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U.S. Department of Homeland Security  
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services  
Office of Administrative Appeals MS 2090  
Washington, DC 20529-2090



U.S. Citizenship  
and Immigration  
Services

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File: [REDACTED] Office: NEBRASKA SERVICE CENTER

Date: OCT 04 2010

IN RE: Petitioner: [REDACTED]  
Beneficiary: [REDACTED]

Petition: Immigrant petition for Alien Worker as an Other, Unskilled Worker pursuant to section 203(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:

[REDACTED]

INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied by us in reaching our decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. The specific requirements for filing such a request can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$585. Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires that any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,

Perry Rhew  
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The preference visa petition was denied by the Director, Nebraska Service Center, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner is a nursing home. It seeks to employ the beneficiary permanently in the United States as a Nursing Aid, Level III. As required by statute, the Form ETA 750, Application for Alien Employment Certification, approved by the United States Department of Labor (DOL), accompanied the petition. The director determined that the petitioner had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage beginning on the priority date of the visa petition and denied the petition accordingly.

The record shows that the appeal is properly filed, timely and makes a specific allegation of error in law or fact. The procedural history in this case is documented by the record and incorporated into the decision. Further elaboration of the procedural history will be made only as necessary.

As set forth in the director's December 2, 2008 denial, the issue in this case is whether or not the petitioner has the ability to pay the proffered wage as of the priority date and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence.

Section 203(b)(3)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(iii), provides for the granting of preference classification to other qualified immigrants who are capable, at the time of petitioning for classification under this paragraph, of performing unskilled labor, not of a temporary or seasonal nature, for which qualified workers are not available in the United States.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) states, in pertinent part:

*Ability of prospective employer to pay wage.* Any petition filed by or for an employment-based immigrant which requires an offer of employment must be accompanied by evidence that the prospective United States employer has the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner must demonstrate this ability at the time the priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. Evidence of this ability shall be either in the form of copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements.

The petitioner must demonstrate the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, which is the date the Form ETA 750, Application for Alien Employment Certification, was accepted for processing by any office within the employment system of the DOL. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(d). The petitioner must also demonstrate that, on the priority date, the beneficiary had the qualifications stated on its Form ETA 750, Application for Permanent Employment Certification, as certified by the DOL and submitted with the instant petition. *Matter of Wing's Tea House*, 16 I&N Dec. 158 (Act. Reg. Comm. 1977).

Here, the Form ETA 750 was accepted on February 11, 2003. The proffered wage as stated on the Form ETA 750 is \$9.70 per hour (\$20,176 per year). The Form ETA 750 states that the position requires six months experience in the proffered position and a “CNA Certificate, or equivalent.”

The AAO conducts appellate review on a *de novo* basis. *See Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004). The AAO considers all pertinent evidence in the record, including new evidence properly submitted upon appeal.<sup>1</sup>

The record indicates the petitioner is structured as a domestic general partnership and filed its tax returns on IRS Form 1065. On the petition, the petitioner claimed to have been established in 1989 and to currently employ 10 workers. According to the tax returns in the record, the petitioner’s fiscal year is based on a calendar year. On the Form ETA 750, signed by the beneficiary on February 5, 2003, the beneficiary did not claim to have worked for the petitioner.

The petitioner must establish that its job offer to the beneficiary is a realistic one. Because the filing of a Form ETA 750 labor certification application establishes a priority date for any immigrant petition later based on the Form ETA 750, the petitioner must establish that the job offer was realistic as of the priority date and that the offer remained realistic for each year thereafter, until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. The petitioner’s ability to pay the proffered wage is an essential element in evaluating whether a job offer is realistic. *See Matter of Great Wall*, 16 I&N Dec. 142 (Acting Reg. Comm. 1977); *see also* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2). In evaluating whether a job offer is realistic, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) requires the petitioner to demonstrate financial resources sufficient to pay the beneficiary’s proffered wages, although the totality of the circumstances affecting the petitioning business will be considered if the evidence warrants such consideration. *See Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (Reg. Comm. 1967).

In determining the petitioner’s ability to pay the proffered wage during a given period, USCIS will first examine whether the petitioner employed and paid the beneficiary during that period. If the petitioner establishes by documentary evidence that it employed the beneficiary at a salary equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the evidence will be considered *prima facie* proof of the petitioner’s ability to pay the proffered wage. In the instant case, the beneficiary has not been employed by the petitioner.

If the petitioner does not establish that it employed and paid the beneficiary an amount at least equal to the proffered wage during that period, USCIS will next examine the net income

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<sup>1</sup> The submission of additional evidence on appeal is allowed by the instructions to the Form I-290B, which are incorporated into the regulations by the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(1). The record in the instant case provides no reason to preclude consideration of any of the documents newly submitted on appeal. *See Matter of Soriano*, 19 I&N Dec. 764 (BIA 1988).

figure reflected on the petitioner's federal income tax return, without consideration of depreciation or other expenses. *River Street Donuts, LLC v. Napolitano*, 558 F.3d 111 (1<sup>st</sup> Cir. 2009); *Taco Especial v. Napolitano*, --- F. Supp. 2d. ---, 2010 WL 956001, at \*6 (E.D. Mich. 2010). Reliance on federal income tax returns as a basis for determining a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is well established by judicial precedent. *Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava*, 632 F. Supp. 1049, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (citing *Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman*, 736 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1984)); see also *Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh*, 719 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Texas 1989); *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); *Ubeda v. Palmer*, 539 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982), *aff'd*, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983). Reliance on the petitioner's wage expense is misplaced. Showing that the petitioner paid wages in excess of the proffered wage is insufficient.

With respect to depreciation, the court in *River Street Donuts* noted:

The AAO recognized that a depreciation deduction is a systematic allocation of the cost of a tangible long-term asset and does not represent a specific cash expenditure during the year claimed. Furthermore, the AAO indicated that the allocation of the depreciation of a long-term asset could be spread out over the years or concentrated into a few depending on the petitioner's choice of accounting and depreciation methods. Nonetheless, the AAO explained that depreciation represents an actual cost of doing business, which could represent either the diminution in value of buildings and equipment or the accumulation of funds necessary to replace perishable equipment and buildings. Accordingly, the AAO stressed that even though amounts deducted for depreciation do not represent current use of cash, neither does it represent amounts available to pay wages.

We find that the AAO has a rational explanation for its policy of not adding depreciation back to net income. Namely, that the amount spent on a long term tangible asset is a "real" expense.

*River Street Donuts* at 118. “[USCIS] and judicial precedent support the use of tax returns and the *net income figures* in determining petitioner's ability to pay. Plaintiffs' argument that these figures should be revised by the court by adding back depreciation is without support.” *Chi-Feng Chang* at 537 (emphasis added).

In *K.C.P. Food*, 623 F. Supp. at 1084, the court held that the Immigration and Naturalization Service, now USCIS, had properly relied on the petitioner's net income figure, as stated on the petitioner's corporate income tax returns, rather than the petitioner's gross income. The court specifically rejected the argument that the Service should have considered income before expenses were paid rather than net income. See *Taco Especial v. Napolitano*, --- F. Supp. 2d. at 6 (gross profits overstate an employer's ability to pay because it ignores other necessary expenses).

The record before the director closed on September 22, 2008 with the receipt by the director of the petitioner's submissions in response to the director's request for evidence. As of that date, the petitioner's 2007 federal income tax return is the most recent return available. The petitioner's tax returns stated its net income as detailed in the table below.

- In 2003, the petitioner's Form 1065 stated net income of (\$24,366).<sup>2</sup>
- In 2004, the petitioner's Form 1065 stated net income of (\$24,442).
- In 2005, the petitioner's Form 1065 stated net income of (\$14,127).
- In 2006, the petitioner's Form 1065 stated net income of \$35,137.
- In 2007, the petitioner's Form 1065 stated net income of \$38,454.

Therefore, for the years 2003, 2004 and 2005, the petitioner did not establish that it had sufficient net income to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner's tax returns for 2006 and 2007 state sufficient net income to pay the proffered wage of this beneficiary. However, USCIS records indicate that the petitioner filed five additional Form I-140 petitions in 2007, three petitions which counsel identifies as having priority dates in 2003. USCIS records also reflect the petitioner filed two Form I-129 petitions in 2003. The petitioner would need to demonstrate its ability to pay the proffered wage for each I-140 beneficiary from each respective priority date until the beneficiary obtains permanent residence. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2).<sup>3</sup> Further, the petitioner would be obligated to pay each H-1B petition beneficiary the prevailing wage in accordance with DOL regulations, and the labor condition application certified with each H-1B petition. *See* 20 C.F.R. § 655.715. While the petitioner provided information about four of the filings stating their priority dates and the wage offered, the record contains no information about wages actually paid or about the remaining I-140 petition. Thus, it cannot be determined that the petitioner had sufficient net income to pay the proffered wage in this case plus the wages of the remaining workers referred to above.

If the net income the petitioner demonstrates it had available during that period, if any, added to the wages paid to the beneficiary during the period, if any, do not equal the amount of the

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<sup>2</sup> For a partnership, where a partnership's income is exclusively from a trade or business, USCIS considers net income to be the figure shown on Line 22 of the Form 1065, U.S. Partnership Income Tax Return. However, where a partnership has income, credits, deductions or other adjustments from sources other than a trade or business, they are reported on Schedule K. If the Schedule K has relevant entries for additional income or additional credits, deductions or other adjustments, net income is found on page 4 of IRS Form 1065 at line 1 of the Analysis of Net Income (Loss) of Schedule K. In the instant case, the petitioner's Schedules K have relevant entries for additional deductions and, therefore, its net income is found on line 1 of the Analysis of Net Income (Loss) of the Schedules K.

<sup>3</sup> The director raised the issue of multiple sponsored workers in his request for evidence and additionally in his decision. Specifically, the director found that the evidence failed to establish the petitioner could pay for the beneficiary and all sponsored workers for the requisite time period.

proffered wage or more, USCIS will review the petitioner's assets. Net current assets are the difference between the petitioner's current assets and current liabilities.<sup>4</sup> A partnership's year-end current assets are shown on Schedule L, lines 1(d) through 6(d) and include cash-on-hand, inventories, and receivables expected to be converted to cash within one year. Its year-end current liabilities are shown on lines 15(d) through 17(d). If the total of a partnership's end-of-year net current assets and the wages paid to the beneficiary (if any) are equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the petitioner is expected to be able to pay the proffered wage using those net current assets. The petitioner's tax returns stated its net current assets as detailed in the table below.

- In 2007, the petitioner's Form 1065 stated net current assets of \$22,523.
- In 2006, the petitioner's Form 1065 stated net current assets of \$31,404.
- In 2005, the petitioner's Form 1065 stated net current assets of \$67,145.
- In 2004, the petitioner's Form 1065 stated net current assets of \$76,065.
- In 2003, the petitioner's Form 1065 stated net current assets of \$15,113.

Therefore, while for the years 2004 through 2007, the petitioner's tax returns would demonstrate sufficient net current assets to pay the proffered wage of this particular beneficiary, the petitioner has multiple filings for additional I-140 petitions. The wage requirements of all those workers are not known and it cannot be determined that the petitioner has sufficient net current assets to pay the wages of all sponsored workers during any relevant year. The petitioner did not have sufficient net current assets to pay the proffered wage of this beneficiary in 2003.

Thus, from the date the Form ETA 750 was accepted for processing by the DOL, the petitioner had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay this beneficiary the proffered wage plus the wage requirements of all other workers petitioned for as of the priority date through an examination of wages paid to the beneficiary, or its net income or net current assets.

On appeal, counsel states that the ability to pay the proffered wage of this beneficiary and three additional I-140 beneficiaries has been established. Counsel refers to unaudited financial statements for the petitioner and to the [REDACTED] a trust containing the assets of the petitioner's individual owner [REDACTED]. A statement from the petitioner's accountant, which was submitted on appeal, states that [REDACTED] is either the sole trustee or a majority interest holder in all assets of the trust. Counsel also submitted information regarding comparable sales for real estate owned by [REDACTED] and his spouse.

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<sup>4</sup> According to *Barron's Dictionary of Accounting Terms* 117 (3<sup>rd</sup> ed. 2000), "current assets" consist of items having (in most cases) a life of one year or less, such as cash, marketable securities, inventory and prepaid expenses. "Current liabilities" are obligations payable (in most cases) within one year, such accounts payable, short-term notes payable, and accrued expenses (such as taxes and salaries). *Id.* at 118.

The unaudited financial statements submitted by the petitioner are of no evidentiary value. The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) makes clear that where a petitioner relies on financial statements to demonstrate its ability to pay the proffered wage, those financial statements must be audited. The accountant's statement accompanying the aforementioned financial statements does not state that the statements are audited financial statements. Unaudited financial statements are the representations of management. The unsupported representations of management are not reliable evidence and are insufficient to demonstrate the ability to pay the proffered wage.

The petitioner also asserts that it owns real estate and that the ownership of this property demonstrates its ability to pay. The property appears to be held by the petitioner's owner and not the petitioner. A partnership consists of a general partner(s) and may also have limited partners. A general partner is personally liable for the partnership's total liabilities. As such, a general partner's personal assets may be utilized to show the ability to pay the proffered wage. However, a general partner's personal expenses and liabilities must also be examined in order to make a determination that his or her assets are truly available to pay the proffered wage. Conversely, a limited partner's liability is limited to his or her initial investment. The record of proceeding does not contain enough information regarding the general partner's personal expenses and liabilities. As such, the petitioner has not demonstrated that his personal assets may be utilized to pay the proffered wage. Additionally, real estate is not a readily liquefiable asset available to pay the proffered wage.

With regard to the [REDACTED] while for a general partnership, personal unencumbered liquefiable assets might be considered, the value of shareholder assets in the trust has not been established by audited financial statements or other corroborating evidence. The unaudited statement shows liabilities as of December 31, 2007 of \$351,859.61 and cash in the amount of \$50,767.47. The trusts other assets are \$795,000 in real estate. Real estate is not a readily liquefiable asset through which the proffered wages can be paid. Additionally, it is unclear whether the cash held in trust is required to pay the trust's current liabilities. Nor has it been established what portion of any such assets would be available to pay the proffered wages in this instance and what ownership interest, whole or part, is held by the petitioner's owner[s], as the accountant states the petitioner's owner "is either a majority interest holder or the sole trustee," the trust itself is a separate legal entity, not a party to these proceedings, and is under no obligation to pay the proffered wage of the beneficiary. The assets of other entities may not be considered in determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. *See Matter of M*, 8 I&N Dec. 24 (BIA 1958), *Matter of Aphrodite Investments, Ltd.*, 17 I&N Dec. 530 (Comm. 1980), and *Matter of Tessel*, 17 I&N Dec. 631 (Act. Assoc. Comm. 1980).

USCIS may consider the overall magnitude of the petitioner's business activities in its determination of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. *See Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (BIA 1967). The petitioning entity in *Sonogawa* had been in business for over 11 years and routinely earned a gross annual income of about \$100,000. During the year in which the petition was filed in that case, the petitioner changed business locations and

paid rent on both the old and new locations for five months. There were large moving costs and also a period of time when the petitioner was unable to do regular business. The Regional Commissioner determined that the petitioner's prospects for a resumption of successful business operations were well established. The petitioner was a fashion designer whose work had been featured in *Time* and *Look* magazines. Her clients included Miss Universe, movie actresses, and society matrons. The petitioner's clients had been included in the lists of the best-dressed California women. The petitioner lectured on fashion design at design and fashion shows throughout the United States and at colleges and universities in California. The Regional Commissioner's determination in *Sonegawa* was based in part on the petitioner's sound business reputation and outstanding reputation as a couturiere. As in *Sonegawa*, USCIS may, at its discretion, consider evidence relevant to the petitioner's financial ability that falls outside of a petitioner's net income and net current assets. USCIS may consider such factors as the number of years the petitioner has been doing business, the established historical growth of the petitioner's business, the overall number of employees, the occurrence of any uncharacteristic business expenditures or losses, the petitioner's reputation within its industry, whether the beneficiary is replacing a former employee or an outsourced service, or any other evidence that USCIS deems relevant to the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage.

In this case, the petitioner has not demonstrated that it has the ability to pay the proffered wage through its net income or net current assets of all workers petitioned for by the petitioner. Thus, assessing the totality of the circumstances in this individual case, it is concluded that the petitioner has not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage of all workers from the priority date onward.

Beyond the decision of the director, the Form ETA 750 requires six months experience in the proffered position and a CNA Certificate or its equivalent. To be eligible for approval, a beneficiary must have the education and experience specified on the labor certification as of the petition's filing date. *See Matter of Wing's Tea House*, 16 I&N Dec. 158 (Act. Reg. Comm. 1977). An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. *See Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States*, 299 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), *aff'd*, 345 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2003); *see also Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004) (noting that the AAO reviews appeals on a *de novo* basis).

Section 203(b)(3)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(iii), provides for the granting of preference classification to other qualified immigrants who are capable, at the time of petitioning for classification under this paragraph, of performing unskilled labor, not of a temporary or seasonal nature, for which qualified workers are not available in the United States.

The Form ETA 750 states, in pertinent part, that the beneficiary worked from October of 1985 until November of 1988 (48 hours per week) as a "nursing aide and clerk" for [REDACTED]

██████████ in the Philippines and also ██████████ from January 2003 to December 2005 as an operational maintenance/nurse aide. These dates of employment conflict with information provided by ██████████ the ██████████. In a letter dated July 6, 2007, ██████████ stated that the beneficiary was employed by the hospital as a nursing aide from January 16, 2002 until February 1, 2003. This discrepancy brings into question the validity of the beneficiary's claimed experience with that organization. The discrepancy has not been explained in the record and is material as it has a direct bearing on whether the beneficiary had the experience required on the Form ETA 750 as of the priority date. Doubt cast on any aspect of the petitioner's proof may, of course, lead to a reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining evidence offered in support of the visa petition. *Matter of Ho*, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591 (BIA 1988). The record further reflects that a caregiver course at the Asian Institute of Health Care was completed on March 28, 2003, subsequent to the February 11, 2003 priority date. Finally, the record does not contain a CNA Certificate issued by the State of California. Under these circumstances, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary was qualified for the position under the terms of the labor certification as of the priority date. For this additional reason, the petition may not be approved.

The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and alternative basis for denial. In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, that burden has not been met.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed.