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U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U. S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Office of Administrative Appeals MS 2090
Washington, DC 20529-2090



U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services

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MAR 15 2010

FILE:

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Office: NEBRASKA SERVICE CENTER

Date:

IN RE:

Petitioner:

Beneficiary:

PETITION: Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as a Skilled Worker or Professional pursuant to Section 203(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)


ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:

SELF-REPRESENTED

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. Please refer to 8 C.F.R. § 103.5 for the specific requirements. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$585. Any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider, as required by 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i).


Perry Rhew
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The Director, Nebraska Service Center, denied the immigrant visa petition. The matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner operates a rehabilitation hospital, and seeks to employ the beneficiary permanently in the United States as a registered nurse, a professional or skilled worker pursuant to section 203(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3).

Section 203(b)(3)(A)(ii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(ii), provides for the granting of preference classification to qualified immigrants who hold baccalaureate degrees and who are members of the professions. The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(l)(2), and section 203(b)(3)(A)(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(i), provides for the granting of preference classification to qualified immigrants who are capable, at the time of petitioning for classification under this paragraph, of performing skilled labor (requiring at least two years training or experience), not of a temporary nature, for which qualified workers are not available in the United States. *See also* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(l)(3)(ii).

The petitioner has applied for the beneficiary under a blanket labor certification pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 656.5, Schedule A, Group I. *See also* 20 C.F.R. § 656.15. Schedule A is the list of occupations set forth at 20 C.F.R. § 656.5 with respect to which the Department of Labor (DOL) has determined that there are not sufficient United States workers who are able, willing, qualified and available, and that the employment of aliens in such occupations will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of United States workers similarly employed.

Based on 8 C.F.R. §§ 204.5(a)(2) and (l)(3)(i) an applicant for a Schedule A position would file Form I-140, “accompanied by any required individual labor certification, application for Schedule A designation, or evidence that the alien’s occupation qualifies as a shortage occupation within the Department of Labor’s Labor Market Information Pilot Program.”¹ The priority date of any petition filed for classification under section 203(b) of the Act “shall be the date the completed, signed petition (including all initial evidence and the correct fee) is properly filed with [U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)].” 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(d).

Pursuant to the regulations set forth in Title 20 of the Code of Federal Regulations, the filing must include evidence of prearranged employment for the alien beneficiary. The employment is evidenced by the employer’s completion of the job offer description on the application form and evidence that the employer has provided appropriate notice of filing the Application for Alien Employment Certification to the bargaining representative or to the employer’s employees as set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 656.10(d).

¹ On March 28, 2005, pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 656.17, the Application for Permanent Employment Certification, ETA 9089 replaced the Application for Alien Employment Certification, Form ETA 750. The new Form ETA 9089 was introduced in connection with the re-engineered permanent foreign labor certification program (PERM), which was published in the Federal Register on December 27, 2004 with an effective date of March 28, 2005. *See* 69 Fed. Reg. 77326 (Dec. 27, 2004).

Also, according to 20 C.F.R. § 656.15(c)(2), aliens who will be permanently employed as professional nurses must have: (1) passed the Commission on Graduates of Foreign Nursing Schools (CGFNS) Examination; or (2) hold a full and unrestricted license to practice professional nursing in the [s]tate of intended employment; or (3) that the alien has passed the National Council Licensure Examination for Registered Nurses (NCLEX-RN).

On July 17, 2007, the director denied the petition because the petitioner failed to properly post the position in accordance with 20 C.F.R. § 656.10(d)(1). Specifically, the director found that the petitioner failed to include the proper proffered wage on the notice, failed to attest to where the notice was posted, and failed to post the notice in in-house media. The director also noted the petitioner's failure to produce evidence of its ability to pay the proffered wage from the date the labor certification was accepted onward.²

The AAO takes a *de novo* look at issues raised in the denial of this petition. *See Dor v. INS*, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989) (noting that the AAO reviews appeals on a *de novo* basis). The AAO considers all pertinent evidence in the record, including new evidence properly submitted upon appeal.³

The record shows that the appeal is properly filed, timely and makes an allegation of error in law or fact. The procedural history in this case is documented by the record and incorporated into the decision. Further elaboration of the procedural history will be made only as necessary.

20 C.F.R. § 656.10(d) provides:

- (1) In applications filed under § 656.15 (Schedule A), § 656.16 (Shepherders), § 656.17 (Basic Process); § 656.18 (College and University Teachers), and § 656.21 (Supervised Recruitment), the employer must give notice of the filing of the Application for Permanent Employment Certification and be able to document that notice was provided, if requested by the certifying officer as follows:
 - (i) To the bargaining representative(s) (if any) of the employer's employees in the occupational classification for which certification of the job opportunity is sought in the employer's location(s) in the area of intended employment. Documentation may consist of a copy of the letter and a copy of the Application for Permanent Employment Certification form that was sent to the bargaining representative.

² The director also noted counsel's failure to submit a proper Form G-28 on behalf of the petitioner and therefore the petitioner was treated as self-represented. No Form G-28 was submitted on appeal.

³ The submission of additional evidence on appeal is allowed by the instructions to the Form I-290B, which are incorporated into the regulations by the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(1). *See Matter of Soriano*, 19 I&N Dec. 764 (BIA 1988).

(ii) If there is no such bargaining representative, by posted notice to the employer's employees at the facility or location of the employment. The notice must be posted for at least 10 consecutive business days. The notice must be clearly visible and unobstructed while posted and must be posted in conspicuous places where the employer's U.S. workers can readily read the posted notice on their way to or from their place of employment . . . In addition, the employer must publish the notice in any and all in-house media, whether electronic or printed, in accordance with the normal procedures used for the recruitment of similar positions in the employer's organization.

...

(3) The notice of the filing of an Application for Permanent Employment Certification must:

(i) State the notice is being provided as a result of the filing of an application for permanent alien labor certification for the relevant job opportunity;

(ii) State any person may provide documentary evidence bearing on the application to the Certifying Officer of the Department of Labor;

(iii) Provide the address of the appropriate Certifying Officer; and

(iv) Be provided between 30 and 180 days before filing the application.

...

(6) If an application is filed under the Schedule A procedures at § 656.15. . . the notice must contain a description of the job and rate of pay and meet the requirements of this section.

20 C.F.R. § 656.40 provides:

(a) Application process. The employer must request a prevailing wage determination from the SWA having jurisdiction over the proposed area of intended employment. The SWA must enter its wage determination on the form it uses and return the form with its endorsement to the employer. Unless the employer chooses to appeal the SWA's prevailing wage determination under Sec. 656.41(a), it files the Application for Permanent Employment Certification either electronically or by mail with an ETA application processing center and maintains the SWA PWD in its files. The determination shall be submitted to an ETA application processing center in the event it is requested in the course of an audit.

Additionally, section 212 (a)(5)(A)(i) of the Act states the following:

Any alien who seeks to enter the United States for the purpose of performing skilled or unskilled labor is inadmissible, unless the Secretary of Labor has determined and certified . . . that

- (I) there are not sufficient workers who are able, willing, qualified . . . and available at the time of application for a visa and admission to the United States and at the place where the alien is to perform such skilled or unskilled labor, and
- (II) the employment of such alien will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of workers in the U.S. similarly employed.

Fundamental to these provisions is the need to ensure that there are no qualified U.S. workers available for the position prior to filing. The required posting notice seeks to allow any person with evidence related to the application to notify the appropriate DOL officer prior to petition filing. *See* the Immigration Act of 1990, Pub.L. No. 101-649, 122(b)(1), 1990 Stat. 358 (1990); *see also* Labor Certification Process for the Permanent Employment of Aliens in the United States and Implementation of the Immigration Act of 1990, 56 Fed. Reg. 32,244 (July 15, 1991). Statutory interpretation begins with the language of the statute itself. *Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare v. Davenport*, 495 U.S. 552 (1990). We are expected to give the words used their ordinary meaning. *Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.*, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). We are to construe the language in question in harmony with the thrust of related provisions and with the statute as a whole. *K Mart Corp. v. Cartier Inc.*, 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988) (holding that construction of language which takes into account the design of the statute as a whole is preferred); *see also COIT Independence Joint Venture v. Federal Sav. and Loan Ins. Corp.*, 489 U.S. 561 (1989); *Matter of W-F-*, 21 I&N Dec. 503 (BIA 1996).

The record contains a prevailing wage determination listing a pay rate of \$23.40. The Form ETA 9089 lists the offered wage as \$23.00 to \$25.00 with the pay range starting below the prevailing wage. The petitioner initially submitted a posting notice that stated an hourly wage of \$23.00 per hour instead of the required proffered wage of \$23.40 per hour. The director cited the petitioner's failure to comply with 20 C.F.R. § 656(d)(10) in his decision. On appeal, the petitioner states that the beneficiary received a salary of \$23.00 per hour until January 1, 2007 when he received a raise to \$23.69. 20 C.F.R. § 656.10(d)(6) requires that the notice contains the correct rate of pay to ensure that potential U.S. workers are apprized as to the position in its entirety. The notice posted was insufficient to provide notice as to the wage available for this particular position, which according to the prevailing wage determination would have had to be \$23.40 per hour regardless as to the amount that the petitioner was actually paying the beneficiary. The intent of the notice is not to inform potential workers of the salary that the beneficiary was actually receiving, but the amount that applicants would receive if hired for the position. The petitioner is obliged to pay at least the prevailing wage as of the time that the beneficiary obtains permanent residence. 20 C.F.R. §

656.10(c)(1). The posting provided does not specify the correct prevailing wage and therefore is not in compliance with 20 C.F.R. § 656.10(d)(6) thus making the petition unapprovable.

In addition to not providing the proper prevailing wage on the notice, the director noted that the petitioner failed to state where the notice was posted or to publish the notice in any in-house media as required by 20 C.F.R. § 656.10(d)(1)(ii). On appeal, the petitioner submitted a letter from the director of human resources stating that the posting was placed at the petitioner's location for the requisite ten consecutive business days and forty days before the petition was filed. Although this letter satisfies the requirement that the notice be posted where the beneficiary would work and for the required time period, it says nothing about the notice having been provided in in-house media.⁴ As a result, the petitioner has not fulfilled the requirements of 20 C.F.R. § 656.10(d)(1)(ii), and the petition may not be approved.⁵

Lastly, the director noted that the petitioner did not submit evidence of its ability to pay the proffered wage. The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) states in pertinent part:

Ability of prospective employer to pay wage. Any petition filed by or for an employment-based immigrant which requires an offer of employment must be accompanied by evidence that the prospective United States employer has the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner must demonstrate this ability at the time the priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. Evidence of this ability shall be either in the form of copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements.

The petitioner must demonstrate the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the date that the I-140 was filed, which in this case was July 3, 2006. The proffered wage as stated on the Prevailing Wage Determination generated by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts Division of Career Services is \$23.40 per hour (\$48,672 per year).

The evidence in the record of proceeding shows that the petitioner is structured as a C corporation. On the petition, the petitioner claimed to have been established in 1921. According to the tax return in the record, the petitioner's fiscal year runs from October 1 to September 30. On the Form ETA 9089, signed by the beneficiary on June 24, 2006, the beneficiary did not claim to have worked for the petitioner.

The petitioner must establish that its job offer to the beneficiary is a realistic one. In Schedule A cases, the filing of an I-140 establishes a priority date for the immigrant petition so, the petitioner must establish that the job offer was realistic as of the priority date and that the offer remained realistic for

⁴ Additionally, the posting notice is deficient as it fails to state the job requirements of an Associate's degree in conformance with 20 C.F.R. § 656.10(d)(6).

⁵ The petitioner submitted a number of job advertisements but the petitioner is not required to advertise for a Schedule A position. In any event, these advertisements are not in conformance with 20 C.F.R. § 656.10 and would not satisfy the in-house advertising requirement.

each year thereafter, until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. The petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is an essential element in evaluating whether a job offer is realistic. *See Matter of Great Wall*, 16 I&N Dec. 142 (Acting Reg. Comm. 1977); *see also* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2). In evaluating whether a job offer is realistic, USCIS requires the petitioner to demonstrate financial resources sufficient to pay the beneficiary's proffered wages, although the totality of the circumstances affecting the petitioning business will be considered if the evidence warrants such consideration. *See Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (Reg. Comm. 1967).

In determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage during a given period, USCIS will first examine whether the petitioner employed and paid the beneficiary during that period. If the petitioner establishes by documentary evidence that it employed the beneficiary at a salary equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the evidence will be considered *prima facie* proof of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. In the instant case, the petitioner submitted wage statements covering January 6, 2007 to March 17, 2007. Those wage statements reflect that the petitioner paid the beneficiary a total of \$13,571.75 gross over that period.⁶ We note that the total pay exceeds that of the proffered wage for that period, however, that period ends months before the appeal was filed in August 2007. The petitioner did not submit any subsequent pay records to cover the time period from March 2007 to August 2007. The records do not include an hourly rate of pay and also include some overtime pay. Therefore, we cannot conclude that the petitioner is regularly employing the beneficiary at the assigned prevailing wage.

If the petitioner does not establish that it employed and paid the beneficiary an amount at least equal to the proffered wage during that period, USCIS will next examine the net income figure reflected on the petitioner's federal income tax return, without consideration of depreciation or other expenses. *River Street Donuts, LLC v. Napolitano*, 558 F.3d 111 (1st Cir. 2009). Reliance on federal income tax returns as a basis for determining a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is well established by judicial precedent. *Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava*, 632 F. Supp. 1049, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (*citing Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman*, 736 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1984)); *see also Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh*, 719 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Texas 1989); *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); *Ubeda v. Palmer*, 539 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982), *aff'd*, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983). Reliance on the petitioner's gross receipts and wage expense is misplaced. Showing that the petitioner's gross receipts exceeded the proffered wage is insufficient. Similarly, showing that the petitioner paid wages in excess of the proffered wage is insufficient.

In *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. at 1084, the court held that the Immigration and Naturalization Service, now USCIS, had properly relied on the petitioner's net income figure, as

⁶ The wage statement also indicates that the beneficiary was not working a set number of hours per week, but instead his biweekly hours ranged from 59.25 to 120 and three out of the six pay periods reflected hours worked at less than the 80 hours indicated on the petition. 20 C.F.R. § 656.3 states that "Employment means: (1) Permanent, full-time work by an employee for an employer other than oneself." The labor certification must be for full-time employment.

stated on the petitioner's corporate income tax returns, rather than the petitioner's gross income. The court specifically rejected the argument that USCIS should have considered income before expenses were paid rather than net income.

With respect to depreciation, the court in *River Street Donuts* noted:

The AAO recognized that a depreciation deduction is a systematic allocation of the cost of a tangible long-term asset and does not represent a specific cash expenditure during the year claimed. Furthermore, the AAO indicated that the allocation of the depreciation of a long-term asset could be spread out over the years or concentrated into a few depending on the petitioner's choice of accounting and depreciation methods. Nonetheless, the AAO explained that depreciation represents an actual cost of doing business, which could represent either the diminution in value of buildings and equipment or the accumulation of funds necessary to replace perishable equipment and buildings. Accordingly, the AAO stressed that even though amounts deducted for depreciation do not represent current use of cash, neither does it represent amounts available to pay wages.

We find that the AAO has a rational explanation for its policy of not adding depreciation back to net income. Namely, that the amount spent on a long term tangible asset is a "real" expense.

River Street Donuts, 558 F.3d at 116. “[USCIS] and judicial precedent support the use of tax returns and the *net income figures* in determining petitioner's ability to pay. Plaintiffs' argument that these figures should be revised by the court by adding back depreciation is without support.” *Chi-Feng Chang*, 719 F.Supp. at 537 (emphasis added). As a result, we will not take into account the amounts that the petitioner used in valuing its depreciation amount. Similarly, we will not look at the total assets in isolation.

For a C corporation, USCIS considers net income to be the figure shown on Line 28 of the Form 1120, U.S. Corporation Income Tax Return. The only evidence submitted with regards to the petitioner's income is the first page of the petitioner's 2005 Form 1120. That Form 1120 for the tax year from October 1, 2005 to September 30, 2006 stated net income in excess of \$6.5 million. This is sufficient to demonstrate the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage at the time of the priority date. No evidence was presented to cover the period from September 30, 2006 to January 2007 or March 2007 onwards. A petitioner must demonstrate its continued ability to pay the proffered wage.

USCIS may consider the overall magnitude of the petitioner's business activities in its determination of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. See *Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (BIA 1967). The petitioning entity in *Sonogawa* had been in business for over 11 years and routinely earned a gross annual income of about \$100,000. During the year in which the petition was filed in that case, the petitioner changed business locations and paid rent on both the old and

new locations for five months. There were large moving costs and also a period of time when the petitioner was unable to do regular business. The Regional Commissioner determined that the petitioner's prospects for a resumption of successful business operations were well established. The petitioner was a fashion designer whose work had been featured in *Time* and *Look* magazines. Her clients included Miss Universe, movie actresses, and society matrons. The petitioner's clients had been included in the lists of the best-dressed California women. The petitioner lectured on fashion design at design and fashion shows throughout the United States and at colleges and universities in California. The Regional Commissioner's determination in *Sonegawa* was based in part on the petitioner's sound business reputation and outstanding reputation as a couturiere. As in *Sonegawa*, USCIS may, at its discretion, consider evidence relevant to the petitioner's financial ability that falls outside of a petitioner's net income and net current assets. USCIS may consider such factors as the number of years the petitioner has been doing business, the established historical growth of the petitioner's business, the overall number of employees, the occurrence of any uncharacteristic business expenditures or losses, the petitioner's reputation within its industry, whether the beneficiary is replacing a former employee or an outsourced service, or any other evidence that USCIS deems relevant to the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage.

In the instant case, the gaps in evidence preclude our ability to conclude that the petitioner demonstrated its ability to pay the proffered wage. The 2005 Form 1120 demonstrated high gross and net income sufficient to pay the proffered wage from July 3, 2006 (the priority date) to September 30, 2006 (the end of the plaintiff's 2005 tax year), however, the petitioner must demonstrate its ability to pay the proffered wage for more than three months. Without evidence of the petitioner's continuing ability to pay the proffered wage from September 30, 2006, we are unable to find that the petitioner demonstrated its overall ability to pay the proffered wage.

Additionally, although not raised by the director, the petitioner failed to establish that the beneficiary had the required experience by the time of the priority date. An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. *See Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States*, 299 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), *aff'd*, 345 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2003); *see also Dor v. INS*, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989) (noting that the AAO reviews appeals on a de novo basis). A petitioner must establish the elements for the approval of the petition at the time of filing. A petition may not be approved if the beneficiary was not qualified at the priority date, but expects to become eligible at a subsequent time. *Matter of Katigbak*, 14 I&N Dec. 45, 49 (Comm. 1971). To be eligible for approval, a beneficiary must have the education and experience specified on the labor certification as of the petition's filing date, which as noted above, is April 26, 2004. *See Matter of Wing's Tea House*, 16 I&N Dec. 158 (Act. Reg. Comm. 1977).

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(l)(3)(ii) specifies for the classification of a skilled worker that:

- (A) *General*. Any requirements of training or experience for skilled workers, professionals, or other workers must be supported by letters from trainers or employers giving the name, address, and title of the trainer or employer, and a description of the training received

(B) *Skilled workers*. If the petition is for a skilled worker, the petition must be accompanied by evidence that the alien meets the educational, training or experience, and any other requirements of the individual labor certification, meets the requirements for Schedule A designation, or meets the requirements for the Labor Market Information Pilot Program occupation designation. The minimum requirements for this classification are at least two years of training or experience.

The ETA Form 9089 specified that an Associate's degree is required for the position, however, the petitioner did not submit any evidence that the beneficiary holds an Associate's degree. As a result, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary had the requisite degree at the time of the priority date.

The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and alternative basis for denial. In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, that burden has not been met.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.