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U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U. S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Office of Administrative Appeals MS 2090
Washington, DC 20529-2090



**U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services**

PUBLIC COPY



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FILE: [REDACTED]

Office: NEBRASKA SERVICE CENTER

NOV 29 2010

IN RE: Petitioner:
 Beneficiary:



PETITION: Immigrant petition for Alien Worker as an Other, Unskilled Worker pursuant to section 203(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:

SELF-REPRESENTED

INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied by us in reaching our decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. The specific requirements for filing such a request can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$630. Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires that any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,

Perry Rhew
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The Director, Nebraska Service Center, denied the immigrant visa petition. The matter was before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner operates a group of elderly homes. It seeks to employ the beneficiary permanently in the United States as a caregiver pursuant to section 203(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3) as an other, unskilled worker. As required by statute, the petition is accompanied by an ETA Form 9089, Application for Permanent Employment Certification (ETA Form 9089), approved by the Department of Labor (DOL). The director determined that the petition was submitted without all of the required initial evidence, and therefore, denied the petition.

The record shows that the appeal is properly filed and timely and makes a specific allegation of error in law or fact. The procedural history in this case is documented by the record and incorporated into the decision. Further elaboration of the procedural history will be made only as necessary.

The AAO conducts appellate review on a *de novo* basis. *See Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004). The AAO considers all pertinent evidence in the record, including new evidence properly submitted upon appeal.¹

As set forth in the director's January 18, 2009 denial, the primary issue in this case is whether or not the petitioner has the ability to pay the proffered wage as of the priority date and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence.

Section 203(b)(3)(A)(iii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(iii), provides for the granting of preference classification to qualified immigrants who are capable, at the time of petitioning for classification under this paragraph, of performing unskilled labor, not of a temporary or seasonal nature, for which qualified workers are not available in the United States.

The regulation 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) states in pertinent part:

Ability of prospective employer to pay wage. Any petition filed by or for an employment-based immigrant which requires an offer of employment must be accompanied by evidence that the prospective United States employer has the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner must demonstrate this ability at the time the priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. Evidence of this ability shall be either in the form of copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements.

¹ The submission of additional evidence on appeal is allowed by the instructions to the Form I-290B, which are incorporated into the regulations by the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(1). The record in the instant case provides no reason to preclude consideration of any of the documents newly submitted on appeal. *See Matter of Soriano*, 19 I&N Dec. 764 (BIA 1988).

The petitioner must demonstrate the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, which is the date the ETA Form 9089 was accepted for processing by any office within the employment system of the DOL. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(d). The petitioner must also demonstrate that, on the priority date, the beneficiary had the qualifications stated on its ETA Form 9089 as certified by the DOL and submitted with the instant petition. *Matter of Wing's Tea House*, 16 I&N Dec. 158 (Act. Reg. Comm. 1977).

Here, the ETA Form 9089 was accepted on December 3, 2007. The proffered wage as stated on the ETA Form 9089 is \$9.50 per hour (\$19,760 per year). On the petition, the petitioner claims that it has been in the business since 1997, has gross annual income of \$1,200,000 and 34 employees. The beneficiary did not claim to have worked for the petitioner on the ETA Form 9089.

The petitioner must establish that its job offer to the beneficiary is a realistic one. Because the filing of an ETA Form 9089 labor certification application establishes a priority date for any immigrant petition later based on the ETA Form 9089, the petitioner must establish that the job offer was realistic as of the priority date and that the offer remained realistic for each year thereafter, until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. The petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is an essential element in evaluating whether a job offer is realistic. *See Matter of Great Wall*, 16 I&N Dec. 142 (Acting Reg. Comm. 1977); *see also* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2). In evaluating whether a job offer is realistic, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) requires the petitioner to demonstrate financial resources sufficient to pay the beneficiary's proffered wages, although the totality of the circumstances affecting the petitioning business will be considered if the evidence warrants such consideration. *See Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (Reg. Comm. 1967).

In determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage during a given period, USCIS will first examine whether the petitioner employed and paid the beneficiary during that period. If the petitioner establishes by documentary evidence that it employed the beneficiary at a salary equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the evidence will be considered *prima facie* proof of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner did not submit any documentary evidence showing that the petitioner employed and paid the beneficiary any compensation in these relevant years. The petitioner failed to establish its ability to pay the proffered wage through examination of wages actually paid to the beneficiary, and therefore, the petitioner must demonstrate that it could pay the beneficiary the full proffered wage in 2007 and subsequent years with its net income or net current assets.

If the petitioner does not establish that it employed and paid the beneficiary an amount at least equal to the proffered wage during that period, USCIS will next examine the net income figure reflected on the petitioner's federal income tax return, without consideration of depreciation or other expenses. *River Street Donuts, LLC v. Napolitano*, 558 F.3d 111 (1st Cir. 2009). Reliance on federal income tax returns as a basis for determining a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is well established by judicial precedent. *Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava*, 632 F. Supp. 1049, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (*citing Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman*, 736 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1984)); *see also Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh*, 719 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Texas 1989); *K.C.P. Food*

Co., Inc. v. Sava, 623 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); *Ubeda v. Palmer*, 539 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982), *aff'd*, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983). Showing that the petitioner paid wages in excess of the proffered wage is insufficient.

With respect to depreciation, the court in *River Street Donuts* noted:

The AAO recognized that a depreciation deduction is a systematic allocation of the cost of a tangible long-term asset and does not represent a specific cash expenditure during the year claimed. Furthermore, the AAO indicated that the allocation of the depreciation of a long-term asset could be spread out over the years or concentrated into a few depending on the petitioner's choice of accounting and depreciation methods. Nonetheless, the AAO explained that depreciation represents an actual cost of doing business, which could represent either the diminution in value of buildings and equipment or the accumulation of funds necessary to replace perishable equipment and buildings. Accordingly, the AAO stressed that even though amounts deducted for depreciation do not represent current use of cash, neither does it represent amounts available to pay wages.

We find that the AAO has a rational explanation for its policy of not adding depreciation back to net income. Namely, that the amount spent on a long term tangible asset is a "real" expense.

River Street Donuts at 116. “[USCIS] and judicial precedent support the use of tax returns and the *net income figures* in determining petitioner’s ability to pay. Plaintiffs’ argument that these figures should be revised by the court by adding back depreciation is without support.” *Chi-Feng Chang* at 537 (emphasis added).

As alternate method, USCIS also reviews the petitioner’s assets. Net current assets are the difference between the petitioner’s current assets and current liabilities.² A corporation’s year-end current assets are shown on Schedule L, lines 1(d) through 6(d) and include cash-on-hand, inventories, and receivables expected to be converted to cash within one year. Its year-end current liabilities are shown on lines 16(d) through 18(d). If the total of a corporation’s end-of-year net current assets and the wages paid to the beneficiary (if any) are equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the petitioner is expected to be able to pay the proffered wage using those net current assets.

The evidence in the record of proceeding shows that the petitioner is structured as a C corporation. According to the tax return in the record, the petitioner’s fiscal year runs from October 1 to

² According to *Barron’s Dictionary of Accounting Terms* 117 (3rd ed. 2000), “current assets” consist of items having (in most cases) a life of one year or less, such as cash, marketable securities, inventory and prepaid expenses. “Current liabilities” are obligations payable (in most cases) within one year, such accounts payable, short-term notes payable, and accrued expenses (such as taxes and salaries). *Id.* at 118.

September 30. The record contains the petitioner's Form 1120, U.S. Corporation Income Tax Return, for the fiscal year of 2006 and 2007. The petitioner's tax returns demonstrate its net income and net current assets as below.

- In the fiscal year of 2007 (10/1/07-9/30/08), the Form 1120 stated net income³ of (\$28,243) and net current assets of (\$10,500).
- In the fiscal year of 2006 (10/1/06-9/30/07), the Form 1120 stated net income of (\$38,132) and net current assets of (\$28,052).

For 2007, the petitioner did not have sufficient net income or net current assets to pay the beneficiary the full proffered wage. The record does not contain any regulatory-prescribed evidence, such as annual reports, tax returns or audited financial statements for 2008. Without these documents, the AAO cannot determine whether the petitioner had sufficient net income or net current assets to pay the beneficiary the full proffered wage. Although the petitioner's 2006 tax return is not necessarily dispositive because the priority date is on December 3, 2007, the AAO has reviewed and considered the petitioner's tax return for 2006 as reference in determining whether the petitioner had ability to pay the proffered wage since the record contains only one year tax return. The AAO finds that the petitioner did not have net income or net current assets sufficient to pay a proffered wage at the level of \$19,760 per year.

Therefore, from the date the ETA Form 9089 was accepted for processing by the DOL in 2007, the petitioner failed to establish its continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wages through examination of wages paid to the beneficiary and the petitioner's net income or net current assets.

On appeal, the petitioner submitted its Restated Statement of Income for Fiscal Years ended September 30, 2007 and September 30, 2008 as additional evidence to establish the ability to pay the proffered wage. However, the statement is not audited. The petitioner's reliance on unaudited financial records is misplaced. The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) makes clear that where a petitioner relies on financial statements to demonstrate its ability to pay the proffered wage, those financial statements must be audited. As there is no accountant's report accompanying these statements, the AAO cannot conclude that they are audited statements. Unaudited financial statements are the representations of management. The unsupported representations of management are not reliable evidence and are insufficient to demonstrate the ability to pay the proffered wage.

Moreover, if the instant petition were the only petition filed by the petitioner, the petitioner would be required to produce evidence of its ability to pay the proffered wage to the single beneficiary of the instant petition. However, where a petitioner has filed multiple petitions for multiple beneficiaries which have been pending or approved simultaneously, the petitioner must produce evidence that its job offers to each beneficiary are realistic, and therefore, that it has the ability to pay the proffered wages to each of the beneficiaries of its pending and approved petitions, as of the priority date of

³ For a C corporation, USCIS considers net income to be the figure shown on Line 28 of the Form 1120, U.S. Corporation Income Tax Return.

each petition and continuing until the beneficiary of each petition obtains lawful permanent residence. *See Mater of Great Wall*, 16 I&N Dec. 142, 144-145 (Acting Reg. Comm. 1977) (petitioner must establish ability to pay as of the date of the Form MA 7-50B job offer, the predecessor to the Form ETA 750 and ETA Form 9089). *See also* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2).

In the instant case, USCIS records show that the petitioner filed Immigrant Petitions for Alien Worker (Form I-140) for additional five workers (one was denied, two approved and the other two have appeals pending with the AAO).⁴ Therefore, the petitioner is obligated to demonstrate its ability to pay four proffered wages in 2007 and three in 2008. The record does not contain any documentary evidence showing that the petitioner paid these additional beneficiaries any compensation in 2007 and 2008. As previously discussed, the petitioner did not have sufficient net income or net current assets to pay a single proffered wage in 2007, and thus it failed to establish its ability to pay all five proffered wages that year. For 2008, the record does not contain any regulatory-prescribed evidence, such as annual reports, tax returns or audited financial statements for the petitioner. Without these documents, the AAO cannot determine whether the petitioner had sufficient net income or net current assets to pay all four proffered wages. Therefore, the petitioner failed to establish its ability to pay all proffered wages for 2007 and 2008.

USCIS may also consider the overall magnitude of the petitioner's business activities in its determination of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. *See Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (BIA 1967). The petitioning entity in *Sonogawa* had been in business for over 11 years and routinely earned a gross annual income of about \$100,000. During the year in which the petition was filed in that case, the petitioner changed business locations and paid rent on both the old and new locations for five months. There were large moving costs and also a period of time when the petitioner was unable to do regular business. The Regional Commissioner determined that the petitioner's prospects for a resumption of successful business operations were well established. The petitioner was a fashion designer whose work had been featured in *Time* and *Look* magazines. Her clients included Miss Universe, movie actresses, and society matrons. The petitioner's clients had been included in the lists of the best-dressed California women. The petitioner lectured on fashion design at design and fashion shows throughout the United States and at colleges and universities in

⁴ The detail information about the two approved petitions and two pending appeals is as follows:

██████████ on December 27, 2004 with the priority date of April 27, 2004 and approved on September 8, 2005. The beneficiary was adjusted to lawful permanent resident status on March 28, 2007.

██████████ on September 5, 2006 with the priority date of June 14, 2006 and approved on September 16, 2006. USCIS records do not contain any record that the beneficiary has been adjusted to lawful permanent resident status and that the approval of the petition has been revoked as of this date.

██████████ on May 7, 2008 and denied on January 18, 2009. USCIS records show that the appeal from the denial is pending with the AAO as of this date.

██████████ on May 12, 2008 and denied on January 18, 2009. USCIS records show that the appeal from the denial is pending with the AAO as of this date.

California. The Regional Commissioner's determination in *Sonegawa* was based in part on the petitioner's sound business reputation and outstanding reputation as a couturiere. As in *Sonegawa*, USCIS may, at its discretion, consider evidence relevant to the petitioner's financial ability that falls outside of a petitioner's net income and net current assets. USCIS may consider such factors as the number of years the petitioner has been doing business, the established historical growth of the petitioner's business, the overall number of employees, the occurrence of any uncharacteristic business expenditures or losses, the petitioner's reputation within its industry, whether the beneficiary is replacing a former employee or an outsourced service, or any other evidence that USCIS deems relevant to the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage.

In the instant case, the petitioner failed to establish its ability to pay a single proffered wage for any relevant year. No unusual circumstances have been shown to exist in this case to parallel those in *Sonegawa*, nor has it been established that 2006 and 2007 were uncharacteristically unprofitable years for the petitioner. In addition, given the record as a whole, the petitioner's history of filing immigrant and nonimmigrant petitions, the AAO must also take into account the petitioner's ability to pay the petitioner's wages in the context of its overall recruitment efforts. Thus, assessing the totality of the circumstances in this individual case, it is concluded that the petitioner has not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage.

Another issue in this case is whether or not the petitioner has demonstrated that the beneficiary possessed the required qualification for the proffered position prior to the priority date. The key to determining the job qualifications is found on ETA Form 9089, Part H. Job Opportunity Information. This section of the application for permanent employment certification describes the terms and conditions of the job offered. It is important that the ETA Form 9089 be read as a whole.

Moreover, when determining whether a beneficiary is eligible for a preference immigrant visa, USCIS may not ignore a term of the labor certification, nor may it impose additional requirements. *See Madany*, 696 F.2d at 1015. USCIS must examine "the language of the labor certification job requirements" in order to determine what the job requires. *Id.* The only rational manner by which USCIS can be expected to interpret the meaning of terms used to describe the requirements of a job in a labor certification is to examine the certified job offer *exactly* as it is completed by the prospective employer. *See Rosedale Linden Park Company v. Smith*, 595 F. Supp. 829, 833 (D.D.C. 1984) (emphasis added). USCIS's interpretation of the job's requirements, as stated on the labor certification must involve reading and applying *the plain language* of the alien employment certification application form. *See id.* at 834. USCIS cannot and should not reasonably be expected to look beyond the plain language of the labor certification that DOL has formally issued or otherwise attempt to divine the employer's intentions through some sort of reverse engineering of the labor certification.

Regarding the minimum level of education and experience required for the proffered position in this matter, Part H Line 5 of the labor certification reflects that the proffered position requires one year of experience in the job offered.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(1) states in pertinent part:

Evidence relating to qualifying experience or training shall be in the form of letter(s) from current or former employer(s) or trainer(s) and shall include the name, address, and title of the writer, and a specific description of the duties performed by the alien or of the training received. If such evidence is unavailable, other documentation relating to the alien's experience or training will be considered.

The petition was filed without any regulatory-prescribed evidence relating to qualifying experience of the beneficiary. On appeal, the petitioner submitted a photocopy of an experience letter dated March 1, 2008 from [REDACTED] as evidence of qualifying experience from the beneficiary's former employer. This letter verifies that the beneficiary worked as a caregiver for the writer's late father from June 1, 2004 to January 15, 2006. However, the petitioner submitted a photocopy only, did not submit the original copy and supporting documents. The record does not contain any evidence which can be used to verify the writer's signature and the contents of the letter. Further, the record does not contain any evidence showing that the photocopy of the letter was written by the writer and delivered directly from Philippine. In visa petition proceedings, the burden is on the petitioner to establish eligibility for the benefit sought. *See Matter of Brantigan*, 11 I&N Dec. 493 (BIA 1966). The petitioner must prove by a preponderance of evidence that the beneficiary is fully qualified for the benefit sought. *Matter of Martinez*, 21 I&N Dec. 1035, 1036 (BIA 1997); *Matter of Patel*, 19 I&N Dec. 774 (BIA 1988); *Matter of Soo Hoo*, 11 I&N Dec. 151 (BIA 1965). If USCIS fails to believe that a fact stated in the petition is true, USCIS may reject that fact. Section 204(b) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1154(b); *see also Anetekhai v. I.N.S.*, 876 F.2d 1218, 1220 (5th Cir.1989); *Lu-Ann Bakery Shop, Inc. v. Nelson*, 705 F. Supp. 7, 10 (D.D.C.1988); *Systronics Corp. v. INS*, 153 F. Supp. 2d 7, 15 (D.D.C. 2001). Thus, the petitioner failed to establish that the beneficiary met the job requirements on the labor certification. Therefore, the petition may not be approved.

The petitioner's assertions and new evidence submitted on appeal cannot overcome the grounds of denial in the director's January 18, 2009 decision. The petitioner failed to establish that it had the continuing ability to pay all proffered wages beginning on the priority date and continues to the present, and also failed to demonstrate with regulatory-prescribed evidence that the beneficiary possessed the requisite one year of experience for the proffered position. Therefore, the petition cannot be approved. Accordingly, the director's decision is affirmed.

The burden of proof in these proceedings rests solely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The petitioner has not met that burden.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.