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U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Administrative Appeals Office (AAO)
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., MS 2090
Washington, DC 20529-2090
**U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services**



B6

Date:

APR 20 2011

Office: NEBRASKA SERVICE CENTER

FILE:

SRC 07 231 51813

IN RE:

Petitioner:

Beneficiary:

Petition: Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as an Other, Unskilled Worker Pursuant to § 203(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)


ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:

INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied by us in reaching our decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. The specific requirements for filing such a request can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$630. Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires that any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you.


Betty Rhew
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The preference visa petition was denied by the Director, Texas Service Center, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be remanded to the director in accordance with the following.

The petitioner is a concrete manufacturer. It seeks to employ the beneficiary permanently in the United States as a first-line supervisor/manager ("Leadman, Precast Concrete"). As required by statute, the petition is accompanied by a Form ETA 750, Application for Alien Employment Certification, approved by the United States Department of Labor (DOL). The director determined that the petitioner failed to establish its ability to pay the proffered wages and noted that the petitioner failed to respond to a request for evidence (RFE).

The record shows that the appeal is properly filed, timely and makes a specific allegation of error in law or fact. The procedural history in this case is documented by the record and incorporated into the decision. Further elaboration of the procedural history will be made only as necessary.

As set forth in the director's September 2, 2008 denial, the issue in this case is whether or not the petitioner has the ability to pay the proffered wage as of the priority date and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence.

Section 203(b)(3)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(iii), provides for the granting of preference classification to other qualified immigrants who are capable, at the time of petitioning for classification under this paragraph, of performing unskilled labor, not of a temporary or seasonal nature, for which qualified workers are not available in the United States.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) states in pertinent part:

Ability of prospective employer to pay wage. Any petition filed by or for an employment-based immigrant which requires an offer of employment must be accompanied by evidence that the prospective United States employer has the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner must demonstrate this ability at the time the priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. Evidence of this ability shall be either in the form of copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements.

In general, 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) requires annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements as evidence of a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. That regulation provides further provides: "In a case where the prospective United States employer employs 100 or more workers, the director *may* accept a statement from a financial officer of the organization which establish the prospective employer's ability to pay the proffered wage." (Emphasis added.)

The petitioner must demonstrate the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, which is the date the Form ETA 750, Application for Alien Employment Certification,

was accepted for processing by any office within the employment system of the DOL. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(d). The petitioner must also demonstrate that, on the priority date, the beneficiary had the qualifications stated on its Form ETA 750, Application for Alien Employment Certification, as certified by the DOL and submitted with the instant petition. *Matter of Wing's Tea House*, 16 I&N Dec. 158 (Act. Reg. Comm. 1977).

Here, the Form ETA 750 was accepted on April 27, 2001. The proffered wage as stated on the Form ETA 750 is \$17.60 per hour (\$36,608 per year). The Form ETA 750 states that the position requires two years experience in the related occupation of "concrete mason."

The AAO conducts appellate review on a *de novo* basis. See *Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004). The AAO considers all pertinent evidence in the record, including new evidence properly submitted upon appeal.¹

As previously noted, the director stated in his decision dated September 2, 2008 that the petitioner failed to respond to a RFE. USCIS records show that a RFE was issued on November 27, 2007 giving the petitioner 12 weeks from the date of the RFE to respond. Thus, the response would be timely if received by February 20, 2008. On appeal, counsel submitted, in part, an affidavit stating that he mailed a response to the director's RFE on December 29, 2007 by first class mail through the U.S. Postal Service. USCIS records show that the record of proceeding was transferred between service centers for processing on December 27, 2007. It is unclear whether the RFE response was received and considered by the director prior to denying the petition. Based upon counsel's affidavit, the transfer of the file two days before counsel states that he submitted his RFE response, and counsel's submission of a copy of his RFE response, it appears that the RFE response was properly submitted and should be considered in the adjudication of the petition. The petition will be remanded to the director for consideration of the petitioner's RFE response.

It is noted that in the petitioner's response to the director's request for evidence, a letter dated December 28, 2007 was submitted by [REDACTED] stating that the petitioner has over 100 employees "at this time." [REDACTED] attached a list of employees to the letter. The priority date in this instance, however, is April 27, 2001. It is not clear that the petitioner had 100 employees in each year from the priority date to establish its ability to pay the proffered wage under 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) without additional proof of its ability to pay. The petitioner has not been afforded an opportunity to address this issue and the petition shall accordingly be remanded to the director for further proceedings.

The petitioner must establish that its job offer to the beneficiary is a realistic one. Because the filing of an ETA 750 labor certification application establishes a priority date for any immigrant petition later based on the ETA 750, the petitioner must establish that the job offer was realistic as of the priority date

¹ The submission of additional evidence on appeal is allowed by the instructions to the Form I-290B, which are incorporated into the regulations by the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(1). The record in the instant case provides no reason to preclude consideration of any of the documents newly submitted on appeal. See *Matter of Soriano*, 19 I&N Dec. 764 (BIA 1988).

and that the offer remained realistic for each year thereafter, until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. The petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is an essential element in evaluating whether a job offer is realistic. *See Matter of Great Wall*, 16 I&N Dec. 142 (Acting Reg. Comm. 1977); *see also* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2). In evaluating whether a job offer is realistic, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) requires the petitioner to demonstrate financial resources sufficient to pay the beneficiary's proffered wages, although the totality of the circumstances affecting the petitioning business will be considered if the evidence warrants such consideration. *See Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (Reg. Comm. 1967).

In determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage during a given period, USCIS will first examine whether the petitioner employed and paid the beneficiary during that period. If the petitioner establishes by documentary evidence that it employed the beneficiary at a salary equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the evidence will be considered *prima facie* proof of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. In the instant case, the petitioner has not established that it employed and paid the beneficiary the full proffered wage from the priority date April 27, 2001.

If the petitioner does not establish that it employed and paid the beneficiary an amount at least equal to the proffered wage during that period, USCIS will next examine the net income figure reflected on the petitioner's federal income tax return, without consideration of depreciation or other expenses. *River Street Donuts, LLC v. Napolitano*, 558 F.3d 111 (1st Cir. 2009); *Taco Especial v. Napolitano*, 696 F. Supp. 2d 873 (E.D. Mich. 2010). Reliance on federal income tax returns as a basis for determining a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is well established by judicial precedent. *Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava*, 632 F. Supp. 1049, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (*citing Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman*, 736 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1984)); *see also Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh*, 719 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Texas 1989); *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); *Ubeda v. Palmer*, 539 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982), *aff'd*, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983). Reliance on the petitioner's gross sales and profits and wage expense is misplaced. Showing that the petitioner's gross sales and profits exceeded the proffered wage is insufficient. Similarly, showing that the petitioner paid wages in excess of the proffered wage is insufficient.

In *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. at 1084, the court held that the Immigration and Naturalization Service, now USCIS, had properly relied on the petitioner's net income figure, as stated on the petitioner's corporate income tax returns, rather than the petitioner's gross income. The court specifically rejected the argument that the Service should have considered income before expenses were paid rather than net income. *See Taco Especial v. Napolitano*, 696 F. Supp. 2d at 881 (gross profits overstate an employer's ability to pay because it ignores other necessary expenses).

With respect to depreciation, the court in *River Street Donuts* noted:

The AAO recognized that a depreciation deduction is a systematic allocation of the cost of a tangible long-term asset and does not represent a specific cash

expenditure during the year claimed. Furthermore, the AAO indicated that the allocation of the depreciation of a long-term asset could be spread out over the years or concentrated into a few depending on the petitioner's choice of accounting and depreciation methods. Nonetheless, the AAO explained that depreciation represents an actual cost of doing business, which could represent either the diminution in value of buildings and equipment or the accumulation of funds necessary to replace perishable equipment and buildings. Accordingly, the AAO stressed that even though amounts deducted for depreciation do not represent current use of cash, neither does it represent amounts available to pay wages.

We find that the AAO has a rational explanation for its policy of not adding depreciation back to net income. Namely, that the amount spent on a long term tangible asset is a "real" expense.

River Street Donuts at 118. “[USCIS] and judicial precedent support the use of tax returns and the net income figures in determining petitioner’s ability to pay. Plaintiffs’ argument that these figures should be revised by the court by adding back depreciation is without support.” *Chi-Feng Chang* at 537 (emphasis added).

If the net income the petitioner demonstrates it had available during that period, if any, added to the wages paid to the beneficiary during the period, if any, do not equal the amount of the proffered wage or more, USCIS will review the petitioner’s assets. The petitioner’s total assets include depreciable assets that the petitioner uses in its business. Those depreciable assets will not be converted to cash during the ordinary course of business and will not, therefore, become funds available to pay the proffered wage. Further, the petitioner’s total assets must be balanced by the petitioner’s liabilities. Otherwise, they cannot properly be considered in the determination of the petitioner’s ability to pay the proffered wage. Rather, USCIS will consider net current assets as an alternative method of demonstrating the ability to pay the proffered wage.

Net current assets are the difference between the petitioner’s current assets and current liabilities.² On Form 1120 and 1120S, a corporation’s year-end current assets are shown on Schedule L, lines 1 through 6 and include cash-on-hand. Its year-end current liabilities are shown on lines 16 through 18. If the total of a corporation’s end-of-year net current assets and the wages paid to the beneficiary (if any) are equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the petitioner is expected to be able to pay the proffered wage using those net current assets.

²According to *Barron’s Dictionary of Accounting Terms* 117 (3rd ed. 2000), “current assets” consist of items having (in most cases) a life of one year or less, such as cash, marketable securities, inventory and prepaid expenses. “Current liabilities” are obligations payable (in most cases) within one year, such accounts payable, short-term notes payable, and accrued expenses (such as taxes and salaries). *Id.* at 118.

If the petitioner submits copies of its federal tax returns in support of its ability to pay the proffered wage, it should submit complete copies of returns for years 2001 through 2010.

On remand, the director may request such additional evidence as he deems necessary in rendering a new decision. That evidence may include, but is not limited to, the following evidence relative to the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage from the 2001 priority date onward:

- Copies of W-2 Forms or Forms 1099 showing wages paid by the petitioner to the beneficiary from 2001 till the present date.
- Proof of wages paid to the beneficiary during any year that the petitioner did not provide him with a W-2 Form or Form 1099. This proof could include, but is not limited to, copies of pay checks (front and back) issued to the beneficiary.
- Copies of the petitioner's federal tax returns with all schedules and attachments for years 2001 through 2010.
- The petitioner must establish that it can pay all of its sponsored workers. USCIS records show that the petitioner has filed at least four other Form I-140 petitions. The petitioner must establish the ability to pay each sponsored worker from each respective priority date onward.

As an additional issue the petitioner must address, Section 203(b)(3)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(iii), provides for the granting of preference classification to other qualified immigrants who are capable, at the time of petitioning for classification under this paragraph, of performing unskilled labor, not of a temporary or seasonal nature, for which qualified workers are not available in the United States.

Section 203(b)(3)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(i), provides for the granting of preference classification to qualified immigrants who are capable, at the time of petitioning for classification under this paragraph, of performing skilled labor (requiring at least two years training or experience), not of a temporary nature, for which qualified workers are not available in the United States.

It is noted that the Form I-140 petition is filed for an unskilled worker, yet the Form ETA 750 requires two years experience in the related occupation of "concrete mason." This brings into question whether the petitioner has filed a petition for the correct classification of worker. If the classification is incorrect, the petition may not be approved.

It is further noted that the experience letter provided by the petitioner to establish that the beneficiary meets the experience requirements of the Form ETA 750 states that the beneficiary worked in Mexico as a construction supervisor from December 1989 to February 1997. The labor certification requires that the sponsored worker have two years experience in the related occupation of "concrete

mason.” The labor certification does not state that the sponsored worker can qualify based upon experience in the position offered. Experience letters must include the name, address, and title of the writer, and a specific description of the duties performed by the beneficiary. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(1) and (1)(3)(ii)(A). The translated experience letter does not provide the name of the company where the beneficiary was employed. The petitioner should have an opportunity to address this issue. The director should determine whether the experience letter provided by the petitioner is sufficient to satisfy the experience requirements of the Form ETA 750 or allow the petitioner an opportunity to submit evidence related to this issue.

In view of the foregoing, the previous decision of the director will be withdrawn. The petition will be remanded to the director for issuance of a new decision commensurate with the directives of this decision.

ORDER: The director’s decision is withdrawn; however, the petition is currently unapprovable for the reasons discussed above, and therefore the AAO may not approve the petition at this time. Because the petition is not approvable, the petition is remanded to the director for issuance of a new, detailed decision which, if adverse to the petitioner, is to be certified to the Administrative Appeals Office for review.