


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U.S. Department of Homeland Security  
U. S. Citizenship and Immigration Services  
Office of Administrative Appeals MS 2090  
Washington, DC 20529-2090



U.S. Citizenship  
and Immigration  
Services

**PUBLIC COPY**



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FILE:

Office: TEXAS SERVICE CENTER

Date:

OCT 26 2010

IN RE: Petitioner:  
Beneficiary:



PETITION: Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as an Other, Unskilled Worker pursuant to Section 203(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:



INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied by us in reaching our decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. The specific requirements for filing such a request can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion. The fee for a Form I-290B is currently \$585, but will increase to \$630 on November 23, 2010. Any appeal or motion filed on or after November 23, 2010 must be filed with the \$630 fee. Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires that any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank You,

*Perry Rhew*

Perry Rhew  
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The preference visa petition was denied by the Director, Texas Service Center, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner is a foundation drilling company. It seeks to employ the beneficiary permanently in the United States as a helper/extraction worker. As required by statute, the petition is accompanied by a Form ETA 750, Application for Alien Employment Certification, approved by the United States Department of Labor (DOL). The director determined that the petitioner had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage beginning on the priority date of the visa petition. The director denied the petition accordingly.

The record shows that the appeal is properly filed, timely and makes a specific allegation of error in law or fact. The procedural history in this case is documented by the record and incorporated into the decision. Further elaboration of the procedural history will be made only as necessary.

As set forth in the director's June 7, 2008 denial, the single issue in this case is whether or not the petitioner has the ability to pay the proffered wage as of the priority date and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence.

Section 203(b)(3)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(iii), provides for the granting of preference classification to other qualified immigrants who are capable, at the time of petitioning for classification under this paragraph, of performing unskilled labor, not of a temporary or seasonal nature, for which qualified workers are not available in the United States.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) states in pertinent part:

*Ability of prospective employer to pay wage.* Any petition filed by or for an employment-based immigrant which requires an offer of employment must be accompanied by evidence that the prospective United States employer has the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner must demonstrate this ability at the time the priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. Evidence of this ability shall be either in the form of copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements.

The petitioner must demonstrate the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, which is the date the Form ETA 750, Application for Alien Employment Certification, was accepted for processing by any office within the employment system of the DOL. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(d). The petitioner must also demonstrate that, on the priority date, the beneficiary had the qualifications stated on its Form ETA 750, Application for Alien Employment Certification, as certified by the DOL and submitted with the instant petition. *Matter of Wing's Tea House*, 16 I&N Dec. 158 (Act. Reg. Comm. 1977).

Here, the Form ETA 750 was accepted on October 2, 2002, and the proffered wage as stated on the Form ETA 750 is \$8.37 per hour, which equates to \$17,409.60 per year.

The AAO conducts appellate review on a *de novo* basis. See *Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004). The AAO considers all pertinent evidence in the record, including new evidence properly submitted upon appeal.<sup>1</sup>

The record reflects that the petitioner has filed at least six other Forms I-140, Immigrant Petitions for Alien Workers, on behalf of other beneficiaries. The petitioner would need to demonstrate its ability to pay the proffered wage for each I-140 beneficiary from the priority date until each beneficiary obtains permanent residence. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2).

The evidence in the record of proceeding shows that the petitioner is structured as an S corporation. On the petition, the petitioner claimed to have been established on January 1, 1993 and to currently employ 45 workers. According to the tax returns in the record, the petitioner's fiscal year is based on the calendar year. According to the Form ETA 750B, signed by the beneficiary on December 18, 2004, the beneficiary claimed to have worked for the petitioner since September 1996.

The petitioner must establish that its job offer to the beneficiary is a realistic one. Because the filing of an ETA 750 labor certification application establishes a priority date for any immigrant petition later based on the ETA 750, the petitioner must establish that the job offer was realistic as of the priority date and that the offer remained realistic for each year thereafter, until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. The petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is an essential element in evaluating whether a job offer is realistic. See *Matter of Great Wall*, 16 I&N Dec. 142 (Acting Reg. Comm. 1977); see also 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2). In evaluating whether a job offer is realistic, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) requires the petitioner to demonstrate financial resources sufficient to pay the beneficiary's proffered wages, although the totality of the circumstances affecting the petitioning business will be considered if the evidence warrants such consideration. See *Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (Reg. Comm. 1967).

In determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage during a given period, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) will first examine whether the petitioner employed and paid the beneficiary during the requisite period. If the petitioner establishes by documentary evidence that it employed the beneficiary at a salary equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the evidence will be considered *prima facie* proof of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage.

In the instant case, the petitioner has submitted Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Forms W-2, Wage and Tax Statements, demonstrating that it paid the beneficiary [REDACTED] in the years 2002 through 2007, respectively. Thus, the petitioner has established that it paid the beneficiary at or above the prevailing wage in 2005, 2006, and 2007. In the years 2002, 2003, and 2004, the petitioner must demonstrate that it can pay the

<sup>1</sup> The submission of additional evidence on appeal is allowed by the instructions to the Form I-290B, which are incorporated into the regulations by the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(1). The record in the instant case provides no reason to preclude consideration of any of the documents newly submitted on appeal. See *Matter of Soriano*, 19 I&N Dec. 764 (BIA 1988).

difference between the wages actually paid to the beneficiary and the proffered wage, which is [REDACTED] in 2002, [REDACTED] in 2003, and [REDACTED] in 2004.

If the petitioner does not establish that it employed and paid the beneficiary an amount at least equal to the proffered wage during that period, USCIS will next examine the net income figure reflected on the petitioner's federal income tax return, without consideration of depreciation or other expenses. *River Street Donuts, LLC v. Napolitano*, 558 F.3d 111 (1<sup>st</sup> Cir. 2009); *Taco Especial v. Napolitano*, --- F. Supp. 2d. ---, 2010 WL 956001, at \*6 (E.D. Mich. 2010). Reliance on federal income tax returns as a basis for determining a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is well established by judicial precedent. *Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava*, 632 F. Supp. 1049, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (citing *Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman*, 736 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1984)); see also *Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh*, 719 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Texas 1989); *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); *Ubeda v. Palmer*, 539 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982), *aff'd*, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983).

In *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. at 1084, the court held that the Immigration and Naturalization Service, now USCIS, had properly relied on the petitioner's net income figure, as stated on the petitioner's corporate income tax returns, rather than the petitioner's gross income. The court specifically rejected the argument that USCIS should have considered income before expenses were paid rather than net income.

With respect to depreciation, the court in *River Street Donuts* noted:

The AAO recognized that a depreciation deduction is a systematic allocation of the cost of a tangible long-term asset and does not represent a specific cash expenditure during the year claimed. Furthermore, the AAO indicated that the allocation of the depreciation of a long-term asset could be spread out over the years or concentrated into a few depending on the petitioner's choice of accounting and depreciation methods. Nonetheless, the AAO explained that depreciation represents an actual cost of doing business, which could represent either the diminution in value of buildings and equipment or the accumulation of funds necessary to replace perishable equipment and buildings. Accordingly, the AAO stressed that even though amounts deducted for depreciation do not represent current use of cash, neither does it represent amounts available to pay wages.

We find that the AAO has a rational explanation for its policy of not adding depreciation back to net income. Namely, that the amount spent on a long term tangible asset is a "real" expense.

*River Street Donuts*, 558 F.3d at 118. "[USCIS] and judicial precedent support the use of tax returns and the *net income figures* in determining petitioner's ability to pay. Plaintiffs' argument that these figures should be revised by the court by adding back depreciation is without support." *Chi-Feng Chang*, 719 F.Supp. at 537 (emphasis added).

The record before the director closed on May 30, 2008 with the receipt by the director of the petitioner's submissions in response to the director's Request for Evidence (RFE) dated May 17, 2008. As of that date, the petitioner's 2008 federal income tax return was not yet due. Therefore, the petitioner's income tax return for 2007 would be the most recent return available.

In support of the petition, the petitioner failed to submit any tax returns for the years 2002 through 2004. Therefore, the record does not demonstrate that the petitioner had sufficient net income in the years 2002, 2003, and 2004 to pay the beneficiary the difference between the wages paid to the beneficiary and the proffered wage.

As an alternate means of determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage, USCIS may review the petitioner's net current assets. Net current assets are the difference between the petitioner's current assets and current liabilities.<sup>2</sup> A corporation's year-end current assets are shown on Schedule L, lines 1 through 6. Its year-end current liabilities are shown on lines 16 through 18. If the total of a corporation's end-of-year net current assets and the wages paid to the beneficiary (if any) are equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the petitioner is expected to be able to pay the proffered wage using those net current assets.

Again, in support of the petition, the petitioner failed to submit any tax returns for the period 2002 through 2004. Therefore, the record does not demonstrate that the petitioner had sufficient net current assets in the years 2002, 2003, and 2004 to pay the beneficiary the difference between the wages paid to the beneficiary and the proffered wage.

On appeal, counsel submits the petitioner's 2006 IRS Form 1120S, U.S. Income Tax Return for an S Corporation, showing net income of [REDACTED]. Counsel also submits an accountant's report, including a balance sheet, statement of income, and statement of changes in shareholder's equity for the year ending December 31, 2007.<sup>3</sup> The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) makes clear that where a petitioner relies on financial statements to demonstrate its ability to pay the proffered wage, those financial statements must be audited. An audit is conducted in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards to obtain a reasonable assurance that the financial statements of the business are free of material misstatements. The unaudited financial statements submitted for the year ending December 31, 2007 are not persuasive evidence. There is no accountant's report that accompanies the statement that makes clear it was produced pursuant to an audit rather than a compilation. Financial statements produced pursuant to a compilation are the representations of management compiled into standard form. The unsupported representations of management are not reliable evidence and are insufficient to demonstrate the ability to pay the proffered wage.

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<sup>2</sup> According to *Barron's Dictionary of Accounting Terms* 117 (3<sup>rd</sup> ed. 2000), "current assets" consist of items having (in most cases) a life of one year or less, such as cash, marketable securities, inventory and prepaid expenses. "Current liabilities" are obligations payable (in most cases) within one year, such accounts payable, short-term notes payable, and accrued expenses (such as taxes and salaries). *Id.* at 118.

<sup>3</sup> No financial documentation for 2005 was submitted in support of the initial petition or on appeal.

On appeal, counsel asserts that since the petitioner has paid the beneficiary at the proffered wage rate since 2005, according to the language in Mr. Yates' memorandum,<sup>4</sup> it has established its continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date. Counsel asserts that because the petitioner "has paid or currently is paying the proffered wage," USCIS should consider the wage rate paid from 2005 through 2007 as satisfying that particular method of demonstrating a petitioning entity's ability to pay.

The Yates' memorandum relied upon by counsel provides guidance to adjudicators to review a record of proceeding and make a positive determination of a petitioning entity's ability to pay if, in the context of the beneficiary's employment, "[t]he record contains credible verifiable evidence that the petitioner is not only is employing the beneficiary but also has paid or currently is paying the proffered wage."

The AAO consistently adjudicates appeals in accordance with the Yates memorandum. However, counsel's interpretation of the language in that memorandum is overly broad and does not comport with the plain language of the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) set forth in the memorandum as authority for the policy guidance therein. The regulation requires that a petitioning entity demonstrate its *continuing* ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date. If USCIS and the AAO were to interpret and apply the Yates memorandum as counsel urges, then in this particular factual context, the clear language in the regulation would be usurped by an interoffice guidance memorandum without binding legal effect. The petitioner must demonstrate its continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, which in this case is October 2, 2002. Thus, the petitioner must show its ability to pay the proffered wage not only in the years 2005 through 2007, when counsel claims it actually began paying the proffered wage rate, but it must also show its continuing ability to pay the proffered wage from 2002 through 2004. Demonstrating that the petitioner is paying the proffered wage in a specific year may suffice to show the petitioner's ability to pay for that year, but the petitioner must still demonstrate its ability to pay for the rest of the pertinent period of time.

On appeal, counsel also asserts that the proper interpretation of the regulation at 20 C.F.R. § 656.10(c)(4) is that the employer is not required to pay the offered wage until after permanent residence is granted. In support of this assertion, counsel cites the *Immigration Law Sourcebook*, 11<sup>th</sup> edition, p. 938, by Ira K. Kurzban.

The regulation at 20 C.F.R. § 656.10(c)(4) states:

(c) Attestations. The employer must certify to the conditions of employment listed below on the Application for Permanent Employment Certification under penalty of perjury under 18 U.S.C. 1621 (2). Failure to attest to any of the conditions listed below results in a denial of the application.

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<sup>4</sup> Memorandum from William R. Yates, Associate Director For Operations, *Determination of Ability to Pay under 8 CFR 204.5(g)(2)*, HQOPRD 90/16.45, (May 4, 2004).

(4) The employer will be able to place the alien on the payroll on or before the date of the alien's proposed entrance into the United States;

The regulation at 20 C.F.R. § 656.10(c)(4), however, applies only to PERM labor certifications filed with the DOL.<sup>5</sup> Further, the above-cited regulation only addresses the employer's attestation on the labor certification application that it will place the alien on the payroll. It does not specifically address the employer's ability to pay the proffered wage.<sup>6</sup> The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) clearly requires the I-140 petitioner to demonstrate its ability to pay the proffered wage at the time the priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence.

USCIS may consider the overall magnitude of the petitioner's business activities in its determination of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. *See Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (BIA 1967). The petitioning entity in *Sonogawa* had been in business for over 11 years and routinely earned a gross annual income of about \$100,000. During the year in which the petition was filed in that case, the petitioner changed business locations and paid rent on both the old and new locations for five months. There were large moving costs and also a period of time when the petitioner was unable to do regular business. The Regional Commissioner determined that the petitioner's prospects for a resumption of successful business operations were well established. The petitioner was a fashion designer whose work had been featured in *Time* and *Look* magazines. Her clients included Miss Universe, movie actresses, and society matrons. The petitioner's clients had been included in the lists of the best-dressed California women. The petitioner lectured on fashion design at design and fashion shows throughout the United States and at colleges and universities in California. The Regional Commissioner's determination in *Sonogawa* was based in part on the petitioner's sound business reputation and outstanding reputation as a couturiere. As in *Sonogawa*, USCIS may, at its discretion, consider evidence relevant to the petitioner's financial ability that falls outside of a petitioner's net income and net current assets. USCIS may consider such factors as the number of years the petitioner has been doing business, the established historical growth of the petitioner's business, the overall number of employees, the occurrence of any uncharacteristic business expenditures or losses, the petitioner's reputation within its industry, whether the

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<sup>5</sup> The regulatory scheme governing the alien labor certification process contains certain safeguards to assure that petitioning employers do not treat alien workers more favorably than U.S. workers. New Department of Labor regulations concerning labor certifications went into effect on March 28, 2005. The new regulations are referred to by the Department of Labor by the acronym PERM. *See* 69 Fed. Reg. 77325, 77326 (Dec. 27, 2004). The PERM regulation was effective as of March 28, 2005, and applies to labor certification applications for the permanent employment of aliens filed on or after that date. However, the instant petition is governed by the pre-PERM regulations.

<sup>6</sup> The DOL has recognized that while the employer may be fiscally able to pay the alien, other circumstances such as non-viability of the business itself may preclude the employer from placing the alien on the payroll. *See* [http://www.foreignlaborcert.doleta.gov/pdf/perm\\_faqs\\_3-3-05.pdf](http://www.foreignlaborcert.doleta.gov/pdf/perm_faqs_3-3-05.pdf) (accessed October 5, 2010).

beneficiary is replacing a former employee or an outsourced service, or any other evidence that USCIS deems relevant to the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage.

In the instant case, the petitioner has been incorporated since 1993 and employs 45 workers. The petitioner has not established an ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage through wages paid, net income, or net current assets for 2002 through 2004. The petitioner also has not submitted evidence of its historical growth, reputation within its industry, or uncharacteristic business expenditures or losses. Furthermore, the petitioner has not established its ability to pay the multiple beneficiaries for whom it has filed petitions. Therefore, the AAO concludes that the petitioner has not demonstrated adequate financial strength to demonstrate its ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage beginning on the priority date of the visa petition.

As always in these proceedings rests solely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The petitioner has not met that burden.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed.