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U.S. Department of Homeland Security  
U. S. Citizenship and Immigration Services  
Office of Administrative Appeals MS 2090  
Washington, DC 20529-2090

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**U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services**

B6

[REDACTED]

FILE: [REDACTED]

Office: NEBRASKA SERVICE CENTER

Date:

NOV 29 2010

IN RE: Petitioner: [REDACTED]  
Beneficiary: [REDACTED]

PETITION: Immigrant petition for Alien Worker as an Other, Unskilled Worker pursuant to section 203(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:

[REDACTED]

**INSTRUCTIONS:**

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied by us in reaching our decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. The specific requirements for filing such a request can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$630. Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires that any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,

Perry Rhew  
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The Director, Nebraska Service Center, denied the immigrant visa petition. The matter was before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner is a moving company. It seeks to employ the beneficiary permanently in the United States as a supervisor pursuant to section 203(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3) as an other, unskilled worker. As required by statute, the petition is accompanied by a Form ETA 750, Application for Alien Employment Certification (Form ETA 750), approved by the Department of Labor (DOL). The director determined that the petition failed to establish its ability to pay the proffered wage from the priority date through the present, and denied the petition accordingly.

The record shows that the appeal is properly filed and timely and makes a specific allegation of error in law or fact. The procedural history in this case is documented by the record and incorporated into the decision. Further elaboration of the procedural history will be made only as necessary.

The AAO conducts appellate review on a *de novo* basis. *See Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004). The AAO considers all pertinent evidence in the record, including new evidence properly submitted upon appeal.<sup>1</sup>

As set forth in the director's October 29, 2008 denial, the primary issue in this case is whether or not the petitioner has established its ability to pay the proffered wage as of the priority date and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence.

Section 203(b)(3)(A)(iii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(iii), provides for the granting of preference classification to qualified immigrants who are capable, at the time of petitioning for classification under this paragraph, of performing unskilled labor, not of a temporary or seasonal nature, for which qualified workers are not available in the United States.

The regulation 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) states in pertinent part:

*Ability of prospective employer to pay wage.* Any petition filed by or for an employment-based immigrant which requires an offer of employment must be accompanied by evidence that the prospective United States employer has the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner must demonstrate this ability at the time the priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. Evidence of this ability shall be either in the form of copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements.

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<sup>1</sup> The submission of additional evidence on appeal is allowed by the instructions to the Form I-290B, which are incorporated into the regulations by the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(1). The record in the instant case provides no reason to preclude consideration of any of the documents newly submitted on appeal. *See Matter of Soriano*, 19 I&N Dec. 764 (BIA 1988).

The petitioner must demonstrate the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, which is the date the Form ETA 750 was accepted for processing by any office within the employment system of the DOL. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(d). The petitioner must also demonstrate that, on the priority date, the beneficiary had the qualifications stated on its Form ETA 750 as certified by the DOL and submitted with the instant petition. *Matter of Wing's Tea House*, 16 I&N Dec. 158 (Act. Reg. Comm. 1977).

Here, the Form ETA 750 was accepted on April 30, 2001. The proffered wage as stated on the Form ETA 750 is \$16.49 per hour (\$34,299.20 per year). On the petition, the petitioner claims that it has been in the business since 1991, and has an annual gross income and net annual income of \$468,002, and nine employees. On the Form ETA 750B, the beneficiary claimed to have worked for the petitioner since April 1995.

The petitioner must establish that its job offer to the beneficiary is a realistic one. Because the filing of a Form ETA 750 labor certification application establishes a priority date for any immigrant petition later based on the Form ETA 750, the petitioner must establish that the job offer was realistic as of the priority date and that the offer remained realistic for each year thereafter, until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. The petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is an essential element in evaluating whether a job offer is realistic. *See Matter of Great Wall*, 16 I&N Dec. 142 (Acting Reg. Comm. 1977); *see also* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2). In evaluating whether a job offer is realistic, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) requires the petitioner to demonstrate financial resources sufficient to pay the beneficiary's proffered wages, although the totality of the circumstances affecting the petitioning business will be considered if the evidence warrants such consideration. *See Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (Reg. Comm. 1967).

In determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage during a given period, USCIS will first examine whether the petitioner employed and paid the beneficiary during that period. If the petitioner establishes by documentary evidence that it employed the beneficiary at a salary equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the evidence will be considered *prima facie* proof of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. While the beneficiary claimed to have worked for the petitioner since April 1995, the petitioner only submitted the beneficiary's W-2 form for 2007 and a paystub for the period ending September 20, 2008. The beneficiary's W-2 form shows that the petitioner paid the beneficiary \$29,040 in 2007. The paystub shows that the petitioner paid the beneficiary at the rate of \$660.00 per week, and the beneficiary's year-to-date earnings as of September 20, 2008 were \$23,760. Counsel did not submit any further documentary evidence on appeal showing that the petitioner continued to pay the beneficiary at the same level in the remaining period of 2008, although such evidence should have been available. The petitioner failed to demonstrate that it paid the beneficiary the full proffered wage for the years 2001 through 2008, and therefore, the petitioner must demonstrate that it had sufficient net income or net current assets to pay the beneficiary the full proffered wage for the years 2001 through 2006 and the differences of \$5,259.20 in 2007 and \$10,539.20 in 2008 between wages actually paid to the beneficiary and the proffered wage respectively.

If the petitioner does not establish that it employed and paid the beneficiary an amount at least equal to the proffered wage during that period, USCIS will next examine the net income figure reflected on the petitioner's federal income tax return, without consideration of depreciation or other expenses. *River Street Donuts, LLC v. Napolitano*, 558 F.3d 111 (1<sup>st</sup> Cir. 2009). Reliance on federal income tax returns as a basis for determining a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is well established by judicial precedent. *Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava*, 632 F. Supp. 1049, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (citing *Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman*, 736 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1984)); see also *Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh*, 719 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Texas 1989); *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); *Ubeda v. Palmer*, 539 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982), *aff'd*, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983). Reliance on the petitioner's wage expense is misplaced. Showing that the petitioner paid wages in excess of the proffered wage is insufficient.

On appeal counsel requests USCIS reconsider its position on adding back the amount of depreciation that the petitioner took on its taxes for the year 2001. Counsel's reliance on depreciation deduction in determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is misplaced. With respect to depreciation, the court in *River Street Donuts* noted:

The AAO recognized that a depreciation deduction is a systematic allocation of the cost of a tangible long-term asset and does not represent a specific cash expenditure during the year claimed. Furthermore, the AAO indicated that the allocation of the depreciation of a long-term asset could be spread out over the years or concentrated into a few depending on the petitioner's choice of accounting and depreciation methods. Nonetheless, the AAO explained that depreciation represents an actual cost of doing business, which could represent either the diminution in value of buildings and equipment or the accumulation of funds necessary to replace perishable equipment and buildings. Accordingly, the AAO stressed that even though amounts deducted for depreciation do not represent current use of cash, neither does it represent amounts available to pay wages.

We find that the AAO has a rational explanation for its policy of not adding depreciation back to net income. Namely, that the amount spent on a long term tangible asset is a "real" expense.

*River Street Donuts* at 116. "[USCIS] and judicial precedent support the use of tax returns and the net income figures in determining petitioner's ability to pay. Plaintiffs' argument that these figures should be revised by the court by adding back depreciation is without support." *Chi-Feng Chang* at 537 (emphasis added).

As alternate method, USCIS also reviews the petitioner's assets. Net current assets are the difference between the petitioner's current assets and current liabilities.<sup>2</sup> A corporation's year-end

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<sup>2</sup> According to *Barron's Dictionary of Accounting Terms* 117 (3<sup>rd</sup> ed. 2000), "current assets" consist

current assets are shown on Schedule L, lines 1(d) through 6(d) and include cash-on-hand, inventories, and receivables expected to be converted to cash within one year. Its year-end current liabilities are shown on lines 16(d) through 18(d). If the total of a corporation's end-of-year net current assets and the wages paid to the beneficiary (if any) are equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the petitioner is expected to be able to pay the proffered wage using those net current assets.

The evidence in the record of proceeding shows that the petitioner was structured as a C corporation and filed its tax return on the Form 1120, U.S. Corporation Income Tax Return. The petitioner selected as an S corporation and filed Form 1120S, U.S. Income Tax Return for an S Corporation, from January 1, 2002. According to the tax returns in the record, the petitioner's fiscal year is based on a calendar year. The record contains the petitioner's Form 1120 for 2001 and Form 1120S for 2002 through 2007. The petitioner's tax returns demonstrate its net income and net current assets as below.

- In 2001, the Form 1120 stated net income<sup>3</sup> of \$3,878 and net current assets of \$13,633.
- In 2002, the Form 1120S stated net income<sup>4</sup> of (\$34,485) and net current assets of \$33,774.
- In 2003, the Form 1120S stated net income of \$4,066 and net current assets of \$31,208.
- In 2004, the Form 1120S stated net income of \$12,247 and net current assets of \$37,859.
- In 2005, the Form 1120S stated net income of \$13,983 and net current assets of \$23,023.

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of items having (in most cases) a life of one year or less, such as cash, marketable securities, inventory and prepaid expenses. "Current liabilities" are obligations payable (in most cases) within one year, such accounts payable, short-term notes payable, and accrued expenses (such as taxes and salaries). *Id.* at 118.

<sup>3</sup> For a C corporation, USCIS considers net income to be the figure shown on Line 28 of the Form 1120, U.S. Corporation Income Tax Return.

<sup>4</sup> Where an S corporation's income is exclusively from a trade or business, USCIS considers net income to be the figure for ordinary income, shown on line 21 of page one of the petitioner's IRS Form 1120S. However, where an S corporation has income, credits, deductions or other adjustments from sources other than a trade or business, they are reported on Schedule K. If the Schedule K has relevant entries for additional income, credits, deductions or other adjustments, net income is found on line 23 (2002-2003), line 17e (2004-2005) or line 18 (2006-2007) of Schedule K. See Instructions for Form 1120S, 2007, at <http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i1120s.pdf> (accessed on November 22, 2010) (indicating that Schedule K is a summary schedule of all shareholder's shares of the corporation's income, deductions, credits, etc.).

- In 2006, the Form 1120S stated net income of \$9,782 and net current assets of (\$14,499).
- In 2007, the Form 1120S stated net income of \$23,887 and net current assets of (\$17,796).

For 2001 through 2003, the petitioner did not have sufficient net income or net current assets to pay the beneficiary the full proffered wage of \$34,299.20. For 2004, the petitioner had sufficient net current assets to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage. For 2005 and 2006, the petitioner did not have sufficient net income or net current assets to pay the beneficiary the full proffered wage. For 2007, the petitioner had sufficient net income to pay the difference of \$5,259.20 between wages actually paid to the beneficiary and the proffered wage. For 2008, the record does not contain any regulatory-prescribed evidence such as annual reports, tax returns or audited financial statements, and therefore, the AAO cannot determine whether the petitioner had sufficient net income or net current assets to pay the beneficiary the difference of \$10,539.20 between wages actually paid to the beneficiary and the proffered wage that year.

Therefore, from the date the Form ETA 750 was accepted for processing by the DOL in 2001, the petitioner failed to establish its continuing ability to pay the proffered wage except for years 2004 and 2007.

On appeal, counsel advocates combining the petitioner's net income with its net current assets to demonstrate the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. This approach is unacceptable because net income and net current assets are not, in the view of the AAO, cumulative. The AAO views net income and net current assets as two different ways of methods of demonstrating the petitioner's ability to pay the wage--one retrospective and one prospective. Net income is retrospective in nature because it represents the sum of income remaining after all expenses were paid over the course of the previous tax year. Conversely, the net current assets figure is a prospective "snapshot" of the net total of petitioner's assets that will become cash within a relatively short period of time minus those expenses that will come due within that same period of time. Thus, the petitioner is expected to receive roughly one-twelfth of its net current assets during each month of the coming year. Given that net income is retrospective and net current assets are prospective in nature, the AAO does not agree with counsel that the two figures can be combined in a meaningful way to illustrate the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage during a single tax year. Moreover, combining the net income and net current assets could double-count certain figures, such as cash on hand and, in the case of a taxpayer who reports taxes pursuant to accrual convention, accounts receivable.

In calculating the ability to pay the proffered salary, USCIS will not augment the petitioner's net income or net current assets by adding in the corporation's credit limits, bank lines, or lines of credit. A "bank line" or "line of credit" is a bank's unenforceable commitment to make loans to a particular borrower up to a specified maximum during a specified time period. A line of credit is not a contractual or legal obligation on the part of the bank. *See Barron's Dictionary of Finance and Investment Terms*, 45 (1998).

Since the line of credit is a “commitment to loan” and not an existent loan, the petitioner has not established that the unused funds from the line of credit are available at the time of filing the petition. As noted above, a petitioner must establish eligibility at the time of filing; a petition cannot be approved at a future date after the petitioner becomes eligible under a new set of facts. *See Matter of Katigbak*, 14 I&N Dec. 45, 49 (Comm. 1971). Moreover, the petitioner’s existent loans will be reflected in the balance sheet provided in the tax return or audited financial statement and will be fully considered in the evaluation of the corporation’s net current assets. Comparable to the limit on a credit card, the line of credit cannot be treated as cash or as a cash asset. However, if the petitioner wishes to rely on a line of credit as evidence of ability to pay, the petitioner must submit documentary evidence, such as a detailed business plan and audited cash flow statements, to demonstrate that the line of credit will augment and not weaken its overall financial position. Finally, USCIS will give less weight to loans and debt as a means of paying salary since the debts will increase the firm’s liabilities and will not improve its overall financial position. Although lines of credit and debt are an integral part of any business operation, USCIS must evaluate the overall financial position of a petitioner to determine whether the employer is making a realistic job offer and has the overall financial ability to satisfy the proffered wage. *See Matter of Great Wall*, 16 I&N Dec. 142 (Acting Reg. Comm. 1977).

Contrary to counsel’s assertion, USCIS may not “pierce the corporate veil” and look to the assets of the corporation’s owner to satisfy the corporation’s ability to pay the proffered wage. It is an elementary rule that a corporation is a separate and distinct legal entity from its owners and shareholders. *See Matter of M*, 8 I&N Dec. 24 (BIA 1958), *Matter of Aphrodite Investments, Ltd.*, 17 I&N Dec. 530 (Comm. 1980), and *Matter of Tessel*, 17 I&N Dec. 631 (Act. Assoc. Comm. 1980). Consequently, assets of its shareholders or of other enterprises or corporations cannot be considered in determining the petitioning corporation’s ability to pay the proffered wage. In the instant case, counsel’s assertion that the shareholder’s home equity and lines of credit should be considered in determining the petitioner’s ability to pay the proffered wage is very misplaced. Because a corporation is a separate and distinct legal entity from its owners and shareholders, the assets of its shareholders or of other enterprises or corporations cannot be considered in determining the petitioning corporation’s ability to pay the proffered wage. *Id.* In a similar case, the court in *Sitar v. Ashcroft*, 2003 WL 22203713 (D.Mass. Sept. 18, 2003) stated, “nothing in the governing regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 204.5, permits [USCIS] to consider the financial resources of individuals or entities who have no legal obligation to pay the wage.”

USCIS may consider the overall magnitude of the petitioner’s business activities in its determination of the petitioner’s ability to pay the proffered wage. *See Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (BIA 1967). The petitioning entity in *Sonogawa* had been in business for over 11 years and routinely earned a gross annual income of about \$100,000. During the year in which the petition was filed in that case, the petitioner changed business locations and paid rent on both the old and new locations for five months. There were large moving costs and also a period of time when the petitioner was unable to do regular business. The Regional Commissioner determined that the petitioner’s prospects for a resumption of successful business operations were well established. The

petitioner was a fashion designer whose work had been featured in *Time* and *Look* magazines. Her clients included Miss Universe, movie actresses, and society matrons. The petitioner's clients had been included in the lists of the best-dressed California women. The petitioner lectured on fashion design at design and fashion shows throughout the United States and at colleges and universities in California. The Regional Commissioner's determination in *Sonegawa* was based in part on the petitioner's sound business reputation and outstanding reputation as a couturiere. As in *Sonegawa*, USCIS may, at its discretion, consider evidence relevant to the petitioner's financial ability that falls outside of a petitioner's net income and net current assets. USCIS may consider such factors as the number of years the petitioner has been doing business, the established historical growth of the petitioner's business, the overall number of employees, the occurrence of any uncharacteristic business expenditures or losses, the petitioner's reputation within its industry, whether the beneficiary is replacing a former employee or an outsourced service, or any other evidence that USCIS deems relevant to the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage.

In the instant case, the petitioner failed to establish its ability to pay the proffered wage six out of eight relevant years. While the petitioner's gross receipts or sales have grown from \$370,796 in 2001 to \$552,372 in 2007, the petitioner never had net income sufficient to pay the proffered wage for a single year. No unusual circumstances have been shown to exist in this case to parallel those in *Sonegawa*, nor has it been established that all these seven years were uncharacteristically unprofitable years for the petitioner. While the petitioner had profits for most years, its business is never profitable to employ and pay a new employee. Thus, assessing the totality of the circumstances in this individual case, it is concluded that the petitioner has not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage.

Counsel's assertions and evidence submitted on appeal cannot overcome the ground of denial in the director's October 29, 2008 decision. The petitioner failed to establish that its continuing ability to pay the proffered wage. Therefore, the petition cannot be approved. Accordingly, the director's decision is affirmed.

The burden of proof in these proceedings rests solely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The petitioner has not met that burden.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed.