powers which it would have in making the initial decision except as it may limit the issues on notice or by rule."); *see also, Janka v. U.S. Dept. of Transp., NTSB*, 925 F.2d 1147, 1149 (9th Cir. 1991). The AAO's *de novo* authority has been long recognized by the federal courts. *See, e.g. Dor v. INS*, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989).

Section 203(b)(3)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(i), provides for the granting of preference classification to qualified immigrants who are capable, at the time of petitioning for classification under this paragraph, of performing skilled labor (requiring at least two years training or experience), not of a temporary nature, for which qualified workers are not available in the United States. Section 203(b)(3)(A)(ii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(ii), also provides for the granting of preference classification to qualified immigrants who hold baccalaureate degrees and are members of the professions.

To be eligible for approval, a beneficiary must have all the education, training, and experience specified on the labor certification as of the petition's priority date. *See Matter of Wing's Tea House*, 16 I&N 158 (Act. Reg. Comm. 1977). Here, the ETA Form 9089 was accepted for processing on March 28, 2006.¹ The Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker (Form I-140) was filed on July 24, 2006.

The proffered position's requirements are found on ETA Form 9089 Part H. This section of the application for alien labor certification, "Job Opportunity Information," describes the terms and conditions of the job offered. It is important that the ETA Form 9089 be read as a whole. The instructions for the ETA Form 9089, Part H, provide:

Minimum Education, Training, and Experience Required to Perform the Job Duties. Do not duplicate the time requirements. For example, time required in

¹ If the petition is approved, the priority date is also used in conjunction with the Visa Bulletin issued by the Department of State to determine when a beneficiary can apply for adjustment of status or for an immigrant visa abroad. Thus, the importance of reviewing the *bona fides* of a job opportunity as of the priority date is clear.

training should not also be listed in education or experience. Indicate whether months or years are required. Do not include restrictive requirements which are not actual business necessities for performance on the job and which would limit consideration of otherwise qualified U.S. workers.

On the ETA Form 9089, the "job offer" position description for an Electronics Computer Engineer provides:

Develop, design, testing hardware and software systems for Home and Industry services. Contact with electronics and software contractors in Israel and the United States. Printed circuit board design software, C/C++ programming, knowledge of processors, chips and computer hardware and software, Program testing-Defect tracking software.

Regarding the minimum level of education and experience required for the proffered position in this matter, Part H.4 of the labor certification indicates that the minimum level of education required is a bachelor's degree and Part H.4-B. specifies that the major field of study required is "Electronics computer engineering or academic equivalent." Parts H.7 and H.7-A indicate that, in the alternative, a bachelor's degree in "CIS or Computer Engineering" is also acceptable. With respect to work experience, Part H.6 indicates that three months of experience in the job offered is required and Part H.10 specifies that, in the alternative, the petitioner will accept three months of experience in the occupation of "Electronics/Electrical Computer Engineer." In Part H.8, the employer indicates that it will not accept a combination and experience as an alternative qualification.

To determine whether a beneficiary is eligible for a preference immigrant visa, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) must ascertain whether the alien is, in fact, qualified for the certified job. USCIS will not accept a degree equivalency or an unrelated degree when a labor certification plainly and expressly requires a candidate with a specific degree. In evaluating the beneficiary's qualifications, USCIS must look to the job offer portion of the labor certification to determine the required qualifications for the position. USCIS may not ignore a term of the labor certification, nor may it impose additional requirements. *See Matter of Silver Dragon Chinese Restaurant*, 19 I&N Dec. 401, 406 (Comm. 1986). *See also, Madany*, 696 F.2d at 1008; *K.R.K. Irvine, Inc.*, 699 F.2d at 1006; *Stewart Infra-Red Commissary of Massachusetts, Inc. v. Coomey*, 661 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1981).

As set forth above, the proffered position requires a Bachelor's degree in Electronics Computer Engineering, CIS or Computer Engineering or academic equivalent and three months of experience in the job offered or, in the alternative, three months experience as an Electronics/Electrical Computer Engineer.

On the ETA Form 9089, signed by the beneficiary on July 6, 2006, the beneficiary represented that the highest level of achieved education related to the requested occupation was "Bachelor's." He listed the institution of study where that education was obtained as Tel Aviv University, and the year completed as 1987.

In support of the beneficiary's educational qualifications, the petitioner submitted a copy of the beneficiary's diploma from Tel Aviv University, along with an English translation. It indicates that the beneficiary was awarded the degree of Practical Engineer in 1987. The petitioner additionally submitted a credentials evaluation, dated October 7, 2004, from [REDACTED] of Medgar Evers College of the City University of New York. The evaluation concludes that the beneficiary's Practical Engineer diploma from Tel Aviv University is equivalent to two years of academic studies leading toward a Bachelor of Science Degree from an accredited institution of higher learning in the United States.

The director denied the petition on May 16, 2007. He determined that the beneficiary's Practical Engineer diploma could not be accepted as a foreign equivalent degree to a U.S. bachelor's degree in Electronics Computer Engineering.

On appeal, with regard to the beneficiary's qualifying academic credentials, the petitioner submitted a brief in which it stated that a baccalaureate degree was not required for the proffered position.

DOL assigned the code of 17-2071 and the title of Electrical Engineer to the proffered position. According to DOL's public online database at <http://online.onetcenter.org/link/summary/17-2071.00> (accessed December 22, 2009) and its description of the position and requirements for the position most analogous to the petitioner's proffered position, the position falls within Job Zone Four requiring "considerable preparation" for the occupation type closest to the proffered position.

According to DOL, a considerable amount of work-related skill, knowledge, or experience are needed for Job Zone 4 occupations. DOL assigns a standard vocational preparation (SVP) range of 7-8 to Job Zone 4 occupations, which means "[m]ost of these occupations require a four-year bachelor's degree, but some do not." See <http://online.onetcenter.org/link/summary/17-2071.00> (accessed December 22, 2009). Additionally, DOL states the following concerning the training and overall experience required for these occupations:

A considerable amount of work-related skill, knowledge, or experience is needed for these occupations. For example, an accountant must complete four years of college and work for several years in accounting to be considered qualified.

See id. Because of the requirements of the proffered position and DOL's standard occupational requirements, the proffered position is for a professional, but might also be considered under the skilled worker category.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(l)(3)(ii)(C) states the following:

If the petition is for a professional, the petition must be accompanied by evidence that the alien holds a United States baccalaureate degree or a foreign equivalent degree and by evidence that the alien is a member of the professions. Evidence of a baccalaureate degree shall be in the form of an official college or university record showing the date the baccalaureate degree was awarded and the area of

concentration of study. To show that the alien is a member of the professions, the petitioner must submit evidence that the minimum of a baccalaureate degree is required for entry into the occupation.

The above regulation uses a singular description of foreign equivalent degree. Thus, the plain meaning of the regulatory language concerning the professional classification sets forth the requirement that a beneficiary must produce one degree that is determined to be the foreign equivalent of a U.S. baccalaureate degree in order to be qualified as a professional for third preference visa category purposes.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 204(5)(l)(3)(ii)(B) states the following:

If the petition is for a skilled worker, the petition must be accompanied by evidence that the alien meets the educational, training or experience, and any other requirements of the individual labor certification, meets the requirements for Schedule A designation, or meets the requirements for the Labor Market Information Pilot Program occupation designation. The minimum requirements for this classification are at least two years of training or experience.

The above regulation requires that the alien meet the requirements of the labor certification.

Because the petition's proffered position qualifies for consideration under both the professional and skilled worker categories, the AAO will apply the regulatory requirements from both provisions to the facts of the case at hand, beginning with the professional category.

Initially, however, we will provide an explanation of the general process of procuring an employment-based immigrant visa and the roles and respective authority of both agencies involved.

As noted above, the Form ETA 750 in this matter is certified by the DOL. Thus, at the outset, it is useful to discuss the DOL's role in this process. Section 212(a)(5)(A)(i) of the Act provides:

In general.-Any alien who seeks to enter the United States for the purpose of performing skilled or unskilled labor is inadmissible, unless the Secretary of Labor has determined and certified to the Secretary of State and the Attorney General that-

- (I) there are not sufficient workers who are able, willing, qualified (or equally qualified in the case of an alien described in clause (ii)) and available at the time of application for a visa and admission to the United States and at the place where the alien is to perform such skilled or unskilled labor, and
- (II) the employment of such alien will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of workers in the United States similarly employed.

It is significant that none of the above inquiries assigned to the DOL, or the remaining regulations implementing these duties under 20 C.F.R. § 656, involve a determination as to whether the position and the alien are qualified for a specific immigrant classification. This fact has not gone unnoticed by Federal Circuit Courts.

There is no doubt that the authority to make preference classification decisions rests with INS. The language of section 204 cannot be read otherwise. *See Castaneda-Gonzalez v. INS*, 564 F.2d 417, 429 (D.C. Cir. 1977). In turn, DOL has the authority to make the two determinations listed in section 212(a)(14).² *Id.* at 423. The necessary result of these two grants of authority is that section 212(a)(14) determinations are not subject to review by INS absent fraud or willful misrepresentation, but all matters relating to preference classification eligibility not expressly delegated to DOL remain within INS' authority.

* * *

Given the language of the Act, the totality of the legislative history,^o and the agencies' own interpretations of their duties under the Act, we must conclude that Congress did not intend DOL to have primary authority to make any determinations other than the two stated in section 212(a)(14). If DOL is to analyze alien qualifications, it is for the purpose of "matching" them with those of corresponding United States workers so that it will then be "in a position to meet the requirement of the law," namely the section 212(a)(14) determinations.

Madany v. Smith, 696 F.2d 1008, 1012-1013 (D.C. Cir. 1983).

Relying in part on *Madany*, 696 F.2d at 1008, the Ninth circuit stated:

[I]t appears that the DOL is responsible only for determining the availability of suitable American workers for a job and the impact of alien employment upon the domestic labor market. It does not appear that the DOL's role extends to determining if the alien is qualified for the job for which he seeks sixth preference status. That determination appears to be delegated to the INS under section 204(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1154(b), as one of the determinations incident to the INS's decision whether the alien is entitled to sixth preference status.

K.R.K. Irvine, Inc. v. Landon, 699 F.2d 1006, 1008 (9th Cir. 1983). The court relied on an amicus brief from DOL that stated the following:

The labor certification made by the Secretary of Labor ... pursuant to section 212(a)(14) of the ... [Act] ... is binding as to the findings of whether there are able, willing, qualified, and available United States workers for the job offered to the alien, and whether employment of the alien under the terms set by the employer would

² Based on revisions to the Act, the current citation is section 212(a)(5)(A) as set forth above.

adversely affect the wages and working conditions of similarly employed United States workers. *The labor certification in no way indicates that the alien offered the certified job opportunity is qualified (or not qualified) to perform the duties of that job.*

(Emphasis added.) *Id.* at 1009. The Ninth Circuit, citing *K.R.K. Irvine, Inc.*, 699 F.2d at 1006, revisited this issue, stating:

The Department of Labor (“DOL”) must certify that insufficient domestic workers are available to perform the job and that the alien’s performance of the job will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of similarly employed domestic workers. *Id.* § 212(a)(14), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(14). The INS then makes its own determination of the alien’s entitlement to sixth preference status. *Id.* § 204(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1154(b). See generally *K.R.K. Irvine, Inc. v. Landon*, 699 F.2d 1006, 1008 9th Cir.1983).

The INS, therefore, may make a de novo determination of whether the alien is in fact qualified to fill the certified job offer.

Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman, 736 F. 2d 1305, 1309 (9th Cir. 1984).

Therefore, it is the DOL’s responsibility to certify the terms of the labor certification, but it is the responsibility of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) to determine if the petition and the alien beneficiary are eligible for the classification sought. For classification as a member of the professions, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(l)(3)(ii)(C) requires that the alien had a U.S. baccalaureate degree or a foreign equivalent degree and be a member of the professions. Additionally, the regulation requires the submission of “an official *college or university* record showing the date the baccalaureate degree was awarded and the area of concentration of study.” (Emphasis added.)

In 1991, when the final rule for 8 C.F.R. § 204.5 was published in the Federal Register, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (the Service), responded to criticism that the regulation required an alien to have a bachelor’s degree as a minimum and that the regulation did not allow for the substitution of experience for education. After reviewing section 121 of the Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-649 (1990), and the Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference, the Service specifically noted that both the Act and the legislative history indicate that an alien must have at least a bachelor’s degree: “[B]oth the Act and its legislative history make clear that, in order to qualify as a professional under the third classification or to have experience equating to an advanced degree under the second, *an alien must have at least a bachelor’s degree.*” 56 Fed. Reg. 60897, 60900 (November 29, 1991)(emphasis added).

Moreover, it is significant that both the statute, section 203(b)(3)(A)(ii) of the Act, and relevant regulations use the word “degree” in relation to professionals. A statute should be construed under the assumption that Congress intended it to have purpose and meaningful effect. *Mountain States*

Tel. & Tel. v. Pueblo of Santa Ana, 472 U.S. 237, 249 (1985); *Sutton v. United States*, 819 F.2d 1289m 1295 (5th Cir. 1987). It can be presumed that Congress' narrow requirement of a "degree" for members of the professions is deliberate. Significantly, in another context, Congress has broadly referenced "the possession of a degree, diploma, certificate, or similar award from a college, university, school, or other institution of learning." Section 203(b)(2)(C) (relating to aliens of exceptional ability). Thus, the requirement at section 203(b)(3)(A)(ii) that an eligible alien both have a baccalaureate "degree" and be a member of the professions reveals that a member of the professions must have a *degree* and that a diploma or certificate from an institution of learning other than a college or university is a potentially similar but distinct type of credential. Thus, even if we did not require "a" degree that is the foreign equivalent of a U.S. baccalaureate degree, we would not consider education earned at an institution other than a college or university.

There is no provision in the statute or the regulations that would allow a beneficiary to qualify under section 203(b)(3)(A)(ii) of the Act with anything less than a full baccalaureate degree. More specifically, a two-year degree will not be considered to be the "foreign equivalent degree" to a United States baccalaureate degree. A United States baccalaureate degree is generally found to require four years of education. *Matter of Shah*, 17 I&N Dec. 244 (Reg. Comm. 1977). Where the analysis of the beneficiary's credentials relies on work experience alone or a combination of multiple lesser degrees, the result is the "equivalent" of a bachelor's degree rather than a single-source "foreign equivalent degree." In order to have experience and education equating to a bachelor's degree under section 203(b)(3)(A)(ii) of the Act, the beneficiary must have a single degree that is the "foreign equivalent degree" to a United States baccalaureate degree.

Because the beneficiary does not have a "United States baccalaureate degree or a foreign equivalent degree," from a college or university in the required field of study listed on the certified labor certification, the beneficiary does not qualify for preference visa classification under section 203(b)(3)(A)(ii) of the Act as he does not have the minimum level of education required for the equivalent of a bachelor's degree.

We are cognizant of the recent decision in *Grace Korean United Methodist Church v. Michael Chertoff*, 437 F. Supp. 2d 1174 (D. Or. 2005), which finds that USCIS "does not have the authority or expertise to impose its strained definition of 'B.A. or equivalent' on that term as set forth in the labor certification." In contrast to the broad precedential authority of the case law of a United States circuit court, the AAO is not bound to follow the published decision of a United States district court in matters arising within the same district. *See Matter of K-S-*, 20 I&N Dec. 715 (BIA 1993). Although the reasoning underlying a district judge's decision will be given due consideration when it is properly before the AAO, the analysis does not have to be followed as a matter of law. *Id.* at 719. The court in *Grace Korean* makes no attempt to distinguish its holding from the Circuit Court decisions cited above. Instead, as legal support for its determination, the court cited to a case holding that the United States Postal Service has no expertise or special competence in immigration matters. *Grace Korean United Methodist Church*, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 1179 (citing *Tovar v. U.S. Postal Service*, 3 F.3d 1271, 1276 (9th Cir. 1993)). On its face, *Tovar* is easily distinguishable from the present matter since USCIS, through the authority delegated by the Secretary of Homeland

Security, is charged by statute with the enforcement of the United States immigration laws and not with the delivery of mail. *See* section 103(a) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a).

Additionally, we also note the recent decision in *Snapnames.com, Inc. v. Michael Chertoff*, 2006 WL 3491005 (D. Or. Nov. 30, 2006). In that case, the labor certification application specified an educational requirement of four years of college and a ‘B.S. or foreign equivalent.’ The district court determined that ‘B.S. or foreign equivalent’ relates solely to the alien’s educational background, precluding consideration of the alien’s combined education and work experience. *Snapnames.com, Inc.* at *11-13. Additionally, the court determined that the word ‘equivalent’ in the employer’s educational requirements was ambiguous and that in the context of skilled worker petitions (where there is no statutory educational requirement), deference must be given to the employer’s intent. *Snapnames.com, Inc.* at *14. However, in professional and advanced degree professional cases, where the beneficiary is statutorily required to hold a baccalaureate degree, the USCIS properly concluded that a single foreign degree or its equivalent is required. *Snapnames.com, Inc.* at *17, 19.

Where the job requirements in a labor certification are not otherwise unambiguously prescribed, e.g., by professional regulation, USCIS must examine “the language of the labor certification job requirements” in order to determine what the petitioner must demonstrate about the beneficiary’s qualifications. *Mudany*, 696 F.2d at 1015. The only rational manner by which USCIS can be expected to interpret the meaning of terms used to describe the requirements of a job in a labor certification is to “examine the certified job offer *exactly* as it is completed by the prospective employer.” *Rosedale Linden Park Company v. Smith*, 595 F. Supp. 829, 833 (D.D.C. 1984)(emphasis added). USCIS’s interpretation of the job’s requirements, as stated on the labor certification must involve “reading and applying *the plain language* of the [labor certification application form].” *Id.* at 834 (emphasis added). USCIS cannot and should not reasonably be expected to look beyond the plain language of the labor certification that DOL has formally issued or otherwise attempt to divine the employer’s intentions through some sort of reverse engineering of the labor certification.

Further, the employer’s subjective intent may not be dispositive of the meaning of the actual minimum requirements of the proffered position. *Maramjaya v. USCIS*, Civ. Act. No. 06-2158, 14 n. 7. Thus, USCIS agrees that the best evidence of the petitioner’s intent concerning the actual minimum educational requirements of the proffered position is evidence of how it expressed those requirements to DOL during the labor certification process and not afterwards to USCIS. The timing of such evidence is needed to ensure inflation of those requirements is not occurring in an effort to fit the beneficiary’s credentials into requirements that do not seem on their face to include what the beneficiary has.

Thus, the AAO issued a request for evidence (RFE) on August 10, 2009 soliciting such evidence. As discussed above, the petitioner previously submitted an educational evaluation which concluded that the beneficiary’s two year diploma, when considered with work experience, was equivalent to a United States bachelor’s degree. The petitioner did not submit any evidence in response to the RFE to establish the actual minimum requirements for the position.

To determine whether a beneficiary is eligible for a preference immigrant visa, USCIS must ascertain whether the alien is, in fact, qualified for the certified job. USCIS will not accept a degree equivalency or an unrelated degree when a labor certification plainly and expressly requires a candidate with a specific degree. In evaluating the beneficiary's qualifications, USCIS must look to the job offer portion of the labor certification to determine the required qualifications for the position. USCIS may not ignore a term of the labor certification, nor may it impose additional requirements. *See Matter of Silver Dragon Chinese Restaurant*, 19 I&N Dec. at 406. *See also, Madany*, 696 F.2d at 1008; *K.R.K. Irvine, Inc.*, 699 F.2d at 1006; *Stewart Infra-Red Commissary of Massachusetts, Inc. v. Coomey*, 661 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1981).

The RFE also requested evidence that the beneficiary met the actual minimum requirements as stated on the ETA Form 9089.³ In response to the RFE, the petitioner submitted two evaluations of the beneficiary's education. These evaluations contradict the previously submitted evaluation from [REDACTED] of Medgar Evers College of the City University of New York. The evaluation from [REDACTED] was submitted in support of the I-140 petitioner and it concluded that the combination of the beneficiary's education and work experience were the equivalent of a United States bachelor's degree in Electronic Engineering and Computer Information Systems. In contrast, the new evaluations submitted by the petitioner in response to the RFE conclude that the beneficiary's Practical Engineer diploma, by itself, is equivalent to a United States bachelor's degree. It is incumbent on the petitioner to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence, and attempts to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies, absent competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth, in fact, lies, will not suffice. *Matter of Ho*, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591-592 (BIA 1988).

The new evaluations are from [REDACTED]⁴ of Career Consulting International and from [REDACTED] of European American University. Both evaluations conclude that the beneficiary completed 161 credits. [REDACTED] states that the program completed by the beneficiary "contains the equivalent of 116 semester credit hours for the classroom study plus 45 semester credit hours for government examinations according to its official transcripts." However, contrary to [REDACTED] assertion, the transcripts in the record do not state the number of semester credit hours.

Both evaluations also reference "contact hours" as a means of evaluating the beneficiary's degree. However, the record fails to provide peer-reviewed material confirming that assigning credits by lecture hour is applicable to the Israeli tertiary education system. For example, if the ratio of classroom and outside study in the Israeli system is different than the U.S. system, which presumes two hours of individual study time for each classroom hour, applying the U.S. credit system to Israeli classroom hours would be meaningless.

³ In addition, the RFE requested additional evidence regarding the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. This evidence is discussed below.

[REDACTED] indicates that she has a Master's degree from the Institute of Transpersonal Psychology and a doctorate from Ecole Superieure Robert de Sorbon but does not indicate the field in which she obtained her doctorate. According to its website, www.sorbon.fr/index1.html, Ecole Superieure Robert de Sorbon awards degrees based on past experience.

Both evaluations also note that three-year bachelor degree programs exist at several regionally accredited colleges and universities in the United States. However, this does not seem to be relevant as the transcript in the record indicates that the beneficiary completed the Practical Engineer program in two years, beginning the program in October 1985 and completing it in October 1987. Further, the existence of three year degree programs in the United States is not useful in evaluating unrelated foreign degrees. At issue is not whether it is possible to obtain a baccalaureate in less than four years in the United States, but the actual equivalence of the specific degree that the beneficiary obtained.⁵

also relies on a UNESCO document. In support of his evaluation you submitted 138 pages of UNESCO materials, only two of which are relevant. The relevant language relates to “recognition” of qualifications awarded in higher education. Paragraph 1(e) defines recognition as follows:

“Recognition” of a foreign qualification in higher education means its acceptance by the competent authorities of the State concerned (whether they be governmental or nongovernmental) as entitling its holder to be considered under the same conditions as those holding a comparable qualification awarded in that State an deemed comparable, for the purposes of access to or further pursuit of higher education studies, participation in research, the practice of a profession, if this does not require the passing of examinations or further special preparation, or all the foregoing, according to the scope of the recognition.

The UNESCO recommendation relates to admission to graduate school and training programs and eligibility to practice in a profession. Nowhere does it suggest that a two-year degree must be deemed equivalent to a four-year degree for purposes of qualifying for a class of individuals defined by statute and regulation as eligible for immigration benefits. More significantly, the recommendation does not define “comparable qualification.” At the heart of this matter is whether the beneficiary’s degree is, in fact, the foreign equivalent of a U.S. baccalaureate. The UNESCO recommendation does not address this issue.

As advised in the RFE issued to the petitioner by this office, we have reviewed the Electronic Database for Global Education (EDGE) created by the American Association of Collegiate Registrars and Admissions Officers (AACRAO).⁶ AACRAO, according to its website, is “a nonprofit, voluntary, professional association of more than 10,000 higher education admissions and

⁵ Similarly, both evaluations also reference the three year “Bologna degree.” Similar to the three year bachelor’s degree programs in the United States, the existence of a three year bachelor’s degree program in Europe is not relevant to whether the beneficiary’s three year bachelor’s degree is equivalent to a United States bachelor’s degree.

⁶ In *Confluence Intern., Inc. v. Holder*, 2009 WL 825793 (D.Minn. March 27, 2009), the District Court in Minnesota determined that the AAO provided a rational explanation for its reliance on information provided by the American Association of Collegiate Registrar and Admissions Officers to support its decision.

registration professionals who represent approximately 2,500 institutions in more than 30 countries.” AACRAO, <http://www.aacrao.org/about/> (accessed December 22, 2009). Its mission “is to provide professional development, guidelines and voluntary standards to be used by higher education officials regarding the best practices in records management, admissions, enrollment management, administrative information technology and student services.” *Id.* According to the login page, EDGE is “a web-based resource for the evaluation of foreign educational credentials” that is continually updated and revised by staff and members of AACRAO. [REDACTED] Director of International Education Services, “AACRAO EDGE Login,” <http://aacraoedge.aacrao.org/index.php> (accessed December 22, 2009).

Authors for EDGE are not merely expressing their personal opinions. Rather, authors for EDGE must work with a publication consultant and a Council Liaison with AACRAO’s National Council on the Evaluation of Foreign Educational Credentials. “An Author’s Guide to Creating AACRAO International Publications” 5-6 (First ed. 2005), available for download at www.aacrao.org/publications/guide_to_creating_international_publications.pdf. If placement recommendations are included, the Council Liaison works with the author to give feedback and the publication is subject to final review by the entire Council. *Id.* at 11-12.

As noted in the RFE, in the section related to Israel’s educational system, EDGE provides that a “Handasai,” Practical Engineer diploma awarded in Israel represents the attainment of a level of education comparable to two years of university study in the United States, and that credit may be awarded on a course-by-course basis. Additionally, EDGE states that “this credential is similar to technical and vocational programs offered at U.S. junior/community colleges. These programs are offered at specialized technical and vocational colleges.” It does not, however, suggest that a two-year diploma from Israel may be deemed a foreign equivalent to a U.S. baccalaureate degree.

Based on this juried opinion, we must conclude that the beneficiary’s baccalaureate in this matter is only equivalent to two years of undergraduate education from a regionally accredited institution in the United States.

The Form ETA 750 does not provide that the minimum academic requirements of a bachelor’s degree or academic equivalent might be met through a combination of work and education or some other formula other than that explicitly stated on the Form ETA 750. Thus, the alien does not qualify as a skilled worker as he does not meet the terms of the labor certification as explicitly expressed or as extrapolated from the evidence of its intent about those requirements during the labor certification process.

The beneficiary does not have a United States baccalaureate degree or a foreign equivalent degree, and fails to meet the requirements of the labor certification, and, thus, does not qualify for preference visa classification under section 203(b)(3) of the Act.

Beyond the decision of the director, the petitioner has not established that it has the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage. An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all

of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. *See Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States*, 299 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), *aff'd*. 345 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2003); *see also Dor v. INS*, 891 F.2d at 1002 n. 9.

The regulation 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) states in pertinent part:

Ability of prospective employer to pay wage. Any petition filed by or for an employment-based immigrant which requires an offer of employment must be accompanied by evidence that the prospective United States employer has the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner must demonstrate this ability at the time the priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. Evidence of this ability shall be in the form of copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements.

The petitioner must demonstrate the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, which is the date the ETA Form 9089 was accepted for processing by any office within the employment system of the DOL. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(d).

Here, the ETA Form 9089 was accepted on March 28, 2006. The proffered wage as stated on the ETA Form 9089 is \$56,000.00 per year.

The evidence in the record of proceeding shows that the petitioner is structured as a sole proprietorship. On the petition, the petitioner claimed to have been established in 1987 and to currently employ two workers. On the ETA Form 9089, signed by the beneficiary on July 6, 2006, the beneficiary claimed to work for the petitioner since October 1, 2004.

The petitioner must establish that its job offer to the beneficiary is a realistic one. Because the filing of an ETA Form 9089 labor certification application establishes a priority date for any immigrant petition later based on the ETA Form 9089, the petitioner must establish that the job offer was realistic as of the priority date and that the offer remained realistic for each year thereafter, until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. The petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is an essential element in evaluating whether a job offer is realistic. *See Matter of Great Wall*, 16 I&N Dec. 142 (Acting Reg. Comm. 1977); *see also* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2). In evaluating whether a job offer is realistic, USCIS requires the petitioner to demonstrate financial resources sufficient to pay the beneficiary's proffered wages, although the totality of the circumstances affecting the petitioning business will be considered if the evidence warrants such consideration. *See Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (Reg. Comm. 1967).

In determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage during a given period, USCIS will first examine whether the petitioner employed and paid the beneficiary during that period. If the petitioner establishes by documentary evidence that it employed the beneficiary at a salary equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the evidence will be considered *prima facie* proof of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. In the instant case, the petitioner has not established that it employed and paid the beneficiary the full proffered wage from the priority date in 2006 onwards.

If the petitioner does not establish that it employed and paid the beneficiary an amount at least equal to the proffered wage during that period, USCIS will next examine the net income figure reflected on the petitioner's federal income tax return, without consideration of depreciation or other expenses. *River Street Donuts, LLC v. Napolitano*, 558 F.3d 111 (1st Cir. 2009). Reliance on federal income tax returns as a basis for determining a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is well established by judicial precedent. *Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava*, 632 F. Supp. 1049, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (citing *Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman*, 736 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1984)); see also *Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh*, 719 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Texas 1989); *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); *Ubeda v. Palmer*, 539 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982), *aff'd*, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983).

The petitioner is a sole proprietorship, a business in which one person operates the business in his or her personal capacity. Black's Law Dictionary 1398 (7th Ed. 1999). Unlike a corporation, a sole proprietorship does not exist as an entity apart from the individual owner. See *Matter of United Investment Group*, 19 I&N Dec. 248, 250 (Comm. 1984). Therefore the sole proprietor's adjusted gross income, assets and personal liabilities are also considered as part of the petitioner's ability to pay. Sole proprietors report income and expenses from their businesses on their individual (Form 1040) federal tax return each year. The business-related income and expenses are reported on Schedule C and are carried forward to the first page of the tax return. Sole proprietors must show that they can cover their existing business expenses as well as pay the proffered wage out of their adjusted gross income or other available funds. In addition, sole proprietors must show that they can sustain themselves and their dependents. *Ubeda v. Palmer*, 539 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982), *aff'd*, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983).

In *Ubeda*, 539 F. Supp. at 650, the court concluded that it was highly unlikely that a petitioning entity structured as a sole proprietorship could support himself, his spouse and five dependents on a gross income of slightly more than \$20,000 where the beneficiary's proposed salary was \$6,000 or approximately thirty percent (30%) of the petitioner's gross income.

In the instant case, the sole proprietor supported a family of five in 2006 and 2007, and a family of four in 2008.

The sole proprietor's tax returns demonstrate its adjusted gross income (AGI) for the years 2006 through 2008, as shown in the table below.

- In 2006, the Form 1040 stated AGI of \$14,430.00.
- In 2007, the Form 1040 stated AGI of \$53,131.00.
- In 2008, the Form 1040 stated AGI of \$91,836.00.⁷

In 2006 and 2007, the sole proprietor's adjusted gross income fails to cover the proffered wage of \$56,000.00 per year. It is improbable that the sole proprietor could support himself on a deficit,

⁷ The petitioner submitted only a draft of the tax return for 2008, stating that he had applied for an extension of time to file the return.

which is what remains after reducing the adjusted gross income by the amount required to pay the proffered wage. For 2008, the sole proprietor's AGI exceeds the proffered wage by \$35,836.00. The sole proprietor submitted a list of monthly household expenses which provided a total of \$26,448.00 in expenses per year. In the RFE issued on August 10, 2009, this office requested the petitioner provide independent credible documentation to verify the accuracy of the petitioner's household expenses. The petitioner failed to provide documentation of all categories of expenses. Specifically, no objective evidence was provided of the expenses for "food" or "misc. charges." In addition, it appears that some expenses were initially understated. Finally, it appears that some expenses may not have been included at all in the petitioner's calculation of monthly household expenses. For example, there is no indication of the amount that the petitioner paid monthly for car insurance or health insurance. Therefore, the petitioner has failed to establish that it had sufficient AGI to pay the proffered wage from 2006 through 2008.

On appeal, the petitioner has submitted an unaudited balance sheet listing assets, liabilities and equity. Reliance on unaudited financial records is misplaced. The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) makes clear that where a petitioner relies on financial statements to demonstrate its ability to pay the proffered wage, those financial statements must be audited. As there is no accountant's report accompanying these statements, the AAO cannot conclude that they are audited statements. Unaudited financial statements are the representations of management. The unsupported representations of management are not reliable evidence and are insufficient to demonstrate the ability to pay the proffered wage.

The petitioner has also submitted account statements showing assets held in the following amounts:

- Bank of America CD with a balance of \$10,432.85 as of June 3, 2009.
- Oppenheimer Funds non-retirement account with a balance of \$10,106.30 as of September 30, 2009.
- MFS portfolio with a value of \$8,384.29 as of September 30, 2009.
- NOVA Bank money market savings account with a balance of \$2,057.82 as of September 15, 2009.
- Citizens Bank IRA CD with a balance of \$26,010.75 as of April 3, 2008.

The total value of these accounts is \$56,992.01, not taking into consideration any taxes and penalties for withdrawal or liquidation of funds from these accounts.⁸ This amount is essentially equal to the proffered wage for one year, and thus is insufficient to establish the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage on a continuing basis.

The petitioner also submitted a printout from a website which lists several deposit accounts as well as four loans. Although the balance is listed for each account, no information is given as to the nature of any of the accounts. Further, although the total value of all of the deposit accounts is nearly \$130,000.00, the value of the loans listed on the printout is more than \$610,000.00. Thus,

⁸ Specifically, withdrawals from the IRA would likely be taxed and may be subject to early withdrawal penalties.

although the balances of the deposit accounts may be intended to demonstrate the petitioner's assets, it appears that the petitioner's liabilities greatly outweigh the assets.

Finally, USCIS may consider the overall magnitude of the petitioner's business activities in its determination of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. *See Matter of Sonegawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612. The petitioning entity in *Sonegawa* had been in business for over 11 years and routinely earned a gross annual income of about \$100,000. During the year in which the petition was filed in that case, the petitioner changed business locations and paid rent on both the old and new locations for five months. There were large moving costs and also a period of time when the petitioner was unable to do regular business. The Regional Commissioner determined that the petitioner's prospects for a resumption of successful business operations were well established. The petitioner was a fashion designer whose work had been featured in *Time* and *Look* magazines. Her clients included Miss Universe, movie actresses, and society matrons. The petitioner's clients had been included in the lists of the best-dressed California women. The petitioner lectured on fashion design at design and fashion shows throughout the United States and at colleges and universities in California. The Regional Commissioner's determination in *Sonegawa* was based in part on the petitioner's sound business reputation and outstanding reputation as a couturiere. As in *Sonegawa*, USCIS may, at its discretion, consider evidence relevant to the petitioner's financial ability that falls outside of a petitioner's net income and net current assets. USCIS may consider such factors as the number of years the petitioner has been doing business, the established historical growth of the petitioner's business, the overall number of employees, the occurrence of any uncharacteristic business expenditures or losses, the petitioner's reputation within its industry, whether the beneficiary is replacing a former employee or an outsourced service, or any other evidence that USCIS deems relevant to the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage.

In the instant case, no unusual circumstances have been shown to exist in this case to parallel those in *Sonegawa*. The petitioner did not establish a pattern of profitable or successful years, that the period from 2006 to 2008 was uncharacteristically unprofitable or difficult for some reason, or that it has a sound business reputation. Thus, assessing the totality of the circumstances in this individual case, it is concluded that the petitioner has not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage.

The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and alternative basis for denial. The burden of proof in these proceedings rests solely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. **The petitioner has not met that burden.**

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.