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
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U.S. Department of Homeland Security  
U. S. Citizenship and Immigration Services  
Office of Administrative Appeals MS 2090  
Washington, DC 20529-2090



U.S. Citizenship  
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
Petitioner:



Beneficiary:

PETITION: Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as an Other, Unskilled Worker Pursuant to § 203(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:



INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied by us in reaching our decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. The specific requirements for filing such a request can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$585. Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires that any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,

Perry Rhew  
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The preference visa petition was denied by the Director, Nebraska Service Center, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner operates a nursery and seeks to employ the beneficiary permanently in the United States as a nursery worker (grower). As required by statute, the Form I-140, Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker, is accompanied by a Form ETA 750, Application for Alien Employment Certification, approved by the United States Department of Labor (USDOL). The director determined the petitioner had not established it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage beginning on the priority date of the visa petition and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence.

The record shows that the appeal is properly filed, timely and makes a specific allegation of error in law or fact. The procedural history in this case is documented by the record and incorporated into the decision. Further elaboration of the procedural history will be made only as necessary.

Section 203(b)(3)(A)(iii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(iii), provides for the granting of preference classification to other qualified immigrants who are capable, at the time of petitioning for classification under this paragraph, of performing unskilled labor, not of a temporary or seasonal nature, for which qualified workers are not available in the United States.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) provides in pertinent part:

*Ability of prospective employer to pay wage.* Any petition filed by or for an employment-based immigrant which requires an offer of employment must be accompanied by evidence that the prospective United States employer has the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner must demonstrate this ability at the time the priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. Evidence of this ability shall be either in the form of copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements.

The above regulation sets forth the requirement that a petitioning entity demonstrate its continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date. The priority date is the date the Form ETA 750 was accepted for processing by any office within the employment system of the USDOL. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(d). The petitioner must demonstrate that on the priority date, the beneficiary met the qualifications stated on the Form ETA 750 certified by the USDOL. *Matter of Wing's Tea House*, 16 I&N Dec. 158 (Act. Reg. Comm. 1977). Here, the Form ETA 750 was accepted on April 30, 2001. The proffered wage as stated on the Form ETA 750 is \$7.65 per hour (\$15,912 per year). The Form ETA 750 states that the position requires three months experience.

The AAO conducts appellate review on a *de novo* basis. See *Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004). The AAO considers all pertinent evidence in the record, including new evidence properly submitted upon appeal.<sup>1</sup>

The petitioner is structured as a C corporation and was established in 1985, had gross annual income of \$429,165, and employed 12 persons at the time of filing. Its IRS Form 1120, U.S. Corporation Income Tax Returns, reflects it operates on a tax year basis beginning October 1 and ending September 30. On the Form ETA 750, Part B, statement of qualifications of alien, signed by the beneficiary on April 30, 2001, he stated that he began employment with the petitioner as a “grower” in April 1998.

A certified labor certification establishes a priority date for any immigrant petition later based on the Form ETA 750 labor certification application. Therefore, the petitioner must establish that the job offer was realistic as of the priority date and that the offer remained realistic for each year thereafter, until a beneficiary obtains lawful permanent resident status. The petitioner’s ability to pay the proffered wage is an essential element in evaluating whether a job offer is realistic. See *Matter of Great Wall*, 16 I&N Dec. 142 (Acting Reg. Comm. 1977); see also 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2). In evaluating whether a job offer is realistic, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) requires the petitioner to demonstrate financial resources sufficient to pay the beneficiary’s proffered wages, although the totality of the circumstances affecting the petitioning business will be considered if the evidence warrants such consideration. See *Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (Reg. Comm. 1967).

USCIS first examines whether the petitioner employed and paid the beneficiary from the priority date onwards. A finding that the petitioner employed the beneficiary at a salary equal to or greater than the proffered wage is *prima facie* proof of the petitioner’s ability to pay. On May 19, 2008, the director requested, in part, that if the petitioner was employing the beneficiary, that it submit copies of all IRS Forms W-2 that the corporation issued to the beneficiary. The director also requested that the petitioner submit copies of the beneficiary’s three most recent pay vouchers identifying the beneficiary and his/her employer by name and specifying his gross/net pay, income received year-to-date, income tax deductions withheld and the length of the pay period(s).

In response, counsel forwarded copies of eleven checks issued to the beneficiary by the corporation in 2008. The checks do not identify the beneficiary as an employee nor do they show for what reason they were issued. It is determined that the petitioner has not established that it employed and paid the beneficiary at any time, including the critical period from the labor certification filing date of April 30, 2001 until the Form I-140 was filed on May 31, 2007.

If the petitioner does not establish that it employed and paid the beneficiary an amount at least equal to the proffered wage during that period, USCIS will next examine the net income figure reflected

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<sup>1</sup> The submission of additional evidence on appeal is allowed by the instructions to the Form I-290B, which are incorporated into the regulations at 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(1). The record in this case provides no reason to preclude consideration of any documents newly submitted on appeal. See *Matter of Soriano*, 19 I&N Dec. 764 (BIA 1988).

on the petitioner's federal income tax return, without consideration of depreciation or other expenses. *River Street Donuts, LLC v. Napolitano*, 558 F.3d 111 (1<sup>st</sup> Cir. 2009); *Taco Especial v. Napolitano*, --- F. Supp. 2d. ---, 2010 WL 956001, at \*6 (E.D. Mich. 2010). Reliance on federal income tax returns as a basis for determining a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is well established by judicial precedent. *Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava*, 632 F. Supp. 1049, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (citing *Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman*, 736 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1984)); see also *Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh*, 719 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Texas 1989); *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); *Ubeda v. Palmer*, 539 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982), *aff'd*, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983). Reliance on the petitioner's gross receipts and wage expense is misplaced. Showing that the petitioner's gross receipts exceeded the proffered wage is insufficient. Similarly, showing that the petitioner paid wages in excess of the proffered wage is insufficient.

In *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. at 1084, the court held that the Immigration and Naturalization Service, now USCIS, had properly relied on the petitioner's net income figure, as stated on the petitioner's corporate income tax returns, rather than the petitioner's gross income. The court specifically rejected the argument that the Service should have considered income before expenses were paid rather than net income.

With respect to depreciation, the court in *River Street Donuts* noted:

The AAO recognized that a depreciation deduction is a systematic allocation of the cost of a tangible long-term asset and does not represent a specific cash expenditure during the year claimed. Furthermore, the AAO indicated that the allocation of the depreciation of a long-term asset could be spread out over the years or concentrated into a few depending on the petitioner's choice of accounting and depreciation methods. Nonetheless, the AAO explained that depreciation represents an actual cost of doing business, which could represent either the diminution in value of buildings and equipment or the accumulation of funds necessary to replace perishable equipment and buildings. Accordingly, the AAO stressed that even though amounts deducted for depreciation do not represent current use of cash, neither does it represent amounts available to pay wages.

We find that the AAO has a rational explanation for its policy of not adding depreciation back to net income. Namely, that the amount spent on a long term tangible asset is a "real" expense.

*River Street Donuts* at 116. "[USCIS] and judicial precedent support the use of tax returns and the *net income figures* in determining petitioner's ability to pay. Plaintiffs' argument that these figures should be revised by the court by adding back depreciation is without support." *Chi-Feng Chang* at 537 (emphasis added).

For a C corporation, USCIS considers net income to be the figure shown on Line 28 of the IRS Form 1120. The record before the director closed on June 30, 2008 with the receipt of the petitioner's submissions in response to the director's request for evidence. As of that date, the petitioner's 2007 federal income tax return was not yet due. Therefore, the petitioner's income tax return for 2006 (covering October 1, 2006 to September 30, 2007) is the most recent return available. The petitioner's IRS Form 1120 tax returns demonstrate its net income for the years of the requisite period below:

<u>Year</u>	<u>Net Income</u>
2001	\$10,506
2002	-\$3,615
2003	-\$7,181
2004	\$13,555
2005	\$10,344
2006	-\$37,462

Therefore, for the years 2001 through 2006, the petitioner did not have sufficient net income to pay the proffered wage.<sup>2</sup>

As an alternate means of determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage, USCIS may review the petitioner's net current assets. Net current assets are the difference between the petitioner's current assets and current liabilities.<sup>3</sup> A corporation's year-end current assets are shown on Schedule L, lines 1 through 6. Its year-end current liabilities are shown on lines 16 through 18. If the total of a corporation's end-of-year net current assets and the wages paid to the beneficiary (if any) are equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the petitioner is expected to be able to pay the proffered wage using those net current assets. The petitioner's tax returns demonstrate its net current assets for the required period, as shown in the table below:

<u>Year</u>	<u>Net Current Assets</u>
2001	\$11,099
2002	-\$4,864
2003	-\$2,161
2004	\$10,319
2005	\$22,921
2006	\$20,650

<sup>2</sup> It is noted that the record does not contain the petitioner's 2000 tax return. As the 2000 return would have covered the period from the priority date (April 30, 2001) until September 30, 2001, the petitioner has failed to establish its ability to pay during that time period as well.

<sup>3</sup> According to *Barron's Dictionary of Accounting Terms* 117 (3<sup>rd</sup> ed. 2000), "current assets" consist of items having (in most cases) a life of one year or less, such as cash, marketable securities, inventory and prepaid expenses. "Current liabilities" are obligations payable (in most cases) within one year, such accounts payable, short-term notes payable, and accrued expenses (such as taxes and salaries). *Id.* at 118.

Therefore, for the years 2001 through 2004, the petitioner did not have, or did not submit evidence to establish, sufficient net current assets to pay the proffered wage.

Therefore, from the date the Form ETA 750 was accepted for processing by the USDOL, the petitioner had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage as of the priority date through an examination of wages paid to the beneficiary, or its net income or net current assets.

On appeal, counsel submits a declaration dated December 30, 2008 from [REDACTED] who states that he is the president and co-shareholder/owner of the petitioning corporation and that his spouse is the other co-shareholder. [REDACTED] indicates that his current equity in his house and 12 acres of business land is \$1.8 million and that he had well over \$1 million in equity in the properties (jointly owned with his spouse) since before April 2001. He argues that the business easily had the ability to pay the prevailing wage for the beneficiary since 2001. He also submits copies of the corporation's bank account statements since 2001 along with a summary and indicates that since 2001, the accounts have had average monthly balances of \$42,500. [REDACTED] also submits two [REDACTED] stock certificates showing he and his spouse have equally owned the corporation since April 19, 1985. He forwards other documents relating to the real estate owned by him and his spouse. Counsel argues that the evidence clearly shows that the petitioner had the ability to pay the prevailing wage from 2001 to the present.

The petitioner's reliance on the average monthly balances in the corporation's bank accounts is misplaced. First, bank statements are not among the three types of evidence, enumerated in 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2), required to illustrate a petitioner's ability to pay a proffered wage. While this regulation allows additional material "in appropriate cases," the petitioner in this case has not demonstrated why the documentation specified at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) is inapplicable or otherwise paints an inaccurate financial picture of the petitioner. Second, bank statements show the amount in an account on a given date, and cannot show the sustainable ability to pay a proffered wage. Third, no evidence was submitted to demonstrate that the funds reported on the petitioner's bank statements somehow reflect additional available funds that were not reflected on its tax returns as the cash specified on Schedule L that was considered in determining the corporation's net current assets.

Regarding the owners' real estate property values, a home or land used for the business are not assets that could be easily liquidated. Further, it is unlikely that the corporate owners would sell these significant assets to pay the beneficiary's wage. USCIS may reject a fact stated in the petition that it does not believe that fact to be true. Section 204(b) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1154(b); *see also Anetekhai v. I.N.S.*, 876 F.2d 1218, 1220 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1989); *Lu-Ann Bakery Shop, Inc. v. Nelson*, 705 F. Supp. 7, 10 (D.D.C. 1988); *Systronics Corp. v. INS*, 153 F. Supp. 2d 7, 15 (D.D.C. 2001). Furthermore, the personal assets of petitioner's shareholders may not be used to establish the petitioning corporation's ability to pay the proffered wage. Because a corporation is a separate and distinct legal entity from its owners and shareholders, the assets of its shareholders or of other enterprises or corporations cannot be considered in determining the petitioning corporation's ability to pay the proffered wage. *See Matter of Aphrodite Investments, Ltd.*, 17 I&N Dec. 530 (Comm. 1980). The court in *Sitar v. Ashcroft*, 2003 WL 22203713 (D.Mass. Sept. 18, 2003) stated, "nothing

in the governing regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 204.5, permits [USCIS] to consider the financial resources of individuals or entities who have no legal obligation to pay the wage.”

Additionally, counsel’s assertions on appeal cannot be concluded to outweigh the evidence presented in the tax returns as submitted by the petitioner that demonstrate the petitioner could not pay the proffered wage from the day the Form ETA 750 was accepted for processing by the USDOL.

USCIS may consider the overall magnitude of the petitioner’s business activities in its determination of the petitioner’s ability to pay the proffered wage. *See Matter of Sonegawa, supra.* The petitioning entity in *Sonegawa* had been in business for over 11 years. During the year in which the petition was filed in that case, the petitioner changed business locations and paid rent on both the old and new locations for five months. There were large moving costs and also a period of time when the petitioner was unable to do regular business. The Regional Commissioner determined that the petitioner’s prospects for a resumption of successful business operations were well established. The petitioner was a fashion designer whose work had been featured in *Time* and *Look* magazines. Her clients included Miss Universe, movie actresses, and society matrons. The petitioner’s clients had been included in the lists of the best-dressed California women. The petitioner lectured on fashion design at design and fashion shows throughout the United States and at colleges and universities in California. The Regional Commissioner’s determination in *Sonegawa* was based in part on the petitioner’s sound business reputation and outstanding reputation as a couturiere. As in *Sonegawa*, USCIS may, at its discretion, consider evidence relevant to the petitioner’s financial ability that falls outside of a petitioner’s net income and net current assets. USCIS may consider such factors as the number of years the petitioner has been doing business, the established historical growth of the petitioner’s business, the overall number of employees, the occurrence of any uncharacteristic business expenditures or losses, the petitioner’s reputation within its industry, whether the beneficiary is replacing a former employee or an outsourced service, or any other evidence that USCIS deems relevant to the petitioner’s ability to pay the proffered wage.

In this case, the petitioner has not established an ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage through net income or net current assets. The petitioner also has not established its historical growth, the occurrence of any uncharacteristic business expenditures or losses, or its reputation within its industry. As indicated in the tax returns, the petitioner’s gross receipts have been declining over the years causing the corporation to be only marginally profitable. Therefore, the AAO concludes that the petitioner has not demonstrated adequate financial strength through its net current income, net current assets, or any other means to demonstrate its ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage beginning on the priority date. Thus, assessing the totality of the circumstances in this individual case, it is concluded that the petitioner has not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date.

The burden of proof in these proceedings rests solely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The petitioner has not met that burden.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed.